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Preface 
'scientific realists 
have appropriated a most persuasive name for themselves 
(aren't we all scientific, and realists, nowadays?)' 
Bas С. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (1980: 5) 
'Nothing can survive in a vacuum. No one can exist all alone.' Writing 
and completing this treatise on the philosophical doctrine of scientific 
realism would not have been possible without the continuing support and 
guiding help of Ton Derksen. Indeed, to a great extent, and in many re­
spects, the work is a joint venture. 
However, in the past four and a half years I have naturally also bene­
fited from discussions with many others. I would like to mention some of 
the occasions that offered me the opportunity to listen to, and discuss, 
carefully considered lectures and presentations of papers. 
First of all I would like to refer to the third Erasmus Ascension Sympo­
sium, 'Physics and Our View of the World', May, 27-31, 1992. I am 
grateful to the Praemium Erasmianum Foundation to have invited, apart 
from distinguished physicists, such scholarly philosophers of science as 
Eman McMullin, Mary Hesse, Paul Feyerabend, and Bas van Fraassen 
(amongst others), to discuss the topic of scientific realism in front of an 
audience of young philosophers. The 1992 report of the Foundation reads: 
'[The question:] "What precisely is the relationship between physical the­
ories and reality?", is an extremely old problem to which philosophers of 
science have given many different answers over the course of the years. 
There are two main ideas that can be roughly characterized as follows. 
Empiricism holds that the only thing a physical theory does is to present 
an adequate description of phenomena. Scientific realism goes further, 
however, holding that a physical theory also refers to things that, although 
they cannot be directly observed, nevertheless objectively exist in reality. 
Eman McMullin represented the standpoint of scientific realism while Bas 
van Fraassen, the most important contemporary proponent of empiricism, 
defended this view' {Praemium Erasmianum 1992: 53). To my great plea­
sure it was possible, due to the format of the symposium, the limited num-
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ber of participants, and the beautiful location at Oosterbeek (Holland), to 
talk to these philosophers personally and in a very direct way. My con-
versation with van Fraassen has convinced me both of the complexity and 
ingenuity of his new empiricism, but also of the awkwardness of his posi-
tion (Chapter 5). 
Then there were Ton's small-scale conferences and workshops of the 
Post-Graduate School of Philosophical Studies (Nijmegen/Tilburg), organ-
ized with the skilful help of Paul Cortois: the Rom Harre Symposium 
(1992), the Paul M. Churchland Symposium (1992), The Promise of Evol-
utionary Epistemology (1994) (at the Queeste, Leusden (Holland)), and the 
Louvain workshop The Many Problems of Realism (1994) (with the mem-
orable informal closing sessions at cafe 'The Universe'). These confer-
ences and workshops offered me ample opportunity to talk intensively 
with Rom Harre, Paul Churchland, Gerhard Vollmer, Michael Ruse, and 
Peter Lipton. Many of the chapters of the thesis are the direct result of 
these inspiring conversations (Chapters 6, 7 & 8, which are rewritten ver-
sions of published articles; see bibliography). 
Menno Hulswit (University of Nijmegen) not only introduced me to the 
literary world of Jorge Luis Borges (for which I am more than grateful to 
him), but also invited me to participate in a small reading group discussing 
the work of Charles Sanders Peirce. This ultimately resulted in our collec-
tively organized one-day conference CS. Peirce and Contemporary Phil-
osophy of Science (1993) at Tilburg University, and in the editing of a 
collection of original essays on Pierce by Dutch and Flemish philosophers 
of science. I would like to thank Guy Debrock, Auke van Bremen, and 
Hetty Kühne for inspiring polemics on Peirce's work, but especially 
Menno, not only for his many contributions to my thesis (especially chap-
ter 2), but also for showing me what it is to persist in doing philosophy. 
1993 was the year that Eugène Dubois' discovery of the Pithec-
anthropus erectus fossils (1891-1894) was celebrated. The Pithecanthropus 
Centennial took place at the University of Leiden (June 26th to July 1st) 
under the auspices of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Sciences. At this scientific congress I presented a philosophical paper to 
an audience of palaeoanthropologists. Chapter 4 is the fundamentally 
rewritten version of this paper. I would like to thank Raymond Corbey, 
Wil Roebroeks, Barbara Saunders, Bert Theunissen, and Pouwel Slurink, 
for their very helpful references concerning anthropological, palaeo-
anthropological, and archaeological literature, Henk Visser for his com-
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ments to the paper concerning the ontologica! status of relations, and 
especially John R.F. Bower (University of Minnesota-Duluth) for offering 
me the opportunity to present the paper to palaeoanthropologists in the 
first place. It was quite an experience to hear palaeoanthropologists dis-
cussing alternative interpretations of empirical data, especially when, on 
June 29th, D. Tyler and S. Sartono presented their fossil findings from 
Sangiran (Central Java) which included 'the most complete [Homo 
erectus] skull of a [female] who lived on Java between 1.1 to 1.4 million 
years ago', while one of the nestors of paleoanthropology, Philip Tobias 
from South Africa, commented on these spectacular findings. Science at 
work! 
These then were the occasions from which the main arguments of the 
book originated. But it would be naive to think that the details of argu-
ments matter less. Therefore, I would also like to thank the following 
persons: Jaap van Brakel and Igor Douven for their workshops on 
Putnam's internal realism and his 'Models and Reality' argument at 
Utrecht University, Theo Kuipers and Hans Radder for their comments (at 
Uppsala, Sweden) on previous versions of chapter 1, Werner Callebaut for 
discussions on evolutionary epistemology (chapter 6), Monica Meijsing for 
polemics on Churchland's connectionism, and Arno Wouters, Sjoerd 
Zwart, Pieter Huiser, Anne Ruth Mackor, Pamela Kribbe, Chris Buskes, 
and Pouwel Slurink, for sharing the belief that one day a first book is 
finished, though the arguments in it are not compelling. 
Much of the work on this thesis I did at Nijmegen University, which 
has always been a great place to work, especially because of Marjan 
Peters-Broekhoom (assistent-librarian) and Ad Vennix (a true philoso-
pher). When I began working at Tilburg University I received a warm 
welcome. I thank Martin van den Akker, Marja Poulussen, Bert 
Hamminga, René Gude and Robbert van Baaren for making me feel at 
home so quickly, Paul Cobben for lending me his movable airco, and 
many of my 1400 students for admitting that philosophy is fun. I also 
mention José van Grimbergen, Brigitte van Gisbergen, Helmie van 
Roessel, and Marjo van Dinieren. Next to offering me many helping 
hands, especially José, they also made me smile. Anique Lensen, my assis-
tant at Tilburg University, collected many of the items needed to complete 
this study. Without her I would not have been able to finish it on Septem-
ber 1st, 1994, which is in many senses a crucial date to me. My thanks go 
out to her. 
ix 
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Finally, a personal word to Pris. Living together with a philosopher is 
not easy, I guess. Your encouragements were definitely a sine qua non for 
finishing the book. 'You can make the most of the distance, but first you 
need endurance; first you've got to last'. 
When one is immersed, for a considerably long period of time, into 
some specific philosophical problem, one ultimately gets the feeling that 
all other philosophical topics are only important to the extent that, and in 
so far as, they contribute to the solution of your problem. That is the time 
when you must finish your book, make a statement on the current status 
of the main philosophical positions with regard to this problem, offer hints 
at a solution to the long-standing debate between proponents of these 
positions, disengage, and focus your attention to another domain of human 
ignorance. If only this were possible; I fear that it is not. In this book I try 
to tackle the problem of scientific realism, I explore available but failing 
defences of scientific realism, I offer a road to a possibly correct solution 
to the problem, but I am, in the end, unable to work out this solution in 
the necessary details. Another study is needed before 'we are all scientific, 
and realists'. 
Tilburg (the Netherlands), September 1st, 1994. 
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"I really don't know," Severinus said. Two dead men, both with blackened 
fingers. What do you deduce from that?" 
"I deduce nothing: nihil sequitur geminis ex particularibus unquam*. Both 
cases would have to conform to a rule. For example: a substance exists that 
blackens the fingers of those who touch it...." [William of Baskerville remarked]. 
Triumphantly, I completed the syllogism: "... Venantius and Berengar have 
blackened fingers, ergo they touched this substance!" 
"Good Adso," William said, "a pity that your syllogism is not valid, because 
aut semel aut iterum medium generaliter esto^, and in this syllogism the middle 
term never appears as general. A sign that we haven't chosen the major premise 
well. I shouldn't have said that all those who touch a certain substance have black 
fingers, because there could also be people with black fingers who have not 
touched a given substance. I should have said that all those and only all those 
who have black fingers have certainly touched a given substance. Venantius and 
Berengar, etc. With which we would have a Darii, an excellent third mode of the 
first syllogistic figure." 
"Then we have the answer," 1 said, delighted. 
"Alas, Adso, you have too much faith in syllogisms! What we have, once 
again, is simply the question. That is: we have ventured the hypothesis that 
Venantius and Berengar touched the same thing, an unquestionably reasonable 
hypothesis. But when we have imagined a substance that, alone among substances, 
causes this result (which is still to be established), we still don't know what it is 
or where they found it, or why they touched it. And, mind you, we don't even 
know if it's the substance they touched that brought them to their death. Imagine 
a madman who wants to kill all those who touch gold dust. Would we say it's 
gold dust that kills?" 
I was upset. I had always believed logic was a universal weapon, and now I 
realized how its validity depended on the way it was employed. Further, since I 
had been with my master I had become aware, and was to become even more 
aware in the days that followed, that logic could be especially useful when you 
entered it but then left it. 
From Umberto Eco's // Nome della Rosa (1980). 
Nothing ever follows from two particular premises. 
f
 Either once or twice the middle term must be general. 

Introduction: 
The Problem of Scientific Realism 
1. Introduction 
Anima est quodammodo omnia. This is Aquinas' translation of one of 
Aristotle's insights. In a sense, the soul is everything. It may be inter-
preted as an old solution to an old problem: the problem of the epistemic 
status of representations. A thing and a knower are formally identical 
while they differ qua matter or 'materially'. To know, say, an elephant is 
to be identical in form to the elephant. The form 'elephant' is realized in 
two different ways: in matter, and so constituting the elephant, and in the 
human knowing soul, and so constituting a representation of the elephant 
in an human. Formally speaking, then, the (human) soul is everything: it 
represents what is presented to it. In a modem context we may ask our-
selves whether we are ever presented with unobservable entities and 
whether we can represent them faithfully in complex scientific representa-
tions. This is currently the problem of realism in philosophy of science. 
To be sure, there are many different debates on realism: the medieval 
realism-nominalism debate on the status of universale, the modern realism-
idealism debate on the possibility of metaphysics, and the contemporary 
scientific realism - scientific anti-realism debate on the status of scientific 
theories.' It is with this latter debate that we are concerned here. More 
specifically, we will be concerned with scientific theories as representa-
tions and the systematic contemporary question whether we are allowed to 
believe, tentatively and for epistemic reasons, that the complex representa-
tions we have of those parts of the world which are hidden from the 
human senses, are truthful; or rather, whether we may believe, for epis-
temic reasons, that scientific theories, which postulate unobservable 
entities, are indeed - to some extent - representations of the unobservable 
1
 See Bhaskar (1975a), Merrill (1980), Horwich (1982), Putnam (1982), Delaney 
(198S), and Haack (1987) for some classifications of different forms of realism. 
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Although it is common opinion that science penetrates into the real 
unobservable structures of the world by representing these in scientific 
theories, philosophers of science wonder what the status of these represen-
tations is. Do the postulated entities of our successful science, ranging 
from quarks to mental structures, really exist? Do we have epistemic rea-
son to believe in their existence? Are scientific representations merely 
instrumental devices which Homo sapiens uses in coping with the complex 
phenomena of the risky world, or can we confidently assume that the 
instrumental success of these representations warrants the stronger claim 
that the unobservable entities postulated really do exist? 
If we think that we have (epistemic) reasons to believe that our best 
current scientific theories tell us about the underlying, unobservable struc-
tures of the world, we commit ourselves to the doctrine of scientific real-
ism. In our century the debate on scientific realism is rather opaque. For 
instance, Pierre Duhem (1906) argued for an instrumentalism in philos-
ophy of science but also defended the metaphysical claim that physical 
theories reflect the ontological order of unobservables (Duhem 1905).3 At 
2
 Is this not initiating a rather fruitless post-Kantian debate on metaphysics? No-
tice that our problem circumvents this accusation of raising metaphysics from the 
dead (cf. Putnam 1990: 19). We are concerned with a rather straightforward epis-
temologica! question: 'Are we epistemologically warranted in believing that our 
current scientific theories are faithful representations of the unobservable world?'. 
But again, we will of course never escape those philosophers who maintain that 
metaphysics is prior to epistemology; that every epistemologica! question presup-
poses commitment to some metaphysical point of departure; that the plausibility 
of some epistemology is determined by its underlying metaphysics. This question 
concerning the priority of metaphysics or epistemology is not the topic of our 
present inquiry but it seems to me that this question is ill-conceived: every state-
ment on what there is depends for its plausibility on the reasons we have for hold-
ing the statement (tentatively) to be true; but every statement on what reasons we 
have to believe something presupposes something that represents itself or some 
other thing; etc. 
On theories of representations, see also Millikan's illuminating Introduction in 
her White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (1993). 
3
 Cf. also the development of Mary Hesse's position (Hesse 1963, 1974, 1976). 
See MacKinnon (1979: 504-510) for a discussion. 
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first glance, according to their concept of scientific theory, both Moritz 
Schlick and Rudolf Carnap ought to be instrumentalists. But their Wissen-
schaftliche Weltauffassimg (Hahn, Neurath, Carnap 1929) takes them, in 
the case of Schlick, to a (kind of) scientific realist stance, but in the case 
of Carnap, to a position more akin to a scientific anti-realist position. 
Schlick emphasizes that the verification ist theory of meaning does not 
lead to the claim that only the given is real. In his 'Positivismus und 
Realismus' he says: 
Our principle that the truth and the falsity of all statements including those 
concerning the reality of a physical object, can be tested only in the 
"given", and that therefore the meaning of all propositions can be formu-
lated and understood only with the help of the given - this principle is 
mistakenly conceived as if it asserted or presupposed that only the given is 
real (1932/3: 52). 
Schlick obviously thought that we are capable to penetrate the underlying 
structures of the world. In this sense he was certainly a scientific realist! 
Indeed, the reductionism of the Wiener Kreis allows him to exclaim: 
But [how] about science? [Atoms] and electrical fields, or whatever else 
the physicist may speak of, are precisely what houses and trees consist of, 
according to this teaching; the one must therefore be real in the same sense 
as the other. [We] have long since convinced ourselves, in fact, that the 
existence of even the most subtle 'invisible' things postulated by the scien-
tist is verified, in principle, in exactly the same way as the reality of a tree 
ora star (ibid, 50). 
And Schlick concludes that for (consistent) empiricism 'everything is real 
that the nonphilosophizing scientist declares to be real' (ibid., S4).4 
Carnap formulated the anti-metaphysical and pro-scientific attitude of 
the Wiener Kreis in a most ingenious way. As is well-known, Carnap 
distinguished internal questions from external questions. Questions of the. 
existence of certain entities are internal if they are posed within a linguis-
tic framework; they are external if they are 'questions concerning the 
existence or reality of the framework itself. The question whether there 
4
 Cf. Fine's 'natural ontological attitude' (1984a). 
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are really electrons is an internal question within the framework in which 
electrons are postulated and must therefore be, trivially, affirmed. (Carnap 
pays tribute to Quine's maxim that 'to be is to be the value of a bound 
variable')3. Taken as an external question it simply turns out to be, on 
empiricist grounds, a pseudo-question6. However, this leaves the problem 
of the acceptance of frameworks. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontolo-
gy' (1950), Carnap says about this problem: 
we take the position that the introduction of new ways of speaking does 
not need any theoretical justification because it does not imply any asser-
tion of reality. We may still speak (and have done so) of "the acceptance 
of the framework" or "the acceptance of the new entities" since this form 
of speech is customary; but one must keep in mind that these phrases do 
not mean for us anything more than acceptance of the new linguistic forms. 
Above all, they must not be interpreted as referring to an assumption, 
belief, or assertion of "the reality of the entities". There is no such asser-
tion. An alleged statement of the reality of the framework of entities is a 
pseudo-statement without cognitive content. (31) 
Linguistic frameworks can only be judged 'as being more or less expedi-
ent, fruitful, conducive for the aim for which the language is intended'. Is 
Carnap a scientific realist? Did he believe that we have epistemic reasons 
to believe in the existence of electrons? I don't think so. Acceptance of an 
entity is not equal to believing that the entity exists. The reasons for ac-
cepting that electrons exist are not reasons for belief in electrons, for one 
accepts some framework in which electrons function as entities for prag-
matic reasons; and pragmatic reasons cannot be classified as good reasons 
for holding a belief.7 But if Schlick seems to be a scientific realist and 
5
 Quine (1943). See Creath (1990) for the correspondence between Carnap and 
Quine. 
6
 Carnap (1928a), (1935). 
7
 Camap's position is akin to the present position of Hilary Putnam but whereas 
Carnap seems to be the more coherent pragmatist Putnam thinks one can be both 
a metaphysical anti-realist (i.e. internal realist) and a scientific realist. A critical 
discussion on the relation between scientific realism and Putnam's internal realism 
must however be postponed to another study. I will only briefly discuss internal 
realism with regard to connectionist scientific realism in chapter 7, sections 7.6 & 
7.7. 
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Carnap seems to be a scientific anti-realist, while lhcy bolh accept the 
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, we conclude that the debate on scien­
tific realism can be very confusing. 
In 1961, Ernest Nagel argued that the problem of scientific realism is 
indeed nothing but a linguistic confusion over expressions: 'the opposition 
between [instrumentalism] and [realism] is a conflict over preferred modes 
of speech' (1961: 152). As one of his criticisms of the realism-instrumen­
tal ism issue he distinguishes several criteria for reality and existence used 
by realists and instrumentalists. He concludes that his list of criteria: 
is long enough [to] indicate that a proponent of the instrumentalist view of 
theories cannot give an unambiguous answer to the ambiguous question 
whether it is congruous with his position to accept the physical reality of 
such things as atoms and electrons. But the list is also long enough to 
suggest that there are at least some senses of the expressions 'physical real' 
and 'physically exist' in which an ironically minded instrumentalist can 
acknowledge the physical reality or existence of many theoretical entities. 
(1961: 151) 
Sometimes this study of Nagel is interpreted as dismissing the whole de­
bate on scientific realism. Indeed, if we accept Nagel's assertion that (on a 
certain criterion) 'to claim that available empirical evidence is sufficient to 
establish the adequacy of the theory as a leading principle for an extensive 
domain of inquiry [is] only verbally different from saying that the theory 
is so well confirmed by the evidence that the theory can be tentatively be 
accepted as true', there is no debate on scientific realism (ibid, 151). 
However, in the course of our extensive discussion of the case for scien­
tific realism it will become clear that the sophisticated empiricist and 
scientific anti-realist Bas С. van Fraassen (1980) will certainly not accept 
that these two claims are identical. There is a problem of scientific real­
ism. 
That the problem of scientific realism reappeared (if it ever disappear­
ed) with the decline of logical empiricism is made clear in HempePs "The 
Theoretician's Dilemma' (1958). In this article Hempel argued that 'theor­
etical terms' would be unnecessary if 'the sole purpose of a theory [is] to 
establish deductive connections among observation sentences' (222), since, 
if such a connection is indeed established, the connection 'should then be 
replaceable by a law which directly links observational antecedents to 
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observational consequents' (186). However, Hempel (amongst others) 
pointed out the many difficulties with the Standard Conception of Theories 
(or the Received View) and ultimately rejected the claim that theoretical 
terms 'are assigned specific "meanings" with the help of an observational 
vocabulary, or [with] the help of a scientific vocabulary that is antecedent-
ly understood' (1969: 253). Hempel pleads for the recognition that 'theor-
etical formulations cannot be replaced by expressions in terms of observ-
ables only' (1958: 222) and the question of the epistemic status of theor-
etical terms that refer to unobservables raises again. And again, van 
Fraassen, as the contemporary empiricist, will argue that the postulation of 
unobservables is desirable and even advisable, but only on pragmatic 
grounds, never on epistemic grounds. This is incompatible with scientific 
realism. 
In the sixties and seventies of this century we witness a remarkable 
increase in the number of adherents to scientific realism, which is prob-
ably due to the decline of logical empiricism and its allegedly anti-realistic 
tenets. Wilfrid Sellars, Maxwell, Feyerabend, Hesse, Smart, Harre, Boyd, 
Hooker, Salmon, Putnam, Snapere and most of all Ernan McMullin, all 
argued for scientific realism.8 In a way they all used the same argument 
to defend realism: the success of science can only be explained or science 
can only be understood if we assume realism to be true. The true nature of 
this defence of realism is shrouded in philosophical mists and therefore 
liable to criticisms. The argument is most vigorously challenged by van 
Fraassen who recently further developed his constructive empiricism as an 
alternative to scientific realism (1985, 1989, 1991). The aim of the present 
study is therefore twofold: 
(1) to show that van Fraassen's (constructive) empiricism is implausible, 
and 
(2) to offer at least a sketch of the correct argument for scientific real-
ism. 
8
 Sellars (1959), (1965), Maxwell (1962), (1970), Feyerabend (1964), Hesse 
(1963), (1974), Smart (1956), (1963), (1979), Harre (1970), (1972), Boyd (1973), 
Hooker (1974), Salmon (1975), (1978), cf. Putnam's work on the causal theory of 
reference, Shapere (1969), and McMullin (1970), (1978). (See also Mayo (1954) 
and Toulmin (1953, eh. IV)). 
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2. Five problems of scientific realism 
Edward MacKinnon offered an historical development of scientific realism 
in the introduction to The Problem of Scientific Realism (MacKinnon 
1972a).9 I will not discuss this historical reconstruction of the problem. 
Scientific realism is an old philosophical doctrine and the argument for 
scientific realism has not changed that much through time. There is a 
striking passage in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura (I, 265-328) which may 
illustrate how old the problem of scientific realism is. In his laudatory 
poem to Epicures' representation of the world in which he postulates 
'atoms', he wonders: 
Perhaps, however, you are becoming mistrustful of my words because these 
atoms of mine are not visible to the eye. Consider therefore, this further 
evidence of bodies whose existence you must acknowledge though they 
cannot be seen. First, wind [whips] up waves, [and] founders tall ships 
[therefore] there must be invisible particles of wind which sweep the sea 
and land and the clouds in the sky ... Then again, we smell various scents 
of things though we never see them approaching our nostrils. Similarly, 
heat and cold cannot be detected by our eyes, and we do not see sounds. 
Yet all these must be composed of bodies, since they are able to impinge 
on our senses. For nothing can touch or be touched except body. [It] fol-
lows that nature works through the agency of invisible bodies. 
Here we are in fact presented with an argument for 'scientific' realism! If 
we accept the fact that 'nothing can touch or be touched except body' 
only the hypothesis of atoms can explain the various observable phenom-
ena. Therefore, we are allowed to believe the hypothesis. This argument, 
an inference to the only explanation, still is, as we will see, the current 
argument for scientific realism. 
I suggest the following working definition of scientific realism: 
9
 See also his systematic analysis of the problem of scientific realism in that 
introduction (1972b: 39-71). In his 'Scientific Realism: the New Debates' (1979) 
MacKinnon discusses van Fraassen's semantic model of scientific theories. He 
argues that the model is valuable, but that van Fraassen's anti-realism is unten-
able. 
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Scientific Realism := we have good, i.e. epistemic, reason to believe that 
(some of the) current scientific theories tell us (something) about the un­
derlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world. 
Many will ask whether this definition of scientific realism is not much too 
weak to initiate a debate on realism. Is there anybody who seriously wants 
to doubt that the best of our scientific theories tell us about the unobserv­
able structures of the world? Einstein's theory of relativity or Bohr's quan­
tum mechanics, Wegener's plate tectonics or (neo)Darwinism, Watson & 
Crick's double-helix model of DNA or the theory on the behaviour of 
electrons in a solid crystal (transistor): does not everybody hold the tenta­
tive belief that these theories are true? Or, in other words, does not every­
body believe that, although the chance that these theories are completely 
off the mark is real, this chance is only very small? Is there anybody who 
seriously doubts this scientific image of the world? Yes there is. 
In his already classical study The Scientific Image (1980) Bas С. van 
Fraassen (born in Goes in the Dutch province of Zeeland) argues that the 
proper epistemic attitude toward theories postulating unobservables is not 
one of believing in the existence of these unobservables. As an empiricist 
van Fraassen argues that the human physiology is the cause for a much 
more restricted belief in scientific theories. It is evident that the human 
senses have physiological limitations. We can only discern objects of a 
certain size reflecting visible light; objects that produce certain sounds. 
Objects without a smell we do not smell, objects that do not excite the 
nerve ends of the skin we do not feel, and objects or liquids without a 
taste we do not taste. This is all rather trivial. But, although the existence 
of an entity does not depend on its observability to the human eye, the 
observability of the entity does have epistemological consequences to the 
proper epistemic attitude humans take toward theories that postulate unob­
servables. Van Fraassen argues that the proper epistemic attitude toward 
existence-claims concerning unobservables is agnosticism: we do not know 
whether the postulated unobservables exist or do not exist for we cannot 
(by definition) observe them. To accept a scientific theory involves there­
fore as belief only that it is empirically adequate, i.e. the belief that the 
theory is true with regard to the actual phenomena (observables), with 
regard to what does happen, and not, what would happen under different 
circumstances; in short with regard to what is in principle observable to 
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humans. This doctrine is labelled constructive empiricism.'0 
For instance, the proper epistemic attitude toward the claim that elec-
trons exist is the empiricist attitude, which in this case boils down to ag-
nosticism because of the fact that an electron is not observable to the 
naked human eye, while the empiricist attitude toward the claim that the 
moons of Jupiter exist boils down to a realist attitude since the moons of 
Jupiter are observable to humans. 
It is important to realize van Fraassen does not claim that a scientific 
theory is just (or merely) an instrument. To the contrary, he insists on 'a 
literal construal of the language of science': 
If the theory's statements include 'There are electrons' then the theory says 
there are electrons. (1980: 11) 
The theory has a truth value. If there really are electrons the theory is 
true; if not, the theory is false. The crucial point of van Fraassen's empiri-
cism in philosophy of science is that this literal construal of the language 
of science does not imply scientific realism, 'for the insistence relates not 
at all to our epistemic attitude toward theories'. 
For now this summary of constructive empiricism suffices to recognize 
empiricism as a competitor to scientific realism. According to van 
Fraassen we never have epistemic reason enough to believe in the exist-
ence of unobservables postulated in current successful scientific theories. 
But, furthermore, van Fraassen offers his constructive empiricism not only 
as an alternative to realism but also as the more plausible philosophy of 
science of the two. Everything realism can explain constructive empiricism 
can explain better. And so the scientific realist seems to be in need of a 
new argument. 
10
 Van Fraassen offers two reasons for labelling his empiricism 'constructive': (1) 
his intention is to offer a 'constructive alternative to scientific realism', and (2) to 
emphasize that science consists in 'construction rather than discovery' (1980: 5). I 
will here not discuss van Fraassen's semantic view of scientific theory in terms of 
models. The reason for this is that, as van Fraassen himself argues, the semantic 
view leaves open both scientific realism and constructive empiricism (Van 
Fraassen 1987). I will also ignore van Fraassen's assertion that the aim of science 
is to give us theories that are empirically adequate (1980: 12) (cf. nl8, chapter 5). 
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Now, consider again the working definition of scientific realism. Is it 
correct to identify 'good reasons' for holding a belief with 'epistemic 
reasons' for holding a belief? Again, van Fraassen position is very sophis-
ticated when he claims that epistemic reasons are of course good reason 
for belief but so are pragmatic reasons. Van Fraassen offers us a new 
theory of rationality according to which it can be rational to believe in 
unobservables. Another problem of scientific realism seems therefore the 
lack of a realist theory of rationality." Furthermore, the definition uses 
the notion of a scientific theory and therefore presupposes an answer to 
the most persisting question in philosophy of science, namely, 'What 
makes a theory scientific?' Of course, the realist's adversary faces the 
same problem and we will not include this problem for realism in our list 
of problems. Nevertheless, the defence of scientific realism must offer a 
solution to this problem as well. The fact that the agenda of philosophy of 
science has changed as a result of, what Suppe calls, the Weltanschauung 
analyses of Kuhn and Feyerabend, and again as a result of van Fraassen's 
attack on realism, cannot alter the fact that a satisfactory answer to this 
question is still lacking.12 
Finally, there are three further and more traditional arguments that 
undermine scientific realism. Two arguments stem from the historical 
record of science. The history of science illustrates that many of the once 
postulated unobservables do not exist from the point of current science. 
Phlogiston is the paradigm case. In his article 'A Confutation of Conver-
gent Realism' (1981b) Larry Laudan offers us a 'plethora of theories that 
were both successful and (so far as we can judge) nonreferential with 
respect to many of their central explanatory concepts' (231) which he 
simply derives from the history of science; the phlogiston theory of chem-
istry is but one such example. Equally, Laudan offers past examples of 
unsuccessful theories which we now take to be correct: the chemical the-
ory in the eighteenth century, the Proutian theory that the atoms of heavy 
elements are composed of hydrogen atoms, and the Wegenerian theory of 
" With a realist theory of rationality I mean a theory of rationality by which it is 
shown that it is irrational not to believe in the existence of some specified unob-
servable. Miller (1987) argues that this is the kind of defense scientific realism is 
waiting for. I think he is right in this. I also think he does not offer such a theory 
of rationality. (Cf. n20, chapter 5). 
12
 See however Derksen (1992). 
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drifting continents (223). These strings of examples suggest the following 
arguments against scientific realism: (1) the instrumental or empirical 
success of a theory betokens no truth with regard to existential claims 
concerning unobservables and the lack of such success cannot rule out the 
truth of a theory's ontology; (2) if so many successful theories tum out to 
be ontologically false we may induce the conclusion that current success-
ful theories will turn out to be ontologically false as well. This latter argu-
ment is also known as the pessimistic induction from the history of sci-
ence. Putnam once worried about this and wrote: 
the following metainduction becomes overwhelmingly compelling: just as 
no term used in the science of more than fifty (or whatever) years ago 
referred, so it will tum out that no term used now refers (except maybe 
observational terms, if there are such). (1984: 146) 
The realist becomes rather like Damocles who feasted while a sword hung 
by a thread over him. The history of science is the realist's Damoclean 
sword. So, another problem for the realist is to take the sting out of this 
pessimistic induction. 
Finally there is the seemingly insurmountable and truly persistent prob-
lem of the underdetermination of theory by data which was first systemati-
cally discussed by Pierre Duhem (1906). The fundamental problem of 
underdetermination for scientific realism is the contemporary, Duhem ¡an-
Quinean (and Putnamian), claim that at any moment in time there exist 
infinitely many logically incompatible yet empirically equivalent theories 
(Duhem 1908, Quine 1975, Putnam 1977). If this can be argued for, the 
realist is really at a loss. If it means that, given some theory that is believ-
ed to be empirically adequate, infinitely many alternative ontologies of 
unobservables are possible which are equally well supported, there seems 
to be no epistemic reason left to prefer one ontology to another. This 
problem of underdetermination is a severe problem for scientific realism. 
Summarizing the problems of scientific realism we obtain the following 
list: 
1. Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (1980) points to the epistemo-
logica! consequences of the unobservability of postulated entities. The 
realist must argue that, if the observability of entities does have epis-
temologica! consequences, the realist epistemic attitude toward theories 
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postulating unobservables is still warranted; 
2. Van Fraassen (1985, 1989) offers a theory of rationality according to 
which it is rational to believe in the existence of unobservables for 
pragmatic reasons while it is not rational to believe in the existence of 
unobservables for epistemic reasons. The realist must argue that van 
Fraassen's theory of rationality is incoherent, or that, according to 
some plausible realist theory of rationality, it is irrational not to believe 
in unobservables; 
3. The history of science warrants a pessimistic induction: many scientific 
terms turned out not to refer, so why should our current scientific terms 
not befall this bitter fate? Do they refer to unobservables? 
4. The instrumental success of a scientific theory is no argument to be-
lieve in the postulated unobservables (but neither is the lack of such 
success an argument to ¿//¿believe the existence claims concerning un-
observables); 
5. The argument from underdeterm¡nation shows that at any time there 
exist infinitely many logically incompatible yet empirically equivalent 
alternatives to any theory we think to be empirically adequate, so that 
there is no epistemic reason to prefer one ontology to another. 
These arguments make scientific realism look very implausible. Neverthe-
less, in this study I will argue that the case for scientific realism can be 
made; that scientific realism is not so much in need of a new argument but 
that the common yet implicit argument for scientific realism must be 
worked out in detail. It is my aim only to instigate this fleshing out of the 
'Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism'; it will turn out that, despite 
appearances, the defence of scientific realism has only just begun. 
In the remaining section of this introduction I will reconstruct the most 
common defence of scientific realism to date: the allegedly abductive 
defence that takes the form of an inference to the only or best explanation. 
3. The contemporary defence of scientific realism 
We already alluded to the 'inference to the only explanation' defence of 
scientific realism with the citation of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura. It has 
not changed much over time. The argument is still very common. Let us 
reconstruct the argument as it has functioned in the second half of our 
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century. 
In his Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963) J.J.C. Smart objects to 
what he calls phenomenalism. Phenomenalism in philosophy of science is 
the doctrine that statements about electrons, protons etc., can be translated 
into statements about galvanometers, Wilson barrels etc. According to 
phenomenalism electrons and protons are merely logical constructs trom 
macro-objects (1963: 27). Against this phenomenalism Smart wants to 
defend scientific realism. First of all he argues that phenomenalism is not 
compelling. Arguments that are supposed to show that phenomenalism 
follows logically from premises the realist accepts are flawed (specifically 
Craig's theorem). But, though one cannot be logically coerced to accept 
phenomenalism it seems nevertheless a very plausible philosophy of sci­
ence. Why should we not be careful and accept the weaker hypothesis? 
Smart suggests that phenomenalism cannot explain what scientific realism 
explains. Let us quote in full length the crucial passage from his book 
since it sets the stage for a critical examination of the common defence of 
scientific realism. Smart says: 
If the phenomenalist about theoretical entities is correct we must believe in 
a cosmic coincidence. That is, if this is so, statements about electrons, etc. 
are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to predict phenomena 
on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers. They do nothing to 
remove the surprising character of these phenomena. Admittedly the physi­
cist will not be surprised in the sense that he will find these phenomena 
arising in unexpected ways: his theory will have instrumental value in 
preventing this sort of surprise. But, if he is reflective, he ought still to 
find it surprising that the world should be such as to contain these odd and 
ontologically disconnected phenomena, i.e. the phenomena are connected 
only by means of a purely instrumental theory. Is it not odd that the phe­
nomena of the world should be such as to make a purely instrumental 
theory true? On the other hand, if we interpret a theory in a realist way, 
then we have no need for such a cosmic coincidence: it is not surprising 
that galvanometers and cloud chambers behave in the sort of way they do, 
for if there really are electrons, etc., this is just what we should expect. A 
lot of surprising facts no longer seem surprising. Marshall Spector has in 
correspondence drawn my attention to the importance for the problem of 
theoretical entities of CS. Peirce's notion of 'abduction'. (We argue from 
A to В by abduction when we point out that the previously surprising fact 
A is no longer surprising on the assumption of the truth of B.) (Smart 
1963, 39). 
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The argument is an inference to the best explanation. We may choose 
between the explanation that the instrumental success of a theory is a 
cosmic coincidence or that the theory depicts the unobservable structures 
of the world faithfully. The latter is classified as the best. The argument 
may even be considered to be an inference to the only plausible explana-
tion if we reject the former explanation as unsatisfactory. The allusion to 
Peirce characterises the argument as an abductive argument. Let us here 
accept the claim that the argument is abductive. 
In 1959 Wilfrid Sellars suggested something similar in his defence of 
scientific realism. His complex arguments from his Science, Perception, 
and Reality (1963) are initially meant as arguments against what he called 
the 'levels picture' of science13 and perhaps we take his defence of real-
ism out of its context,14 but Sellars seems to employ the same kind of 
argument as his contemporary Smart: 
[Microtheories] not only explain why observational constructs obey induc-
tive generalizations, they explain what, as far as the observational frame-
work is concerned, is a random component in their behaviour, and, in the 
last analysis it is by doing the latter that microtheories establish their char-
acter as indispensable elements of scientific explanation and (as we shall 
see) as knowledge about what really exists. (Sellars 1959: 122) 
This is an abductive 'inference to the only explanation' argument for sci-
entific realism:15 
only if we assume the truth of microtheories can we understand the behav-
iour of observables; since we want to understand the behaviour of observ-
ables we assume that these microtheories tell us about the underlying struc-
ture of the world. 
13
 Putnam called it the 'Received View' and it can be identified as the philosophy 
of science of the logical empiricists (Putnam 1962). The Illinois symposium in 
1969 constitutes the definitive 'refutation' of the 'levels picture' (Suppe 1974). 
14
 I will not discuss Sellars' scientific image of man and will ignore the debate on 
the priority of the scientific or manifest image. But cf. van Brakel (1992) and 
(199?) for a very recent contribution to this discussion. 
15
 The gentle polemics between Sellars and van Fraassen on this point are famil-
iar, cf. Sellars (1976), van Fraassen (1976). 
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Already in 1955 did Ernan McMullin argue for realism along these 
abductive lines (McMullin 1955: 137-50). In his taxonomy of philosophies 
of science from 1970, he attacks Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend for their 
ideas on the relevance and use of the history of science. Subsequently, 
McMullin stresses the role of the history of science in a defence of scien-
tific realism. He emphasizes that 
The realist-instrumentalist debate about the status of theoretical entities 
cannot be resolved [unless] one takes into account the developmental aspect 
of science. And not just in an abstract way, but as specific testimony to 
how theoretical entities have in fact guided research. [The] claim of a 
realist ontology of science is that the only way of explaining why the 
models of science function so successfully in the overcoming of anomalies 
is that they approximate in some way the structure of the object (1970: 63-
4, my italics), 
and he continues: 
The resources that a "good" model seems to possess to meet the unexpected 
challenge from the data of the twilight world that lies over against the 
scientist can only come from its being "fit" for that world. The long-lasting 
fertility of the good theory cannot be accounted for by simply alleging the 
endless creativity of the human mind in the face of anomaly. The model 
guides, and it guides in a way that a summary of the original "data" could 
never do, no matter how "creatively" made, unless there was a resonance 
between model and object, (ibid., 64) 
McMullin illustrates his defence of scientific realism by discussing the 
history of the Bohr-model of the hydrogen atom. The model 'immediately 
accounted for the Ritz 'principle of combination' (1908)' and offered an 
explanation for the Balmer, Lyman, and Paschen series. This model was 
further developed in ways suggested by the model itself and this led to 
successful retrodictions16. This fertility of the Bohr-model offers, accord-
16
 McMullin mentions: (1) the calculation of the Pickering series (ionized helium), 
(2) the amount of splitting of lines and polarizations in the Stark-effect, and (3) a 
relativistic correction of the calculation of energy levels for all the H-lines (1970: 
65-6). 
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ing to McMullin, a strong argument for scientific realism17: 
How is this striking series of successes [of the Bohr-model] to be account­
ed for? What relationship must be postulated between the model and the 
world the physicist is trying to understand? Since the model is the only 
possible mode of access we have to the world, there is no way of answer­
ing this question directly. But if we try to account for the career of the 
model (and the philosopher is forced to account for it somehow), there 
seems to be no satisfactory alternative to saying that the explanatory re­
sources of the model are due to its having revealed, however imperfectly 
and incompletely, an "ontological" structure, i.e., a structure intrinsic to the 
world over against the observer, an anchor point in a network of causal 
relations stretching outward in the world. This is, of course, highly meta­
physical and vague, as any discussion of ontology is forced to be because 
of the obvious limitations of language and proof in this domain. But if 
someone finds such a realism intolerably naive or hopelessly vague, he is 
still faced with the question: from where does the fertility of the model 
come, from the mind of the physicist, from the purely logical resources of 
the original construct - or from the object modeled and partially under­
stood? (1970: 66) 
The argument is (almost) identical to Smart's. It consists of ал inference 
to the only explanation: only if we assume realism to be true can we un­
derstand science. 
In the mid-seventies, Hilary Putnam committed himself to scientific 
realism. In the first volume of his Philosophical Papers Putnam discusses 
mathematical truth. From this paper stems the often quoted Miracle Argu­
ment for scientific realism. Putnam remarks: 
I believe that the positive argument for realism has an analogue in the case 
of mathematical realism. Here too, I believe, realism is the only philosophy 
that doesn't make the success of the science a miracle. (1975, 73) 
With this analogy between mathematical and scientific realism we are 
immediately referred to Putnam's article 'Philosophy of Logic' which is 
included in the same volume. There we find a different argument for real­
ism, namely an indispensability argument ('quantification over mathemat-
17
 Cf. also McMullin (1978), (1984), (1985), (1992). 
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ical entities is indispensable for science' (347)). Putnam's target of attack 
is fictionalism, i.e. the doctrine that although some concepts may be indis­
pensable in the scientific explanation of the behaviour of observables, this 
does not mean that the entities to which these concepts refer really exist 
for they may only be useful fictions {ibid., 350). Putnam claims that 
it is silly to agree that a reason for believing ρ warrants accepting ρ in all 
scientific circumstances, and then to add 'but even so it is not good 
enough". Such a judgment could only be made if one accepted a trans-
scientific method as superior to the scientific method; but this philosopher, 
at least, has no interest in doing that, {ibid, 356)'* 
Translated to the problem of scientific realism: it is silly to agree that a 
reason for believing that electrons exist warrants accepting that electrons 
exist in all scientific circumstances, and then to add 'but even so it is not 
good enough'. We will see that van Fraassen in his constructive empiri­
cism, exploiting the acceptance/belief distinction to the extreme, will not 
completely agree with Putnam. This leaves Putnam the miracle argument 
to argue for scientific realism. This argument is identical to McMullin's, 
Sellars', and Smart's argument. 
The most common contemporary defence of scientific realism, then, is 
an abductive inference to the only plausible explanation. However, con­
fronted with the claim by van Fraassen that constructive empiricism can 
also explain the success of science, the realist must either retreat to an 
inference to the best explanation (assuming realism is the best explanation) 
or argue that constructive empiricism does not explain what it claims to 
explain. 
In chapter 1 I will discuss the very recent proposals by Richard Boyd, 
Alan Musgrave and Paul Thagard to defend scientific realism along the 
18
 Paradoxically, Putnam now argues for a pragmatic or internal realism (Putnam 
1978, 18-33, 123-40, 1983, xvii-xviii, cf. 1981, 54, 1990, vii-xi). Internal realism 
is the claim that truth is ideal justification as opposed to justification-on-present-
evidence. This realism is however a metaphysical anti-realism. The original mir­
acle argument for scientific realism (an inference to the only explanation) has 
never been rejected by Putnam and it seems he thinks that one can be an internal 
scientific realist. The question whether this is a coherent position must be the 
topic of another study (cf. chapter 7 for some preliminary remarks). 
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lines of an inference to the best explanation and offer a critique of this 
defence of scientific realism. Chapter 2 is an intermezzo initiated by 
Smart's allusion to the work of C.S. Peirce that aims at disproving the 
suggestion that the inference to the only explanation defence of scientific 
realism refers to the Peircean notion of abduction or retroduction. Chapter 
3 concentrates on the most serious threat to realism: underdetermination of 
theory by data. The overall conclusion of Part I is that (i) the correct argu-
ment for scientific realism, although unknown, must surely be an inductive 
argument, (ii) that any defence of scientific realism is logically weakened 
by underdetermination, but (iii) that this danger of underdetermination can, 
at least for the time being, be warded off. 
In Part II I will move toward a new critique of van Fraassen's con-
structive empiricism. I will show the awkward nature of this philosophy of 
science by arguing that it is problematic even when confronted with a 
prima facie favourable case from paleoanthropology which seems only to 
be concerned with observables (chapter 4). However, there is a route of 
escape for the empiricist: he may present his theory as a first philosophy 
of science, i.e. a philosophy of science that is fundamentally independent 
from the history and practice of science. 
In Chapter 5 I will argue that this is indeed the option van Fraassen 
takes. However, with this manoeuvre the rationality of existential scientific 
beliefs concerning specified unobservables is forever lost to the empiricist. 
Van Fraassen thinks he can nevertheless maintain that these beliefs are 
rational by presenting a new theory of rationality. It is shown that this 
empiricist theory of rationality contains a category mistake. Hence the 
rationality of these scientific beliefs cannot be saved by the empiricist. 
Therefore, if we are not prepared to give up the rationality of these beliefs 
we must give up constructive empiricism. 
This leaves us in an uncomfortable position. It must be concluded that 
although constructive empiricism is not a viable option in philosophy of 
science, neither is scientific realism, since, apart from our suggestion that 
the correct argument for realism is inductive, we have not uncovered the 
details of this argument. To say that the inductive argument is an infer-
ence to the only explanation is much too vague. In Part III I therefore 
investigate (relatively) new defences of scientific realism that may offer us 
a fleshing out of the inductive argument for realism. In Chapter 6 I tum to 
the evolutionist's 'phylogenetical' attempt to defend scientific realism. In 
Chapter 7 I will discuss Paul Churchland's philosophical connectionism 
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and his version of scientific realism, and finally, I will consider the entity, 
policy and candidate realist's inductive arguments for scientific realism 
(Chapter 8). In the closing chapter I will bring together the main conclu-
sions of the several parts and offer two arguments for scientific realism. 
My conclusion is that there certainly is a case for scientific realism, 
and although I am at present not able to flesh out the inductive argument 
\nfiill detail, the strong argument for scientific realism suggested in chap-
ter 9 is nevertheless detailed enough to see what must be done next if one 
wants to defend scientific realism convincingly. 
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PARTI 
INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 
AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM 

Chapter 1 
Inference to the Best Explanation and Contemporary 
Defences of Scientific Realism: Some Illustrations 
1.1 Introduction 
I will now have a closer look at fairly recent, but more importantly, typi-
cal 'inference to the best explanation' defences of scientific realism, name-
ly those of Richard Boyd, Alan Musgrave and Paul Thagard.1 These 
defences might succeed but only given the legitimacy of inference to the 
best explanation (IBE) as a mode of reasoning. Yet all three philosophers 
fail in their endeavour to provide this legitimacy. I will therefore use their 
attempts as useful and indispensable foils to show how we have learned 
not to argue for scientific realism. 
In section 1.2 I will discuss Boyd's arguments which are meant to 
defend the claim that abduction is a legitimate mode of reasoning. Assum-
ing that an 'inference to the best explanation' argument is an abductive 
argument, Boyd thinks that the 'inference to the best explanation' defence 
of realism is tenable. Yet, although these arguments pave the road to a 
more robust critique of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, in the end 
the arguments do not establish the legitimacy of abduction. Consequently 
Boyd's abductive IBE-defence of scientific realism is still suspect. If 
Boyd's defence of scientific realism would be the only possible defence of 
realism, the realist case would certainly be lost. 
In section 1.3 I therefore tum to Musgrave's 'Ultimate Argument for 
Realism'. Musgrave also characterizes the IBE-argument for realism as an 
abductive argument. Witnessing the many problems with the IBE-argu-
ment for realism, he stresses the need to amend this argument. Unfortu-
nately, he does not succeed in finding a true defence of realism. To 
accomplish his task Musgrave needs criteria of theory evaluation to deter-
mine the best explanation in a sample of available alternative explanations. 
1
 Boyd (1973), (1981), (1984), (1985), (1989), (1990a), (1990b), (1991), (1992), 
Musgrave (1982), (1985), (1988), (1992), Thagard (1978), (1988), (1992). 
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These criteria are not given but, so Musgrave presupposes, they can easily 
be formulated. But even if we assume that these criteria can indeed be 
given, Musgrave's defence is still disappointing, for he argues at most that 
anti-realism is preferable on anti-realist grounds whereas realism is prefer­
able on realist grounds. 
In section 1.4 I will interpret Thagard's computational philosophy of 
science as coming to the realist's rescue. Thagard offers criteria for theory 
evaluation and constructs a new 'inference to the best explanation' defence 
of scientific realism. However, his defence of realism (although very soph­
isticated) ultimately fails since the rule of inference to the best explanation 
can only be (inductively) justified as a pragmatic rule. I therefore con­
clude that neither Boyd, nor Musgrave, nor Thagard succeeds in offering 
us an abductive(-like) IBE-argument for scientific realism. The overall 
conclusion must be that an abductive IBE-defence of scientific realism 
runs into many troubles and has little chance to succeed. If an IBE-
defence has any chance to succeed it must be a probability argument. In 
the closing section I will therefore discuss and reject van Fraassen's recent 
criticism on the characterization of ІВБ as a probability argument. 
1.2 Boyd and the legitimacy of abduction 
In his classic article 'Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology' 
(1981) Richard Boyd formulates realism in the following way: 
[scientific realism is] the doctrine that non-observational terms in scientific 
theories should typically be interpreted as putative referring expressions 
and that when the semantics of theories is understood that way ("realisti­
cally") scientific theories embody the sorts of propositions whose (approxi­
mate) truth can be confirmed by the ordinary experimental methods which 
scientists employ. (1981: 613) 
And he offers the following argument for this doctrine: 
24 
¡BE and Scientific Realism 
No scientifically plausible explanation for the instrumental reliability of 
scientific methods2 can be given without simultaneously arguing for the 
theoretical reliability of these methods (1981: 617, 1984: 58-9, 1989: 6); 
[And] at some specific moment one can only explain the reliability of 
scientific methods by postulating the (approximate) truth of our background 
knowledge (1981: 616, 1989: 9). 
Boyd is eager to stress the fundamental idea behind this argumentation for 
realism. He points to the fact that both the realist and his opponent share 
the belief that the judgment concerning the projectability of patterns in 
observational data by means of scientific theory (Goodman's phrase) and 
the degree of confirmation of a scientific theory, is heavily theory-laden.3 
This common belief, together with the fact that scientific methods are 
indeed instrumentally reliable, offers the realist the opportunity to develop 
an inference to the only explanation: 
if our scientific methods are instrumentally reliable then this reliability (at 
some moment in time) can only be explained by assuming that the back-
ground theories are (approximately) true. 
According to Boyd, it is simply impossible to understand that scientific 
methods, which are heavily theory-laden, are instrumentally reliable unless 
they are also theoretically reliable. If the realist explanation of the instru-
mental reliability of scientific methods is indeed the only explanation, then 
the argument is rather compelling. 
However, we know that van Fraassen has an alternative explanation. 
He can easily reconstruct the realist argument in terms of empirically ade-
quate theories. Since Boyd is concerned with the instrumental reliability of 
scientific methods, i.e. with methods in so far as they contribute to the 
establishment of knowledge about observables, the following alternative 
constructive empiricist explanation is available: 
2
 By the 'instrumental reliability of scientific methods' Boyd means the degree to 
which these methods contribute to establishing instrumental knowledge which is 
knowledge concerning observables (1981: 616). 
3
 Boyd (1984: 57), (1985: 6-7), (1989: 8). 
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if our scientific methods are instrumentally reliable, then this reliability (at 
some moment in time) can be explained by assuming that the background 
theories are empirically adequate. 
Boyd seems to be aware of this and he retreats to an inference to the best 
explanation. In his 'Lex Orandi est Lex Credendi' we find this defence of 
scientific realism: 
scientific realism [is] an empirical hypothesis which is justified because it 
provides the best scientific explanation for various facts about the ways in 
which scientific methods are epistemically successful. (1983: 3, my italics) 
Throughout his work, then, we find the following, according to Boyd ab-
ductive, argument for scientific realism (where i-iii are premises and iv the 
compelling conclusion): 
i. Scientific methodological principles are instrumentally reliable. 
ii. The judgment on the instrumental reliability of scientific methodo-
logical principles is heavily theory-laden. 
iii. Though scientific realism is not the only explanation it is certainly 
the best explanation of the instrumental reliablity of scientific meth-
odological principles. 
iv. Therefore, scientific realism is (very probably) true. 
Now, if we accept this argument we accept, according to Boyd, the legit-
imacy of abduction. So the realist needs some defence of the legitimacy of 
abduction.4 It is interesting to see whether such defence can be given. 
Boyd certainly accepts this 'challenge to abduction' (1984: 65-75). Let us 
see whether Boyd is able to offer a defence of the legitimacy of abductive 
reasoning so as to be able to tentatively accept the best explanation as the 
true one. 
We can distinguish many arguments in Boyd (1984) that are meant to 
justify abduction, but none of these arguments offers the realist any help 
to escape his precarious position. All of these arguments are circular. But 
surprisingly Boyd readily admits this. Against Fine Boyd argues: 
4
 Cf. Laudan (1981b) and Fine (1984a) for criticism on the legitimacy of infer-
ence to the best explanation as an abductive argument for scientific realism. 
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Fine's entirely correct insistence that the issue between empiricists and 
realists is over the legitimacy of abductive inference is a double-edged 
sword. While it facilitates the identification of a sort of circularity in argu-
ments for realism, it also highlights the epistemologica! oddity of consistent 
empiricism. (1984: 67) 
This remark complicates the matter substantially for it causes a shift of 
emphasis in Boyd's arguments for the justification of abduction. Instead of 
arguing for the legitimacy of abduction Boyd in fact argues that 
the empiricist who rejects abductive inferences is probably unable to avoid, 
in any plausible way, the conclusion that the inductive inferences that 
scientists make about observables are unjustified. (1984: 72) 
We wonder why this should be the case. And again, Boyd stresses that the 
judgment of scientists on the instrumental reliability of scientific methodo-
logical principles is heavily theory-dependent and that 'the choice of gen-
eralizations [about observable phenomena] that are seriously advanced and 
the assessment of the evidence for or against them, rest upon theoretical 
inferences that manifest, or depend upon, the sort of abductive inferences 
to which the empiricist objects' (1984: 67). The empiricist might want to 
argue that the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology is not 
abductively justified but rather inductively. The empiricist may use a sec-
ond-order induction: there is inductive reason to suppose that the methods 
by which scientists inductively generalize about observables are instrumen-
tal ly reliable, i.e. that they contribute to the attainment of instrumentally 
reliable knowledge. But, so Boyd argues, this will not do. For the realist 
can argue, again, that this induction is itself dependent upon second-order 
theoretical considerations, etc. (1984: 68-9). 
Recalling the work of Hanson, Kuhn, and Goodman, Boyd argues that 
the instrumental reliability of scientific methods is heavily theory-laden 
and is dependent on abductive theoretical considerations. If the empiricist 
accepts this 'result of recent philosophical and historical scholarship' and 
nevertheless rejects abductive inferences as justificatory, he cannot justify 
the inductive generalizations about observable phenomena. Since the 
empiricist surely wants to hold on to the justification of these generaliz-
ations his position has become inconsistent. 
But is it van Fraassen's empiricism that is under attack here? If so, the 
attack can be easily dismissed. Van Fraassen could accept everything 
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Boyd claims about the scientific measure of projectability of observables 
and assessments of the degree of instrumental reliability and reformulate 
them in terms of inductively warranted belief in the empirical adequacy of 
the background theories which generate the degree of projectability and 
assessment of reliability. Boyd's argument against empiricism amounts to 
his original argument that we must assume the truth of our background 
theories in order to make sense of scientific methodology. But, as we 
noted, van Fraassen can make sense of this methodology by assuming the 
empirical adequacy of these background theories, which is clearly a 
weaker assumption. Furthermore, Boyd has still not offered a defence of 
the legitimacy of abduction. 
In response to Fine's challenge Boyd offers two arguments to justify 
abduction (1984: 72-5). His first argument tells us that abduction is prima 
facie legitimate and is seen as suspect only 'in the light of certain distinct-
ly empiricist epistemologica! considerations' (73). Surely this is no justifi-
cation of abduction. But Boyd continues and argues that if we accept 
abductive reasonings as arguments for scientific realism then it becomes 
clear why the empiricist 'indistinguishability thesis' (the thesis that empiri-
cally equivalent theories are evidentially indistinguishable) is wrong, while 
the truth of empiricism, namely that all knowledge is grounded in experi-
ence, is saved (74). But, though this remark might hearten the realist, the 
argument will not impress the empiricist who thinks the indistinguishabili-
ty thesis to be correct. Nor can it be an argument for the justification of 
abduction since the argument simply presupposes the legitimacy of abduc-
tion. 
The second argument Boyd offers for the legitimate use of abduction in 
his defence of scientific realism concentrates on the holistic explanatory 
strength of realism. One must take the abductive defence of realism to be 
an essential part of a complete epistemology: 
Rather, what is to be assessed are the relative merits of empiricist 
epistemology and the emerging naturalistic epistemology of which the 
realist's conception of scientific knowledge is one of the more distinctive 
and controversial parts. (1984: 75) 
Now, this argument is irrelevant to the justification of abduction since it 
simply presupposes that abduction is legitimate. Yet, the argument does 
suggest a defence of scientific realism. If criteria for theory evaluation that 
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correlate with a high degree of instrumental reliability of our scientific 
theories are available, we might use these criteria at a higher level in order 
to assess 'the relative merits' of competing theories of science. As is well-
known, Thagard defends consilience, simplicity and analogy as plausible 
criteria for theory evaluation. Perhaps the assessment of scientific realism 
and constructive empiricism is possible with the aid of these criteria. We 
might try to determine which of these two philosophies of science can 
account for the instrumental reliability of scientific methodological prin-
ciples best, according to these criteria. If we follow this strategy, could we 
come to a decision in the scientific realism debate, and would this decision 
then be in favour of realism? In order to answer these questions some 
issues have to be settled first: we must argue that there actually are such 
criteria of theory evaluation and secondly, we must argue for some sort of 
naturalism in which it is stated that there is no fundamental difference 
between evaluating scientific theories and theories of science. Only after 
having discussed Thagard's position (section 1.4) will I return to this 
issue. 
We started our investigation of Boyd's argument for scientific realism 
with the observation that his 'inference to the only explanation' argument 
for realism was given up and replaced by an abductive 'inference to the 
best explanation' argument. This seems to me to be a wrong move. 
Boyd's move to argue that realism is the best explanation makes his argu-
ment prima facie more sophisticated than McMullin's, Smart's, and 
Putnam's Miracle Argument (which is an inference to the only explana-
tion). But, given Boyd's claim that inference to the best explanation is an 
abductive inference, the argument for scientific realism now depends on 
the 'justification' of abduction. This justification, as we have seen, is not 
within reach for the realist. We must try to defend realism by an inference 
to the only explanation: we must show that constructive empiricism does 
not explain science; this seems indeed to be a hard task. The 'inference to 
the only explanation' argument for realism given by Boyd is his argument 
that at some specific moment one can only explain the reliability of scien-
tific methods by postulating the (approximate) truth of our background 
knowledge. But the constructive empiricist will argue that he has an alter-
native explanation in terms of empirically adequate background knowl-
edge. 
The general conclusion is that Boyd's argument for realism presup-
poses the legitimacy of abduction as a mode of inference. Boyd argues 
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that realism must tentatively be accepted as true because, if it is so 
accepted, we attain the best explanation for the instrumental reliability of 
scientific principles of methodology. The empiricist can easily undermine 
this argument by pointing out that empiricism explains better this instru-
mental reliability. And so one wonders if there can be a convincing IBE-
argument for realism at all. Yet both Musgrave and Thagard try to argue 
for scientific realism using an 'inference to the best explanation' argu-
ment. In the next section I will discuss Musgrave's defence of realism 
and, what van Fraassen called, the 'Ultimate Argument for Realism' (Van 
Fraassen 1980: 37). 
1.3 Musgrave's Ultimate Argument for Realism 
To Musgrave scientific realism is (again) the doctrine that we (sometimes) 
have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories give us 
knowledge about the unobservable structures of the world. And the Mir-
acle Argument is supposed to be a good argument for this doctrine. The 
argument becomes an abductive 'inference to the best explanation' argu-
ment as soon as there is an alternative non-realist explanation for the suc-
cess of science: after van Fraassen presented his constructive empiricism 
in 1980 the original inference to the only explanation is replaced by an ab-
ductive inference to the best explanation. The plausibility of the abductive 
argument for realism, given alternative explanations, depends therefore on 
the legitimacy of abduction. As was illustrated in the previous section, an 
argument to establish this legitimacy has yet to be found. 
Obviously, if the Miracle Argument for realism is modified to an infer-
ence to the best explanation the argument becomes a deductive fallacy, to 
wit the fallacy of 'affirming the consequent'. Furthermore, as Musgrave 
observes, it is not clear what is meant by 'the success of science'. If suc-
cess means 'predictive success' Laudan's objection that the history of 
science is full of false but predictively successful theories is convincing 
(Laudan 1981b). From the work of Whewell, Duhem and Popper, 
Musgrave concludes that the true success of scientific theories should be 
understood as the novel predictive success. We can now reformulate the 
Miracle Argument for realism thus: 
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realism is the only philosophy of science that does not make the novel 
predictive success of scientific theories a miracle. 
However, not much is gained by this modification, for, if we assume that 
it is reasonable to presume (tentatively) that a theory is true if it has novel 
predictive success, the resulting argument for realism now becomes: 
(1) It is reasonable to tentatively accept a theory as true whenever it 
reveals novel predictive success; 
(2) Scientific realism is the only philosophy of science that does not 
make the novel predictive success of scientific theories a miracle; 
(3) Therefore: It is reasonable to tentatively accept realism as true, 
which is clearly an invalid argument. Only if realism itself is a theory of 
science which shows novel predictive success can we argue along these 
lines. Although Boyd and Putnam have interpreted realism as an empirical 
hypothesis it is not clear what must be understood by the novel predictive 
success of scientific realism. Musgrave proceeds in a different way. 
In his article 'The Ultimate Argument for Realism' (1988) Musgrave 
discusses at length the abductive 'inference to the best explanation' argu-
ment for scientific realism. He offers the original, Peircean, scheme of 
inference to the best explanation: 
(1) There is some fact F; 
(2) Hypothesis H explains F best; 
(3) Therefore, H is true. 
This argument is however elliptical: the argument needs the further prem-
ise that the best explanation of some fact F is necessarily true. This prem-
ise is obviously false and so the conclusion must be that if realism is to be 
defended by an inference to the best explanation the Peircean scheme must 
be amended. Musgrave then proposes the following scheme for inference 
to the best explanation (1988: 239): 
(1) It is reasonable to accept a satisfactory explanation of any fact, 
which is the best available explanation of that fact, as true. 
(2) F is a fact. 
(3) Hypothesis H explains F. 
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(4) Hypothesis H satisfactorily explains F. 
(5) No available competing hypothesis explains F as well as Я does. 
(6) Therefore, it is reasonable to accept H as trae. 
If we substitute for F the novel predictive success and for H scientific 
realism we get Musgrave's 'Ultimate Argument for (Scientific) Realism':5 
(1 ') It is rational to accept as true a satisfactory explanation of some fact 
F that is also the best explanation; 
(2') The novel predictive success of scientific theories is a fact F; 
(3') Realism explains F; 
(4') Realism explains F satisfactorily; 
(5') There is no alternative philosophy of science available that explains 
F as well as realism does. 
(6') Therefore: it is rational to accept realism as the true philosophy of 
science. 
The conclusion follows, but is it true? In my commentary I will concen­
trate on premises (P), (4') and (5'). 
Why should we accept premise (P)? Musgrave offers the following 
consideration: sometimes it is obviously reasonable to accept as true some 
theory even if it later turns out to be false. However, as Musgrave himself 
observes, van Fraassen will claim that it can never be reasonable (on 
epistemic grounds) to presume (however tentatively) that a theory (postu­
lating unobservables) is true (1988: 242). So we may expect that van 
Fraassen will not be convinced by this realist argument for (P); for him it 
will be a case of realist rhetorics. However, the realist can retort that the 
nature of the criteria by which we determine the best explanation from a 
sample of alternatives is such that the abductive 'ampliative' realist step 
from 'qualify as best' to 'tentatively accept as true' is rationally war­
ranted. This takes us to premise (5') in Musgrave's argument. How does 
the realist argue that realism is the philosophy of science that explains the 
novel predictive success of scientific theories best? Can Musgrave give 
criteria by which we evaluate realism as the best theory of science? That 
is, can he give us criteria for assessing the merits of theories of science? 
5
 Musgrave (1988: 239). 
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Does Musgrave imply that these criteria are the same as the criteria scien-
tists actually use for evaluating theories? And are these criteria such that 
the ampi iati ve step from 'qualify as best' and 'accept as true' is epistemic-
ally warranted? Musgrave's comment vis-à-vis these difficulties is as fol-
lows: 
of course, for this argument-scheme to be applicable, the 'explanationist' 
owes us an account of when an explanation is minimally adequate (or 
'satisfactory'), as well as an account of when one satisfactory explanation 
is better than another. But this digression on the inference to the best 
explanation has gone on long enough, so I will simply assume that such 
explanationist accounts can be given (1988: 239). 
Musgrave assumes that these criteria can be given, but he does not make 
clear what these criteria are. One of the most recent and detailed attempts 
to actually formulate these criteria is Thagard's. The discussion of this 
attempt is postponed to section 1.4. 
With regard to premise (4'), note that Musgrave does not make an 
explicit distinction between two levels of theory evaluation, though such a 
distinction is implied by his argument for realism. If the explanation of 
some fact F is a scientific theory, we need criteria of (scientific) theory-
evaluation, but if the explanation is a theory of scientific theories we obvi-
ously need criteria for the evaluation of theories of science. It is far from 
evident that these criteria are identical. On this issue Musgrave is silent. 
However, he does initiate some investigations into the fruitfulness of sci-
entific realism. Musgrave argues that realism is indeed the best explana-
tion of the novel predictive success of scientific theories. It is at least 
better than constructive empiricism: 
the realist invokes the fact that all of a theory's consequences are true, the 
anti-realist invokes the fact that all of its empirical consequences are true. 
The realist explanation is better, one might say, because broadness of scope 
is an explanatory virtue. (1988: 243) 
But as Musgrave himself admits, it is very difficult to test this 'broadness 
of scope' of the realist explanation for the novel predictive success of 
scientific theories independently. A defence of the assertion that 'broad-
ness of scope' is an explanatory virtue that can be taken as a sign for truth 
is still needed. Musgrave sees no other possibility than to admit that 
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explanatory virtues,-need not be evidential virtues. [But] it is that you feel 
cheated by "The world is as if Τ were true", in the same way as you feel 
cheated by "The stars move as if they were fixed on a rotating sphere". 
(1988: 247) 
Here Musgrave expresses the realist gut feeling and the argument, though 
much too rough, is very persuasive. Yet, whatever the gut feeling, the 
enterprise to defend scientific realism by an 'Ultimate Argument' against 
the constructive empiricist has failed. To the empiricist the realist argu­
ments are unconvincing and 'nothing but' rhetorics.6 It is Musgrave him­
self who notices the impasse. He is very much to the point when he 
claims that 
realist explanations of success are preferable on realist grounds; anti-realist 
explanations of success are preferable on anti-realist grounds. (1988: 249) 
The only thing that brings comfort to the realist, according to Musgrave, is 
that the anti-realist thinks one can reasonably doubt the explanatory 
strength of science {loc. cit.), which seems "unrealistic". But even here the 
anti-realist has an answer: the very question is whether science explains in 
a realist or rather in an empiricist way! Only on the realist interpretation 
of science does the empiricist doubt the explanatory strength of science. 
Although Musgrave did not develop an argument against (constructive) 
empiricism, he concludes that, nevertheless, the realist has an argument to 
defend his position on realist grounds. That is, Musgrave concludes that 
the 'Ultimate Argument for Realism' saves the consistency of scientific 
realism. However, as I have argued, Musgrave's argument for realism 
presupposes at least three things: (1) that it is indeed rational to tentatively 
accept (on epistemic grounds) the best explanation as true, (2) that there 
actually are criteria for the evaluation of theories of science, and (3) that, 
on these criteria, scientific realism will be assessed as the best theory of 
science. In the next section we will consider Thagard's computational 
philosophy of science as a fresh attempt to argue for scientific realism 
using an inference to the best explanation. Perhaps Musgrave's exposition 
6
 In chapter 5 it will become clear what resources the empiricist needs to qualify 
these realist arguments as rhetorics. According to the empiricist there are never 
epistemic reasons to believe in unobservables. 
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can be strengthened if the criteria for theory evaluation and acceptance 
proposed by Thagard can be applied to theories of science. 
J. 4 Computational philosophy of science and scientific realism 
Thagard's simulation of the acceptance of scientific theories by scientists 
in an implemented computer programme might be relevant to premise (Γ), 
(4') and (5') of Musgrave's argument. In this section I will discuss 
Thagard's computational philosophy of science. 
In his article 'The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice' (1978) 
Thagard argued that scientists like Darwin, Lavoisier, Huygens and 
Fresnel applied specific criteria for theory evaluation in order to determine 
which scientific theory, concerning some domain, is the best amongst 
available alternatives. The criteria discerned by Thagard are consilience, 
simplicity, and analogy.7 I will not discuss these criteria here and assume 
that the content of these concepts is familiar to the reader.8 Thagard 
7
 See Popper (1982: 22, 56-62), and Watkins (1984: 304-6) for theory evaluation 
in terms of verisimilitude, and Williams (1986) for a criticism. An important 
improvement upon the Popperian strategy of theory evaluation and the concept of 
verisimilitude in relation to the debate of scientific realism can be found in 
Kuipers (1982), (1984), (1994). I will, however, not discuss the structuralist 
approach to scientific theories, since the discussion on realism ought to be inde­
pendent of the nature of scientific theories (cf. Van Fraassen's remarks (1987) on 
the relation between the nature of theories and the debate on scientific realism). 
However, along structuralist lines, Kuipers develops a much more sophisticated 
notion of approximate truth which could be relevant to the discussion on realism 
(Kuipers 1992, cf. Laudan 1981b). Yet, this notion of approximate truth seems to 
be designed to determine scientific progress and convergence to the truth within 
an ontologically conservative series of modifications of one scientific research 
programme and seems not to be applicable in the case of programmes with funda­
mentally different ontologies (cf. discussion between Derksen (1994d) and 
Kuipers (1994)). To what extent this notion of approximate truth can be extended 
to the case of ontologically incompatible theories remains to be seen. 
' For the introduction of the term consilience see Whewell (1840: 65). For a 
description of its content see Thagard (1978: 79, 83-5), where a distinction is 
made between static, conservative dynamic and radical dynamic consilience. For 
the notion of (qualitative) simplicity in terms of ad hoc hypotheses see Thagard 
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claims: 
(a) that these criteria are actually applied by these scientists to argue for 
the excellence of their theory, that is, for the assertion that their 
theory is the best; and 
(b) that the fact that their theory is the best (at that moment, according 
to those criteria), is a decisive argument to accept the theory as 
being true. 
With (b) we run (again) into the rule of inference to the best explanation. 
According to Thagard we witness in the history of science a twofold func­
tion for this rule. On the one hand it embodies a criterion for theory 
evaluation, on the other hand, it functions as a rule of theory acceptance. 
This ambiguity in the notion of 'inference to the best explanation' 
generates much confusion over the defence of scientific realism. I will, as 
McMullin (1985: 222-3) does, distinguish between 'inference from the best 
explanation' and 'inference to the best explanation': 
i. Inference to the best explanation: given certain criteria of evalu­
ation, we infer that an explanation E is the best. 
ii. Inference from the best explanation: we infer from the assertion that 
a certain explanation is the best explanation, to the assertion that the 
(1978: 87); for the notion of analogy Thagard (1978: 90). In his (1988) Thagard 
develops computational versions of these criteria of theory evaluation. These 
computational versions are not unproblematic. For instance, how do we quantify 
the fact that a theory is consilient if it explains facts from different domains 
(Thagard 1988: 89)? The assignment of the 'importances of the facts' which the 
theory explains cannot be quantified, nevertheless Thagard suggests that 
consilience is the weighted number of facts explained. Simplicity is quantified as 
the ratio of the number of facts explained by Τ minus the number of auxiliary 
hypotheses and the number of facts explained by Τ (ibid, 90). Subsequently, the 
explanatory strenght of Τ is defined as the product of simplicity and consilience. 
The criterion of analogy is implemented as the rule of problem solving in the 
program PI: 'look for analogous problems and their solutions' (1988: 202). A 
strict computational version of analogy as a criterion by which we assess explana­
tions is not given (Thagard 1988: 95). 
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explanation can be accepted as true.9 
If we speak of an inference to the best explanation we mean to speak of 
theory evaluation. If we use inference from the best explanation we are 
dealing with a rule of theory acceptance. I will use 'IBE' as an abbrevi­
ation of 'inference from the best explanation', i.e. as a rule of theory 
acceptance. 
According to Thagard IB Б 
accounts for many different aspects of scientific reasoning and applies to 
examples from different sciences, we can say with a hint of circularity that 
the theory of IBE ... is a highly consilient one. (1978: 91) 
But we all know that circularity does not come in degrees. The conclusion 
must therefore be that the legitimacy of IBE cannot be established as a 
rule for scientific reasoning this easy. As Thagard himself notices to argue 
for the 'inference to the best explanation'-model as an acceptable decision-
rule for theory acceptance we need some sort of warrant for IBE. 
So, to accomplish the task of giving this warrant, Thagard needs more 
than just the historical account of criteria for theory evaluation. In his 
Computational Philosophy of Science (1988) he tries to defend the legit­
imacy of IBE in a most ingenious and sophisticated way. This leads to the 
following argument for scientific realism: 
(a) If we can design a programme which simulates the acceptance of 
known successful theories, and if IBE is amongst the rules imple­
mented, then we have reason to suppose that IBE is indeed an effec­
tive rule of theory acceptance; 
(b) We may then conclude that successful science obviously proceeds 
along IBE-lines, and IBE is inductively legitimatized; 
(c) If we can somehow argue from the proven effectivity of IBE to IBE 
as a norm of reasoning, we are able to use IBE in the defence of 
scientific realism, if 
9
 Most authors attach this meaning (ii) to the phrase 'inference to the best 
explanation'. In quoting these authors in this chapter I will change 'to' in 'from' 
while placing it between square brackets. 
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(d) scientific realism is the best theory of science. 
Let us now look for the details. 
In his book Thagard describes an artificial intelligent program in LISP. 
The program is called 'Process of Induction' (PI) and PI is defined as 
a general model of problem solving and inductive inference. (15) 
PI implements rules for formulating and evaluating hypotheses that explain 
certain phenomena. Both 'inference to the best explanation' and 'inference 
from the best explanation' are among these rules (1988: 207-8). Eventual­
ly, PI simulates, or so Thagard maintains, the discovery and evaluation of 
the wave-theory of sound, and it does so with a very meagre input. To the 
realist the importance of successful simulations by PI is not only that the 
output of PI is the best explanation of certain observable phenomena, but 
also that this explanation is accepted as plausible or tentatively accepted 
as true.10 
The simulation by PI of the discovery, evaluation and acceptance of the 
wave-theory of sound is successful." The question then is whether IBE, 
since it is an implemented principle in PI, can be accepted as a legitimate 
mode of reasoning, so that premise (Γ) in Musgrave's 'Ultimate Argu­
ment for Realism' (it is rational to accept as true a satisfactory explanation 
of some fact F that is also the best explanation) can be independently sup­
ported by the successful simulations of known successful scientific the­
ories by PI. To answer this question in the affirmative it must be possible, 
one way or another, to get from the assumed adequate description of IBE 
10
 This can for instance be concluded from the following paragraph: 'when PI 
forms a hypothesis, it does so because it would furnish a possible explanation 
using an established rule. Hence any hypothesis formed has some initial plausibil­
ity ... Additional plausibility is achieved by noticing other evidence that the 
hypothesis explained' (1988: 64). 
11
 See Thagard (1992: 158-160) for the successful simulation on PI of the early 
development of the theory of continental drift. In his (1992) Thagard develops 
also another programme called ECHO, 'a computer programme written in Com­
mon LISP that is a straightforward application of connectionist algorithms to the 
problem of explanatory coherence' (71). This programme however does not alter 
his defence of scientific realism in a substantial way. 
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in PI to IBE as a norm of reasoning, so that IBE can be applied in a 
defence of scientific realism (assuming that realism is the best theory of 
science). 
Thagard is well aware of this fact, and indeed he offers, besides PI, a 
model 'for developing normative conclusions on the basis of descriptive 
studies' (1988: 135). This model is simply called the FDN-model ('From 
the Descriptive to the Normative') and is represented in figure 1. I will 
investigate how this model may establish IBE as a norm of reasoning, 
given Thagard's scheme. We must design IBE as an inferential system. 
This is not that easy, for Thagard only offers vague hints at how this is to 
be done (whereas this step in his argument is of fundamental importance!). 
The normative principles, background psychological and philosophical 
theories, descriptions of inferential practices, and inferential goals form an 
inferential system that is evaluated in the light of the criteria of optimal 
systems, that is, plausibility criteria (1988: 128). And here Thagard states: 
principles 
background 
Incorici 
criteria Гот 
optimal 
systems 
practices 
Fig. 1. FDN: from the descriptive to the normative 
(taken from Thagard 1988: 133) 
Robustness, accommodation, and efficacy are our best current candidates 
for such criteria [for inferential systems] (1988: 133).'2 
12
 Thagard suggests that robustness, accommodation and efficacy are the best 
available criteria (1988: 133). But then one could raise the complicated question: 
what are the criteria of evaluation of the criteria of the evaluation of some infer-
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By 'robustness of a system' Thagard means the property of the system to 
explain a variation of inductive practices by humans (laymen and scien-
tists alike) by applying the (normative) principles.13 The criterion of 
'accommodation' says the system must be able to explain deviations of in-
ductive practices by humans from the (normative) principles. Finally, a 
system is efficient if the principles and practices of the system 'promote 
the satisfaction of the inferential goals'.14 
The success of PI gives one reason to believe that IBE is one of those 
principles which are actually at work in science. To legitimatize IBE as a 
normative rule of reasoning there has to be a relevant FDN-scheme. 
Thagard does not propose such a scheme explicitly but we could construct 
it in the following way, given Thagard's argumentation in 'Justification 
and Truth' (1988, ch.8). (Recall that we need to choose our principles, 
background theories, practices, and goal(s) in such a way that the prin-
ciples, background theories and practices form an inferential IBE-system 
which is evaluated by the proposed criteria for such systems). 
The inferential IBE-system: 
(1) Principles. The principles of the inferential system are simplicity, 
analogy, consilience, and 'inference from the best explanation'. 
(2) Background theories. Here we might use several theories from cog-
nitive psychology and draw from the work of, for instance, Nisbett 
and Ross (1980) or Kunda (1987). 
(3) Practices. Inferential practices. These include those cases from the 
history of science where the best hypothesis is actually accepted as 
ential system (in our case of the IBE-system)? Thagard answers: 'I have advo-
cated these criteria because they seem to be the ones actually used when we set 
out to evaluate inferential practices, and because they seem to promote the estab-
lishment of the sorts of inferential principles we want. In short, the criteria are, in 
an extended sense, robust and efficacious. There is no circularity here of the sort 
that is found in inductive justifications of induction. We have long since aban-
doned the search for a full foundationalist justification of inferential practice.' 
(1988: 131) 
13
 Thagard: 'Robustness in inferential systems is analogous to consilience in the-
ory choice' (128). 
" Thagard (1988: 128-9). 
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true. Some of these cases can be found in Thagard (1978). Yet, 
relevant deviations from the principles must be included as well. 
(4) Goal of the inferential system. Scientific explanation (including pre-
diction). 
(5) Criteria of plausibility of the system. These are the criteria suggested 
by Thagard: robustness, accommodation and efficacy. 
Herewith we have now designed what might be called a legitimatizing 
FDN-scheme for IBE. We can argue that the inferential IBE-system is: 
(a) robust, since IBE explains many of the reasonings deployed by sci-
entists (Thagard 1978: 91, 1988: 142). It can explain many common 
sense reasonings, since IBE appears in these contexts more than 
often (Harman 1973). Finally, the system can explain metaphysical 
arguments (most often to be characterized as transcendental or 
abductive IBE-arguments) (Thagard 1978: 92). 
(b) accommodating: cognitive psychological theories can explain why in 
particular cases scientists and laymen alike deviate from the prin-
ciple of IBE, while the conditions for applying the rule of IBE were 
nevertheless present (cf. Thagard 1988: 143). 
(c) efficient. The system is efficient if it is successful in promoting the 
inferential goal of explanation. We know that it is successful in at 
least one case which is simulated by PI (wave-theory of sound). 
Suppose PI is able to successfully simulate many other actual cases 
from the history of science. We might then conclude from the effi-
cacy of the system that the principle of IBE is legitimate as a rule 
of reasoning. Thagard concludes: 
Since inference [from] the best explanation is structured to maxi-
mize the goal of explanation, including prediction, we can expect it 
to be highly efficacious with respect to those goals, and the histori-
cal record suggests that it has been. Thus the use of inference to the 
best explanation is justified. (1988: 144) 
If Thagard's suggestion is correct we seem to be in a position to support 
Musgrave's 'Ultimate Argument' from computational philosophy of sci-
ence. Firstly, we now have criteria of theory evaluation by which the best 
explanation can be determined from a sample of hypotheses: consilience, 
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simplicity and analogy. Secondly, IBE is (inductively) legitimatized as a 
rule of reasoning by which one is permitted to tentatively accept as true 
the best explanation. However, this latter claim does not follow from the 
evaluation of the inferential IBE-system. Here is why. 
The determination of the correct goal of the inferential system for IBE 
is crucial (1988: 143). The obvious question, of course, is what the goal of 
science is. Unfortunately, here the empiricist and the realist differ in opin-
ion. For the empiricist the aim of science is empirical adequacy (knowl-
edge concerning observables only), for the realist the aim is truth (knowl-
edge concerning observables and unobservables). We might simply assume 
that the goal of science is truth and that therefore the inferential goal pro-
moted by this IBE-system is truth rather than empirical adequacy. But this 
would make the argument for realism question-begging (that is, biased to 
the extent that the debate is already settled beforehand). To remain neutral, 
Thagard is forced to deny that truth is the goal of the inferential IBE-sys-
tem. He opts for explanation as the goal of the inferential IBE-system 
(1988: 144). This makes it possible to legitimatize IBE as a methodologi-
cal rule in science in the light of the triad of proposed criteria of the 
FDN-scheme. Yet, since the justification of IBE is independent of the 
question whether it leads to truth, the argument (thus far) cannot be an 
argument for realism. What has been established is not the inductive justi-
fication of 'inference from the best explanation' (IBE) but merely (a) the 
inductive (or epistemic) justification of 'inference to the best explanation' 
and (b) the pragmatic justification of 'inference from the best explana-
tion'. The goal of the "IBE"-system is simply 'explanation': using the 
criteria of consilience, analogy, and simplicity, and accepting the best 
explanation as true leads to explanatory theories. In other words: if you 
want explanatory theories, use 'inference to the best explanation' and 
'inference from the best explanation'. The inferential IBE-system leads to 
the obvious conclusion that if we accept the best explanation as true we 
will obtain explanatory theories; but will we obtain theories concerning 
unobservables which are probable? 
What has not been established, therefore, is IBE as the normative, 
epistemic, principle of reasoning which says that, given certain criteria, 
one is allowed to accept an explanation as true for epistemic reasons. So 
Thagard has not yet developed an argument for scientific realism, and he 
seems to be aware of this. He continues with a further argument: 
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An argument that inference to the best explanation leads to truth can be 
constructed much more indirectly. If we can show that scientific inquiry in 
general leads to truth, and that inference to the best explanation is a central 
part of that inquiry, then we can conclude that inference to the best expla-
nation leads to truth. The doctrine that scientific inquiry leads to truth is 
called scientific realism. (1988: 144) 
This argument, so it seems, is quite independent from Thagard's computa-
tional philosophy of science. In the next sections I will investigate how 
Thagard develops this argument for scientific realism. 
1.5 Thagard's argument for scientific realism 
The common belief expressed in the work of Boyd, Musgrave and 
Thagard is that scientific realism can be defended by an inference to the 
best explanation. The realist philosophy of science is meant to be and is 
qualified as the best explanation for some phenomena E. The argument for 
realism in its most simple form is: 
i. There are phenomena £ to be explained by a philosophy of science; 
ii. Scientific realism explains E. 
iii. There are alternative philosophies of science that explain E. 
iv. Scientific realism explains E best. 
v. It is rational to tentatively accept scientific realism as true. 
The main problem with this argument, as we have seen, is the legitimacy 
of IBE. And so Thagard proposes the following amended argument for 
scientific realism from his computational philosophy of science (cf. 1988: 
150): 
1. I argued for a methodology for going from the descriptive to the nor-
mative. 
2. I used this methodology to justify the use of inference [from] the best 
explanation in the acceptance of theories. 
3. I [apply] inference [from] the best explanation to defend realism [since 
realism turns out to be the best theory of science]. 
4. Thus realism is acceptable and antirealism is not: we should accept the 
view that scientific theories can be accepted as true. 
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But recall that IBE here is justified as a legitimate rule of scientific rea-
soning because it is robust, accommodating and efficacious with respect to 
goals other than truth (1988: 150). Thagard had to choose a goal other 
than truth in order to prevent a fundamental bias in his argument for real-
ism. But the justification of Thagard's 'inference [from] the best explana-
tion' only leads to the conclusion that, if we accept the best explanation as 
true we will (obviously) obtain explanatory theories, but not true or prob-
able theories. Using the inductively justified 'inference to the best explana-
tion' can only take us to the claim that we accept a scientific theory be-
cause it explains the phenomena best, it can never take us to the claim that 
we believe a scientific theory to be true for the reason that it is the best 
amongst a sample of available alternatives. An inference to the best expla-
nation can never be more than it actually says it is: a principle by which 
we accept an explanation as the best. The argument for realism then be-
comes: 
i. There are phenomena E to be explained by a philosophy of science; 
ii. Scientific realism explains E. 
iii. There are alternative philosophies of science that explain E. 
iv. There are criteria by which we are able to assess the explanatory 
strength of philosophies of science, 
v. Scientific realism explains E best. 
vi. Inference to the best explanation is a legitimate rule of reasoning, 
vii. It is rational to accept scientific realism as the best explanation for 
E. 
But notice that premise (vi) has become rather empty. If 'inference from 
the best explanation' is ultimately not justified as assigning any plausibil-
ity to the explanation that is judged to be the best (but is only efficacious 
in obtaining explanatory theories), how can it be applied in an argument 
for realism? Thagard concludes that his argument for realism does not 
'warrant the conclusion that realism is true, only that it is acceptable in 
some weaker sense' (1988: 150). But in what weaker sense? We are al-
lowed to accept scientific realism as the best explanation. Thagard asserts 
that, since realism is the claim that scientific theories are (approximately) 
true, acceptance of realism means to accept that scientific theories are 
(approximately) true! But what kind of acceptance is this? Thagard only 
inductively justified 'inference to the best explanation' and pragmatically 
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'inference from the best explanation'. So, for pragmatic reasons scientists 
accept the best theories as true, and equally, philosophers of science accept 
for pragmatic reasons the best theory of science as true. On the level of 
scientific theories there are therefore no epistemic reasons to believe in the 
(approximate) truth of these theories. And on the level of theories of 
science, even if realism is the best theory of science we are not epistemic-
ally warranted to assign any plausibility to this realist hypothesis. We are 
not epistemically justified to 'infer from the best explanation', that is, we 
cannot accept scientific realism as true for the reason that it is the best 
explanation. The realist case is still not defended. 
So far the empiricist, notably van Fraassen, will be totally unimpressed 
by Thagard's argument for realism. For it shows that even if, on some cri-
teria, scientific realism is the best explanation for some phenomena E, we 
are still only allowed to act as if OUT best scientific theories are true. The 
explicated legitimatizing FDN-scheme for 'inference from the best expla-
nation' can only justify this rule of inference as a pragmatic rule.15 But 
this means that Thagard's justification of 'inference from the best explana-
tion' only leads to the conclusion that it may be convenient to scientists to 
hold the belief that some of their theories, which are the best according to 
some criteria for theory evaluation, are approximately true.16 This boils 
down to the claim that it is convenient to scientists to act as if their best 
theories are true, that is, as if they tell us about the unobservable struc-
tures of the world. Evidently, the realist is not helped by this conclusion. 
The realist wants to argue that there are epistemic reasons for believing in 
the existence of unobservables postulated in our best scientific theories. 
19
 As will be made clear in chapter 5, van Fraassen claims that pragmatic rules 
may lead to rational beliefs. So, if scientists often use inference to the best expla-
nation as a rule of scientific reasoning this may be taken as evidence that it is a 
pragmatic rule of scientific reasoning, and the rule may lead to rational scientific 
existential beliefs concerning unobservables. (But cf. van Fraassen 1980: 20). 
16
 Thagard seems not to be aware of this. In his (1992) he discusses van 
Fraassen's critique on IBE. He concludes that 'understanding is as important as 
truth, and the pursuit of [understanding] requires the acceptance of explanatory 
theories that may turn out to be false' (96). But again, this is to acknowledge that 
IBE is pragmatically justified, not epistemically. 
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1.6 Naturalism and realism 
Thagard concludes that 'a scientific theory can rationally be accepted, and 
accepted as true, if it can be justified by an inference to the best explana-
tion' (1988: 152). However, since 'inference from the best explanation' is 
only justified as a pragmatic principle of scientific reasoning, a scientific 
theory which postulates unobservables can only be accepted as true on 
pragmatic grounds which is, as we will see, compatible with van 
Fraassen's constructive empiricism. 
There is however another line of argument in the work of Thagard. Al-
though he argued for scientific realism by claiming that scientific realism 
is the best theory of science according to criteria used in the practice of 
science itself, Thagard hinted at a much more indirect argument for real-
ism (cf. quotation at the end of section 1.4). If we could establish that 
'inference to the best explanation' leads to truth, and if scientists actually 
use 'inference to the best explanation' as a fundamental rule of reasoning, 
scientific realism is supported as a theory of science. In this case we do 
not need an inference to the best explanation at the level of theories of 
science in order to argue for realism}1 The problem, of course, is how 
to establish that 'inference to the best explanation' leads to truth. It is van 
Fraassen's contention that we cannot and I will return to this issue in sec-
tion 1.7. 
What we could establish, and here we return to Boyd's naturalistic real-
ism, is 'inference to the best explanation' as an instrumentally reliable 
principle of science, that is, as a principle contributing to scientific knowl-
edge about observables. If scientists often do infer to the best explanation 
as the true explanation and if this contingent fact does lead to a more in-
strumentally successful science, the realist might fall back on the follow-
ing naturalistic argument; an argument that combines the several lines of 
argument for realism presented thus far: 
(1) Science offers us instrumentally reliable knowledge of the world. 
(2) The method of science consists in a conglomerate of theory-depend-
17
 Cf. Fine's objection to realism in his (1984a: 85-6) where the realist is accused 
of violating Hubert's maxim. 
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ent instrumentally reliable principles.18 
(3) Inference from the best explanation is such an instrumentally reli-
able principle of scientific methodology. 
(4) Naturalism in philosophy of science, which proclaims the continuity 
of philosophy and science, is very plausible. 
(5) 'inference from the best explanation' is an elementary epistemologi-
ca! principle tout court [3, 4].19 
(6) It is rational to tentatively accept as true any explanation that is the 
best of a sample of available alternatives given certain criteria for 
theory evaluation [5].20 
18
 Cf. Boyd (1989: 8), for an enumeration of such principles: sampling (Boyd 
1973: 10, 1985: 10) or experimental design (Boyd 1981: 620), entrenchment 
(Boyd 1981: 618) or projectability (1985: 7), the principle of experimental arti-
facts (Boyd 1985: 7), measurement and detection (Boyd 1981: 619), and the 
principle of unity of science (Boyd 1981: 645, 1984: 57-8, 1985: 16-7). See Boyd 
(1981: 617-8, 1984: 57, 1985: 6-13) for arguments that show that these principles 
are heavily theory-laden. 
19
 Recently Ben-Menahem tried to justify 'inference to the best explanation' for 
any non-philosophical domain of knowledge by emphasizing the dynamical char-
acter of the conjunction of the complete set of criteria (by which we assess the 
plausibility of a scientific hypothesis) and our empirical knowledge (1990: 324, 
332). However, he argues that the criteria by which we determine the plausibility 
of philosophical theories are themselves determined by those philosophical the-
ories and that accordingly 'inference to the best explanation' has a different status 
altogether in strictly philosophical contexts (326). Ben-Menahem thinks the realist 
cannot use 'inference to the best explanation' to support his realism because the 
criteria by which the realist determines the plausibility of his doctrine are different 
from the ones his opponent uses (cf. Musgrave's conclusion in his 1988: 249). It 
seems then that Ben-Menahem will object to the naturalistic tum in the argument 
for realism: one cannot simply extrapolate the criteria for the evaluation of scien-
tific theories to the evaluation of theories of science. However, Ben-Menahem 
seems to draw his conclusions from the actual practice of philosophy while natu-
ralism is meant to change that practice. 
20
 Here we will simply assume that these criteria are the criteria proposed by 
Thagard. If naturalism is correct we are able to assess the explanatory strength of 
theories of science by the same criteria we use for the evaluation of scientific 
theories. The criteria Thagard refers to are consilience, simplicity and analogy. 
There is another aspect about the evaluation of theories of science that must be 
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(7) Scientific realism explains the instrumental reliability of methodo-
logical scientific principles that are fundamentally theory-dependent. 
(8) There is no theory of science that explains this fact better than real-
ism does. 
(9) It is rational to tentatively accept scientific realism as the most 
plausible theory of science [6, 2, 7, 8]. 
The empiricist will agree with premises (1) and (2). Premise (3) needs 
support from the actual practice and history of science. Thagard offers the 
case of Darwin as an important example of a scientist who applied 'infer-
ence to the best explanation' as an argument for his theory. Thagard 
claims that 
[Darwin] frequently cites the explanatory merits of the theory of evolution 
by natural selection as evidence of its truth (1988, 142), 
and he claims that many other cases can be found in the history of science 
in which scientists argue for their hypotheses by using 'inference to the 
best explanation' {loc. cit.). So, though van Fraassen would object to 
premise (3), there is some evidence that 'inference to the best explanation' 
mentioned. The evaluation itself must be subjected to certain criteria. Kourany 
(1982) suggests that there is (again) a triad of criteria by which we can assess the 
plausibility of the evaluation-procedure of theories of science. (In a sense 
Kourany's proposal might support Musgrave's and Thagard's attempt to defend 
realism. It can also be seen as an answer to Ben-Mehanem's critique of 'inference 
to the best explanation' at the level of philosophies of science, cf. previous foot-
note). These criteria are practicality, i.e. the procedure 'can plausibly be put into 
effect by the philosophers of science who will be doing the evaluation' (531), 
suitability, i.e. 'it should utilize the empirical data regarding science, and all and 
only those data (within the bounds of the practicality criterion) that are in fact 
relevant to evaluating alternative methodologies, and neutral among (i.e. unbiased 
by any of) those methodologies' (loc. cit.), and completeness, i.e. 'it can plausibly 
be expected to yield a decision regarding the relative merits of those 
methodologies' (532). 
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is indeed a principle of scientific methodology.21 
The sixth premise involves the concept of rationality. In chapter 5 I 
will discuss the empiricist concept of rationality. Anticipating van 
Fraassen's ideas on this issue we will here assume that the empiricist 
accepts this premise: it may indeed be rational to tentatively accept as true 
the best explanation. 
However, the empiricist will simply not accept premise (8). Van 
Fraassen argues that constructive empiricism makes better sense of science 
and scientific practice than realism does.22 
It is now clear that Thagard's defence of scientific realism ultimately 
consists in a rather roundabout way to argue that (according to some cri-
terion) realism is the best theory of science. Indeed, Thagard states: 
Once inference [from] the best explanation is admitted as a legitimate 
mode of inference, response to the ['inference from the best explanation'] 
argument [for realism] must consist in offering alternative explanations 
(1988: 148) 
and he means an alternative explanation for (i) the explanation of techno-
logical application of scientific knowledge, (ii) the accumulation of 
science, and (iii) the high degree of agreement amongst scientists (Thagard 
1988: 147-8). These phenomena, so Thagard claims, are best explained by 
scientific realism. 
Now, van Fraassen offers an alternative, Darwinian, explanation but 
Thagard simply dismisses this alternative, since, according to Thagard, the 
Darwinian model of science is 'seriously defective' (1988: 148-9). But this 
seems to me to be a misunderstanding. Surely van Fraassen does not pro-
liferate himself as an evolutionary epistemologist. He does not invoke a 
discussion on the plausibility of the metaphors used in this epistemology. 
This becomes clear if we realize that what van Fraassen really claims is 
that it is enough to assert the empirical adequacy of our best scientific 
theories to understand what scientists do, what science is about and what 
21
 Van Fraassen (1980: 19-23), but see Fine (1986a: 167-8) on the role van 
Fraassen assigns to 'inference to the best explanation'. Cf. also Devitt (1984: 129-
30) and Harman (1973), (1986), for evidence that 'inference to the best explana-
tion' is a fundamental rule of reasoning. 
22
 Van Fraassen (1980: 73). 
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the proper epistemic attitude of philosophers of science toward scientific 
theories must be. The success of science is no miracle if we accept the 
fact that scientists only adhere to theories 'which in fact latched on to 
actual regularities' (Van Fraassen 1980: 40), or better, if we realize that 
the acceptance of theories only involves as belief the belief in the exist-
ence of observables. 
Van Fraassen does not aim at an evolutionary epistemology. The only 
Popperian metaphors used by van Fraassen are (1) that the world does not 
select amongst scientific theories for explanatory strength, simplicity, etc. 
but only for correspondence with empirical facts, and (2) that our capacity 
to formulate theoretical conjectures is not of such a nature that these con-
jectures are probably true. Van Fraassen states: 
scientific progress results from instruction (analogous to inheritance) and 
selection, and there is no instruction from without nor selection from within 
(1985: 261). 
This does not constitute a 'Darwinistic Turn' in the debate on realism, as 
Thagard insinuates.23 Van Fraassen offers his anti-realistic evolutionary 
analogies only 'to bewitch [the realist's] mind' (1985: 261) and to meet 
the realist demand for explanation. Van Fraassen's evolutionary answer is 
only meant to emphasize that (1) theoretical considerations cannot play 
any role in assessing the degree of confirmation and projectability of a 
theory ('there is no selection from within') and (2) that there cannot be 
indirect empirical evidence (like the explanatory strength) for the truth of 
a theory postulating unobservables ('there is no instruction from 
without').24 
We must not be misled by van Fraassen's evolutionary explanation of 
the success of science. His empiricism must first of all be formulated in 
epistemological terms of acceptance, belief, and epistemic attitudes. We 
see this illustrated in his discussion of the phenomenology of scientific 
activity. Van Fraassen offers alternative explanations of features of scien-
23
 See chapter 6 for a discussion on evolutionary epistemology and the problem of 
scientific realism. 
24
 Cf. Boyd (1985, esp. 24-28) for a realist evolutionary explanation of the success 
of science. 
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tifie activity23 and he would claim that the technological application of 
scientific knowledge, the accumulation of science, and the high degree of 
agreement amongst scientists can be explained in an empiricist vein. 
Indeed, since it is to be expected that the technological application of 
scientific knowledge, the accumulation of science, and the high degree of 
agreement amongst scientists will most importantly concern scientific 
knowledge about observables, it is the empiricist who can explain these 
facts most economically by postulating that the aim of science and scien-
tists is empirically adequate knowledge! 
We are led to the conclusion that the most sophisticated 'inference to 
the best explanation' argument for scientific realism is bereft of convinc-
ing power.26 The only way out would be for the realist, along the line of 
Boyd, to claim that we must already assume the approximate truth of our 
background theories since they determine the degree of confirmation and 
projectability of highly instrumentally successful theories (Boyd 1981). 
Yet, the empiricist, who accepts premise (2) of the naturalistic argument 
for realism, can easily state that if our scientific methods are instrumen-
tally reliable then this reliability (at some moment in time) can be ex-
plained by assuming only that the background theories are empirically 
adequate, and the realist cannot hold his ground. 
As is illustrated by our discussion of the contemporary 'inference to the 
best explanation' defences of realism there are many problems with this 
kind of defence. The following problem seems to be the most urgent one: 
25
 See for instance van Fraassen's discussion in his (1980: 73-7) on Millikan's 
measurement-experiments of the quantity of the elementary electrical charge. See 
chapter 9 for a criticism on this constructive empiricist interpretation. 
26
 Notice that, unfortunately, it does not help to assume that naturalism in philos-
ophy of science is true. The naturalistic realist argues that if 'inference to the best 
explanation' is a reliable scientific principle we can also use it as a principle to 
argue for realism (on the condition that it is the best theory of science). But as the 
sophisticated defence of Thagard shows, the principle of 'inference to the best 
explanation' can at most be justified as a pragmatic principle and this would only 
lead to accepting realism on pragmatic grounds. The realist cannot defend his 
position by making an appeal to naturalism. (Cf. Matheson 1989 in which it is 
argued that the naturalist is not forced to be a realist.) 
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If the 'inference from the best explanation' is epistemically justified and 
used as an argument for realism, realism is possibly not the best explana-
tion of the phenomenology of science: constructive empiricism may well be 
the better philosophy of science. But the principle of 'inference from the 
best explanation' can at most be warranted as a pragmatic principle of 
reasoning and has no epistemic bearing. So even if realism is the best 
theory of science it can only be accepted as plausible on pragmatic 
grounds. 
1.7 Van Fraassen and inference to the best explanation as a probability 
argument 
If Boyd is right in his suggestion that the 'inference to the best explana-
tion' defence of realism is an abductive defence, it is reasonable to con-
clude from the present chapter that abductive defences of realism are im-
plausible and that there is obviously the need for a non-abductive argu-
ment for realism. Is it possible to reconstruct the 'inference to the best 
explanation'-argument for realism as an inductive argument? It seems so. 
Gilbert Harman, who introduced the notion of inference to the best ex-
planation (IBE) in 196S, comes to the conclusion that induction must be 
characterized as inference to the best explanatory account.27 If the oppo-
27
 Harman (1965: 89): 'In making this inference one infers from the fact that a 
certain hypothesis would explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis' (cf. 
1968a, 1968b). Harman argues that induction must be characterized as an infer-
ence. In his major work Thought (1973) Harman concludes that induction is an 
inference to the best total explanatory account (158-51). Later he qualifies this 
conclusion: induction is inference to the best total explanatory account 'which 
adds to and abstracts from antecedent beliefs in the interests of explanatory 
coherence' (1975: 296, 1980a) so that the fundamental feature of induction as 
'inference to the best explanation' becomes the defeasibility of our beliefs. In his 
latest book Change in View (1986) Harman gives the following description of 
'inference to the best explanation': 'one starts by believing e and comes to believe 
e because ofh' (67). 
Harman offers four reasons why induction must be an 'inference to the best 
explanation'. If induction is inference to the best total explanatory account we can 
explain Gettier examples (Gettier 1963, Harman 1965: 91, 1973: 120-1, 171-2, 
1980b). It also offers us the opportunity to avoid the lottery paradox (Kyburg 
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site also holds this would suggest that, indeed, the 'inference to the best 
explanation' defence of scientific realism must not be construed as an 
abductive defence but rather as an inductive defence. Peter Lipton recently 
reexamined the case of inference to the best explanation as a model for 
induction (1991: 58). He states: 
we find inference compelling [because] we are creatures that judge like-
liness on explanatory grounds. This is why Inference to the Best Expla-
nation gives a good account of our actual inferential practices. This does 
not show that all arguments for scientific realism must beg the question, 
but it does suggest that, in the end, the best evidence for scientific realism 
is the scientific evidence, and the structure of the methods scientists use to 
draw their inferences from it. (1991: 184) 
Can inference from the best explanation be interpreted as a scientific in-
ductive mode of inference? 
The defences of realism by Boyd, Musgrave and Thagard all tried to 
argue for realism by using 'inference to the best explanation'. Boyd ar-
gued that this argument is abductive. Musgrave saw reason to amend the 
1961, Harman 1973: 159-60, cf. Derksen 1978 for a different solution to the same 
paradox, and Bogen 1985 for a criticism on Harman), because induction is taken 
to be a 'single step to one conclusion'. Furthermore, the fundamental difference 
between 'argument' and 'reasoning', or better: 'deductive argument' and 'induc-
tive reasoning' is clarified (Harman 1973: 159, 1986: 5, cf. 1975: 273 and 1986: 
5 for two illustrations). And finally, induction as 'inference to the best explana-
tion' accounts for the defeasibility of our beliefs which is inexplainable in terms 
of deductive inference since deductive inference is 'not a process of changing 
beliefs' (Harman 1973, 159). 
There has also been considerable criticisms on the vagueness of the notion of 
inference to the best explanation, for instance Ennis (1968) and Vinci (1982). 
Annis (1982) represents an opinion shared by many when he claims: 'inference to 
the best explanation is still at best only an intuitive notion with no general canons 
to determine when an explanation is the best' (72) (but cf. Thagard's work on 
'inference to the best explanation'). Lipton (1991) notices: 'Inference to the Best 
Explanation has become extremely popular in philosophical circles, discussed by 
many and endorsed by many without discussion by many more ... Yet it still 
remains much more of a slogan than an articulated account of induction' (58). 
(Cf. Day & Kincaid (1994) for a recent discussion). 
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original Peircean IBE-scheme in terms of rationality to avoid the fact that 
'inference to the best explanation' seems to be a logical fallacy. Thagard, 
however, is keen to distinguish between abduction and inference to the 
best explanation and he characterizes inference to the best explanation as a 
species of inductive inference (1988: 75, 1981, 1992: 62). Unfortunately 
he failed to legitimatize 'inference to the best explanation' as an epistemic 
rule of reasoning concerning knowledge of unobservables. 
If only 'inference to the best explanation' were indeed a scientific 
inductive inference, and an inference that leads from probable knowledge 
concerning observables to probable knowledge concerning unobservables, 
then scientific realism would be at once warranted as the most probable 
theory of science. Indeed, scientific realism is best defended by scientific 
inductive arguments that lead from probable knowledge concerning ob-
servables to probable knowledge concerning unobservables. 
So, the realist must be aware of what van Fraassen calls 'the under-
ground epistemology of probabïlisnC}% To argue for scientific realism is 
to argue in terms of probabilities. If inference to the best explanation is to 
be an argument for scientific realism at all it better be a probabilistic argu-
ment! Luckily, many realists, although not always fully aware of this fact, 
mean to argue in a probabilistic manner whenever they use inference to 
the best explanation. However, van Fraassen argues extensively that IBE is 
no coherent ampliative probabilistic compelling rule for change in opinion. 
Let us see how he comes to this conclusion.29 
The problem with IBE is correctly diagnosed by van Fraassen as the 
problem that the sample of theories from which we choose 'the best' is 
historically contingent, that is, the best theory may well be 'the best of a 
bad lot' (1989: 143). What reasons do we have to believe that 'the truth is 
already more likely to be found' in this historically contingent set of the-
28
 In his Laws and Symmetry (1989) van Fraassen says: 'So far I have only 
offered a critique of traditional epistemology with its ampliative rules of induction 
and inference to the best explanation (abduction). But this mainstream does not 
constitute the only tradition in epistemology. The seventeenth century gave us 
besides Descartes and Newton also Blaise Pascal, and from his less systematic 
writings there sprung a stream that in the succeeding three centuries has become a 
powerful river: the underground epistemology of probabilism' (151) 
29
 In his Laws and Symmetry van Fraassen draws the more general conclusion that 
there are no ampliative coherent probabilistic compelling rules at all. 
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ories? If we accept the possibility that innumerable logically and ontologi-
ca! ly incompatible30, yet empirically equivalent alternative theories can 
be made up (if we only would try hard enough), we see that it is very im-
probable that the true theory is a member of the available set of theories. 
Van Fraassen then considers possible realist answers to this problem. 
Since the realist is wise enough to take the probabilistic turn in philosophy 
of science it is natural to expect the realist to device IBE as a probabilistic 
rule for belief revision. Or as van Fraassen formulates it: 
Behind the naive rule of IBE there might lie a recipe for adjusting our 
personal probabilities, in response to new experience, under the aegis of 
explanatory success. (1989: 160) 
Van Fraassen then introduces Bayesian Peter who updates his opinions on 
an alien die according to Bayes's Theorem. Peter is converted by a 
Preacher who preaches the rule of IBE as a compelling rule for belief 
revision. Subsequently, van Fraassen constructs a Dutch Book argument 
and argues that Converted Peter 'has become incoherent - for even by his 
own lights, he is sabotaging himself, that is, although he is "obliged" to 
buy all tickets he is losing money on the constructed bets (van Fraassen 
1989: 160-70). 
How is this attack on scientific realism to be interpreted? Of course van 
Fraassen is right in that, from a strictly logical point of view (Bayesian-
ism), no bonuses ought to be given to hypotheses on the basis of a mea-
sure of explanatory success. This takes us indeed into the domain of the 
incoherent.31 However, one could also argue that, as van Fraassen, Con-
30
 The reason why I would like to include ontologically incompatibility is to rule 
out the relatively "easy" way to construct logically incompatible yet empirically 
equivalent scientific theories to existing theories by using some kind of logical 
algorithm (cf. Laudan & Leplin 1991). 
31
 The constructed example of the alien die is of course open to sceptical worries. 
There are ten possible hypotheses H„ ... H1M for tifie model N=10, assigning a 
factor 1/10, 2/10, ... 1 of bias respectively, and it is therefore easy to calculate the 
priors for each hypothesis, P(H¡)=1/10. But the N=10 model is only one possible 
model for the alien die. Infinitely many more models can be constructed. The 
consequence is that the priors of the hypotheses of the factor of bias are only 
determined within a chosen model. Clearly, the constructive empiricist is forced to 
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verted Peter 'could have figured out beforehand what would happen, if he 
was going to act on his new probabilities'32, and so he would not have 
bought the bets. Rather than showing the incoherence of Peter's belief, it 
is a nice illustration why acceptance is not belief: there is obviously a 
difference between believing a theory and accepting bets.33 What van 
Fraassen's critique does illustrate is that we cannot simply assign a bonus 
probability to some explanatory theory for the reason that it is assessed the 
best, within a Bayesian framework. But perhaps we can develop inference 
to the best/only explanation as a straightforward inductive argument that 
takes us from probable knowledge concerning observables to probable 
knowledge concerning unobservables. In Part III we will look for such an 
argument for scientific realism. 
1.8 Conclusion 
The most sophisticated contemporary 'inference to the best explanation' 
defences of scientific realism fail. As was briefly mentioned in the Intro-
duction it is perhaps due to Smart that this defence of realism took an 
be some sort of relativist or perhaps an 'internal scientific anti-realist', that is, he 
is of the opinion that there are only epistemic reasons to believe in the existence 
of observables within a model. 
32
 Van Fraassen (1989, 169). 
33
 In his 'Belief and the Will' (1984) van Fraassen offers a solution to the prob-
lem of rationality invoked by this Dutch book argument and he postulates his 
principle Reflection ('a form of commitment to stand behind one's own 
commitments'), very loosely formulated: 'My credence that A is true, on the 
supposition that tomorrow I shall accord it credence to degree r, equals r' (1984, 
2S4). This principle itself can be defended, according to van Fraassen, if we 
accept a voluntarist interpretation of epistemic judgment, that is, if we insist on 
the 'element of free choice involved in our decisions' (cf. van Fraassen 1989, 
176-182). Here the matter becomes very complicated and I will only very briefly 
discuss one possible consequence of van Fraassen's voluntarism for the problem 
of scientific realism (cf. chapter 5; cf. for recent criticisms, for instance: Talbott 
(1991), Kvanvig (1994), Green & Hitchcock (1994)). I will here also neglect van 
Fraassen's discussion on the acceptance of statistical theories, the role of expert 
functions, and a minor amendment of his empiricism (cf. his 1989, 197-201). 
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abducttve turn. Many realists, like McMullin, Putnam and Boyd, tried to 
use an inference to the only explanation as an abducttve argument for real-
ism: realism is the only explanation available, therefore, it is rational to 
tentatively accept it as true. Given the alternative anti-realist explanation 
of the success of science, many were tempted to retreat to an abducttve 
inference to the best explanation in order to defend realism: realism is the 
best explanation, therefore, it is rational to tentatively accept it as true. 
In the following chapter, an intermezzo, I will argue that it is wrong to 
see the work of Charles Sanders Peirce as the source of abductive 
defences for scientific realism. Furthermore I will argue that Peirce was 
well aware of the fact that an abductive argument can never be an argu-
ment for the reality of unobservables, and that the correct argument for 
scientific realism must indeed be an inference to the only explanation 
construed as a probability argument. 
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CS. Peirce and Inference to the Only Explanation 
2.1 Introduction 
In the 'inference to the best explanation' defences of scientific realism one 
frequently refers to the notion of abduction as it is found in the work of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, the American pragmaticist (1839-1914). In this 
chapter I will argue that Peirce's notion of abduction has nothing to do 
with these contemporary 'inference to the best explanation' defences of 
scientific realism. Secondly, I will consider Peirce's case for scientific 
realism to see how he himself defended this theory of science. The sug-
gestion made at the end of the previous chapter, namely that realism is 
best defended by inductive arguments from the sciences, will be developed 
somewhat further, and, finally, we will identify underdeterm¡nation of 
theory by data as the main threat to scientific realism. 
2.2 The Peircean notion of abduction in contemporary defences of 
scientific realism 
When we consider the original formulation of abductive reasoning in the 
work of Peirce we find that abduction need not be an invalid logical argu-
ment after all. Peirce offers the following paradigmatic case of abduction: 
Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by 
logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis - which 
is just what abduction is - was subject to certain conditions, namely the 
hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed 
that it would account for the facts of them. The form of inference, there-
fore, is this: 
(1) The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
(2) But if A were true, С would be a matter of course, 
(3) Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
(CP 5.189, cf. 2.51 In, 2.624) 
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Is this an example of logically invalid reasoning? As Haack notices, if we 
transform the form of inference in a deductive manner (B, if A then B, 
therefore A) abduction surely is a fallacy. However, Peirce starts from the 
other end and argues that logic is the classification of arguments, that ab-
duction is clearly an argument, and that, therefore, not all arguments are 
deductive. Next to deductive inferences there are also inductive and even 
abductive inferences (Haack 1977, Peirce CP 8.384). If we accept Peirce's 
opinion here, we could argue that, if 'inference to the best explanation' is 
a clear example of abductive reasoning, it is saved from being a logical 
fallacy. Although one might recast inference to the best explanation in a 
deductive mould by which it becomes a deductive fallacy it is nevertheless 
a logically valid abductive argument. One should notice that the term 'sur-
prising' is of the utmost importance for the abductive validity of the argu-
ment.' 
The abductive defence of scientific realism can analogously be con-
structed along these Peircean lines: 
(1) We are surprised by the fact that science is ¡nstrumentally success-
ful. 
(2) If scientific realism is true we understand why science is instrumen-
tally successful, for if realism is true the instrumental success of 
science would be a matter of course. 
(3) Hence, there is reason to suspect that scientific realism is the true 
theory of science. 
And here we are back at the original abductive argument for scientific 
realism. In my opinion, however, it would be a great historical distortion 
when we reconstruct the abductive defence of scientific realism along 
these Peircean lines. In fact, Peirce had nothing to do with this wrong-
headed way of defending the claim that we have good reasons to believe 
in unobservables. In this section I will try to bear out this assertion. 
Whenever contemporary philosophers of science point to the auton-
omous abductive character of their argument for scientific realism and 
refer to the work of Peirce for an 'abductive logic', the crucial question is 
how the notion of abduction actually developed through the work of 
Peirce and what kind of notion of abduction Peirce himself accepted as 
1
 Cf. Smart's argument for realism, Introduction, section 3. 
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satisfactory. Luckily K..T. Fann (1970) took great pains to map the differ-
ent notions of abduction in Peirce's oeuvre and it is to this study I now 
tum. 
The overall conclusion drawn by Fann is that there are roughly (and 
chronologically) two theories of abduction present in Peirce's papers 
(1970: 9-10). The first theory of abduction (1859-1890) is presented in 
Peirce's 'Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis' (1878). In this paper 
Peirce takes abduction as an inference and he considers all inference as 
evidencing processes, so that abduction (as an autonomous mode of rea-
soning, i.e. not reducible to deduction or induction) must be considered as 
an argumentative, that is evidencing, autonomous mode of reasoning (EP: 
189, cf. Kapitän 1992 for criticism). 
In a later, second, theory of abduction (1891-1914) Peirce employs a 
different notion of 'inference', viz. inference as a methodological pro-
cess.2 Now abduction becomes 'the First Stage of Inquiry', that is, abduc-
tion is the methodological process by which one introduces or suggests a 
hypothesis as a candidate for a true explanation of certain phenomena, and 
the act of suggesting a hypothesis cannot be any evidence for the probabil-
ity of the hypothesis.3 In 1902 Peirce states: 
When after repeated attempts, I finally succeeded in clearing the matter up, 
the fact shone out that probability proper had nothing to do with validity of 
Abduction. (CP 2.101) 
Fann refers in his study to CP 2.7SS and 6.526 and concludes: 
What Peirce succeeded in clearing up is the notion of abduction as the 
reasoning that leads to the adoption of a hypothesis on probation and of 
induction as the testing of the hypothesis ... The distinctions between 
induction and hypothesis [abduction] made in the early period [1859-1890], 
however, are kept, in a modified form, as that between Quantitative and 
Qualitative induction in the later period. (1970: 26-7) 
г
 Dewey: 'As far as I am aware, [Peirce] was the first writer on logic to make 
inquiry and its methods the primary and ultimate source of logical subject matter' 
(Logic, 9nl). Cf. Peirce's remark that 'each step in science has been a lesson in 
logic' (CP. 5.363). 
1
 Ian Hacking speaks of 'the mature Peirce' (1989: 568). 
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The consequences of this interpretation of abduction in the work of 
Peirce for the abductive defence of scientific realism in the form of either 
an inference to the only explanation or an inference to the best explanation 
(in the work of Boyd, Smart, McMullin and others) may now be clear. 
The notion of abduction as suggested by Peirce in his later work has no 
place in contemporary defences of scientific realism, since scientific real­
ism is simply an already formulated philosophical theory! If the process of 
abduction is 'the First Stage of Inquiry', like Peirce ultimately thought, 
then the conclusion follows that the 'Inquiry into Scientific Realism' has 
long since passed this First Inquiry. The contemporary abductive defences 
of scientific realism have the form of an abductive evidencing reasoning 
as distinguished by Peirce in his first, and afterwards revised, theory of 
abduction. The conclusion, based on the scholarly work of Fann and oth­
ers
4
, as regards the contemporary abductive defences of scientific realism 
must be that these are based upon a notion of abduction that was ulti­
mately rejected by Peirce: abductive processes have nothing to do with the 
probability of the hypothesis, they cannot be evidencing processes.5 If we 
try to defend scientific realism by an evidencing abductive argument, and 
if we present this line of argument as stemming from the work of Peirce 
4
 For instance Burks (1946), Thagard (1988), (1981), Shanahan (1986), Hookway 
(1985, ch. 7), Skagestad (1981), Almeder (1980), Rescher (1979). 
5
 However, the abductive scheme can be very tempting as an evidencing argument 
especially in philosophy where the Second and Third Stages of Inquiry (deduction 
and induction respectively, cf. СР. 7.202-7.206) are (principally?) omitted. 
Abductive reasoning is very often conflated with (Kantian) transcendental reason­
ing which may be seen as a typical philosophical style of reasoning. 
As Peirce discovered in his studies on the syllogistic form, abduction appears 
under the name of apagoge in Aristotle's Analytica Priora. Even here we find 
Aristotle struggling with the proper characterisation of abduction. To Aristotle 
apagoge is clearly a dialectic syllogism. But if this is true one expects abduction 
to have a place in the Topica since that is the place where Aristotle discusses this 
kind of syllogisms. The Aristotle scholar Heinrich Maier seems to have an expla­
nation for this curious fact: abduction must be interpreted as a dialectic instrument 
for apodeictic science (1970, 453). Nevertheless, it seems that abduction does not 
have a natural place in the Analytica Priora, but we will leave this question to the 
scholars. 
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we are distorting the history of philosophy.6 
2.3 C.S. Peirce's problem of scientific realism 
The next stage is to see whether Peirce himself tried to defend some form 
of scientific realism and, if so, what kind of argument he used to accom-
plish this defence. Is there a problem of scientific realism in the work of 
Peirce, and if there is such a problem, how does he solve this problem if 
the possibility of an abductive defence of realism is impossible? Perhaps 
we may find some solution to the problem of scientific realism in the 
papers of Peirce. 
In his aforementioned article 'Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis' 
(1878)7 we find, or so I think, a first clue to the way Peirce wants to 
defend some form of scientific realism. In this paper he says: 
When we adopt a certain hypothesis, it is not alone because it will explain 
the observed facts, but also because the contrary hypothesis would probably 
lead to results contrary to those observed. So, when we make an induction, 
it is drawn not only because it explains the distribution of characters in the 
sample, but also because a different rule would probably have led to the 
sample being other than it is. (EP 191) 
61 will not discuss the problem of abduction as a 'logic of discovery' (Hanson 
1965, cf. van Balen (1987, 1988)). One of the more familiar reasons why the 
original scheme of abduction will not do as a logic of discovery is that hypothesis 
A which is supposed to explain the surprising fact C, must already be discovered. 
Yet, in 1965, Hanson assessed the work of Peirce thus: 'Two possible judgments 
snap forth: Peirce still is, as he always was, behind the times in his writings, or 
we are still not ready for much of Peirce's philosophy - no more than were our 
grandparents'. Witnessing the enormous increase in secondary literature on Peirce, 
the new chronological edition of his papers, and the richness of his work, Peirce 
might well become 'a philosopher of the 21st century' (Debrock 1992). 
The importance of the development of the notion of abduction in these papers 
of Peirce cannot be emphasized enough given Peirce's remark that 'If you careful-
ly consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the 
question of the logic of abduction.' (CP. 5.196). 
7
 EP 186-199, CP 2.619-44. 
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The interpretation of this passage seems to be straightforward: Peirce 
thinks we may adopt a certain hypothesis as an explanation for some phe-
nomena after eliminative inductions. To illustrate this claim consider the 
following examples given by Peirce in connection with the early (or 
'wrong') notion of abduction (or 'hypothesis'). 
If we find fossils of fish 'far in the interior of the country' and try to 
seek an explanation of this (surprising) fact we infer to the hypothesis that 
once upon a time in the past the land was covered by sea. Other hypoth-
eses cannot be ruled out beforehand and soon we are faced with a cluster 
of alternative hypotheses. Now we may apply (the rule of) eliminative 
induction and we conclude that successful predictions support the sea-
hypothesis while simultaneously refuting alternative hypotheses. In the 
case of our belief in the existence of Napoleon we witness the same form 
of argument. How do we explain the presence of many documents and 
monuments concerning Napoleon? Peirce: 
Though we have not seen the man, yet we cannot explain what we have 
seen, namely, all these documents and monuments, without supposing that 
he really existed. (EP 189, my italics) 
Although he presents these examples as examples of abduction the con-
siderations Peirce discusses go beyond the mere suggestion or invention of 
the hypothesis, and I conclude that the nowadays well-known idea of eli-
minative induction obviously plays an important role in Peircean theory 
evaluation. The hypothesis on the existence of Napoleon is the only expla-
nation for certain (surprising) phenomena, but the conclusion that it actual-
ly is the only explanation can only be reached or warranted after many eli-
minative inductions. So, relatively early in the work of Peirce we find, 
although confused with the notion of hypothesis or abduction, the concept 
of eliminative induction as a form of induction that leads one to infer the 
only explanation (cf. Bacon 1620, Bk. II). The more general conjecture is 
that many scientific reasonings have the form of an eliminative inductive 
inference to the only explanation. 
As yet we have not come far in characterizing Peirce as a scientific 
realist. Given our working definition of scientific realism: 
we (sometimes) do have good (epistemic) reasons to believe that (some of) 
our best scientific theories tell us something about the unobservable struc-
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tures of the world, 
the examples given by Peirce concern observables so that his conclusion 
does not have any bearing on the issue of scientific realism. Yet scientific 
realism has been an important theme in the writings of Peirce under the 
guise of his more encompassing extreme scholastic realism (Boler 1963). 
Extreme scholastic realism is a label Peirce reserved for his philosophy 
which is as specific as the term pragmaticism. 
Before elaborating on this extreme scholastic realism, and by that on 
his scientific realism, I will first briefly discuss two other characterisations 
of Peirce's scientific realism by two Peirce scholars, to wit Pçter 
Skagestad and Robert Almeder, in order to draw two important conclu-
sions concerning our discussion on the nature of the defence of scientific 
realism. 
2.3.1 Skagestad's interpretation of Peirce's scientific realism 
On the supposition that the instrumentalist is one of the major opponents 
to scientific realism it is interesting to discuss in some detail Peirce's 
attack on Karl Pearson's The Grammar of Science (1900). This attack 
appeared in the form of a book review in 1901 (CP 8.132-155). It is to 
this review that Skagestad (1983) turns (cf. Skagestad 1981). 
Pearson can be characterized as a typical instrumentalist. Skagestad 
summarizes Pearson's instrumentalism as follows: 
on Pearson's view [science] can discover only empirical generalizations; 
theories which explain these generalizations are essentially beyond the 
scope of science, unless they are fully reducible to the empirical generaliz-
ations, thus serving merely as conceptual shorthand for the latter. (1983, 
271-2) 
Skagestad then offers an exposé of Peirce's critique of Pearson's instru-
mentalism. However, I think he misses the fundamental point in Peirce's 
critique. In a long paragraph (CP 8.153) the true objection to Pearson's 
instrumentalism is formulated. To Peirce, the most compromising claim in 
Pearson's admirable work is the suggestion that our scientific theories, and 
therefore the laws of nature, are nothing but figments. Peirce's argument 
against this instrumentalist suggestion reads as follows: 
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the question is whether [law] is among those intellectual objects that are 
destined ultimately to be exploded from the spectacle of the universe, or 
whether, as far as we can judge, it has the force to stand its ground 
indefinitely ... I, for my part, do not believe that any law is perfectly sat-
isfied. If I am right in this, the reality of law is diminished; but it is not 
thereby abolished. But my argument to show that law is reality and not 
figment, - is in the nature independently of any connivance of ours, - is 
that predictions are verified. Nobody will maintain that these verifications 
are chance coincidences. (CP 8.153, my italics). 
Since the argument is directed against the instrumentalist who thinks that 
one only needs empirical generalizations, that is, relations between observ-
ables, we are justified in saying that Peirce defends a brand of scientific 
realism which may be categorized under our working definition of real-
ism.8 The argument for scientific realism seems to be the same argument 
J.J.C. Smart gave in his Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963). But 
more importantly, we notice that the notion of abduction Smart alluded to 
by referring to a remark by Spector plays no role at all in the Peircean 
argument for realism. Realism is not suggested as an hypothesis but rather 
defended by some probability argument. Again, we are confirmed in our 
claim that abductive defences of scientific realism take the discussion on 
realism away from the real issue: is there an inductive argument for scien-
tific realism? 
2.3.2 Almeder's interpretation of Peirce's scientific realism 
Robert Almeder also investigates the question whether Peirce may be char-
acterized as a scientific realist (Almeder 1989, cf his 1983). His point of 
departure is not Peirce's opposition to instramentalism but his theory of 
truth and Peirce's optimism regarding progress in science and scientific 
thought. 
8
 Of course, a scientific realism that defends the reality of scientific laws is differ-
ent from a scientific realism that defends the existence of the entities postulated in 
those laws. I will extensively discuss entity realism as a brand of scientific realism 
in chapter 8. Here I am concerned with the nature of the defence of some form of 
scientific realism. 
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As is well-known, according to Peirce true scientific theories arc the-
ories on which ultimately, in the long run, scientists will reach consensus 
(cf. Peirce's review of Fraser's The Works of George Berkeley 1861, CP 
8.7-38). Some authors interpret Peirce's theory on truth in such a way that 
science will never be in this state and that the phrase 'in the long run' 
indicates some ideal limit that will never be reached. Others however, and 
Almeder is amongst them, suggest that Peirce thought that this final stage 
will actually be reached some day, though only after billions of years and 
not necessarily here on earth nor necessarily by Homo sapiens. This 
Peircean opinion on the convergence of science expresses, so Almeder 
argues, a scientific realism (cf. Laudan 1981b). 
Subsequently, Almeder suggests that Peirce obviously must have 
thought that there is a finite number of non-trivial empirical questions. 
For, if there is an infinite number of such questions, we could never 
answer these questions in a finite time so that the scientific realism of 
Peirce, the actually accomplished convergence, is in jeopardy. The result 
of Almeder's study is a bit disappointing because his strategy of defence 
of scientific realism consists in essence in arguing that the ball is in the 
anti-realist's court and that the burden of proof is on him to show that 
there is an infinite number of non-trivial empirical questions (1989, 362). 
Almeder concludes that, since such proof is still lacking, Peirce's realism, 
at least for the time being, is saved. 
In my opinion however Almeder ignores a crucial element of scientific 
realism, indeed, the element that makes this realism a scientific realism, 
namely the claim that the realist typically and on epistemic grounds 
believes in the inobservable entities postulated by our best scientific the-
ories. The discussion on Peircean scientific realism as presented and dis-
cussed by Almeder is completely neutral with regard to this claim. Does 
the convergence Peirce refers to (if Almeder's interpretation is correct) 
involve theories that postulate only observable entities or does it also 
involve theories that postulate unobservables? Almeder's problem of scien-
tific realism, the problem of the convergence of theories which are ans-
wers to empirical questions, that is questions concerning observables, is, 
however interesting, not a problem that is specifically a realist problem. 
For Peirce to be a scientific realist he should think that he, and others of 
his time, had good reasons to (tentatively) believe that the unobservable 
entities postulated by the best scientific theories of their time really 
existed. 
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2.3.3 Ρ eiree 's extreme scholastic realism 
Looking for an acceptable description of some Peircean form of scientific 
realism we are faced with his complex and idiosyncratic extreme scholas­
tic realism (cf. his 'Lessons from the History of Philosophy' CP 1.15-42). 
Whenever Peirce calls himself a realist he does so to contrast his position 
with a position he himself once held for only a brief moment, namely the 
nominalist one (CP 5.470). In an illuminating study, Susan Haack discuss­
es the importance of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism for contemporary 
philosophy of science and I will accept her reconstruction of this realism 
(Haack 1992). 
According to Peirce there are undeniable facts. These undeniable facts 
can be explained or can be made intelligible if we accept the truth of 
extreme scholastic realism. However, nominalism asserts that it can ex­
plain these facts as well and more economically.9 The very old issue that 
originated with these different philosophical claims, the realism-nomina­
lism debate, is lucidly summarized by Peirce: 
The question ... is whether man, horse, and other names of natural classes, 
correspond with anything which all men, or all horses, really have in com­
mon, independent of our thoughts, or whether these classes are constituted 
simply by a likeness in the way in which our minds are affected by indi­
vidual objects which have in themselves no resemblance. (CP 8.12) 
The first question one raises is: what are these undeniable facts that, 
according to Peirce, can be explained by realism but not by nomina­
lism?10 Haack reconstructs Peirce's argument for his extreme scholastic 
realism along the following lines: 
His view ... was something like this: the science of his day, though thor­
oughly fallible and incomplete, had some success, success partly explicable 
in evolutionary terms; that this constituted grounds for supposing that 
genuine scientific explanation, etc. is possible; that the possibility of genu­
ine science requires the truth of scholastic realism; and that the real gen-
9
 Note the similarity between Peirce's characterisation of the nominalism-realism 
debate and the instrumentalism-scientific realism debate. 
10
 Cf. Peirce's Harvard experiment. 
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erais are those that would figure in the laws - some of them already 
known - which would be accepted in a hypothetical completed science. 
(Haack 1992, 29, my italics)" 
Now, we are not concerned with the details of this argument for extreme 
scholastic realism as opposed to nominalism. We are only interested in the 
question whether Peirce was a scientific realist. Peirce was unmistakably a 
realist with regard to generals: there are real generals, although these gen-
erals have a mode of being which is different from existing (CP 6.349). 
Peirce then was indeed a scientific realist in the sense that he thought that 
it is science that determines which of the postulated generals are real gen-
erals. 
To what extent does the Peircean formulation of scientific realism dif-
fer from the one suggested as the working definition throughout this book? 
In my opinion, not much. Compare 
Contemporary scientific realism: We have good reasons to suppose that our 
best scientific theories tell us something about the unobservable structures 
of reality, 
to 
Peircean scientific realism: We have good reasons to suppose that our best 
scientific theories tell us which of the postulated generals are real generals. 
There is obviously a difference, and to Peirce scholars the difference is of 
course considerable. There is a great difference between 'unobservables' 
and 'generals'. More importantly, the Peircean generals could well be "ob-
servables" only. It is Peirce's well-known pragmatism that could throw 
some doubt upon my characterisation of Peirce's realism as containing 
some form of scientific realism. Indeed, some will object and argue that 
science might well infer to the conclusion that to understand the world and 
to understand the fact that predictions are verified, it is enough to believe 
in the empirical adequacy of scientific theories. Might science not con-
clude that in the true laws of nature the only real generals postulated are 
11
 Haack speaks of 'real generals that figure in the laws of a completed science'. 
To Peirce however laws themselves are also generals. 
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natural classes of individual observable objects? Perhaps so, but if one is 
of the opinion, as Peirce was, that these generals are real, not merely 
names of classes, and if it is science that determines which generals are 
real, one is obviously a scientific realist. But, admittedly, this Peircean 
scientific realism is different from contemporary scientific realism. 
Yet, as the famous example of the diamond shows, Peirce was obvious-
ly of the opinion that scientists do have good (epistemic) reason to sup-
pose that there are unobservables like molecules to account for the hard-
ness of the diamond by postulating the 'high polymerization of the mole-
cule' (CP 5.457). So it is to be expected that there are laws of nature of 
which the real generals postulated are natural classes of individual inob-
servable objects. It is the history of science that offers an inductive argu-
ment to believe that the postulation of unobservables is indispensable to 
real science. Peirce was certainly a scientific realist in the modem sense. 
2.4 Conclusion: Peirce, realism, and inference to the only explanation 
The identification of Peircean extreme scholastic realism with contempor-
ary scientific realism is admittedly problematic. Yet within this philosophi-
cally broad doctrine of scholastic realism Peirce evidently held on to 
scientific realism. According to him it is not to be expected that all gen-
erals postulated by our best scientific theories are natural classes of indi-
vidual observable objects. 
How did Peirce argue for his scientific realism? Against the instrumen-
talist Peirce used the same form of argument as his successors Smart, 
Putnam, Boyd and McMullin do. In each case it has the form of an 'infer-
ence to the only explanation'. This inference to the only explanation is not 
an abductive argument but rather an inductive argument, and more specifi-
cally it consists of the eliminative inductive arguments scientists them-
selves give for their hypotheses (postulating unobservables). On the level 
of scientific theories Peirce offers the strength of these scientific elimina-
tive inductions to argue that if scientists hold theories that postulate unob-
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servables their tentative belief in the truth of the theories is warranted.'2 
Unfortunately, the strength of (the rule of) scientific el im ¡native induction 
is seriously undermined by the phenomenon of underdeterm i nation of the-
ory by data. 
At the end of chapter 1, I suggested that contemporary scientific real-
ism would be maximally defended if we could offer some probability 
argument that would take us from knowledge concerning observables to 
knowledge concerning unobservables. El im ¡native induction in science 
could be such a probability argument at work. But if the list of alternative 
scientific hypotheses is incomplete the strength of an eliminative inductive 
argument is subsequently diminished since we might have overlooked 
some possible scientific explanations of the same facts that may be as 
good as our 'sole' survivor. However, if the number of these neglected 
alternatives is only very small and, more importantly, if these alternatives 
have an ontology that differs only in some very limited number of aspects 
from our main candidate for truth, the strength of eliminative induction is 
saved. If, subsequently, the only scientific explanation of some phenomena 
postulates unobservables, scientific realism seems maximally defended. 
However, it is the fundamental underdeterm ¡nation of scientific theories 
by data that completely destroys the philosophical plausibility of scientific 
realism if it depends on the eliminative inductive arguments in science. 
The problem of underdetermination is that, in the case of a scientific 
hypothesis which postulates unobservable entities, it is always possible to 
construct an alternative scientific hypothesis that is logically incompatible 
with, but nevertheless empirical equivalent to, that hypothesis. Moreover, 
not only is it always possible to construct at least one such alternative, it 
is always possible - so it is said - to construct an infinite number of such 
alternatives. If this is true, the strength of scientific eliminative inductive 
arguments is completely destroyed: not only do we have to face the possi-
bility that, in the end, not one but two hypotheses survive the eliminative 
method, we must also reckon in the infinitely many alternative hypotheses, 
so that the probability of the initial hypothesis decreases to zero! If for 
12
 On the level of his metaphysical scholastic realism, which Peirce offered as a 
testable hypothesis on the nature of the world, he argues that the verifications of 
predictions is an inductive argument for realism and simultaneously against 
nominalism. 
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any hypothesis H which postulates some ontology of unobservables the 
probability of the existential claims of Я is zero, the hope of ever defend­
ing scientific realism, that says that we do have epistemic reasons to 
believe that (some of) our best scientific theories tell us something about 
the unobservable structures of the world, is idle. 
The general problem of eliminative induction as an adjudicatory argu­
ment in theory evaluation and acceptance is simply the fact that we can 
never be sure that we have considered all alternative explanations for 
some phenomena. The danger of the incompleteness of the list of alterna­
tives undermines the argument for scientific realism. 
I presented Peircean scientific realism to argue that the true defence of 
scientific realism cannot be abductive. Instead, as the work of Peirce indi­
cates, scientific realism gets its plausibility from the eliminative inductive 
arguments in science, where theories which postulate unobservables are 
the sole survivors of this rule of eliminative induction." However, the 
13
 In his Science and Hypothesis Larry Laudan (1981a) investigates the rise of the 
method of hypothesis. This method was historically offered as an alternative to 
the method of enumerati ve induction. Laudan states: 'By the 1740s and 1750s [a] 
number of scientists - and philosophers - began developing theories which, in the 
nature of the case, could not conceivably have been arrived at by enumerative 
induction. Franklin's fluid theory of electricity, the vibratory theory of heat, the 
Buffonian theory of organic molecules, and phlogiston chemistry are but a small 
sample of the growing set of theories in the middle of the 18th century, which 
hypothesized unobservable entities in order to explain observable processes.' 
(1981a: 12, my italics). The problem of hypothesis is identical to the problem of 
scientific realism: 'if we have an hypothesis (or theory) all of whose thus far 
examined consequences are true, then what - if anything - can we warrantedly 
infer about the truth or likelihood or verisimilitude or well-testedness of the 
hypothesis?'. (Laudan 1981a: 5) The realist claims that we can warrantedly infer 
the likelihood of the hypothesis. Now, the fact that I argue for scientific 
eliminative inductive arguments as the best arguments for scientific realism does 
not mean that I propose eliminative induction as the method of science. I there­
fore do not argue with Laudan on the importance of the method of hypothesis. To 
the contrary. However, I do want to emphasise the fact that the method of hypoth­
esis is fundamentally incomplete if it is characterized with what Peirce would call 
the 'First Stage of Inquiry'. And indeed the method of hypothesis is characterized 
by Laudan as the hypothetico-deductive method or the method of conjecture and 
refutation and this method clearly involves eliminative inductions (or as Peirce has 
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problem of underdeterm ¡nation now becomes (he main threat to scient i lie 
realism. 
Appendix: CS. Ρ eiree and the problem of underdetermination 
In the immense secondary literature on the philosophy of science of C.S. 
Peirce there are at least (and to the best of my knowledge at most) three 
authors who claim that Peirce identified the problem of underdetermina­
tion of theory by data, where we take the problem of underdetermination 
to be the always existing possibility to construct infinitely many logically 
incompatible but empirically equivalent alternatives to instrumentally suc­
cessful scientific theories postulating unobservables. According to these 
authors (Hookway, Skagestad and Almeder), Peirce was well aware of the 
threat of underdetermination to his scientific and scholastic realism. How­
ever, if we consider the arguments and references to the work of Peirce 
offered by these philosophers we must conclude that it is not clear at all 
whether Peirce was aware of the problem of underdetermination. 
In his well documented study Christopher Hookway discusses the prob­
lem of theory equivalence within Peirce's pragmaticism (Hookway 198S). 
Within this pragmaticism it is possible that there are two theories on the 
basis of which the same predictions are deduced which are subsequently 
verified while a common vocabulary in which these predictions can be 
described is lacking. We could, for the sake of argument, interpret this 
situation as a situation in which there are logically incompatible but 
empirically equivalent theories, that is to say, as an example of a case of 
underdetermination. The conclusion would follow that Peirce was aware of 
the problem of underdetermination and we might look for a Peircean 
answer to this problem. However, Hookway's reference to the paragraph 
it, the Second (deductive) and Third (inductive) Stages of Inquiry). The methodo­
logically revolutionary idea behind the method of hypothesis is that there evident­
ly are phenomena for the explanation of which one needs hypotheses postulating 
unobservables and these hypotheses cannot be reached by induction over 
observables. The method of hypothesis then makes room for the inevitable and 
indispensable, but also non-evidencing, creative moment of the scientists, that is, 
the invention of a hypothesis that goes beyond the observable data. The method of 
hypothesis at once creates the problem of scientific realism. 
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which is supposed to illustrate this awareness of Peirce, reads as follows 
(Hookway 1985: 249): 
I have already remarked that a definition of science in general which shall 
express a really intelligent conception of it as a living historic entity must 
regard it as the occupation of that peculiar class of men, the scientific men. 
The same remark may be extended to definitions of the different branches 
of science. The men who pursue a given branch herd together. They under-
stand one another; they live in the same world, while those who pursue 
another branch are for them foreigners. (CP 1.99) 
Here Peirce speaks of different branches of science. Although the classifi-
cations of the sciences is indeed a very important theme in the work of 
Peirce it is not to be confused with the discussion on the possibility of 
constructing logically incompatible yet empirically equivalent alternatives 
to some hypothesis for the same domain of phenomena. Clearly, the para-
graph does not support the claim that Peirce was aware of the always 
existing possibility of underdetermination. Since Hookway does not offer 
us any other clues that might substantiate this claim we are pessimistic 
about the possibility that Peirce might have in store some solution to the 
problem of underdetermination. 
The already mentioned Peirce scholar Peter Skagestad is also of the 
opinion that Peirce was aware of the problem of underdetermination. 
Skagestad argues that Peirce saw the problem after studying the logic of 
his preceptor Augustus de Morgan. Skagestad mentions the crucial passage 
in the papers of Peirce by which this claim is illustrated and supported. 
The reference, however, is disappointingly unclear. I here offer the full 
citation (Skagestad 1981: 182): 
[There] are general laws connected with [dyads, one of whose subjects is a 
monad and the other a possible dyad, that is, a unit]. 
The first of these is that any unit (or units) whatsoever contemplated in 
itself without conscious regard to its parts would, were our sense to 
respond to it, be seen to embody a monad. De Morgan propounded this 
law, so far as it is pertinent to formal logic, affirming that any collection 
of objects whatsoever possess universally some character which belongs to 
no other object at all. For, said he, they at least possess the character of 
being units ofthat collection. Considered as a proof, this begs the question; 
but considered as another way of formulating the same phenomenon, and 
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as a way which throws some light upon it, it has its value. This coincides 
with the principle of the excluded middle. Those objects of the universe 
which do not possess a given character possess another character which, in 
reference to that universe, is in relation of negation to the first. Hence, it is 
impossible to form a single class of dyads; two classes of dyads must be 
formed at once. Hence, considering all the monads which can appear on 
the contemplation of sets of units of the universe in their monadic aspect, 
every single unit is determined to be one subject of a dyad which has any 
one of those monads as its second object, namely it is either such a dyad as 
determines it to have the character of being one of the units which made 
up the object of contemplation in which that monad appeared, or it is such 
a dyad as determines the unit to have the character belonging to all the 
other units of the universe. (CP 1.449-50) 
It may be the idiosyncratic idiom of Peirce that is the cause for my possi-
ble misunderstanding, but to my mind, the paragraph offers all but a clear 
formulation of the problem of underdetermination. If Peirce really identi-
fied the problem of underdetermination, and if he was really aware of the 
possibly devastating effect on the plausibility of the realism he wanted to 
defend, he should have referred to this problem openly and more than 
once, for instance in his 'Lessons from the History of Science' (CP 1.43-
125). 
Finally, Robert Almeder also claims that Peirce was aware of the prob-
lem of underdetermination. It is safe to accept the assertion, so Almeder 
claims, 'that Peirce was well aware that physical theory is underdetermi-
ned by observational data' (1980: 44). Again one waits for the relevant 
references to the papers of Peirce. But the only reference offered by 
Almeder in order to back up his claim is the following: 
The other variety of the argument from the fulfilment of predictions is 
where truths ascertained subsequently to the provisional adoption of the 
hypothesis or, at least, not at all seen to have any bearing upon it, lead to 
new predictions being based upon the hypothesis of an entirely different 
kind from those originally contemplated and these new predictions are 
equally found to be verified. (CP 7.117) 
Even though this paragraph is more convincing than those referred to by 
Hookway and Skagestad it is still a far cry from establishing the fact that 
Peirce was 'well aware' of the problem of underdetermination. I think we 
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should rather conclude that, although Peirce defended some form of scien-
tific realism, the evidence for the claim that he realized the threat from 
underdetermination is absent. It is therefore not to be expected that we 
will find some Peircean argument that saves contemporary scientific real-
ism from the threat of underdetermination. 
There are at least two possibilities to escape the conclusion that Peirce 
was not aware of the problem of underdetermination. The first possibility 
concentrates on the notions of reality and truth. For instance, we could 
argue that the Peircean idea of reality, as that to which the scientific com-
munity will converge and conclude 'in the long run', is precisely meant as 
an answer to the possibility of underdetermination in the sciences and a 
rebuttal of scientific anti-realism. This idea of Peirce, which he already 
formulated in the closing paragraphs of his 'Consequences of Four Capaci-
ties' (1868), could indeed be interpreted as an answer to the threat of 
underdetermination if we emphasize the implication to the very far future. 
The idea is that, given the continuation of science through time, there will 
surely be cases of underdetermination in science, but these will be of a 
temporary nature only; they will ultimately disappear and in the end there 
will be no cases of underdetermination left. In a letter to Cantor Peirce 
formulates his theory of truth very concisely: 
By a reality [or truth] I mean anything represented in a true proposition. 
[By] a true proposition (if there is any such thing) I mean a proposition 
which at some time, past or future, emerges into thought, and has the fol-
lowing characters: First, no direct effort of yours, mine or anybody's, can 
reverse it permanently, or even permanently prevent its asserting itself; 
Second, no reasoning or discussion can permanently prevent its asserting 
itself; Third, any prediction based on the proposition, as to what ought to 
present itself in experience under certain conditions, will be fulfilled when 
those conditions are satisfied. (NEM III, 2: 772-79) 
From Peirce's philosophy of science there clearly emerges the expectation 
that when science has come to an (ideal) end underdetermination will have 
disappeared. However, there are no arguments to be found in Peirce's 
papers that rule out the logical possibility of underdetermination. In the 
letter to Cantor we find the further claim that if, even in the long ran, 
there are empirically equivalent theories, we must decide, on the basis of 
the pragmatic principle, that these theories are merely different formula-
tions of the same theory. But Peircean arguments for this claim are lack-
76 
Peirce and the Only Explanation 
ing. So we may conclude that even Peirce's theory of reality and truth 
cannot prevent us from drawing the conclusion that even in the longest 
run there can still be cases of undcrdcterm¡nation of theory by data. But, 
and this is as important, wc have as to yet, no logical proof that there 
always will be cases of underdeterm¡nation in science. 1 will return to this 
issue below (chapter 3). 
The second possibility to answer the critique that Peirce was not aware 
of the problem of underdeterm ¡nation, stems from his semeiotics and con-
sists in emphasizing the Peircean notion of 'real vagueness': a sign which 
is objectively indeterminate is objectively vague to the extent that it must 
be determined by other signs; however, the complete determinacy of a 
sign is simply impossible for it can always be logically divided into fur-
ther analyzable elements (CP 5.447, 1.434, Engel-Tiercelin 1992: 66-7). 
Here we embark upon Peirce's opaque theory of continuity. Perhaps this 
notion of vagueness can be identified with the Peircean version of the 
thesis of underdeterm ¡nation. I cannot exclude this hypothesis since I am 
unable, given the many difficulties surrounding Peirce's theory of continu-
ity, to assess the plausibility of this interpretation. If I understand Engel-
Tiercelin's reference to manuscript #283 correctly I must conclude that the 
problem of underdetermination of theory by data is ultimately something 
different from the problem of the indeterminacy of signs. Drawing from 
this manuscript Engel-Tiercelin suggests that: 
a sign is indefinite if its interpretation remains doubtful, but not if there is 
a choice between possible interpretations (which is ambiguity). (1992: 68) 
My suggestion would be that the problem of underdetermination in the 
philosophy of science is indeed a case of ambiguity, having epistemologic-
al consequences, rather than indeterminacy. (To what extent there may be 
a parallel between the Peircean discussion on indeterminacy and ambiguity 
of signs and Quine's discussion of indeterminacy and underdetermination, 
remains to be seen). 
My own hypothesis on this seemingly naive element concerning under-
determination in Peirce's complex and otherwise exhaustive philosophy of 
science is that he did not have a theory on the structure of scientific the-
ories. It may be enlightening to notice that Pierre Duhem was one of the 
first to discuss the structure of physical theories in 1906, and he was very 
much aware of the problem of underdetermination. Although Peirce, who 
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died in 1914, was very interested in European philosophies of science 
(especially in those of Mach and Poincaré) it seems unlikely that he was 
in a position to account for this Duhemian analysis of physical science and 
to incorporate the problem of Duhemian underdetermination and the denial 
of crucial experiments, and subsequently the more general formulation of 
the problem of underdetermination, in his philosophical system. Nowhere, 
as far as my knowledge goes, do we find any reference to the work of 
Duhem in the papers of Peirce. More importantly, I know of only one 
Peirce commentator who acknowledges the fact that Peirce's system of 
philosophy indeed lacks any theory on the structure of scientific theories. 
In a footnote Riemer observes that 
[dieser] Mangel an zusätzlicher Differenzierung zum Gesetzts- und Theo-
riebegriff tritt besonders deutlich hervor, wenn man Peirces Schriften in 
dieser Hinsicht mit dem Werk seines Zeitgenossen Duhem, P. Ziel und 
Struktur der physikalischen Theorie (1908) vergleicht. (1988: 62-3) 
If we accept that with Duhem's discussion of the nature and structure of 
scientific theories the thesis of underdetermination (in the sense that one 
has to deny the possibility of unequivocal falsification of isolated theories, 
Duhem 1906: 187) becomes (once more) the main threat to scientific real-
ism (cf. Harding 1976: xi), it becomes intelligible why Peirce was not 
aware of this threat of underdetermination to his scientific realism. 
To my mind then we are justified in our conclusion that Peirce was not 
aware of the terrible threat of underdetermination of theory by data to the 
plausibility of scientific realism. The reason for his unawareness concern-
ing underdetermination is the fact that Peirce did not have a theory on the 
structure of scientific theories, and so, unfortunately, the difficulties of 
contemporary scientific realism stemming from underdetermination cannot 
be solved by an appeal to the ingenuity of Peirce. 
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Underdetermination and Scientific Realism: 
the Real Danger 
3.1 Introduction 
At the end of chapter 1, it was suggested that the best defence of scientific 
realism is to point at the many (elim ¡native) inductive arguments scientists 
offer for theories which postulate unobservables. However, the plausibility 
of these arguments is undermined by the phenomena of underdetermina-
tion: if it is possible to construct, at any moment in time, an infinite num-
ber of alternative scientific theories which are empirically equivalent, yet 
logically incompatible, there seems to be no epistemic reason left to prefer 
one ontology of unobservables over another. 
Naturally, then, the question of underdetermination plays a major role 
in the debate on scientific realism. There are however at least two differ-
ent aspects to this question.' The first one, discussed in section 3.2, may 
be called historical: to what extent does the historical scientific record 
show actual cases of underdetermination; how are these cases, if any, 
solved, and what are the conclusions drawn from these cases by scientists 
regarding the status of their theories? Note that the simple historical fact 
of underdetermination need not be an argument against scientific realism. 
If cases of underdetermination are solved in a way that is only explainable 
within scientific realism, the historical underdetermination objection might 
1
 See Laudan (1990) for an illuminating discussion of the various forms of 
underdetermination. In his article, however, Laudan does not discuss the distinc-
tion made here between the historical and the logical dimension of 
underdetermination which has important consequences for the inductive argument 
for realism. (Cf. Laudan and Leplin (1991) for some additional considerations to 
this distinction). See also the several contributions in Harding (1976). Other 
authors discussing underdetermination are Bergström (1984), (1990), Boyd (1973), 
(1981), (1984), (1985), Clendinnen (1989), Gibson (1986), (1991), Laudan (1988), 
Newton-Smith (1978), (1981), (1990), Quine (1975), (1990), Wright (1985) en 
Yalcin (1992). 
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actually and surprisingly turn out to be an argument/or scientific realism. 
The other aspect is obviously the logical one: is there really always the 
logical possibility of constructing infinitely many logically incompatible 
yet empirically equivalent theories, and if so, how is it done? One of the 
interpretations of Hilary Putnam's exposition of the Löwenheim-Skolem 
theorem shows that, indeed, there will always be, even in the Peircean 
long run, the possibility of constructing infinitely many logically incom-
patible, yet empirically equivalent, alternatives to the reigning scientific 
theory. It is necessary to investigate this logical proof of underdeterm¡na-
tion, for it will turn out that if underdetermination is a real threat for 
scientific realism it comes from logical underdetermination (section 3.3). 
3.2 The historical dimension to underdetermination 
Recently Larry Laudan offered a dialogue between a relativist and a non-
relativist on the problem of underdetermination (1988). In this dialogue it 
is suggested that 'underdetermination may be the undoing of realism' 
(1988: 123). In this section I investigate to what extent this is really the 
case when we consider underdetermination in science from a historical 
point of view. However, I will not offer detailed historical studies of cases 
of underdetermination. The only historical conclusion the realist will need 
in order to argue that the historical argument from underdetermination 
against realism will not do, is the more general fact that actual massive 
underdetermination of scientific theory by data is a rare phenomenon in 
the history of science. Let us first clear up some of the conceptual matters 
concerning underdetermination. 
3.2. J Empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible scientific theories 
In The Rationality of Science Newton-Smith distinguishes two kinds of 
theory equivalence, namely empirical equivalence and evidential equival-
ence (1981: 40). Two scientific theories can be said to be empirically 
equivalent and logically incompatible if they have the same class of obser-
vational consequences but nevertheless differ in content with respect to 
their theoretical statements. In other words, there is a theoretical proposi-
tion contained by one of the theories whereof its negation is contained by 
the other (1981: 41). 
80 
Underdetermination 
In the case of two theories, which have the same class of observational 
consequences, but which nevertheless differ in content with respect to their 
theoretical statements and, furthermore, differ in content with regard to the 
assessments of their degree of evidence, we have a case of empirically 
equivalent yet logically incompatible theories. Scientists can nevertheless 
choose rationally between these because of the fact that the theories are 
evidentially different. Now, on the supposition that underdetermination is 
actually a phenomenon in the history of science, and on the further suppo-
sition that these cases of underdetermination are resolved in the course of 
doing science, one could argue, as Boyd does, that these cases are actually 
cases of empirically equivalent yet evidentially non-equivalent scientific 
theories. This phenomenon is exploited by Boyd in his defence of scien-
tific realism. I will briefly discuss how. 
Boyd writes: 
the empiricist [underdetermination argument against scientific realism] 
depends on the epistemologica! principle that empirically equivalent the-
ories are evidentially indistinguishable. (1984: 44) 
In 1973 Boyd already denounced this empiricist principle.2 To deny this 
principle means to substantiate the claim that 'plausibility estimates on 
scientific theories should be understood as reflecting experimental evi-
dence for the truth of the causal claims made by those theories' (1973: 9). 
This is accomplished in the following way: 
(1) find a methodological scientific principle involving intertheoretic 
considerations regarding the plausibility of suggested theories;3 
(2) show that this principle contributes to the plausibility of accepted 
theories as good predictors of the behaviour of observables; 
(3) show that the hypothesis that the principle is dependent upon back-
ground theories which are approximately true, is the only explana-
1
 Cf. also Boyd (1981: 651-2), (1984: 50-1), (1985), and section 1.2 of the present 
study. 
1
 Cf. section 1.6, note 18 for an enumeration of such principles. 
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tion of the reliability of this principle.4 
Boyd argues that this can be done for a number of principles.5 If this is 
4
 The general argument concerning the instrumental reliability of methodological 
principles that are heavily theory dependent is, for instance, formulated in his 
(1985): 'the relevant methodology depends on the theoretical structure of the 
currently accepted scientific theories; were those theories replaced by others which 
are empirically equivalent but theoretically divergent, quite different methodologi­
cal practices would be identified as appropriate ... scientists behave as though their 
methodology were determined by inductive inferences from the theoretical prin­
ciples embodied in the received theoretical tradition'. (1985: 9) 
5
 In his (1985) van Fraassen explicates this realist 'recipe for disaster': 'Step 1. 
Assume that there is such a thing as the scientific method [described] by account 
X. Step 2. Assume that this method is a method for arriving at true, or at least 
reliable, information about aspect Y of the world. Step 3. Raise the problem of 
justification: to show or to explain how the method described by X is indeed 
especially designed to lead to true or reliable information about Y, or at least that 
it is better than alternative methods that might have been followed. Produce such 
justification Z. Step 4. Claim that the success of Ζ in explaining the success of the 
sciences which proceed by method X is good support for the correctness of 
[assumptions] underlying Z.' (259). When we eliminate the reference to truth in 
this recipe it seems indeed to be the strategy Boyd suggests. In that case X stands 
for one of the scientific methodological principles, Y for some observable aspect 
of the world. Justification Ζ refers to the claim that our background theories are 
approximately true, and the assumption underlying Ζ is scientific realism. Van 
Fraassen however sees it as a recipe for disaster since the realist is faced by the 
following dilemma: 'either this partem of inference is licensed by the methodol­
ogy described by X or it is not. In the first case, part of the justified methodology 
was assumed in the justification. In the second, the person taking this step must 
reflect that his inference is neither part of what he takes to be the best description 
of scientific method nor incontrovertible among philosophers' (van Fraassen 1985: 
259). But notice that the same recipe is followed by the constructive empiricist 
and although it does not constitute a dilemma to the empiricist it does undermine 
the plausibility of empiricism to some extent. 
In the empiricist case X stands for some 'methodology of theory construction' 
(for instance, 'widening' or 'experimentation' (van Fraassen 1985: 269, 273, 
1980: 77), Y stands, again, for some observable aspect of the world, and Ζ stands 
for the empiricist claim that the aim of science is to formulate empirically 
adequate theories, which explains why X leads to reliable knowledge about Y. 
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true, the practice of science provides reason to believe that the empiricist 
indistinguishability thesis is implausible (Boyd 1984: 44, 60ff).6 Cases of 
underdetermination can be, and possibly are, resolved by theoretical con­
siderations. In this way, resolved cases of underdetermination actually 
form an argument for realism rather than against it. For only under the 
assumption of the approximate truth of the background theories, on which 
these considerations are based, can we understand how cases of underde­
termination can be resolved. To apply this argument from underdetermina­
tion in a defence of scientific realism it seems that we only have to look 
for such cases in science. 
However, this would surely be a wasted effort, for the empiricist 
response to this realist argument from underdetermination is very clear: 
there is an alternative explanation for the instrumental reliability of the 
theory-laden methodological principles of science, namely the claim that 
The underlying assumption of Ζ is constructive empiricism and the conclusion 
follows, according to the recipe, that constructive empiricism is a better explana­
tion than scientific realism and that this is reason to tentatively believe empiricism 
to be true. And indeed this is what van Fraassen claims to be the case (1980: 73). 
Now, the realist can assert that to van Fraassen IBE is either a member of the 
class of X's or it is not. The constructive empiricist will surely argue that IBE as 
an inference that leads to the tentative belief in the truth of hypotheses is no part 
of the methodology of science (1980: 20-1). But then the realist may ask why we 
should (tentatively) believe that empiricism is true for the reason that it best 
explains 'science and scientific activity'? Boyd, the naturalist, may even argue 
that if IBE is not a scientific rule of inference there is no reason to believe it 
contributes to reliable knowledge so that IBE cannot be an argument for construc­
tive empiricism. (Cf. also Hooker's reaction to the circularity in the realist recipe 
for disaster: 'There is no circularity, just internal coherence' (1987: 324)). 
6
 Boyd (1984: 61): 'the actual theoretical tradition has an epistemically privileged 
position in the assessment of empirical evidence. Thus, a total science whose 
theoretical conception is significantly in conflict with the received theoretical 
tradition is, for that reason, subject to "indirect" but perfectly real prima facie 
disconfirmation relative to an empirically equivalent total science that reflects the 
existing tradition. The evidential indistinguishability thesis is therefore false, and 
the basic empiricist antirealist argument is rebutted.' 
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the background theories are taken to be empirically adequate.7 The empiri-
cist need not object to the realist counterfactual argument that scientists 
would have 'identified quite different methodological practices' if they 
would have accepted empirically equivalent yet theoretically divergent 
theories, since this is also true on van Fraassen's pragmatic explanation of 
the behaviour of scientists. Boyd of course would protest against this sort 
of explanation. With regard to the scientific methodological rule of 
'entrenchment' or 'projectability' (Boyd 1981: 618, 1985: 7) he argues: 
Some philosophers have treated the principle as purely pragmatic ... it is 
pragmatically sound to test those theories you already have first. It is like 
picking out a hammer - you see if the ones at the local hardware store 
work before ordering something more esoteric. We can already see that this 
pragmatic justification leaves a central issue unsettled: since we almost 
never send away for one of the esoteric theoretical hammers (of which 
there is an infinite variety), why do we so often hit the nail on the head? 
(Boyd 1981: 621) 
But, once again, van Fraassen can retort that Boyd is right up to the point 
where the realist assumes the truth of the background theories on which 
the instrumentally reliable principles of evidence depend. The empirical 
adequacy of the these theories will do. For instance, consider the principle 
of 'sampling' or 'experimental design' which says that a suggested hy-
pothesis L must be experimentally tested under those circumstances of 
which our background theories tell us the hypothesis will probably go 
wrong (Boyd 1973: 10, 1985: 10, 1981: 620). Van Fraassen offers the 
empiricist alternative explanation: 
The models of L are quite simple, and reflection on the models of the 
collateral [or background] theories suggests ways in which the models of L 
could be altered in various ways. The empirical adequacy of L requires that 
the phenomena ... can be fitted into some of its models. Certain phenomena 
do fit the suggested altered models and not the models of £ as it stands. 
7
 Van Fraassen: 'We must admit that this is one explanation: that the collateral 
theories are believed to be true. But Boyd needs to establish not only that, as a 
realist, he can explain what is happening, but also that competing explanations are 
not feasible' (1980: 80). 
84 
l/iulcn/clcrniimilioii 
Thus a test is devised that will favour L (or not favour it) as against one of 
those contemplated alternatives. But it is easy to see that what such a test 
will do is to speak for (or against) the empirical adequacy of L in those 
respects in which it differs from those alternatives. (1980: 80)' 
With regard to the principle labelled 'unity of science' (Boyd 1981: 645, 
1984: 57-8, 1985: 16-7) van Fraassen again offers a constructive empiri-
cist alternative by suggesting that the 'process of unification is mainly one 
of correction and not of conjunction' (1980: 87), and again the alternative 
only involves the presupposition of the empirical adequacy of the back-
ground theories. 
The conclusion must be that, although empirically equivalent yet logi-
cally incompatible theories may be evidentially non-equivalent, this does 
not constitute evidence for scientific realism as against empiricism. The 
"evidential" non-equivalence can be explained in an empiricist manner by 
assuming that the empirical adequacy of the background theories, rather 
than the truth of these theories (as the realist has it), is enough to explain 
the instrumental ly reliable theory-laden scientific methodological principles 
by which scientists assess the degree of evidence of theories. Van 
Fraassen's (new) indistinguishability thesis states that empirically equival-
ent scientific theories are evidentially (i.e. epistemically) equivalent yet 
pragmatically non-equivalent. This offers the empiricist the opportunity to 
maintain his underdeterm¡nation argument against realism, while accepting 
1
 In his (1973) Boyd argues his case from a syntactic conception and he empha-
sizes the role of auxiliary hypothesis in determining the observational conse-
quences of a hypothesis (1973: 3-4). However, in 1981 Boyd reformulates his 
argument for realism in such a way that it is independent of the semantic or 
syntactical conception of scientific theories, so that if van Fraassen states that 'the 
talk of underlying causal mechanisms can be construed ... as talk about the inter-
nal structure of the models' and that 'in contrast with the logical, syntactic 
construal of theories which Boyd used ... we must direct our attention to the fam-
ily of models of the theory to make sense of the pursuit of empirical adequacy 
through total immersion (for practical purposes) in the theoretical world-picture', 
this criticism is no longer viable in so far as it is meant as a criticism on Boyd's 
syntactical conception of theories. In Part III will discuss van Fraassen's semantic 
conception of theories which is, as he himself admits, neutral to the issue of real-
ism. 
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the (allegedly) resolved cases of underdetermination in the history and 
practice of science. 
We have not inquired into the historical record to see whether there are 
actually cases in which the empirical equivalence of mutually incompatible 
theories is resolved in the course of doing science by appealing to the 
'evidential' difference of those theories. There is no need to do so. For if 
there are such cases, these cannot function as the basis of an argument 
from underdetermination in favour of scientific realism, since the realist 
explanation faces the more economical pragmatist-empiricist explanation 
offered by van Fraassen. 
3.2.2 Evidentially equivalent yet logically incompatible scientific theories 
Newton-Smith (1981) discusses the weak thesis of underdetermination 
which says that there may be pairs of rival evidentially equivalent theories 
in science (cf. Quine 1975). Two rival theories are evidentially equivalent 
if they are observationally equivalent and at the same time 'fare equally 
well on any justifiable principles of evidence' (Newton-Smith 1981: 40). 
He argued for this thesis by constructing examples of evidentially equival-
ent but logically incompatible theories for specific domains, thus trying to 
establish at least the possibility of this kind of underdetermination of the-
ory by data (Newton-Smith 1978: 78-81). However, he concedes that for 
really establishing the weak thesis of underdetermination one needs the 
guarantee that there will not be one unique total theory of nature which is 
compatible with only one of two evidentially equivalent theories. In that 
case the two theories considered are simply not evidentially equivalent 
from the moment we accept the principle of evidence that tells us to 
choose the theory that is the most plausible one in the light of the avail-
able total theory of nature. According to Newton-Smith, however, we must 
'entertain the thought that there might be massive underdetermination by 
data' for we do not have an a priori guarantee that there is such a unique 
total theory of nature (1981: 41): 
there could be a pair of incompatible evidentially equivalent total theories 
of nature, (loc. cit.) 
Let us here consider the more specific question to what extent 'massive 
underdetermination of theory by data' forms a threat to scientific realism. 
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Notice that the meaning of the term 'underdetermination' has now chang-
ed from 'the existence of a very large number of empirically equivalen! 
(but logically incompatible) theories' to 'the existence of a very large 
number of cases of evidentially equivalent (but logically incompatible) 
theories'. 
The optimistic realist could mould the established fact that there could 
well be massive underdetermination into an historical argument for real-
ism. This argument runs as follows. Given the fact that there actually is no 
massive underdetermination of scientific theories nor many total theories 
of nature, and given the truth of the weak thesis of underdetermination 
which says that there may be pairs of rival evidentially equivalent theories 
in science, how do we explain this absence of actual massive underdeter-
mination'} One could make yet another attempt to argue along the lines of 
Boyd and claim that scientific realism is the only philosophy of science 
that can explain this absence of massive underdetermination in science. 
Consider two evidentially equivalent but logically incompatible theories 
T, and T2. These theories are observationally equivalent and the assess-
ments of their degree of confirmation and evidence are exactly equal. In a 
realist wording: T, and T2 have the same degree of evidence in the light of 
the relevant background theories which provide us with the necessary 
principles of evidence. At the same time the theories are logically incom-
patible, which means that there must be a proposition (notably a theoreti-
cal proposition, i.e. a proposition that postulates the existence of 
unobservables) 'which is contained in one theory the negation of which is 
contained in the other theory'. Now, given the conjunction of the Law of 
the Excluded Middle and scientific realism, the realist concludes that the 
equal assessment of T, and T2 is reason to believe that something is wrong 
with our accepted background theories. Indeed, as the realist might argue, 
it is important that our background theories are only approximately true so 
that something can be wrong with our background theories and that equal 
estimates of degree of evidence of incompatible theories are possible. 
After all, the weak thesis of underdetermination is likely to be true. 
The realist may continue and give the following explanation of the fact 
why there are but very few actual cases of evidentially equivalent but 
logically incompatible theories in science. Cases of underdetermination are 
nearly ruled out because of what Boyd calls 'the dialectic process of the 
assessment of the degree of evidence of scientific theories' (Boyd 1981). 
Every time scientists are confronted by a case of a pair of logically incom-
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patible but evidentially equivalent theories they alter their background 
theories on which the principles of assessment of the degree of evidence 
are based. In this way, so the realist thinks, the cluster of background 
theories will become increasingly more accurate as a measure in the esti-
mates of degrees of evidence. Correspondingly, cases of underdetermina-
tion will become less frequent as science proceeds its course through his-
tory.9 
Newton-Smith argues that there are two possible ways open to the 
realist to answer the problem of evidentially equivalent theories, to wit the 
ignorance response and the arrogance response (1981: 41-2). He claims 
that in order to maintain scientific realism one has to give up either the 
accessibility of some fact of the matter (ignorance response10) or classical 
logic with its Law of the Excluded Middle (arrogance response11). 
Although Newton-Smith opts for the arrogance response, Bergström offers 
reasons to prefer the ignorance response (1984: 356-9). The dialectical 
response initiated by Boyd seems to be a refreshingly third option in this 
conflict of responses. Perhaps there is some inaccessible fact of the matter 
and perhaps the Law of the Excluded Middle must ultimately be given up: 
for the moment however the dialectical process of science ensures us that 
massive underdetermination of theory by data, in the sense of existing 
evidentially equivalent theories, does not occur. The argument for realism 
from this kind of underdetermination is a historical argument and draws 
from the historical record of science which does not show an abundance 
of evidentially equivalent theories (or so he assumes). Indeed as Newton-
9
 There is of course the problem of the unanalysed notion of 'approximate truth' 
(Laudan 1977, 1981b). I will not try to elaborate Newton-Smith's preliminary 
analysis of verisimilitude and follow one of his more modest proposals namely to 
use it for the time being as an unanalysed philosophical notion (Newton-Smith 
1981: 197, Hardin & Rosenberg 1982: 604-5). The work of Kuipers is an excel-
lent analysis and improvement of the Popperian notion of verisimilitude (see ch. 1, 
n.7 for a reservation on this analysis as a solution to the problem of scientific 
realism). 
10
 Newton-Smith: 'something about the world, some matter of fact, makes one 
theory true and the other false; but that matter of fact is something beyond our 
power to discover' (1981: 41). 
11
 'One simply declines to assert (p or not-/») for empirically undecidable p" 
(1980: 42). 
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Smith observes 'massive underdetermination by data is not a phenomenon 
wc in fact face' (1981: 43, my italics). I lie realist oilers an explanation of 
this contingent fact. 
Unfortunately, there are at least two possible alternative explanations to 
the absence of massive underdetermination in science. First there is (of 
course) the empiricist explanation in terms of empirically adequate the-
ories. Actual cases of underdetermination are indeed nearly ruled out 
because of what Boyd calls 'the dialectic process of the assessment of the 
degree of evidence of scientific theories'. But this dialectical process can 
be interpreted in empiricist terms. Every time scientists are confronted 
with a case of a pair of logically incompatible but evidentially equivalent 
theories they tum to their background theories on which the principles of 
assessment of the degree of evidence are based. These are then altered and 
the alterations involve only the empirical adequacy of the theories. The 
cluster of background theories will become increasingly more accurate, i.e. 
more empirically adequate, and therefore more accurate as a measure in 
the estimates of degrees of empirical adequacy. Correspondingly, cases of 
underdetermination involving theories that are judged to have the same 
degree of empirical adequacy will become, as a matter of fact, less fre-
quent as science proceeds its course through history.12 
12
 To the empiricist the degree of evidence of a theory is the degree of empirical 
adequacy (and empirical strength) assigned to that theory (cf. van Fraassen 1980: 
88). Empirically equivalence has often an ambiguous meaning: do we mean that 
two theories are empirically equivalent if they are both compatible with the 
known observational data, that is the actually available data, or do we mean to 
say that they have the same observational consequences whether already available 
or not? If this latter is the case (cf. Newton-Smith 1980: 40) it seems that empiri-
cally equivalent theories are very likely to have the same degree of empirical 
adequacy within empiricism and so empirical equivalence is simultaneously a case 
of evidential equivalence. The indistinguishability thesis can nevertheless be 
rejected if pragmatic considerations in science are taken into account which is of 
course exactly the move made by van Fraassen. It is these considerations that 
motivate scientists to try to resolve cases of empirically or evidentially equivalent 
incompatible theories. The empiricist conclusion with regard to the historical 
dimension of underdetermination must be that if there are resolved cases of 
underdetermination these cases were resolved on pragmatic grounds and not on 
epistemic grounds. 
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The second alternative explanation is suggested by Bergström. The 
alleged absence of massive underdetermination can easily be explained by 
referring to the psychology of science: 
it is probably very difficult to provide actual examples of genuine under-
determination. If this can be done at all, it is surely a task of scientists 
rather than philosophers. But it seems unreasonable to expect scientists to 
concern themselves with such a task. Scientists are expected to contribute 
to the growth of science. They are not supposed to provide empirically 
equivalent alternatives to it. Hence the thesis of underdetermination will 
never be more than a plausible conjecture. (1984: 354) 
Remember that we are still concerned with the historical dimension of 
underdetermination (whether involving empirically equivalent or eviden-
tially equivalent theories). Bergström claims that it is not the task of 
science to generate empirically (or evidentially) equivalent theories for this 
would only temper the growth rate of science. His conclusion is that 
underdetermination 'will never be more than a plausible conjecture' and 
this seems to be a conclusion on the historical dimension of underdetermi-
nation that favours scientific realism. But it also suggests that the absence 
of massive underdetermination can be explained psychologically.13 If sci-
entists would spend more time formulating empirically or even evidential-
ly equivalent theories actual massive underdetermination would be a mat-
ter of fact. The realist explanation of the absence of massive underdeter-
mination involving evidentially equivalent theories in science is therefore 
not the only explanation and the realist argument from underdetermination 
fails here as well. 
The realist could of course point to the fact that it is indeed 'very diffi-
cult to provide actual examples of genuine underdetermination' and that 
this fact can be explained on realist grounds, for the dialectical process of 
scientific estimates of degrees of evidence makes it more and more diffi-
cult for scientists to conceive underdetermination. Equivalent theories are 
difficult to invent simply because we now have very accurate measures of 
degrees of evidence. It is also not true that cases of underdetermination do 
not contribute to the growth of science. The realist argues that resolved 
cases of underdetermination lead to greater accuracy of the principles of 
13
 Remember Feyerabend's remark on the 'slow imagination of scientists'. 
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assessment of the degree of evidence of scientific theories. 
However, these objections to the psychological explanation can also be 
formulated in empiricist terms, as was illustrated earlier, so that they can-
not save the realist argument from underdetermination. 
We started the discussion of the historical dimension to the problem of 
underdetermination with the observation that the phenomenon of resolved 
cases of underdetermination could perhaps surprisingly be turned into an 
argument for scientific realism. We did not investigate the historical record 
of the sciences to see whether there actually are such resolved cases of 
underdetermination and simply assumed the phenomenon. Next we dis-
cussed two different sorts of underdetermination: underdetermination 
involving empirically equivalent yet evidentially non-equivalent theories 
and underdetermination involving evidentially equivalent theories. In nei-
ther case could we establish an historical argument from underdetermina-
tion for scientific realism, although the realist is able to explain resolved 
cases of underdetermination. The conclusion follows that allegedly 
resolved cases of underdetermination in the history of science cannot 
decide between realism or empiricism. The pessimistic conclusion is that 
we did not find a positive argument for realism. The optimistic conclusion 
is that realism can handle (resolved) cases of underdetermination14 so that 
the real danger of underdetermination for scientific realism must now 
come from the logical dimension of underdetermination. 
3.3 The logical dimension to underdetermination 
In our century the threat of underdetermination to scientific realism has 
been discussed by many. Yet it is strange to see that although the dragon 
of underdetermination breathes down the realist's neck, the realist remains 
rather optimistic about some realist solution to the problem of underdeter-
mination. This optimism is perhaps fed by a persistent emphasis on the 
14
 We did not discuss unresolved cases of underdetermination since it will obvi-
ously be an empirical claim whether there will actually be unresolved cases of 
underdetermination in the end or 'in the long run'. The possibility of unresolved 
cases of underdetermination must be argued for by some logical argument for 
underdetermination (cf. next section). 
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historical dimension of underdeterm¡nation and the philosopher's intuition 
that underdetermination is not something we actually face and furthermore 
that actual massive underdetermination in science is not to be expected. 
However, there is another reason for this realist optimism that the real 
danger of underdetermination can be mitigated: the realist seems content 
that, until today, nobody has shown that at any moment, including the 
moment we identify with the phrase 'in the long run', there must neces-
sarily be massive underdetermination of theory by data. 
Yet this is exactly what one has to infer to if one accepts Putnam's 
argument from his well-known and extensively discussed paper 'Models 
and Reality' (1977). Here Putnam offers a logical argument for under-
determination that shows that it is always possible to construct infinitely 
many logically incompatible yet empirically equivalent theories. If it is 
true that there is a way to construct, at any arbitrary moment in time an 
infinite number of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible alter-
native theories, scientific realism is really in jeopardy since this means 
that, even in the longest run, we will not have epistemic reasons to believe 
in the existence of the postulated unobservables of any theory and we 
cannot rationally choose between different ontologies. 
Putnam argues that once the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is applied 
within the philosophy of language the consequences for metaphysical (sci-
entific) realism are disastrous. It is not my intention to discuss Putnam's 
paper in detail and I will only offer Putnam's conclusion of his tour de 
force. Putnam states: 
What Skolem really pointed out was this: no interesting theory (in the 
sense of first-order theory) can, in and of itself, determine its own objects 
up to isomorphism. And Skolem's argument can be extended, as we saw, 
to show that if theoretical constraints don't determine reference, then the 
addition of operational constraints won't do it either. (1983: 23) 
In a very loose translation we could reformulate this conclusion as fol-
lows: if a first-order theory has a model, it has an infinite number of 
models; in other words, if we offer an interpretation of a scientific theory 
as a first-order theory, by constructing a model, we must be aware of the 
fact that if such a model can be constructed an infinite number of alterna-
tive models can be constructed. Or, in yet another wording, in that case 
many empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible ontologies are 
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possible. In this way the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is applied by 
Putnam as a logical proof for the claim that there must always be massive 
underdetermination involving empirically equivalent yet logically incom-
patible theories, even in the long run. This argument is sometimes inter-
preted as a logical disproof of (scientific) realism. 
Before considering possible objections to this logical argument from 
underdetermination it must be clear that Putnam discusses the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem initially as an illustration of Quine's indeterminacy of 
reference rather than of his thesis of underdetermination of theory by data. 
But since Putnam's argument concerns the possibility of 'mappings' of 
empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible ontologies ('cats and 
mats' as opposed to 'cherries and trees' for instance), the theorem seems 
nevertheless to be relevant as a logical argument for underdetermination of 
theory by data. 
The logical argument for underdetermination is impressive and com-
plex. However, the main question, to my mind, is whether the logical 
considerations from Putnam's argument lead one to the conclusion that 
infinitely many different empirically equivalent yet ontologically incom-
patible theories are always possible. What is meant by 'a model' in the 
case of a scientific theory postulating unobservables? We probably mean 
to depict some mathematical model. But we clearly assign some ontol-
ogica! interpretation to this mathematical model in order to make it a 
picture of (some part of) nature. It is the plausibility of these interpreta-
tions or ontologies that initiate the realism debate. 
Now, how could the logical argument that, loosely interpreted, shows 
that infinite mappings of some mathematical model onto other mathemat-
ical models is possible, have ontological implications? And consequently, 
how could it have implications to the debate on scientific realism? Must 
we not conclude that the argument shows that the same ontology can be 
represented by many logically incompatible mathematical models rather 
than that different mathematical models represent different ontologies?15 
There seems to be a way out of the web of underdetermination in which 
the scientific realist is trapped: although there may be infinitely many 
15
 In this respect it is well to notice that it is actually not scientific realism that is 
at stake here but rather metaphysical realism. In his recent work Putnam argues 
that some internal scientific realism is possible (cf. section 7.7). 
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empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible mathematical models at 
any moment in time, these may be mathematical models of the same onto-
logy (cf. the concept of 'notational variants')·16 Let us now tum to other 
criticisms of Putnam's argument. 
Ian Hacking has drawn attention to the many presuppositions involved 
in Putnam's logical argument of underdeterm¡nation from the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem (1983: 101-8). I will not enumerate these presuppositions 
here but will concentrate on only one of them which is recently empha-
sised in the study by Laudan & Leplin in which they try to take the edge 
of the logical argument of underdetermination (Laudan & Leplin 1991). 
One of the assumption in Putnam's argument is that scientific theories are 
formal first-order theories. Fixing the referents of scientific theoretical 
terms is however probably more complex than is supposed by Putnam in 
his argument. Hacking concludes that since nobody has convincingly 
shown that the interesting scientific theories are indeed formal first-order 
theories nor that the language of physics has a first-order format, Putnam's 
argument does not affect science (1983: 105). Laudan & Leplin simply 
state: 
If, given the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, formal statements in first-order 
logic are referentially indeterminate, then a physical theory is not simply a 
set of formal statements in first-order logic. (1991: 456) 
If these authors are right, this has important consequences for assessing 
the real danger of underdetermination for scientific realism. Furthermore, 
Laudan & Leplin argue that there is no algorithm to construct empirically 
equivalent yet ontologically incompatible alternatives to some theory. 
Given the fact that there seem to be serious flaws in the logical argu-
ment of underdetermination against scientific realism, the question now is 
whether there is massive underdetermination involving empirically equiv-
alent yet ontologically incompatible scientific theories at some arbitrary 
moment in time (even if this includes 'in the long run'), and this is obvi-
16
 In other words, the question is whether the intended and unintended mathemat-
ical models are identified as the ontologies of the theory. 
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ously an empirical question (Laudan & Leplin 1991: 457)17. As we have 
argued, the realist can allow present cases of underdetermination in sci-
ence since he has reason to believe that these cases will be resolved in the 
future; that is to say, either these cases will turn out not to be genuine 
cases of underdetermination (the theories rather turn out to be empirically 
non-equivalent) or the cases tum out to be cases of empirically equivalent 
yet evidentially non-equivalent theories. As Laudan & Leplin argue: 'find-
ings of empirical equivalence are not reliable projectable' (1991: 453). It 
seems, then, that underdetermination is relative to our knowledge of the 
moment. 
I am well aware of the fact that the discussion on Putnam's 'Models 
and Reality' argument has only just begun.18 To do justice to the ingeni-
ous logical argument of underdetermination one needs to explore the com-
plex world of intended and unintended models. I did not undertake this 
voyage into the logical domain. My choice not to do so is motivated by 
three reasons: (1) the argument offered by Hacking and Laudan & Leplin 
concerning the presuppositions of Putnam's argument as restrictions to its 
application, (2) the fact that the argument seems to hold only if we ident-
ify the mathematical models with the ontologies of the theory, to which I 
object, and (3) the fact that Putnam is not so much concerned with the im-
plausibility of scientific realism but rather with the impossibility of meta-
physical realism; that is to say, according to Putnam one can still be a sci-
entific realist even if the logical argument of underdetermination is cor-
rect." 
Here our discussion on the problem of underdetermination for scientific 
realism ends. What, then, is the real danger of underdetermination of the-
17
 Cf. Kukla (1993) and Leplin & Laudan (1993) for a continuation of the dis-
cussion. Igor Douven (1994) suggests that although there is no algorithm to con-
struct empirically equivalent yet logically equivalent theories there is nevertheless 
a logical proof of the claim that there are such theories. It is unclear to me 
whether he also thinks there is an existential logical proof for empirically equival-
ent yet ontologically equivalent theories. 
18
 See for instance Koethe (1979), Merrill (1980), Smart (1982), Brueckner 
(1984), Devitt (1984), Lewis (1984), Hansen (1987), Heller (1988), Anderson 
(1992), (1993), and especially Van Cleve (1992). 
19
 Which brings me back to my original remark that Putnam's argument here is 
rather concerned with Quinean indeterminacy of reference. 
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ory by data for scientific realism? Consider Newton-Smith's typically real-
ist statement on the current status of the argument from underdetermina-
tion: 
It is important to note that the underdetermination which would provide a 
threat to realism is underdetermination by the actual and possible data. In 
the case of underdetermination by the actually available data, the realist can 
simply take an agnostic stance, deferring any decision as to which theory is 
the one more likely to be true until further evidence is available. In the 
case of underdetermination by all actual and possible data, no data could be 
obtained which would count in favour of one theory over the other. The 
claim that there are any such cases is very controversial. And most realists 
would feel that there is no threat from this quarter. However, contemporary 
instrumentalists such as van Fraassen have tended to follow the lead of 
Duhem in arguing that every theory does in fact suffer from underdetermi-
nation, even though we do not have to hand underdetermined alternatives 
to our current theories. The alleged fact that such theories could be articu-
lated if we were clever and willing enough would undermine the grounds 
the realist has for claiming any degree of truth for our current theories ... 
The realist holds that the most serious threat to his position rests on a 
purely speculative assumption which finds no support from the history of 
science nor any convincing a priori demonstration. (1990: 192-3) 
But how speculative is this assumption? I think van Fraassen's logical 
argument from underdetermination against scientific realism is much more 
straightforward than the application of Putnam's anti-realist logical argu-
ment. Indeed, it is relatively easy to construct theories that are empirically 
equivalent yet ontologically incompatible. 
Van Fraassen suggests to consider the following two theories 'of what 
the world is like': Rutherford's atomic theory and Vaihingens contention 
that 'although perhaps there are no electrons and such, the observable 
world is nevertheless exactly as if Rutherford's theory were true' (1980, 
35). These two hypotheses obviously differ ontologically: the one says 
there are electrons, the other says there may be electrons. This can be 
interpreted as a case of underdetermination of theory by data. The argu-
ment can then easily be turned into an argument for empiricism and 
against realism. Van Fraassen: 
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Vaihingens view differed from Rutherford's by being logically weaker - il 
only withheld assent to an existence assertion. It follows automatically that 
Vaihinger's view cannot be a priori less plausible than Rutherford's. 
(1980: 36) 
Indeed, since the claim that a theory is empirically adequate is at least as 
probable as the conjunction that the theory is empirically adequate and 
that the unobservables postulated by that theory exist, van Fraassen is able 
to develop a direct argument for the empiricist epistemic attitude towards 
scientific theories. In the next chapters (Part II) I will discuss and assess 
constructive empiricism as a candidate for a plausible philosophy of 
science. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The arguments of the previous chapter took us from the denial of the 
Peircean notion of abduction in contemporary defences of scientific real-
ism to the conclusion that scientific realism is best defended by some 
inductive or probability argument on the basis of which we may rationally 
infer from knowledge concerning observables to knowledge concerning un-
observables. If we are to find such an argument, as Peirce himself hinted 
at, we must look for eliminative inductive arguments in science, that is to 
say, scientific inferences to the only explanation which postulate unobserv-
ables. However, the method of eliminative induction is severely under-
mined by the possibility of underdetermination of theory by data. 
Our inquiry into underdetermination as the main threat to scientific 
realism brings us to the conclusion that there is no conclusive historical 
realist argument from underdetermination, but neither is there a conclusive 
historical anti-realist argument from underdetermination. The logical argu-
ment from underdetermination which argues for the possibility of empiri-
cally equivalent yet ontologically incompatible theories awaits definite 
evaluation. Putnam's argument in his 'Models and Reality' has however 
been criticized and the real danger of underdetermination for scientific 
realism is, at least for the time being, warded off. 
Nevertheless, there is a very straightforward form of underdetermina-
tion offered by van Fraassen which seems to be a rather direct argument 
against scientific realism. It remains to be seen to what extent this argu-
ment can be refuted. 
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PAKT II 
TOWARD A NEW CRITIQUE OF CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM 

Chapter 4 
Constructive Empiricism And Its Empirical Adequacy 
4.1 Introduction 
In Part 11 have argued that the contemporary 'inference to the best expla-
nation' defences of scientific realism are ill-conceived since these defences 
(a) depend upon the evidencing notion of abduction (a notion explicitly 
rejected by the mature Peirce), as in Boyd's case, or (b) are only convinc-
ing to the realist himself, as in the case of Musgrave, or (c) can only show 
'inference to the best explanation' as a pragmatic principle (cf. the dis-
cussion on Thagard's computational philosophy of science). In so far these 
defences nevertheless appeal to the realist's intuitions it is because the 
actual argument for the existence of unobservables is some hidden prob-
ability argument. 
It is now high time to explore in detail the most sophisticated scientific 
anti-realist position to date, to wit van Fraassen's constructive empiricism 
(Van Fraassen 1980). We have already often alluded to this philosophy of 
science as a current alternative to scientific realism so that the 'inference 
to the only explanation-arguments' for realism presented in Part I are 
defeated. In this chapter we will spell out some of the main characteristics 
of constructive empiricism and assess the plausibility of constructive 
empiricism by considering its empirical adequacy for one of the many 
domains of science, namely paleoanthropology. The choice for this 
branch of science is not altogether coincidental. Van Fraassen's empiri-
cism proves to be very useful in analyzing quantum mechanics. Indeed, it 
is not unreasonable to argue that one of its main motives stems from the 
latest developments in quantum mechanics (cf. Van Fraassen 1982a, 
1982b, 1989, 1991). Yet it seems that other branches of science, more 
specifically, those branches of science that only involve observables, are 
prima facie the most favourable cases on which empiricism as a philos-
ophy of science sheds its light. We will investigate in this chapter whether 
this is indeed the case for an important contribution to the history of the 
science of paleoanthropology. 
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In current philosophy of science there are at least two theories of 
science that have labelled themselves constructivist. Next to constructive 
empiricism there is also Giere's constructive realism (Giere 1985b, 1988). 
One of the points of controversy between these philosophies (according to 
Giere at least) is precisely which of these two philosophies of science is 
the most empirically adequate theory of science. I will test this using a 
well-known theory in paleoanthropology.' 
There is an ongoing philosophical debate in a certain domain of anthro-
pology, namely archaeology. Some archaeologists discuss the role of phil-
osophy, and, more specifically, the role of philosophy of science and 
epistemology for archaeology.2 One form of, what one might call reflec-
tive, archaeology, to wit New or Processual Archaeology, can be charac-
terized as a positivistic attitude toward archaeological theories.3 It was the 
repudiation of the logical empiricist philosophy of science that stirred 
some confusion in, and initiated several movements against, this "New" 
Archaeology. 
In this chapter I will investigate whether empiricism is (again) a live 
option for what may be called a philosophy of anthropology. How well 
does van Fraassen's constructive empiricism fare as the purported proper 
epistemic attitude in a 'reflective anthropology'? Part of this question is 
implicitly present in M. Salmon's fine study Philosophy and Archaeology 
(1982, esp. 162). We will try to find an answer to the question what the 
proper epistemic attitude in paleoanthropology is. 
I will here concentrate on this latter branch of anthropology.4 If we 
take John T. Robinson's early and classic study on the splitting of the 
Australopithecines into two species, Australopithecus and Paranthropus, 
we will consider one of the prima facie most favourable cases for con-
structive empiricism in physical paleoanthropology (Robinson 1963). Yet 
1
 As far as semantic theories of science are concerned I will limit myself to these 
two theories. I will therefore not consider Frederick Suppe's quasi-realism (Suppe 
1989) (cf. also Lloyd 1988). 
2
 Cf. Taylor (1948), Binford & Binford (1968), Binford (1968), (1972), (1981), 
(1983), (1989), Watson, LeBlanc & Redman (1971), Fritz & Plog (1970), Wylie 
(1985). 
3
 But see Binford (1983: 106-8) for some critical remarks on this characterization. 
4
 Cf. Foley (1987), Ciochion & Fleagle (1987), Conroy (1990), Poirier (1990), 
and Ciochion & Fleagle (1993). 
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my conclusion will be that even in this case it is far from clear whether 
the constructive empiricist attitude is indeed the proper epistemic attitude 
to take. 
In section 4.4 the relation between paleoanthropology and archaeology 
will be briefly discussed. The intimacy of reflective archaeology with 
philosophy of science will be highlighted and an argument is given for the 
relevance of paleoanthropology for the assessment of the empirical ade-
quacy of constructive empiricism and realism. In sections 4.2 and 4.3 
these two new theories of science will be briefly discussed. The semantic 
approach of scientific theories will be emphasized and the notions of state-
space, (theoretical) model and theoretical hypotheses will be introduced. In 
4.4.4 a possible model for Robinson's theory is developed in order to 
argue that paleoanthropology can be modelled on the model of science 
constructivist philosophies of science depict. 
In section 4.4.5.1 the observability of the subject matter of paleo-
anthropology will be examined by taking van Fraassen's principle of 
observability into account. It will be argued that many but not all entities 
in paleoanthropology are observable. This means that in the acceptance of 
palaeoanthropological theories beliefs are involved that concern the exist-
ence of unobservables. This ought to be fatal to the constructive empiricist 
and it is illustrated by Robinson's study.3 However, there is a way out for 
the constructive empiricist. He may present his philosophy of science as a 
normative philosophy of science and accuse the reflective scientist of not 
taking the proper epistemic attitude toward scientific theories (4.4.5.4). 
But this seems simply not to be acceptable if we are in search for an 
empirically adequate philosophy of science. 
4.2 Constructive empiricism 
4.2.1 The revival of empiricism in philosophy of science 
Considering the different philosophical attitudes taken up towards science 
in 1969, 1977, and 1980 respectively, we notice the decline and rise of 
11 do realize that my conclusions are based upon a one-case study. Definitive 
refutation of constructive empiricism is therefore not to be expected. 
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empiricism in philosophy of science. The 1969 'Illinois Symposium on the 
Structure of Scientific Theories' can be seen as the intellectual funeral of 
logical positivism (Suppe 1977: 4). Chaos ruled in philosophy of science 
when the Received View of the logical positivists appeared to be 'inad­
equate as an analysis of scientific theories'. Honesty compels us to admit 
that it was the Wiener Kreis itself which criticized this Received View 
first, culminating in the philosophical death of logical empiricism in 
Hempel (1950), (1951), and (1965). The Symposium 'was convened to 
bring together leading figures in philosophy of science, and allied disci­
plines, to sort out prevailing chaos and to search for new, productive intel­
lectual directions to follow' (Suppe 1977: 4). 
The Received View 'construed scientific theories as axiomatic theories 
formulated in a mathematical logic V meeting certain conditions (Suppe 
1977: 16). The basic idea underlying the Received View was to distin­
guish an observational vocabulary V0 containing only observation terms, a 
theoretical vocabulary VT containing only theoretical terms, and correspon­
dence rules С which gave an explicit definition of the terms of VT in terms 
of V0. This idea was modified to the Received View which says 'that 
theories are to be thought of as 'partially interpreted calculi' in which only 
the 'observational terms' are 'directly interpreted' (the theoretical terms 
being only 'partially interpreted', or, some people even say, 'partially 
understood')' (Putnam 1962: 215). 
Frederick Suppe summarizes the inadequacy of the Received View 
(1977: 117). What is important to my exposition of constructive empiri­
cism and realism are criticisms #2 and #8: 
2. No distinction between direct-observation and non-direct observation 
terms may be assumed ... 8. Whatever formalization is involved must be 
semantic, not syntactical, (loc. cit.) 
In Suppe's 'Afterword' (1977), accompying the Symposium's proceed­
ings, the alternatives and competitors to the Received View, which he calls 
the Weltanschauungen analyses of Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend, are pre­
sented as undergoing the same fate as logical positivism (Suppe 1977: 
633-4). Perhaps the dismissal of these views is somewhat premature (cf. 
P.M. Churchland's (1991) elaboration of Paul Feyerabend's work and 
Horwich (ed.) (1993) on Kuhn), but these views were indeed heavily criti­
cized, so that in the early 80s the stage of philosophy of science was quite 
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empty while the audience still attended, waiting for a new protagonist to 
enter. Van Fraassen could well be this new protagonist. 
4.2.2 The semantic-empiricist approach to scientific theories 
The philosophical community of philosophers of science was in need for a 
new (and better) philosophy of science. Bas С. van Fraassen's The Scien­
tific Image (1980) quickly took the ground that was left by the logical 
empiricists and formulated the new empiricist philosophy of science, now 
known as constructive empiricism. His position proves to be a promising 
one: it has been severely, yet inconclusively (van Fraassen 1985, 1989, 
1994), criticized by many (Churchland & Hooker 1985).6 Let us briefly 
summarize the main doctrines of constructive empiricism. 
Van Fraassen formulates his position in terms of what he thinks the 
aim of science is, on the one hand, and in terms of the epistemic attitude 
the philosopher of science should take towards scientific theories, on the 
other: 
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and 
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically 
adequate. (1980: 12) 
6
 To name only some of the many authors (besides those in Churchland & Hooker 
1985) to show the diversity of criticism van Fraassen's work has initiated: 
Hausman (1982), Churchland (1982) et al. (general criticisms), Kukla (1992), 
Horwich (1991), Melchert (1985) et al. (the acceptance-belief distinction), Trout 
(1992), Giere (1988), Schlägel (1988) et al. (phenomenology of science), Kitcher 
& Salmon (1987), Lipton (1991) et al. (explanation), Brown (1982), Stairs (1984), 
some contributions in Cushing & McMullin (1989), et al. (quantum mechanics), 
Sober (1985) (intentionality), Armstrong (1988) et al. (laws and causality), Talbott 
(1991), Kvanvig (1994) et al. (voluntarism) etc., etc. 
My interpretation of van Fraassen's position (to be developed in chapters 4 & 
5) differs in a fundamental respect from the one recently offered by Rosen in his 
'What is Constructive Empiricism?' (1994). In this latter study, van Fraassen's 
category mistake (the idea that one can have pragmatic reasons for belief, cf. 
chapter 5) goes by unnoticed. 
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Van Fraassen takes criticism #8 of the Received View seriously and devel-
ops a semantical approach to scientific theories. The structure of a scien-
tific theory should no longer be explicated in terms of syntax (since this 
proved to result in an inadequate theory of science) but rather in terms of 
semantics. A scientific theory should no longer be identified by 'a body of 
theorems', that is, in an axiomatic way, but it should rather be identified 
by a 'class of structures as its models' (1980: 44). Van Fraassen is very 
clear in explicating this idea: 
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and 
secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substruc-
tures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena. 
The structures which can be described in experimental and measurement 
reports we call appearances: the theory is empirically adequate if it has 
some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substruc-
tures ofthat model. (1980: 64, cf. 1989: 217-232) 
As one can easily see van Fraassen's empiricism heavily depends on the 
notions of empirical adequacy and observability. But even here van 
Fraassen is quite willing to offer the content of these concepts. Some X is 
observable if 'there are circumstances which are such that, if X is present 
to us humans under those circumstances, then we (humans) observe it' 
(1980: 16). Finally, we should mention that empirical adequacy 'concerns 
actual phenomena: what does happen, and not, what would happen under 
different circumstances' (60). 
These ingredients of constructive empiricism are indeed sufficient to 
state the current controversy between new-bom empiricists and (scientific) 
realists. I think we may point to van Fraassen's book as the locus classi-
cus of this controversy, and more specifically to the following passage: 
With this new picture of theories in mind, we can distinguish between two 
epistemic attitudes we can take up toward a theory. We can assert it to be 
true (i.e. to have a model which is a faithful replica, in all detail, of the 
world), and we can call for belief; or we can simply assert its empirical 
adequacy, calling for acceptance as such. In either case we stick our necks 
out: empirical adequacy goes far beyond what we can know at any given 
time. (All results of measurement are not in; they will never be in; and in 
any case, we won't measure everything that can be measured.) Nevertheless 
there is a difference: the assertion of empirical adequacy is a great deal 
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weaker than the assertion of truth, and the restraint to acceptance delivers 
us from metaphysics. (68-9) 
Before elaborating on the constructive empiricist attitude toward paleo-
anthropology we should first describe in somewhat more detail the opposi-
tion to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, namely Ronald Giere's 
constructive realism. Indeed, van Fraassen himself leaves open the possi-
bility of sharing the semantic approach to scientific theories while dis-
agreeing on the empiricist doctrines (1985: 289, 1987: 107, 1991: 15).7 
4.3 Constructive realism: similarities and differences with constructive 
empiricism 
Giere accepts the analysis of science in terms of models. He uses the term 
theoretical model 'to refer either to a general model or to one of its speci-
fic versions obtained by specifying unique values for all parameters and 
initial conditions' (1985b: 78). Both van Fraassen and Giere accept the 
notion of a state-space to identify the model, and to allow for modalities 
(van Fraassen 1980: 67, 1991: 26-33, Giere 1985b: 78). A state-space dia-
gram illustrates the evolution of the state of the system in state-space. 
Next to a theoretical model Giere distinguishes theoretical hypotheses (cf. 
1988: 78-82): 
I propose we take theoretical hypotheses to have the following general 
form: the designated real system is similar to the proposed model in spec-
ified respects and to specified degrees. (1985b: 80) 
Giere agrees with van Fraassen that this model-theoretic approach to 
science leaves open all kinds of possible philosophical positions. Van 
Fraassen's position amounts to specifying the respects in which the model 
is isomorphic to the designated real system. The constructive empiricist 
7
 Cf. Lloyd 1988. In response to a question by Callebaut on Giere's realism 
Lloyd, a supporter of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, says: 'The pressure 
to take a position on the realism/antirealism issue has astonished me from the very 
beginning. I thought, and I still do think, that you can do a huge amount of philo-
sophical work without taking a position on that issue.' (Callebaut 1993: 178). 
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insists that acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief only that 
the model is isomorphic to the real system with regard to the observable 
aspects. Giere thinks it is rational to believe the model to be similar with 
regard to the detectable aspects (1985b: 81-2). 
The class of detectable objects is larger than the class of observable 
objects. Electrons are unobservable but yet detectable by using for instance 
a Glaser bubble chamber. Many authors have argued that the crucial 
notion in science is scientific detectability rather than human observability, 
as have for instance Churchland (1979, 1985) and Shapere (1982)." But 
for detectability to be an argument against van Fraassen one has to argue 
that detection leads to the belief in the existence of unobservables. How-
ever, van Fraassen can argue that concluding to the claim that an unob-
servable is detected means nothing more than accepting certain scientific 
theories for which belief only in the empirical adequacy is involved. Van 
Fraassen may not have any difficulty in accepting the claim that an unob-
servable is detected, but he would object to believing the claim that an 
unobservable has been detected. (Detection of observables is of course no 
problem for the constructive empiricist.) 
Yet Giere is right in posing the question how van Fraassen picks out 
the empirical substructures. The answer van Fraassen gives is that science 
itself picks out the empirical substructures by deciding what is observable 
and what is unobservable to the unaided human eye: 
Measurement interactions are a special subclass of physical interactions in 
general. The structures definable from measurement data are a subclass of 
the physical structures described. It is in this way that science itself distin-
guishes the observable which it postulates from the whole it postulates. The 
distinction, being in part a function of the limits science discloses on 
human observation, is an anthropocentric one. But since science places 
human observers among the physical systems it means to describe, it also 
gives itself the task of describing anthropocentric distinctions. (1980: 59) 
This does not mean that observability is theory-dependent since nothing is 
observable because of a theory. Something is observable because of the 
human physiology and psychology. In this way the scientist solves the 
8
 Others have argued for manipulation (Hacking 1983) or the combination of 
induction, detectability and manipulation (Harre 1986). Cf. eh. 7. 
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constructive empiricist problem of picking out the empirical substructures 
from the model (van Fraassen 1980: S7-8, 198S: 30S-S). 
However, Giere uses a much stronger argument against van Fraassen's 
empiricism. This ingenious argument considers physical modalities, deci-
sion theory and the role of background knowledge (1985b: 82-95). To dis-
cuss this argument properly we need to go into details and this would only 
distract us from the central issue of this chapter, which is the empirical 
adequacy of constructive empiricism. Still, we can summarize the some-
what disappointing outcome of Giere's argumentation. Giere admits that 
he cannot find any justifying relationships that can 'determine whether the 
realist hypothesis on realistic background is better justified than the 
empiricist hypothesis with an empiricist background' (1985b: 94). Giere 
further admits that an appeal to values cannot decide the issue either, but 
he concludes: 
it does put the issue in better focus. The question for van Fraassen is why 
he prefers empiricist hypotheses. It cannot simply be a matter of epistemic 
caution, since ... [h]e is willing to take some risks. Why is he unwilling to 
take a few more? Nor is it sufficient to point to the spectre of metaphysics. 
The physical modalities he would regard as metaphysical are for others the 
essence of theoretical science. (1985b: 94) 
And he is probably right in this. Why does van Fraassen want to draw an 
(albeit vague) line between observables and unobservables? 
Deviti (1991) offers a detailed analysis of the origins for van 
Fraassen's empiricism. He concludes that van Fraassen's empiricism ap-
parently depends upon a new epistemology (Deviti 1991: 148, 153). Van 
Fraassen wants to argue that acceptance of a scientific theory involves the 
belief only that the theory is empirically adequate. Nevertheless, according 
to him, it can be rational to go beyond the (empirical) evidence (1980: 87-
9, 1985: 248). Deviti sees a sprouting epistemology here. Yet, for the 
moment, the new empiricist epistemology keeps us waiting, and Devitt's 
argument against the constructive empiricist, based upon "traditional" 
epistemology, sounds convincing.' 
9
 In chapter 5 I will discuss this new empiricist epistemology. In that chapter it is 
concluded that this epistemology is, if coherent, implausible. 
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Devitt's argument is that 'considerations that support' the constructive 
empiricist theses that (1) experience yields information about observed 
entities and (2) experience yields information about unobserved observ-
ables, undermine the constructive empiricist thesis that experience does not 
yield information about unobservables (1991: 149 ff.). Since van Fraassen 
admits that the gathered information about observed and unobserved 
observables is uncertain, the embarrassing question arises why experience 
cannot, in a risky way, inform us about unobservables (150): 'Ruling out 
all knowledge of unobservables seems arbitrary'. Van Fraassen has got to 
back up his distinction between accepting and believing by a new epis-
temology. 
So far we have been considering some internal philosophical arguments 
against constructive empiricism. However, internal criticism is but one 
kind of criticism. External criticism, i.e. the alleged empirical inadequacy 
of constructive empiricism for the actual practice and the history of 
science, is also possible. Giere observes flaws in reflexive constructive 
empiricism: according to its own standard of empirical adequacy, con-
structive empiricism seems not to be empirically adequate at all: 
It is very difficult, I think, to save the phenomena of molecular biology, as 
a scientific enterprise, using the empiricist model. The major figures in the 
1950s, Pauling, Watson, Crick, et al., could not be described as having the 
goal of merely accounting for the phenomena of X-ray diffraction and 
chemical reactions ... Van Fraassen's willingness radically to reinterpret 
how scientists talk and act raises serious questions about the phenomena 
which a theory of science is to save. (Giere 1985b: 95-6, cf. 1988: 128) 
In Explaining Science Giere considers what could be supporting evidence 
for constructive empiricism, viz. the laboratory studies of Latour & 
Woolgar (1979) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) (1988: 11 Iff). From these 
studies van Fraassen could, if he wanted to and with some reformulations, 
draw the conclusion that what is going on in science is not what scientists 
say is going on, viz. deploying activities that aim for true theories and 
involve belief in the existence of unobservables. Van Fraassen only needs 
the claim that what is really going on in science is not always what scien-
tists say is going on. So he may as well assert that what is really going on 
is the deployment of activities to achieve empirically adequate theories. In 
this way van Fraassen could save the phenomena of scientific practice. 
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To my mind, there is something fundamentally wrong with this re­
sponse to the problem of the adequacy of his empiricism. Of course Giere 
also criticizes this response, but to my mind he does so wrongly (1988: 
130). Giere thinks it has to do with a quarrel between the realist and 
empiricist on the question what the phenomena are which must be explain­
ed by a theory of science. But I think it has rather to do with the fact that 
van Fraassen is much more interested in an α priori analysis of what 
would be the proper epistemic attitude towards scientific theories. 
One of the most meaningful remarks in van Fraassen (1985) concerns 
footnote 6. There van Fraassen states: 
It is philosophers, not scientists (as such), who are realists or empiricists, 
for the difference in views is not about what exists but about what science 
is. (255) 
So I think van Fraassen is actually not so much interested in the phenome­
nology of science, but rather in what a scientist would say if he would 
describe his epistemic commitment 'by stepping back for a moment', by 
becoming a philosopher of science. As a philosopher of science construc­
tive empiricism would then be the compelling theory of science, since this 
is the correct result of a priori philosophical considerations}0 According 
to van Fraassen the reflective scientist would say 'something like: the 
theory entails that electrons exist, and not all theories do, and my epistem­
ic attitude towards this theory is Λ" (1980: 82). But what would van 
Fraassen say if the scientist would take the "wrong" epistemic attitude, say 
a constructive realist one? Surely, van Fraassen would convince this scien­
tist to alter his epistemic attitude since accepting a theory involves the 
belief only that a theory is empirically adequate! 
Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism seems to be mainly construed 
on a priori empiricist principles. Constructive empiricism appears to be a 
full-blooded normative philosophy of science, dictating what is the proper 
epistemic attitude toward scientific theories, no matter what scientists say 
10
 Cf. MacKinnon's remark, already in 1979, that 'van Fraassen's insistence on a 
literal construal of scientific language does not signal an attempt to analyze what 
scientists intend to say in the claims they make. It means, rather: what might I, or 
any other reasonable rational reconstructionist, be claiming if I were to affirm my 
own rational reconstruction of a scientific theory?' (1979: 519). 
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they believe. That is why his empiricism can accommodate scientific prac­
tice and the history of science by reinterpreting this practice and the his­
tory of science. 
Van Fraassen could of course argue that his empiricism stems from 
new developments in Quantum Mechanics. He could argue that Bell's In­
equality is actually violated, as is shown by for instance Aspect et al. 
(1982), that this is in agreement with quantum mechanical predictions and 
that this undermines scientific realism (van Fraassen 1982a, 1982b). This 
would show that his empiricism is grounded in a posteriori principles of 
physics: the world could have been different and constructive empiricism 
could have been wrong. However, I do not see how this conclusion could 
affect the whole of science and could lead to an overall epistemic attitude 
toward scientific theories, irrespective of their domains (cf. Giere 1988: 
97-8, Harre 1986, Levin 1990, McMullin 1991). 
The constructive empiricist faces one of the following tasks: either his 
theory of science is an a priori theory of science so that he must develop 
a new plausible empiricist epistemologica! distinction between acceptance 
and belief, or his theory of science is an о posteriori theory of science and 
he must show that it is empirically adequate. In the next chapter I will 
discuss van Fraassen's new epistemology (van Fraassen 1989) and it will 
be argued that it makes constructive empiricism implausible. Since many 
will argue that constructive empiricism is an empirically inadequate theory 
of science, the empiricist is trapped in a dilemma. 
However, given the constructive empiricist principle of observation, 
paleoanthropology (and perhaps the whole of anthropology) seems prima 
facie to be a case for constructive empiricism (as I will explain in section 
4.4). Therefore, the dilemma may be a false dilemma: there may actually 
be scientific disciplines to which a constructive empiricist attitude is the 
most appropriate attitude to take. Judgments on the empirical inadequacy 
of constructive empiricism may be too quick. The conclusion Giere draws 
in his Explaining Science with regard to empiricism is therefore to my 
mind correct: 
realism provides the proper account for at least some important areas of 
modern science. [E]mpiricism will have been shown not to be [a] generally 
applicable account [it has] claimed to be. This finding, of course, will not 
mean that empiricism ... might not apply in some areas of science. Which 
type of account applies must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Only then 
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might one seek some rough generalizations regarding the kind of circum-
stances in which realism, rather than empiricism ... provides the best 
account. (1988: 112)" 
It is to be expected that paleoanthropology is one of these areas of sci-
ence to which empiricism is applicable as a descriptive philosophy of 
science and the question to which extent empiricism is empirically ade-
quate with regard to this science is the topic of the next section. 
4.4 Testing philosophies of science for empirical adequacy: a case from 
paleoanthropology 
Kuhn's revolutionary book on the structure of scientific revolutions made 
very clear that the history of science and the actual practice of science 
obviously have a role to play within philosophy of science (Kuhn 1970, 
cf. McMullin 1970). However, liberating though this post-positivistic idea 
is, testing philosophies of science on the actual practice of science suffers 
from great difficulties. Let me briefly discuss these difficulties. 
If actual science is taken to be the touchstone of true philosophy of 
science, that is, if actual science is used as a justification for a theory of 
science, we can aptly speak of the justificational priority of science over 
philosophy of science (cf. Derksen 1986). With regard to scientific ratio-
nality, Laudan (1977) tried to argue for his own philosophy of science on 
the basis of the fact that his analysis of science in terms of problem-solv-
" Compare Giere's remarks in Callebaut (1993: 171, 184): 'Look, antirealism is 
just bizarre; it is not logically impossible, of course, but it's bizarrel ... In some 
of my own laboratory research I find that scientists use what to many people are 
highly theoretical things - protons and neutrons - but they use them as research 
tools to do sophisticated experiments on the structure of matter about which at 
this time they are not very clear. But I would want to say that there is at this 
point no reasonable doubt - although it is logically possible that they are wrong -
nor do we have any reason to doubt, that they understand pretty well the major 
characteristics of, say, protons and neutrons, especially as they use them in the 
laboratories.' See chapter 7 for a discussion of the manipulation argument for 
entity realism and chapter 5 for a discussion of the role of the concept of rational-
ity of scientific beliefs in constructive empiricism. 
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ing effectivity fitted the 'preferred (unaminous and normative) intuitions' 
of scientists themselves best. In his Science and Hypothesis (1981a) he 
further claimed that scientific theories even justify methodologies to the 
extent that these methodologies (or philosophies of science) are successful 
in explaining the success of the scientific methods in producing successful 
scientific theories. 
However, Laudan offers no decisive reasons for these claims (Derksen 
1986)12. It could well be that the preferred intuitions of scientists, in 
Laudan's case allegedly accounted for by his philosophy of science, were 
chosen for the wrong reasons. One has to admit that only those intuitions 
are allowed to serve as test-cases which have already been established as 
rational intuitions, viz. as based on good reasons. From this it is clear that 
there can be no general justificational priority of science over the philos-
ophy of science. 
Furthermore, the success of methods, to be found in the success of the 
scientific theories they produce, cannot justify the methods as truth-gener-
ators since success does not imply (approximate) truth (an argument 
Laudan himself is only too eager to apply in his attack on scientific real-
ism (Laudan 1981b)). As Derksen rightfully states: 
if the success of a method does not justify that method, how could it jus-
tify the methodology that fits that method best? (1986: 260) 
Do these difficulties then block the idea of putting philosophies of 
science to the scientific-historical test? Is it useless to put the new philos-
ophies of science, constructive empiricism and constructive realism, to an 
empirical test? I think not. Surely, we must remind ourselves of the fact 
that there may not be an absolute justificational priority of science over 
philosophy of science. Yet, this leaves open the possibility of some depen-
dence of philosophy of science on the history and actual practice of 
science. The history of science becomes a last resort in philosophy of 
science whenever there are no decisive internal philosophical reasons for 
12
 In fact, what Derksen argues is the even stronger claim that Laudan's own 
(rational) reconstruction of part of the history of physics demonstrates that, at 
least with regard to most of the issues Laudan mentions, there is no justificational 
priority of science over the philosophy of science. 
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accepting one theory of science over another, while all (leading) philos-
ophers of science accept some sample of historical cases as paradigmatic 
cases of good science. So, instead of choosing a set of intuitions scientists 
have of their science, we choose a set of shared intuitions philosophers of 
science have of what is to count as science and what not. As in the case of 
naive falsificationism one can always argue that no theory is scientific if it 
is not falsifiable, but one isolates oneself from the philosophic community 
if there is agreement on paradigmatic cases of good science that obviously 
do not satisfy the basic Popperian criterium for good science. 
There is, then, reason to believe that we can (and perhaps must) deter-
mine the empirical adequacy of philosophies of science.13 Let us now 
return to our initial topic, the relevance of paleoanthropology for philos-
ophy of science,14 and tentatively conclude that palaeoanthropological 
theory, practice and history, can be a touchstone for theories of science. In 
13
 Cf. also R. Laudan, L. Laudan &. A. Donovan (1988) for a related discussion. 
(See De Regt (1994) for a commentary on the attempt of Slofstra (1994) to test 
Kuhn's theory of science on the history of Dutch archaeology). 
14
 The question whether palaeoanthropology is intuitively classified by philos-
ophers as a science now becomes pressing. I would like to stick my neck out and 
claim that palaeoanthropology (as it is depicted for instance in the textbooks of 
Conroy, Poirier, Ciochion & Fleagle and others) will be classified as scientific by 
most philosophers of science, even though we still lack clear criteria for good 
science. Of course, there are severe criticisms on the scientific status of 
palaeoanthropology, as for instance Cartmill (1990). Cartmill says: 'In one way or 
another, policing and maintaining the [animal-human] boundary has been a tacit 
objective of most palaeoanthropological model-building since the late 1940s. The 
theoretical content of palaeoanthropology has suffered accordingly.' (1990: 178) 
Cartmill observes that the 'qualitative discontinuity between people and animals 
has diminished the theoretical content of palaeoanthropological discourse' {loc. 
cit.). Nevertheless, although all kinds of non-epistemic factors influence the con-
tent of palaeoanthropological theories, this cannot be an argument against the 
scientific character of palaeoanthropology, since all kinds of non-epistemic factors 
influence all kinds of undisputed scientific theories. There are, as the critique of 
Cartmill itself shows, implicit canons of rationality which seem to be fairly inde-
pendent of context. This gives one hope that after 'the collapse of the classical 
primatological synthesis in the 1970s', palaeoanthroplogy will appear purified on 
the scenes of science, as, to my mind, it already has, witnessing the scholarly 
work of for instance Conroy and Poirier. 
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the next section I will link the discussion in current philosophy of science 
between constructive empiricists and realists to anthropology. Since van 
Fraassen's constructive empiricism is at least conceptually compatible with 
anthropology, more specifically with paleoanthropology (as I will argue 
in section 4.4.5.1), the aim of the remaining sections of this chapter is to 
assess the plausibility of constructive empiricism by testing it for empirical 
adequacy on paleoanthropology. 
My conclusion will be that it is not at all clear whether constructive 
empiricism is empirically adequate with regard to paleoanthropology. 
Consequently, in his reflective moment, the anthropologist, becoming a 
philosopher of anthropology, should be careful in accepting constructive 
empiricism as the weakest, empirically adequate, claim. 
4.4.1 Anthropology 
American anthropology distinguishes four fields of study: cultural anthro-
pology, archaeology, linguistics and physical anthropology. In general, ar-
chaeology can be described as the systematic study of (past) material cul-
ture or the cultural evolution of mankind. Physical anthropology can be 
described as the systematic study of the physical evolution of mankind; pa-
leoanthropology is usually seen as a branch of physical anthropology.15 
From a philosophy of science perspective it is evident that there is an 
analogy between archaeology and paleoanthropology since the same epis-
temologica! and methodological problems arise with regard to both anthro-
pological sciences. Both sciences aim for knowledge of the past of man-
kind, and reflection on paleoanthropology will therefore yield (mostly) 
the same philosophical problems as they are found in reflective archae-
ology. Before considering a philosophy of science for paleoanthropology 
it is therefore illuminating to summarize the main developments that led to 
New Archaeology and its critics. 
19
 This constellation of anthropological sciences clearly has its historical origins. A 
more a-historical division of the anthropological sciences can be attained if we 
consider the cultural and physical evolution of mankind. We could then divide 
anthropology into two main subdivisions, viz. contemporary anthropology and 
paleoanthropology. Contemporary anthropology could be divided into cultural 
anthropology and physical anthropology; paleoanthropology into archaeology and 
physical paleoanthropology. 
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4.4.2 Archaeology and Philosophy of Science 
In her book Philosophy and Archaeology16 Merilee Salmon17 takes the 
New Archaeology as the starting point for her study. Salmon states: 
My starting point is ... the efforts of "New Archaeologists", to seek, in 
works of philosophy of science, fairly specific guidelines for ways to make 
their discipline more scientific, that is, to ensure that archaeological claims 
embody knowledge rather than guesswork. (1982: 2) 
In her article on the relation between philosophy and archaeology, Wylie 
sees the New Archaeology originating from a critique by Kluckhohn 
(1939) of empiricist presuppositions in human archaeology (Wylie 1985: 
480). What Wylie calls the self-reflective turn in archaeology, Clarke calls 
archaeology's conceptual 'loss of innocence' (Clarke 1973). The reason 
for criticizing the practice of archaeology and anthropology is clear. Wylie 
states (cf. Wylie 1989, Dunnell 1989: 5-6): 
The reflective analyses initiated by the New Archaeologists purported to 
show that [the empirical and methodological inadequacies of "traditional" 
research] can be traced directly to the "empiricism" that Kluckhohn and 
others among his contemporaries had challenged in the 1930s and to a 
series of unnecessarily limiting and, indeed, highly implausible assumptions 
about the nature of "culture" and of the sources of its material variability. 
Philosophical discourse served primarily in a critical capacity in these 
initial debates. (1985: 480) 
According to Wylie however, the tragedy in this movement was that 
instead of importing the philosophical methods into archaeology (viz. 
methods of conceptual analysis), as was the original idea, New Archaeol-
ogists in fact imported alleged philosophical results (Wylie 1985: 482-3). 
In search of an adequate philosophy of science, they choose the one that 
seemed to give the best solutions to the methodological problems in phil-
16
 According to Wylie 'the first extensive philosophical study of archaeology' 
(Wylie 1985: 487). 
17
 According to Dunnell the only one who attempts to 'analyse archaeological 
positions in a manner that [is] useful to archaeologists' (Dunnell 1989: 7). 
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osophy of science at the time. They accepted the Hempelian logical positi-
vistic deductive-nomological model of explanation, therewith implicitly 
accepting yet again the empiricist presuppositions in human archaeology 
(Watson, P. et.al. 1971). 
Yet, with the demise of logical positivist theory of science (or, as 
Putnam (1962) called it, the Received View) New Archaeologists were in 
trouble. Should they now accept the post-empiricist philosophies of 
science of Hanson and Kuhn, even though these were disputed philoso-
phies of science? Should they accept any philosophy of science at all after 
the failure of logical positivism? Fierce debates amongst archaeologists 
finally resulted in a reaction against the very idea that philosophy (of 
science) could play a constructive role in archaeology, and consequently in 
a return to innocent archaeology. 
Wylie distinguishes four objections that were made to accepting 'philo-
sophical discourse in archaeology' (481-2): theories in philosophy of 
science were (i) inapplicable within archaeology (though applicable in 
physics), (ii) inconsistent with the aims New Archaeology initially set 
itself (to wit, anti-empiricist aims), (iii) inadequate as models of science 
(witnessing the post-empiricist confusion within philosophy of science), 
and (iv) imported in a way (namely as established results) that was 'inher-
ently counter-productive'. A central theme in reflective archaeology, there-
fore, became the very possibility of 'inter-disciplinary borrowing'. 
However, Wylie is rather optimistic on possible 'interaction patterns' 
(Schiffer 1981) and pleads for a secondary loss of innocence in archaeol-
ogy. Ironically though, she explicitly uses philosophical results to argue 
for this. More specifically, she uses the results of a philosophical analysis 
of explanation into why-questions to account for the differences in archae-
ology and philosophy, viz. Salmon's and van Fraassen's pragmatic theory 
of explanation. Wylie says: 
Even when archaeologists and philosophers raise the same questions about 
the nature of science, their general presuppositions about the subject and 
the interests that motivate their request for explanation for it may lead 
them to consider very different features of the subject puzzling and to 
identify different factors as explanatory of those. (1985: 484) 
But at the same time the pragmatics of explanation offer the very possibil-
ity of a collaboration of philosophy and archaeology. According to Wylie, 
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the philosopher of science and the reflective archaeologist could share the 
same interest, namely to come to a theory of (archaeological) science by 
taking actual practice as their immediate subject1* (cf. McMullin 1970). 
Therefore, Wylie concludes that 'the disjunction between philosophy and 
archaeology identified by the radical critics of archaeological philosophiz-
ing is by no means irreparable' (485). For the argument that I want to 
explore it is important to note her overall conclusion. Wylie states: 
The theories of science appropriated by archaeologists proved irrelevant 
because they were, in part, descriptively inadequate [that is, empirically 
inadequate] and because they did not deal with scientific practice at a level, 
or in the kind of concrete detail, that could have yielded useful methodo-
logical directives. This is a serious difficulty but it is not so profound that 
it supports a general argument against importation. (1985: 485, cf. 1989: 2) 
This being said, it is interesting to note that a new empiricist philos-
ophy of science seems to be available to anthropologists (archaeologists 
and palaeoanthropologists alike): van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. I 
would like to apply the philosophic strategy that takes paleoanthropology 
as a subject matter in philosophy of science, and more specifically as a 
possible illustration of the plausibility of constructive empiricism. I will 
explore the empirical adequacy of constructive empiricism by turning to 
the actual practice of paleoanthropology. More specifically, I will analyse 
John T. Robinson's classic theory on the Australopithecines, making use 
of the original article from 1963 and of recent textbooks by Conroy and 
Poirier. 
4.4.3 The story of A ustralopithecus 
The fossils of the Australopithecines are currently interpreted as 'one of 
the true glamour areas of human evolution as these fossils document the 
initial divergence of the human lineage from that of our ape ancestors' 
(Ciochon & Fleagle 1993: 85). I will here briefly summarize the historical 
" Wylie is of the opinion that even if they do not share the same interest the 
results of philosophy of science can be of use to archaeology if for instance one 
wants to avoid in reflective archaeology the repetition of the philosophic dis-
cussion on empiricist theories of knowledge. 
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background of the scientific palaeoanthropological inquiry into the origin 
of man as far as the genus Australopithecus is concerned." 
In 1924 Raymond Dart, professor of anatomy in the Medical faculty of 
the University of Johannesburg, 'obtained20 the skull of a juvenile 
hominoid individual from the Buxton lime quarry' close to the Tswana-
village called Taung in the northern Cape Province of, what was then 
named, the Union of South Africa. It was baptised 'Taung child'. It had a 
comparatively small brain size and a relatively large snout, which are 
indicative for being a specimen of the Pongidae (apes), yet, its small 
canines and, most of all, the 'ventral position of the foramen magnum', 
which implied a virtually vertical vertebral column or backbone, are typi-
cally humanlike features. Moreover, as a brain specialist, Dart was able to 
read the structure of a natural cast of the interior of the skull and con-
cluded that the species, of which the skull represented a young individual, 
was probably an ancestral relative to Homo but it represented an altogether 
different genus: he named it Australopithecus africanus (the 'southern ape 
from Africa'). The Western Morning News (Plymouth) of 5-2-1925 printed 
this statement from Dart: 
The owner of the Taung skull was not a human being, yet he was a much 
more intelligent being than the gorilla or chimpanzee. He was unable to 
talk, but his brain had advanced in the direction required of a being whose 
offspring were ultimately to attain the power of communicating with their 
fellows by the symbolism of speech. He is, therefore, to be regarded not as 
an ape-like man but rather as a man-like ape (cited from an illustration in 
Tobias 1981) 
19
 This summary is based upon Grine (1993), Le Gros Clarke (1969), Tobias 
(1981), Conroy (1990), and the very helpful short introductions in Ciochion & 
Fleagle (eds.) (1987) and (1993) as well as several contributions to these 
palaeoanthropological readers. 
20
 'In November of that year, one of the limeworkers blasted out a part of [a] 
fossilized skull that was lying around the office of the lime-works manager when 
R.B. Young arrived. Knowing Dart's interest in fossil primates, Young brought 
the fossil back to Johannesburg and handed it over to Dart on November 28, 
1924' (Conroy 1990: 279). 
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However, the Taung skull was found in a place of which contemporary 
palaeoanthropologists thought it was the "wrong" place for this fossilized 
australopithecine skull, since Asia was generally recognized as the 'cradle 
of mankind'. Grine tells us: 
Dart's claims for the evolutionary significance of Australopithecus 
africanus were hotly disputed by the leading palaeoanthropologists of his 
day ... and despite studies by Broom, Dart, Romer and others, the hominid 
status of Australopithecus began to be more generally accepted only more 
than a decade after the discovery of the Taung skull. This acceptance 
resulted primarily from the work by Robert Broom. (1993: 198) 
In august 1936 two assistants of Dart took Robert Broom to Sterkfontein 
where he found part of an adult australopithecine skull. However, the 
important fossil findings and palaeoanthropological interpretations of Dart 
and Broom were initially neglected by the major palaeoanthropologists 
who, in England, were disputing the Piltdown skull, a British fossil find, 
that ultimately turned out to be a forgery. (It became known as the 
Piltdown fraud). Luckily, in 1947, one of the leading palaeoanthropolo-
gists, Le Gros Clarke, who seriously doubted the anthropological value of 
the Piltdown skull, left Oxford for 'an extensive African visit, beginning 
in Johannesburg': 
In addition to the Taung skull, he was able to examine at first hand the 
many similar specimens that had been recovered since 1936, which is when 
Dart's friend and associate Robert Broom had found the first australopi-
thecine fossil since Dart's original discovery. (Lewin 1987: 76) 
Le Gros Clarke rescued the australopithecine fossils 'from anthropological 
oblivion' (ibid, 75). Although he was initially doubtful 'of the suggestion 
that the australopithecines were hominids rather than pongids' he neverthe-
less intensively studied the specimens. The results of his studies 
were very illuminating. They at last convinced me that Dart and Broom 
were essentially right in their assessment of the significance of the 
australopithecines as the probable precursors of more advanced types of 
[humans]. (Le Gros Clarke, cited in Lewin 1987: 76) 
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In 1947 in a congress paper Le Gros Clarke 'formally referred to the aus-
tralopithecines as hominids, rather than by some vague term associating 
them with apes, as had become common practice' {loc. cit.). The import-
ance of the findings by Dart and Broom was recognized and the australo-
pithecines were interpreted as different from the apes and ancestral to 
man: 
it was the first time a practitioner of the authority of Le Gros Clarke had 
done so, and he did it in such a way that it could no longer be ignored. 
(Lewin 1987: 76-7) 
In 1938 Broom had recovered some hominid fossils at Kromdraai which 
were morphologically different from the fossils from Sterkfontein and 
Taung. Later on similar fossils were also found at Swartkrans: 
Broom and his colleague John T. Robinson recognized that the Kromdraai 
and Swartkrans hominid specimens, which they attributed to Paranthropus, 
differed from those of Australopithecus in a number of morphological 
features including a flattened facial skeleton, a low forehead,and a notably 
enlarged postcanine dentition, among others. (Grine 1993: 199)21 
It is with these two species that the paper of Robinson we will consider 
(Robinson 1963) is concerned. Currently, five australopithecine species are 
distinguished: A. afarensis, A. africanus, Paranthropus robustus (or A. 
robustus), P. boisei (or A. boisei) and recently, after the discovery in 1985 
by Alan Walker of a nearly complete cranium on the West side of Lake 
Turkana, P. aethiopicus. Grine distinguishes six different hypotheses on 
the evolutionary relationships of the australopithecine species (phylogene-
tic schemes) of which three are presented as falsified by the discovery of 
P. aethiopicus. The most recent hypothesis considers A. africanus as 
ancestral to both Paranthropus and Homo. P. aethiopicus is the common 
ancestor to P. boisei and P. robustus. A. africanus (the Taung child) is the 
postulated common ancestor to H. habilis, H. erectus, and finally H. 
sapiens (Grine 1993). I will not, however, be concerned with this recent 
hypothesis but will rather concentrate on Robinson's 1963 article and the 
21
 Cf. Le Gros Clarke (1969: 123-173) for an example of an analysis of 
australopithecine fossils. 
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state of affairs he depicted in this article. 
Having gained some historical insight into the case of the australopithe-
cines we must now assess the empirical adequacy of constructive empiri-
cism for this study from paleoanthropology. 
4.4.4 Models and theoretical hypotheses in palaeoanthropology" 
The first task we must set ourselves is to take a look at the models in 
palaeoanthropology, to see whether palaeoanthropological theories can be 
modelled on the general model of science on which the constructive realist 
and empiricist agree. Both Giere and van Fraassen use the model for a 
linear harmonic oscillator to illustrate the semantic approach to scientific 
theories. The state-space model is depicted in figure 1 (Giere 1985b: 78, 
van Fraassen 1991: 28). Here it is important to note that time is no dimen-
sion of the state space. Since the movements of a system like an ideal 
linear harmonic oscillator are repetitious the trajectory through state-space 
of the ideal system is simply a mapping of time on the state-space. 
Fig. 1. the state space model for an ideal linear 
harmonic oscillator (From Giere 1985b) 
21
 The following section depends heavily on the first chapter of Glenn C. 
Conroy's handbook on palaeoprimatology. 
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In paleoanthropology the physical systems under study (individuals) 
usually have an evolutionary extremely short life-span: only the fossils of 
these systems remain for million of years, depending on pre- and post-
depositional factors (to be assessed in theories of taphonomical processes). 
It can be argued that time must be a dimension of palaeoanthropological 
"state-space-like" models. Palaeoanthropologists are interested in the devel­
opment of a certain quantifiable property or character of certain (now 
fossilized) type of systems or structures through time. Since paleoanthro­
pology accepts (neo-)Darwinistic theories, the (relative) frequency of the 
system through time is also a main concern for palaeoanthropologists. The 
more so since two main models in paleoanthropology, phyletic gradual­
ism and punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge & Gould 1972), can be distin­
guished by, among other characteristics, the (relative) frequency and the 
rate of development of structures through time. Furthermore, the physical 
systems under study in paleoanthropology may develop in contrary quan­
tifiable directions. This means that because of certain identity criteria (they 
may be functional or morphological), a trajectory in a palaeoanthropolo­
gical model may split up in several other trajectories. This is usually 
expressed by a phylogram. In such a phylogram one usually plots time on 
the vertical axis. However, the dimension of the horizontal axis is not 
explicitly determined, nor is there any reference to the number of systems 
at a particular time. These phylograms can therefore not function as 
palaeoanthropological state-space-like models that satisfy constructivist 
philosophies of science. 
In a publication by Elisabeth Vrba the difference between phyletic 
gradualism and punctuated equilibrium is graphically illustrated (Vrba 
1980). These graphics lead to the idea to design a palaeoanthropological 
state-space-//^ model in (at least) three-dimensions with each dimension 
well-defined. I think many palaeoanthropological theories can thus be 
depicted as models. 
Palaeoanthropological theories concern types of systems or structures 
which can be represented as trajectories in the space of the possible states 
the type of system or structure is capable to be in. In Fig. 2 I have tried to 
draw such a model. In this model the x3-axis represents the (relative) fre­
quency (/), the x2-axis some quantifiable aspect of a type of structure (s) 
and the χ,-axis time (t). The curtain is made up of the means of the nor­
mal distributions for tokens of the type. The actual trajectory then, is 
defined by the line on which these means lie. Remember that this is not 
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the way in which palaeoanthropological theories are normally presented. 
The question merely was whether palaeoanthropological theories can be 
modelled on constructive theories of science. So far it seems we can 
answer this question in the affirmative. 
For instance, to take a concrete example from the history of paleo-
anthropology, John T. Robinson's (1963) (now superseded23) theory on 
the evolutionary relationship between Australopithecus and Paranthropus 
can be depicted in a palaeoanthropological state-space-like model. Given 
certain South African Australopithecine fossils presented by Raymond 
Dart in 1924-5 (Taung) and Robert Broom in 1938 (Kromdraai), consider 
the first lower deciduous molar (dm,) as a distinguishing character for 
these fossils (1963: 257). If we could quantify the properties of this molar 
(s), if we could assess the relative frequency of the structure (/), and if we 
could determine from what time the tokens of the structure originate (0, 
we are able to draw a trajectory. 
Fig. 2. a "state-space" like palaeoanthropological model 
23
 Wolpoff (1971), Pilbeam & Gould (1974) and McHenry (1984), (1985). 
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Subsequently, this can be done for other types of teeth (for instance the 
mandibular canines) or structures like the braincase, of which the height 
can be quantified according to Le Gros Clark's supraorbital height index, 
the nasal cavity floor, of which its 'relation to the subnasal maxillary 
surface' can probably be quantified, etc. Accordingly, we get several 
models corresponding to the evolution of these structures. How all these 
models must be related to species is not an easy question to answer. I will 
tentatively assume, in the case of Robinson's theory, that for instance 
certain characteristics of the first lower deciduous molar can be identified 
with a species, so that the diagram for this structure is the modified model 
of (the evolution of) certain hominids. 
Fig. 2 depicts Robinson's theory in a diagram. We see the development 
of a type of structure (dm,) through time (Pleistocene - early-Pliocene). 
According to Robinson's theory at one time (a time of altering environ-
mental conditions) the structure changed in one direction, becoming small-
er, as the result of adaptations that made meat part of the diet of the crea-
tures to whom the structure as a character belonged; and in another, 
becoming larger, as the result of overspecializing with regard to a vegetar-
ian diet (t,). The former corresponds to a new species of Australopithe-
cines, Australopithecus, the latter to a specializing existing species of 
Australopithecines, Paranthropus, that gave rise to Australopithecus. Ulti-
mately, Paranthropus became extinct (^). 
Let us now turn to the theoretical hypotheses that go with this model of 
Robinson in 1963. In which specified respects and to which specified 
degrees is the designated real system similar to the model? I think 
Robinson would have answered that the model is very similar to the real 
system with regard to the bifurcation itself (since this is his central thesis). 
The model is probably less similar to the real system where the means and 
intermediate means for the frequency of the quantified structure and the 
determination of t,, t2 and t3 are concerned, although the upper and lower 
time-limits for the bifurcation are given. Robinson states: 
[t]he two phyletic lines were already well differentiated early in [the Pleis-
tocene]. (1963: 265) 
And on the origins of the Australopithecines he says: 
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it is more likely that Australopithecines originated in the latter half of the 
Tertiary than in the earlier half; probably in the Pliocene, just possibly in 
the Miocene, (loc. cit.) 
With regard to the relative frequencies of the structure the model should 
however be faithful. The fact that one of the trajectories stops at a certain 
point is also taken to be correct. These then are some of the theoretical 
hypotheses. 
We may conclude that it is possible to present palaeoanthropological 
theories as theoretical models and their theoretical hypotheses and that 
both constructive empiricism and realism are adequate theories of science 
as far as the construction of models is concerned. Next, we will look for 
possible palaeoanthropological constraints on the theoretical hypotheses 
that go along with the models. Do palaeoanthropologists restrict them-
selves to beliefs only that the model is isomorphic to the real system with 
regard to the observable aspects? In the case of J.T. Robinson's theory 
this seems indeed to be the case. Let us have a closer look at this. 
4.4.5 Empirical adequacy of constructive theories of science for 
palaeoanthropology 
First of all it must be clear that it is not necessary for palaeoanthropolo-
gists to restrict themselves to theoretical hypotheses that claim an isomor-
phology of the model to the real system only in observable respects to be 
able to take (as reflective scientists) a constructive empiricist epistemic 
attitude toward their theories. Although it can never be rational to believe 
them (on epistemic grounds), it can be rational to accept them (on epis-
temic grounds). (According to van Fraassen it can even be rational to 
believe them on pragmatic grounds24). 
The question is therefore not whether the structures s in palaeoanthro-
pological models involve only observables (or, as van Fraassen rhetorically 
calls them: physical magnitudes (1991: 26)). Clearly they do not, as in the 
case of palaeoanthropological dating and classification by means of, for 
instance, molecular clocks, or palaeomagnetic, potassium-argon-, and fis-
sion track dating techniques, or, to take another example of the role of 
241 will extensively discuss this empiricist claim in chapter 5. 
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unobservables with regard to the time of Robinson's study, Goodman's 
analysis of protein sequences (Goodman 1963). Goodman focused the at-
tention on the importance of these sequences for the evolution of species. 
One of his conclusion was (cf. Poirier 1990: 55-6): 
A comparative study of the serum proteins of the Primates provides evi-
dence for the theory of man's evolution ... The data show that there was a 
marked deceleration of albumin evolution, but not of gamma globulin 
evolution, during the phylogenetic advances of the Primates. This decelera-
tion can be correlated with a placental evolution that increased the oppor-
tunity for maternal immune attacks on the fetus. Man's distant but never-
theless striking serological relationship to the tree shrew is further evidence 
that sections of the human genotype are extremely ancient, dating back to 
primitive members of the Eutheria. The serological data provide informa-
tion on the taxonomie relationships of man and other Primates. (1963: 312) 
However, the question rather is whether palaeoanthropologists have (epis-
temically grounded) beliefs that involve the existence of unobservables. 
Since Robinson (1963) surely believed that Australopithecus existed at 
some period of the earth's past it is important to ask ourselves first 
whether Australopithecus is observable on van Fraassen's account. 
4.4.5.1 Is Australopithecus observable? 
Consider again van Fraassen's principle of observation: 
X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if X is 
present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it. (1980: 16) 
This principle of observation is too vague to determine whether something 
is observable or not, since in this description the notion of observing is 
being used to describe the notion of observability. The examples van 
Fraassen gives are therefore crucial: 
A look through a telescope at the moons of Jupiter seems to me a clear 
case of observation, since astronauts will no doubt be able to see them as 
well from close up. But the purported observation of micro-particles in a 
cloud chamber seems to me a too clearly different case ... while the par-
ticle is detected by means of the cloud chamber, and the detection is based 
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on observation, it is clearly not a case of the particle's being observed. 
(1980: 16-7) 
It is clear that the species Australopithecus is not observable. Only tokens 
of the type may be observable. Is an Australopithecus observable? Are 
there circumstances such that under those circumstances we can observe 
an Australopithecus? According to van Fraassen a dinosaur is obviously 
observable: "If there were a dinosaur in this hall, you could hardly miss 
it".23 The circumstance in this case is simply 'being present'. 
In 1979 Johanson presented the new findings of what is now know as 
an exemplar of Australopithecus afarensis, nicknamed Lucy (from the 
Beatles song 'Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds' which played on the even-
ing of the discovery), that lived 3,5 mya (Johanson & White 1979, Johan-
son & Edey 1981). Now, is Lucy observable? If we were individuals of 
the same species of Australopithecus we could "in the right circumstances" 
"shake hands" with Lucy. This is not the way in which van Fraassen 
would consider Lucy to be observable. He would rather argue that if Lucy 
would now walk into the room we could observe her. Lucy and dinosaurs 
are thus observable, and belief in their existence at any time in the history 
of the world is compatible with a constructive empiricist epistemic atti-
tude. Indeed, van Fraassen clearly states: 
Missing links in biological theory are observable entities (1980: 75). 
Before we proceed I would like to pause for a moment to consider 
some other examples concerning (un)observables in anthropology, this 
time in archaeology. It will offer us the opportunity to consider (again, cf. 
section 1.7) the empiricist relation between inference to the best explana-
tion and observables as well as van Fraassen's opinion on the observa-
tional-theoretical vocabulary distinction. 
4.4.5.2 Inference to the best explanation in archaeology 
One mode of inference that may lead to the belief in the existence of 
unobservables is inference to the best explanation. The best explanation 
25
 Personal conversation Erasmus Ascension Symposium, Oosterbeek 1992. 
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for the vapour-trail in the cloud chamber is that it is caused by, say, an 
electron. The fact that an explanation is the best among several alternative 
explanations is (often) seen as giving scientists a reason to believe in the 
existence of the postulated unobservables. Pointing to this scientific rule of 
inference has therefore often been applied as an argument for a realistic 
attitude toward scientific theories (cf. Part I). But as long as the inference 
to the best explanation leads to belief in unobserved observables this mode 
of inference is allowed by constructive empiricism (cf. van Fraassen 1980: 
19-23, Lipton 1993, esp. 91-2). As long as inference to the best explana-
tion leads to the belief that a theory is empirically adequate, the empiricist 
(reflective) scientist may use this rule of inference (although several 
authors have claimed that in allowing this rule the empiricist must conse-
quently allow more than he was initially prepared to). 
If this is true, case-studies like Hanen & Kelley (1989) on inference to 
the best explanation can be accommodated by constructive empiricism if 
no unobservables are involved. In their study Hanen and Kelley discuss 
two instances of inference to the best explanation in archaeology. The first 
example concerns the postulation by Haury 'of a prehistoric migration 
from Kayenta region (Northern Arizona) south to Point of Pines' to 
account for certain archaeological evidence (Haury 1958, Hanen & Kelley 
1989: 15-6). Their second example concerns the evaluation of several hy-
potheses on the function of 'a potentially significant feature at a corner of 
a temple platform at Cihuatan (EI Salvador) which its discoverers called 
an "oven"' (1989: 16). Yet these examples that involve inferences to the 
best explanation cannot, even on the most favourable interpretation, decide 
for the (constructive) realist theory of science for archaeology nor against 
the (constructive) empiricist theory of science, since the postulated entities 
are (unobserved) observables in van Fraassen's sense. 
4.4.5.3 Salmon on the observational-theoretical distinction in archaeol-
ogy 
Another example concerning the observable/unobservable distinction in 
archaeology is provided by Salmon. In her criticism on the positivistic 
notion of operational definitions, Salmon argues that acculturation is a 
theoretical term. She continues: 
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The basis for the distinction between theoretical terms and observational 
terms is the contrast between remoteness of such abstract concepts as "elec-
tron" from any sensory experience, and the apparently close link between 
sense impressions and such terms as "red spot" and "shrill noise" ... 
Although I agree that a sharp distinction between observational and theor-
etical vocabularies is indefensible, a crude scale that admits that some 
terms are much more theory-laden than others seems quite plausible, and it 
is useful for many purposes ... Even in a crude and desultory separation of 
observational and theoretic vocabulary, "acculturation" clearly falls under 
the heading of theoretic. (1982: 147-8) 
To this I would like to make the following remarks. Salmon suggests that 
for a term to be theoretic is has to refer to entities that are remote from 
sensory experience. This does not quite correspond to how van Fraassen 
conceives the notion of a theoretical term. 
For van Fraassen terms can be theoretic or non-theoretic and entities 
can be observable or unobservable (1980: 14).26 Van Fraassen accepts the 
fact that all our useful language is theory-laden, in other words, that there 
are (probably) only theoretic terms (loc. cit.). But this does not force one 
to the conclusion that all entities are unobservable. So the distinction 
between theoretic and non-theoretic terms has nothing to do with 'remote-
ness from sensory experience'. As has been said before, the observable-
unobservable distinction is determined by the science that studies the 
observing capacities of man. Now, the term 'acculturation', as being an 
useful term in archaeology, must be a theoretical term and it obviously has 
the function to refer to a (type of) process or entity. Is acculturation 
observable? I think here is a case where the vagueness of van Fraassen's 
principle of observation is crucial. Are there any circumstances such that if 
acculturation is present under those circumstances we can observe accultu-
ration? Perhaps there are. But these circumstances would be described in 
sentences very much like the positivistic operational definitions. Perhaps 
they will not even be 'definitions', but to identify particular instances of 
acculturation we need more than an interpretation of the model. Giere 
says: 
26
 With this analysis van Fraassen is able to rebut Grover Maxwell's well-known 
argument in his (1962) that the theory/observation distinction cannot be drawn. 
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I think van Fraassen would agree that the details of this process [of ident-
ifying particular instantiations of terms of the model] are not a matter for 
philosophical analysis or for armchair psycholinguistics. Rather, the topic 
calls for deep empirical investigations into how we humans use abstract 
symbols in describing particular objects in the real world. (1985b, 78) 
And van Fraassen would of course agree. Observability is to be deter-
mined by human physiology and psychology. But if it would turn out that 
acculturation is observable, or indeed that processes in general are observ-
able, on a certain psycholinguistic account, would that same account not 
also make other kinds of entities observable like electrons? Perhaps van 
Fraassen would like to interpret processes like acculturation as relations 
between observables (and not as unobservables) where these relations are 
interpreted as 'properties of infinite sequences of individuals' (van 
Fraassen 1991: 501). What about the proper epistemic attitude toward 
relations? This question will also be raised in our discussion on the 
palaeoanthropological case. 
Whatever the outcome may be I think that only in the most favourable 
interpretation can van Fraassen insist that 'acculturation' refers to an 
observable entity. If archaeologists hold a belief about the existence of 
something unobservable like acculturation (be it because it is an unobserv-
able entity or because it is reinterpreted as a relation), they seem to be 
violating constructive empiricist epistemic principles. Yet, if acculturation 
is an unobservable entity it is van Fraassen's claim that the archaeologist 
is taking a wrong epistemic attitude toward his theory of acculturation. 
Here the empiricist falls back on the a priori character of his theory of 
science. However, the empirical adequacy of constructive empiricism for 
archaeology then becomes doubtful.27 
27
 Gibbon analyzes the importance of the theory-ladenness of observation for 
archaeology. His concern with the theory-ladenness of observation is obvious: 
understanding the nature of observation in science is fundamental to understanding 
archaeology (1989). He adheres to Shapere's well-known analysis of observation 
(Shapere 1982), in which it is concluded that the senses are to be seen as but one 
kind of information receptors and that what counts as an observation 'is a function 
of the current state of physical knowledge'. To the best of my knowledge, van 
Fraassen has not yet reacted to Shapere's argument on scientific observation. 
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To return to our palaeoanthropological case: we previously concluded 
that an Australopithecus is observable and that many theories in palaeo-
anthroplogy concern the existence of such prehistoric creatures. Palaeo-
anthropological beliefs which involve the existence of such creatures 
therefore suggest the empirical adequacy of constructive empiricism for 
this branch of science. However, unobservables are also involved in 
paleoanthropology (as in anthropology in general). Some of the main 
'unobservables' in palaeoanthropological theories are evolutionary relation-
ships, climatológica! changes, specialization of cranial and postcranial 
structures, geological changes etc. These seem to be clearly unobservable 
since no circumstances would provide us with the possibility of observing 
for instance the evolutionary relationship between Paranthropus and Aus-
tralopithecus, as in the case of Robinson's (now superseded) theory. The 
life-span of a human being is far too short to be in the circumstances to 
observe the actual process of speciation and specialization, climatológica! 
and geological changes, or evolutionary relationships. We are (so they say) 
not immortal by nature. It seems that constructive empiricism cannot be 
accommodated to the science of paleoanthropology. 
However, there are at least two possible answers available to the con-
structive empiricist. As in the case of Salmon's discussion of the archae-
ological entity or process of 'acculturation' he could argue that these 
'unobservables' are no entities at all, that they must be spelled out in 
terms of relations which obtain between observables, and that belief in the 
existence of these relations is simply not the proper epistemic attitude to 
take unless we analyse relations as observable properties of infinite 
sequences of observable individuals. Or, if we do not agree with this 
empiricist analysis of unobservable entities, he could (again) argue that the 
acceptance of palaeoanthropological theories and their unobservables is 
compatible with constructive empiricism; that is, if palaeoanthropologists 
accept theories and hold the belief only that the theory is empirically 
adequate then van Fraassen's empiricism is itself empirically adequate. 
Since the opponent of van Fraassen's empiricism will naturally object 
to the empiricist analysis of unobservables since infinite sequences are not 
observable in the sense of empiricist observability, only the second answer 
seems satisfactory. To assess the empirical adequacy of constructive 
empiricism we must therefore look for 'confessions of beliefs' by palaeo-
anthropologists. Let us look for these in Robinson (1963). 
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4.4.5.4 John T. Robinson's confession of belief in his analysis of 
australopithecine fossils 
Here is a short summary of Robinson's study from 1963. Given certain 
fossils (found in the 1920s and 1930s) which were lumped together by 
some authors as all belonging to the Australopithecines, Robinson noticed 
distinctive differences in cranio-dental form in this group of fossils. These 
brought him to the conjecture that two distinct species were involved. A 
more gracile species called Australopithecus and a more robust species 
called Paranthropus. 
The robust form shows enlargement of the cheek teeth, development of 
massive facial skeleton and chewing musculature, size reduction and 
crowding of the front teeth. The gracile form has none of these cranial-
dental features. Australopithecus was classified as more "human-like" and 
Paranthropus was seen as more of a hominized pongid. Robinson then 
posed his so-called Dietary Hypothesis: the morphological dichotomy in 
skull and dentition is correlated to behavioral and ecological differences, 
i.e the robust form shows a dietary adaptation emphasizing the crushing 
and grinding of tough vegetable material, the gracile form probably had an 
omnivorous diet. At one moment Robinson states: 
Long and intimate acquaintance with almost all the known material has 
convinced me that the specimens fit into two quite distinct groups which 
are well differentiated in morphology and apparently also in ecology and 
behaviour ... [t]he split between the two Australopithecine subgroups is far 
more fundamental than is that between one of these {Australopithecus) and 
the hominines. The other {Paranthropus) is quite aberrant as a hominid, 
whether it is compared with the contemporary Australopithecus or with the 
more advanced hominines. (1963: 257) 
In his article Robinson further speculates 'about the selective forces which 
brought the australopithecine group into existence, caused adaptive radi-
ation within the group, and resulted in the origin of man' {loc. cit.). He 
concludes to classify Australopithecus in the ancestry oí Homo and Paran-
thropus as the overspecialized ancestor of Australopithecus that went 
extinct (265, 267-8). 
Now, what about Robinson's confession of belief? I will try to list but 
some of the passages that show an epistemic attitude toward the many 
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theoretical hypotheses he holds (cf. section 4.3). With regard to the differ-
ences in morphology of cranio-dental features Robinson states: 
Considerable significance ... attaches to the reason for the differences in 
dental specialization; hence it is important to try to discover that reason. 
For there must be a reason; it is not acceptable to say that all hominids 
have one sort of dentition except Paranthropus, which has quite a different 
type, but that there is no adaptive significance in this fact - it just happened 
that way without cause. (259) 
With this in mind we may conclude that Robinson will certainly accept the 
existence of what he is about to determine as the cause for the dental spe-
cialization. It is to be expected that he will hold a belief that involves the 
existence of the cause(s). One of the reasons for the dental features of the 
fossils is that Australopithecus 'was an omnivore that ate at least a moder-
ate amount of meat'. This hypothesis seems 'not unreasonable' (260). He 
further concludes from empirical evidence that Paranthropus is known 
'only from wet climatic periods ... which is consistent with a vegetarian 
diet' (260). Robinson had the belief that Australopithecus was an omni-
vore and that Paranthropus was a vegetarian. Since this belief involves 
only observables it is consistent with an empiricist attitude. He then pro-
ceeds in applying consilience of induction arguments, independent evi-
dence arguments, and (relative) probability arguments. No confessions of 
belief in the existence of inobservables. 
Robinson then comes to the following, in the light of our discussion, 
remarkable conclusion: 
Theoretical considerations ... indicate that adaptive radiation in the early 
stages of hominid evolution is by no means improbable. The available facts 
indicate considerable morphological differences between the two well-
defined groups, more than can be found among living pongids for example, 
and imply that considerable differences in ecological adaptation were also 
involved. The ecological differences appear rather early to have involved 
differences in diet. At least differences in diet may logically be inferred 
from the morphological differences present; such a conclusion adequately 
explains the different morphology of the two groups and no alternative 
explanation has yet been advanced which does so. Furthermore, the dietary 
hypothesis is very fruitful in throwing light on the entire question of 
Australopithecine evolution and the origin from them of the hominines. 
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(261, my italics) 
The emphasized statement reveals some prudence with regard to the epis-
temic attitude Robinson is willing to take (if he is being pressed to make a 
choice). The conclusion is remarkable because Robinson clearly shows 
signs of being willing to reconsider his epistemic attitude. Here, he seems 
to state that whatever you may infer from the data, you are at least entitled 
to infer differences in diet from the morphological differences. This con-
clusion adequately explains observables. Since no unobservables are 
involved, acceptance of the theory only involves the belief that the theory 
is empirically adequate. The question of course is whether Robinson's 
epistemic attitude is determined by his awareness that observability (in van 
Fraassen's sense) 'has nothing to do with existence (is indeed, too anthro-
pocentric for that)' but that it actually may fix the 'proper epistemic atti-
tude to science' (van Fraassen 1980: 19). Consider therefore the following 
and last citation from Robinson (1963): 
If Paranthropus represents basically the original Australopithecine stock 
and Australopithecus represents an adaptively different line evolving in a 
different direction, how did the latter line arise? ... The changed environ-
mental circumstances resulting from the known desiccation of a substantial 
part of Africa during the later Tertiary could ... very easily have led to a 
second adaptive shift and the establishment of a second phyletic line in the 
Australopithecines. (265, 267) 
Here we notice that something unobservable is concerned, viz. changing 
environmental circumstances and speciation. Indeed, McMullin stresses 
that 'a geological period, such as the Devonian, is a theoretical entity', 
that is, it is 'in principle, inaccessible to our direct observation' (1984: 
27).28 If a geological period like the Devonian is unobservable then so 
are Robinson's postulated changing environmental circumstances and spe-
ciation. Now, what is the proper epistemic attitude toward these processes? 
I do not know. If Robinson believed they took place, and this seems to me 
to be very likely, does the acceptance of his own theories involve the 
28
 Likewise, according to McMullin, 'the long-vanished species of [for instance] 
the Devonian are theoretical entities' {loc. cit.). But remember van Fraassen's 
remark that missing links in biological theory are observable entities (1980: 75). 
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belief in the existence of unobservables? I do not know. This depends on 
how we philosophically analyze the notion of relations. Are relations 
observable? If we analyze them, as van Fraassen's does, as properties of 
infinite sequences of individuals then relations are certainly unobservable 
on an empiricist account. Are there circumstances which are such that if 
properties of infinite sequences of individuals are present to us under those 
circumstances, we are able to observe them? 
The discussion on the ontologica! status of relations (rather than the 
logical status) takes us back to, for instance, Russell's and Quine's work 
on relations (cf. Veatch 1954). Recently, David Armstrong discussed the 
realism-nominalism debate extensively (Armstrong 1978a, 1978b), defend-
ing an a posteriori realism (the doctrine that there are universale and that 
what universale there are has to be established a posteriori, on the basis of 
total science29) based upon an empiricist epistemology (1978a: xv). On 
the notion of relations he says: 
This century has seen great advances in the topic of the logic of relations. 
Unfortunately, advances in the philosophy of relations have not been com-
parable ... Even those philosophers who have exhibited a fairly firm grip of 
the notion of property [Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Leibnitz and Russell] have 
often been puzzled by relations. (1978b: 75) 
Armstrong suggests, like Russell, that relations are 'dyadic, triadic, n-adic 
uni versais'. The question to which we are seeking an answer is whether 
Robinson (the palaeoanthropologist) believed in the existence of relations 
between observables and if so whether this is compatible with constructive 
empiricism. The first question can be answered in the affirmative: al-
though the depicted "state-space-like" model does not involve unobserv-
ables Robinson clearly believed in some theoretical hypotheses postulating 
environmental change and speciation which seem to be relations between 
observables. Did Robinson believe in the reality of these relations and are 
these relations themselves observable? We have at our disposal at least 
three characterizations of relations: we can take them to be properties of 
infinite sequences of individuals (van Fraassen), polyadic nominal univer-
sale, or polyadic real universale (Armstrong). Except for the analysis of 
Cf. chapter 2 on Peirce's scientific realism. 
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relations as polyadic nominal universale, these notions of relations show 
them to be real but yet unobservable on van Fraassen's account of observ-
ability. 
I will not try to force a decision on the observability of relations, but 
we may at least conclude that ultimately it is the philosophical analysis of 
concepts that are being used in science that determines what the proper 
epistemic attitude toward that science is. Robinson's case can therefore not 
adjudicate for us what would be the proper epistemic attitude in palaeo-
anthropology, the constructive empiricist or realist one, although it was a 
prima facie favourable case for constructive empiricism. 
If Robinson accepted his theory postulating unobservable relations but 
only believed in its empirical adequacy, then this is evidence for the 
empirical adequacy of constructive empiricism. If, however, Robinson 
believed in unobservable relations for epistemic reasons, then this is sim-
ply incompatible with constructive empiricism as a descriptive philosophy 
of science. If, finally, Robinson believed for pragmatic reasons in unob-
servable relations he is not ipso facto irrational (according to van 
Fraassen) and, as will be made clear in chapter 5, this is again compatible 
with constructive empiricism. I think we may claim that Robinson indeed 
believed in unobservables for good, epistemic, scientific (i.e. inductive) 
reasons. It clearly shows that the empirical adequacy of van Fraassen's 
theory of science is very doubtful. 
4.4.6 Conclusion from the palaeoanthropological case study 
The one-case study from paleoanthropology must not be misunderstood. 
Surely, there are cases in paleoanthropology contemporary with 
Robinson's, like Goodman (1963), that clearly involve (allegedly epistemi-
cally grounded) belief in the existence of unobservables, and for which 
Giere's constructive realist account seems to be the most empirically 
adequate philosophy of science.30 But to argue for this was not my aim. 
What I wanted to point out was that, even in one of the prima facie most 
favourable cases in palaeoanthropology, the empirical adequacy of con-
structive empiricism depends on the truth of its metaphysical and a priori 
principles and analyses. This must be a disappointment to the empiricist-
Cf. Giere's own case studies in his (1988). 
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philosopher who wanted to do without metaphysics and a relief to the 
palaeoanthropologist who, in his reflective moments, is attracted to a real-
istic (epistemic) attitude. 
4.5 General conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold: (a) to emphasize the main features of 
constructive empiricism and (b) to discuss its empirical adequacy for the 
practice and history of science. We chose to consider only one prima facie 
favourable 'empiricist' case from paleoanthropology31. It was argued 
that even in this case the empirical adequacy of empiricism is doubtful. 
However, one may claim that to look for the degree of empirical ade-
quacy of constructive empiricism is typically to apply naturalist strategies 
in contemporary philosophy of science. From an empiricist point of view 
one seems not to be concerned with the fact to what extent one's philos-
ophy of science describes the actual practice and history of science. Our 
conclusion that the empirical adequacy of constructive empiricism is very 
low, perhaps even in the case of the prima facie favourable example of 
palaeoanthroplogy32 may therefore be irrelevant and cannot be a strong 
argument against constructive empiricism unless one already argues from 
a naturalistic perspective (that is to say, unless one is already of the opin-
ion that the actual practice and history of science play a major role in 
determining what is to be the most plausible theory of theories). To my 
mind then, case-studies from the history of science and recorded confes-
sions of belief by scientists have no impact on the plausibility of construc-
tive empiricism from an empiricist point of view. To the naturalist this is 
at once a sign that this empiricism is an old-fashioned normative philos-
ophy of science and that the empiricist's theory of science must therefore 
be rejected. But this conclusion would be too quick. Again, we witness the 
impasse in the realism-empiricism debate. Scientific realism is defended 
and constructive empiricism is criticized, on typically realist-minded 
" See for other studies the more familiar ones by Gardner (1983), (1979), 
Musgrave (1991), Bechtel (1975), Carr (1990), Vicedo (1991) etc. 
32
 Depending on the ontological analysis of relations and the nature of the reasons 
for belief in the existence of these held by the palaeoanthropologists. 
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grounds. The empiricist is of course unlikely to accept these as convinc-
ing. 
In the next chapter I will further explore these conclusions in the light 
of recent work by Bas van Fraassen (1985, 1989, 1991) and I will develop 
what is in my opinion an independent argument against constructive empi-
ricism. 
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Constructive Empiricism and the Rationality of Belief 
'I urge anyone who thinks disbelief in 
unobservables is always a rational option 
to get a microscope and acquire data' 
R. Miller, Fact and Method (1987: 465). 
5.1 Introduction 
Van Fraassen has been developing his constructive empiricism to ever 
more sophistication. In this chapter I will follow some of these develop-
ments. My main objective will be to consider in what part of the empiri-
cist labyrinth the Minotaur really roams, ready to eat all scientific realists 
that pass its way, and to see whether there is a thread of Ariadne to be 
found. 
I will consider a new line of argument against the constructive empiri-
cist and embark upon a philosophical undertaking that will show that con-
structive empiricism must be interpreted as an implausible first philosophy 
of science (i.e. as a theory of science that is independent of the history 
and practice of science). In the way van Fraassen develops his empiricist 
epistemology there is an (independent) reason for rejecting constructive 
empiricism. His epistemology contains a philosophical and category mis-
take (to wit, the notion of having 'pragmatic reason for believing that p'). 
I will argue that this is good reason to reject constructive empiricism as a 
serious candidate for a plausible theory of science. However, there is an 
escape route for the empiricist which consists in simply denying the ratio-
nality of (existential) scientific beliefs (beliefs held by scientists) concern-
ing unobservables. But this seems to be a very tough remedy indeed, to 
save van Fraassen's empiricism in philosophy of science. 
To set the scene I will start with a discussion of van Fraassen's 
response to Hacking's realist arguments from microscopy (sections 5.2 to 
S.S). Again we will be forced to conclude (with van Fraassen) that seien-
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that such an argument is not yet available I will develop a critique of 
constructive empiricism to reach the conclusion that, although the 
'decisive' argument for scientific realism has yet to be found, there is 
nevertheless good reason to reject constructive empiricism (5.8). 
5.2 Hacking's scientist 
In the opening paragraph of his article 'Do We See Through a Micro-
scope?' Ian Hacking cites the scientist's answer to the question whether 
we have any reason to believe in unobservable entities. Without further 
ado the scientist says: 
a main reason for believing in the existence of entities postulated by theory 
is that we have evolved better and better ways of actually seeing them. 
(1985: 132) 
Hacking then explores the developments in the field of microscopy and 
wonders whether we actually see through a microscope and consequently 
whether the scientist's answer is epistemically correct. This latter question 
of the epistemic status of the scientist's answer is of course a question that 
is of utmost importance to van Fraassen's philosophy of science. It is dealt 
with throughout his work. Hacking clearly states: 
It is essential for van Fraassen to restore the distinction between observable 
and unobservable. But it is not essential to him, exactly where we should 
draw it ... Van Fraassen concludes that we do not see through a micro-
scope. (134-5) 
That this is indeed van Fraassen's position is illustrated by his description 
of an observable entity in his Scientific Image (1980)1. Consider once 
1
 It is, however, not true that it is not essential to van Fraassen exactly where we 
should draw the distinction between the realm of the observables and the realm of 
the unobservables. Many writers think that to the constructive empiricist it is 
science itself that is ultimately responsible for drawing this distinction. However, 
as van Fraassen claims, only the physiology of Homo sapiens can really be the 
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again his claim that 
X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if X is 
present to us (humans) under those circumstances, then we observe it. 
Consequently, according to the constructive empiricist, all of the alleged 
entities of the microscopic world are unobservable to humans. It is there-
fore interesting to see in what way Hacking's arguments from microscopy, 
which seem to be supportive to some kind of scientific realism, are chal-
lenged by van Fraassen. However, in this chapter, I will not discuss 
Hacking's entity realism2 nor will I discuss the question why Hacking 
thinks his arguments from microscopy (the coincidence argument and the 
argument of the grid, see below) are the wrong arguments to argue for the 
existence of the entities 'seen' under a (light)microscope. I will rather 
concentrate on the question to what extent the arguments from microscopy 
are defeated by van Fraassen, when these arguments are taken as argu-
ments for a full-blooded, i.e. strong, scientific realism. 
5.3 Hacking's coincidence argument 
Hacking relates the following story from the scientific world of the micro-
scope: 
Slices of red blood cell are fixed upon a microscopic grid. This is literally 
a grid: when seen through a microscope one sees a grid each of whose 
squares is labelled with a capital letter. Electron micrographs are made of 
the slices mounted upon such grids. Specimens with particularly striking 
configurations of dense bodies are then prepared for fluorescence micro-
scopy. Finally one compares the electron micrographs and the fluorescence 
micrographs. One knows that the micrographs show the same bit of the cell 
because this bit is clearly in the square of the grid labelled P, say. In the 
fluorescence micrographs there is exactly the same arrangement of grid, 
general structure, and of the seven "bodies" seen in the electron micro-
graph. It is inferred that the bodies are not an artefact of the electron 
microscope. (144) 
adjudicator in these matters. 
2
 See chapter 8, Part III. 
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It depicts the way in which the scientists of the microscope act. The story 
belongs to what is called the phenomenology of science. Let us here 
accept that this description is accurate. Hacking then concludes: 
Two physical processes - electron transmission and fluorescent remission -
are used to detect the bodies. These processes have virtually nothing in 
common between them. They are essentially unrelated chunks of physics. It 
would be a preposterous coincidence if, time and again, two completely 
different physical processes produced identical visual configurations which 
were, however, artifacts of the physical processes rather than real struc-
tures in the cell. (144-5, my italics) 
This argument from microscopy may be labelled the coincidence argu-
ment. The argument seems to echo the coincidence arguments of Smart 
and Salmon but Hacking is keen to deny this, and to my mind rightly so, 
since his coincidence argument is not meant as an argument for scientific 
realism but only for the much more modest claim that we are justified in 
distinguishing artifacts of machinery from real structures. Yet, if it can be 
argued that some of the structures are really there and seen with (rather 
than through) a microscope, the coincidence argument becomes highly 
seductive to the realist. Van Fraassen accepts that it is indeed a seductive 
argument, yet he denies that it is a compelling one. 
Before dealing with van Fraassen's answer to the local coincidence 
argument from microscopy for scientific realism, I will first summarize a 
further realist argument, to wit Hacking's argument of the grid. 
J. 4 Hacking's argument of the grid 
Hacking is well aware of the fact that if we accept van Fraassen's observ-
ability criterion we are dealing with unobservable entities within micro-
scopy. That is, the dense bodies are in principle unobservable to the naked 
human eye. So the question whether the epistemic attitude of the scientist 
toward (for instance) the existence of dense bodies is the proper one is left 
untouched by the coincidence argument since it starts from knowledge 
concerning unobservables. So Hacking offers the following argument of 
the grid in a 'philosopher's aside on the topic of scientific realism', which 
starts from knowledge concerning observables, more specifically, the grid 
'drawn with pen and ink': 
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Consider the grid that we used for re-identifying dense bodies. The tiny 
grids are made of metal; they are barely visible to the naked eye. They are 
made by drawing a very large grid with pen and ink. Letters are neatly 
inscribed by a draftsman at the corner of each square of the grid. Then the 
grid is reduced photographically. Using what are now standard techniques, 
metal is deposited on the resulting micrograph. Grids are sold in packets, 
or rather tubes, of 100, 250, and 1,000. The procedures for making such 
grids are entirely well understood, and as reliable as any other high quality 
mass production system ... We look at the tiny disc through almost any 
kind of microscope and see exactly the same shapes and letters as were 
drawn in the large by the first draftsman. It is impossible seriously to 
entertain the thought that the minute disc, which I am holding by a pair of 
tweezers, does not in fact have the structure of a labelled grid. I know that 
what I see through the microscope is veridical because we made the grid to 
be just that way. (146, my italics) 
To my mind this argument is best interpreted as follows. The argument of 
the grid is supposed to be stronger than the (local) coincidence argument 
for the reason that (in this case) we are dealing with an observable entity 
(the grid drawn with pen and ink) that happens to go through processes 
we know are 'structure conservative', so that we are justified to use the 
grid as a calibrating entity for microscopy. The chance that the reduced 
grid "is not really there" is too small to take seriously. Now, interpreting 
images obtained from using calibrated microscopes to novel and unobserv-
able samples naturally involves probability arguments. So the argument of 
the grid is actually an argument that is designed to drastically lower the 
probability of the proposition that what we see with a microscope is not a 
real structure. This is, I think, the reason why Hacking concludes: 
To be an anti-realist about that grid you would have to invoke a malign 
Cartesian demon of the microscope. (147) 
And if Hacking weren't an entity realist he would certainly conclude, on 
the basis of these arguments alone, to the stronger claim that the structures 
seen on the grid are real. However, in Hacking's view the arguments from 
microscopy are only strong enough to support the weaker claim that we 
can discern artifacts from indeterminate unobservable structures. The 
physicist is indeed a realist 'and he shows this by using the word see' but, 
so Hacking concludes, 'his usage is no argument' why we are (epistemic-
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ally) allowed to be convinced of the existence of the unobservable struc-
tures we see with our microscopes (151-2). To argue for this we need, 
according to Hacking, a manipulation argument: 
[We are convinced because] we can interfere with them in quite physical 
ways, say by microinjection. (152) 
Here we enter the discussion on entity realism. In the following I will 
ignore this discussion (cf. chapter 8, Part III) and take the coincidence 
argument and the argument of the grid as arguments for a strong scientific 
realism (rather than hints toward a defence of entity realism), that is, for 
the statement that we have epistemic reasons to believe that some of our 
best scientific theories tell us something about the unobservable structures 
of the world. 
5.5 Van Fraassen 's answer to the arguments from microscopy 
As part of his essay 'Empiricism in Philosophy of Science' (1985) van 
Fraassen includes a reply to Hacking's arguments from microscopy. There 
can be little doubt as to the real issue at stake. The question is: 
whether the information "naturally" or "uncritically" gathered by means of 
a microscope has the same status as what we get by mere looking - wheth-
er we should believe that the structures apparently revealed are really there. 
(297) 
The answer can easily be anticipated. The constructive empiricist will 
deny that this microscopic information has the same status as ocular infor-
mation. Let us see in detail how van Fraassen offers a rebuttal of the real-
ist argumentation from microscopy. 
5.5.1 The empiricist answer to the coincidence argument 
Let me first quote van Fraassen's answer to the coincidence argument, i.e. 
the argument that it would be a 'preposterous coincidence if different 
physical processes produce identical visual configurations which were 
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artifacts rather than real structures':1 
We refer to two different sort of instruments, so the sameness in the out-
puts must be attributed principally to similarities among the inputs. But no 
one doubts that it is in each case blood samples and not different kinds of 
physical systems that were fed into the machines. This conclusion warrants 
no inference about the reality of the imputed unobservable structures. 
(1985: 298) 
However, how does van Fraassen explain the fact that 'completely differ-
ent physical processes produce identical visual configurations'? For to 
state that sameness in input (blood samples) results in sameness of output 
(microscopic visual configurations) because of sameness in input is a state-
ment that is empty of explanatory content in this context. One wants an 
explanation why sameness in inputs, despite completely different physical 
processes, nevertheless results in sameness of outputs. Here van Fraassen 
offers an answer from the phenomenology of science. The information 
gathered by means of the microscopes is not naturally or uncritically gath-
ered. It is the emphasis on similarities and the neglect of dissimilarities 
that ultimately produce the identity of the visual microscopic images 
(1985: 298). This latter move shows one of the weak spots in empiricism. 
As Giere remarks, it seems that the empiricist reinterprets the phenomeno-
logy of science rather than explain it (1985: 95-7). I will postpone the 
critique on the role of the phenomenology of science in constructive 
empiricism to a later section (5.6). 
The main empiricist objection to the realist coincidence argument from 
microscopy remains of course the fact that the argument is concerned with 
unobservable dense bodies so that it is an ampliative argument. Since the 
probability of an empirically adequate explanation is greater than an expla-
nation that involves the supplemental postulation of unobservables it is up 
to the realist to offer a coherent probabilistic compelling rule to epistemi-
cally coerce a person to take the realist epistemic attitude. Since such a 
rule is, as yet, not given we must conclude, or so it seems, that the coinci-
dence argument is no argument for scientific realism. 
3
 See van Fraassen (1980: 123), where van Fraassen gives the same answer I cite 
here from his (1985). 
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5.5.2 The empiricist answer to the argument of the grid 
We have already identified the reason behind designing the argument of 
the grid as an argument for realism. The argument seems to involve an 
observable grid that functions as a calibrating entity for microscopy. Van 
Fraassen's commentary to this argument runs as follows: 
It is no argument to say, "I know that what I see through the microscope is 
veridical because we made the grid to be just that way," since the premise 
needs to imply what is under dispute (that we successfully made the object 
to be that way). (298) 
There is, so to say, no independent way to establish the fact that we suc-
cessfully made the grid to be this way other than by means of the micro-
scopes. And since the argument of the grid, at least in the strong realist 
interpretation, is designed to drastically lower the probability of the prop-
osition that what we see with a microscope is not a real structure, van 
Fraassen is right in interpreting this argument as just another coincidence 
argument. Since he is of the opinion that there is no coherent probabilistic 
ampliative compelling rule for belief revision he rejects the argument as 
an argument for realism. 
Subsequently, van Fraassen then wonders what the pattern at work in 
these coincidence arguments really is. Perhaps these arguments are meant 
as common-cause arguments, that is, perhaps the arguments are meant to 
show that the histories of two events or event types 'can be traced back to 
an intersection of a third event or event type, bearing certain relations to 
the first two' (1985: 298). However, as van Fraassen clearly shows, the 
coincidence arguments from microscopy can only be similar-cause argu-
ments: 
The similarities in experimental outcomes that Salmon pointed to in con-
nection with Avogadro's number [Perrin 1913], and Hacking for the visual 
images produced by different sorts of microscopy, are not a case in point. 
If we pick a specific pair exhibiting the similarity in their particular, pre-
cisely noted, results, we shall rarely find a significant intersection (such as 
a specific blood sample taken from a particular patient) of their histories. 
The explanation of inference is not by, or to, a common cause but a similar 
cause. (299) 
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The real pattern of argument at work in the coincidence arguments from 
microscopy is therefore one of analogy. It is interesting to see that van 
Fraassen here refers to Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal 
Structure of the World (1984)4. In his book Salmon states: 
How is the crucial step, which takes us from the realm of observables to 
that of unobservables, to be characterized? It is, I think, both a causal 
argument [postulation of causal processes and interactions] and an argu-
ment by analogy ... [The] analogy takes the following form: 
it is observed that: 
An effect of type £, is produced by a cause of type C, 
An effect of type E2 is produced by a cause of type C2 
An effect of type Et occurred. 
We conclude that: 
A cause of type Ct produced Eh. 
An analogical argument of this sort can take us from premises about 
observables to a conclusion of unobservables, for Ck may be an unobserv-
able cause that is similar to C„ C2, ... in most respects other than size. 
(1984: 233) 
In his search for the logical status of analogical arguments Salmon exposes 
analogical argumentation as 'some sort of vague plausibility consideration' 
(234) and 'given only a nonzero value for the prior probability of the 
hypothesis that there is such a microscopic particle that produces the 
image, Bayes's theorem guarantees that a positive result of an observa-
tional test will inevitably enhance the probability of that hypothesis' (235). 
But van Fraassen is not impressed. He objects to the idea that analogy 
arguments are relevant to setting our priors if we interpret these priors in 
an objective Bayesian way and he draws the following conclusion on the 
coincidence arguments from microscopy: 
4
 Van Fraassen literally says: 'Salmon has now, I think correctly, diagnosed the 
pattern of argument at work as one of analogy.' (299) 
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Inspiration is hard to find, and any mental device that can help us concoct 
more complex and sophisticated novel hypotheses is to be welcomed. 
Hence, analogical thinking is welcome. But it belongs to the context of 
discovery, and drawing ingenious analogies may help to find, but does not 
support, novel conjectures. (1985: 299) 
According to van Fraassen, then, there simply are no arguments relevant 
to setting our priors that make it epistemically reasonable to believe in the 
existence of unobservables. 
In the following I will explore a line of critique that sprouts from a 
rather straightforward interpretation of van Fraassen's reaction to Salmon's 
analogy arguments, namely that there is, according to the empiricist, a 
fundamental distinction to be made between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification. 
5.6 Constructive empiricism and the phenomenology of science 
There are at least two motives behind the constructive empiricist philos-
ophy of science. First there is the well-known shift in the nature of a 
scientific theory exemplified in the 1969 Illinois Symposium. Instead of 
thinking of scientific theories in terms of syntax the constructive empiricist 
takes a semantic point of view and interprets a scientific theory as a fam-
ily of models. Secondly, there is the work of Kant. Van Fraassen con-
fesses: 
I lack sympathy for metaphysics, though not in general: only for pre-
Kantian metaphysics - and then only if practised after Kant. (1989: viii) 
Constructive empiricism is meant to give us an understanding of science 
and scientific activity without 'inflationary metaphysics' (1980: 73). To 
the empiricist, knowledge beyond the realm of experience is a pertinent 
impossibility. In an almost literary passage van Fraassen argues: 
There was a point at the end of the eighteenth century when philosophers 
by and large agreed that metaphysics was dead. Kant, who dominated all of 
Western philosophy for a century, had purportedly shown up this enterprise 
as inherently and essentially mistaken. It involved after all the extrapola-
tions of our concepts, familiar from daily applications in experience, to 
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applications outside the reach of experience - and there cannot be for us 
even the glimmer of a hope of the possibility of a warrant for such extrap-
olation. We can spin and weave our words into a rich and colourful tapes-
try to depict ourselves weaving a likeness of ourselves in the world. But 
the result must inevitably depict us as hopelessly ignorant of even the 
conditions under which the woven picture would be true. In science, theor-
izing can always be harshly brought to a stop, through confrontations 
arranged within our experience; but purported applications of our concepts 
outside experience can never be put to the question within experience. 
(1989: 8) 
I will not dispute this interpretation of the work of Kant.3 Here I only cite 
the paragraph to emphasize the empiricist presupposition within van 
Fraassen's philosophy of science: that sensory experience is our only 
source of information about he world.6 But if his philosophy of science is 
truly empiricist, does it not fall victim to the many criticisms of empiricist 
philosophy of science?7 
The specific question I will discuss here in the light of contemporary 
philosophy of science is whether constructive empiricism is a First Philos-
ophy of Science, that is, a philosophy that is ultimately not concerned 
with, or is ultimately independent of, the phenomenology of science. A 
philosophy of science might be taken to be prior to the changing methods 
of science in the sense that the content of this philosophy of science is 
independent from the methods employed in science. Whenever this is the 
case we speak of a first philosophy of science. Constructive empiricism is 
such a philosophy of science, at least if I am right in my interpretation of 
van Fraassen's work. 
One argument has already been presented. In his answer to Salmon van 
Fraassen clearly evokes the Reichenbachian distinction between the con-
5
 This interpretation of Kant is also the reason why van Fraassen is opposed to an 
evolutionary naturalistic realism. Van Fraassen: 'My view of ... evolutionary 
naturalistic realism is, of course, as that on other metaphysical positions, however 
closely aligned with science: they involve the impossible ideal typical of pre-
Kantian metaphysics, of knowledge beyond the reach of experience.' (1985, 300) 
6
 Van Fraassen (1985: 258, 1989: 8, 144). 
7
 Kant's philosophy is, at least to a large extent, meant as a critique of empiri-
cism! 
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text of discovery and the context of justification (Reichenbach 1938: 6-7). 
Arguments of analogy, for instance, do not properly belong to the context 
of justification. Since epistemology 'is only occupied in constructing the 
context of justification', these arguments have no place in van Fraassen's 
logical reconstruction of knowledge or belief3 (even if they do have a 
place in van Fraassen's reconstruction of science). Analogical reasoning is 
what van Fraassen calls a 'tactical maxim of scientific inquiry and theory 
construction' and: 
There is no belief, in the case of tactics, that they must be successful. 
(1982a: 209) 
Evoking a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification implies the independency of philosophy of science from the 
history and practice of science if philosophy of science only involves con-
structing the context of justification. Now, van Fraassen claims that con-
structive empiricism gives a better understanding not only of science but 
also of scientific activity, that is of the phenomenology of science. This 
phenomenology of science is dealt with by van Fraassen within the 'prag-
matic analysis of language' (1980: 83). However, the fact remains that, 
within constructive empiricism, there is a distinction to be made between 
arguments that are offered to 'justify, warrant or defend one's belief and 
arguments that are the result of applying 'tactical maxims'. 
To a great extent constructive empiricism therefore mimics logical 
empiricism.9 With regard to the distinction between the context of dis-
covery and the context of justification one might argue that the work of 
Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1970), Nickles (1980a, 1980b) and others clearly 
shows that such a distinction cannot be made. What counts to scientists as 
a good argument for a theory depends on the paradigm in which these 
8
 We cannot use the phrase 'rational reconstruction' here, for van Fraassen's 
rational reconstruction of (scientific) belief differs from his logical reconstruction 
of (scientific) belief, as will be made clear below. 
9
 It is not my aim to cover up the many and profound differences between con-
structive empiricism and logical empiricism. I only venture to say that to the 
extent in which logical empiricists thought philosophy of science to be indepen-
dent of the practice of science (though, of course, not of the content of scientific 
theories), constructive empiricism and logical empiricism are much alike. 
154 
Rationality of Belief 
scientists do there normal scientific work. Sometimes scientists accept 
analogy arguments as good reasons to believe in (he existence of iinob-
servables (biology), sometimes they don't (quantum mechanics). It is not 
to the philosopher of science to determine what is a good reason in 
science to accept and believe a complex scientific theory. If staring in the 
fire would be a historically successful tactical maxim of science there is 
inductive reason to believe that staring in the fire takes us to successful 
theories. Does staring in the fire belong to the context of justification or 
the context of discovery? Contemporary philosophy of science argues that 
the distinction cannot be made, or if it can be made that it is historically 
contingent. As Nickles summarizes: 
Whereas an older generation of methodologists considered discovery issues 
pertinent only to the efficient generation of new theories at the initial stage 
of research, today discovery is widely recognised to be relevant to all 
manner of justification processes. In the contemporary view, the treatment 
of discovery does not merely fill a lacuna in older methodologies of 
science. By appreciating how early, faltering, problem formulations and 
solutions are progressively refined by later stages of research, the entire 
conception of research, including the process and logical structure of scien-
tific justification, is transformed. Taking scientific reconstructions seriously 
may help to bridge the gap ... between logical and historical treatments of 
discovery and innovative research. (1990: 162) 
This interpretation of contemporary philosophy of science is set against 
van Fraassen's remark that 'it is philosophers, not scientists (as such), who 
are realists or empiricists' (1985: 255, n6). He seems to distinguish 
between (what Nickles calls) 'scientific justification' and the 'proper 
epistemic attitude' toward theories. Van Fraassen accounts for 'scientific 
justification' ("justification" within science) in terms of his pragmatic 
theory of explanation and language. The proper epistemic attitude toward 
scientific theories, however, is determined by the bounds of logic (condi-
tional ization). A scientist as such has no epistemic attitude toward, say, the 
theory of electrons. Only if a scientist is 'stepping back for a moment', 
and considers the matter epistemologica!ly, can he determine the right 
epistemic attitude, which is, or so van Fraassen argues, the constructive 
empiricist attitude. 
We must conclude that constructive empiricism contests the rejection 
by contemporary philosophy of science of the Reichenbachian distinction 
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between the contexts of discovery and justification. This means that con­
structive empiricism claims to be independent of the history and practice 
of science. True, van Fraassen offers empiricist interpretations of episodes 
in the history of the natural sciences that are supposed to give us a better 
understanding of the phenomenology of science. But the question concern­
ing the right epistemic attitude toward scientific theories, which is the 
central dispute between realists and empiricists, is answered without an 
appeal to the history of science. I conclude therefore that, in the way indi­
cated, the phenomenology of science is irrelevant to constructive empiri­
cism. Since this independency is a hallmark of first philosophies of 
science it seems that constructive empiricism is an old-fashioned philos­
ophy of science that disregards major contributions in contemporary phil­
osophy of science. Must it therefore be rejected as a plausible candidate 
for a theory of science? Although my enterprise is a defence of scientific 
realism, I do not think one can dismiss constructive empiricism that easy. 
Constructive empiricism need not be a lost case merely for the reason that 
it is a first philosophy of science. 
One must be aware of the fact that van Fraassen's empiricism cannot 
be identified with a first philosophy in epistemology. There is one very 
obvious reason why constructive empiricism cannot be meant as an α 
priori truth: the empiricist acknowledges that it is simply a contingent fact 
that Homo sapiens has the sensory experiences it has, that Homo sapiens 
is physiologically limited, and that it is therefore a finite creature.10 If we 
would have evolved into sentient beings able to observe viruses, our epis­
temic attitude toward theories that postulate the existence of such viruses 
would have been different. The right epistemic attitude for us (humans) is 
determined by our contingent physical make-up. Constructive empiricism 
is not a first philosophy (prima philosophia), it does not proclaim eternal 
a priori (experience-independent) truths. This would surely result in 'pre-
Kantian metaphysics practised after Kant'." In short, to van Fraassen, the 
10
 Indeed, the human 'Endlichkeit' is perhaps the main motive behind van 
Fraassen's empiricism. 
11
 In his introductory essay to the two-volumed work on scientific discovery 
Nickles summarizes the attempts by Shapere and Laudan to naturalize philosophy 
of science as follows: 'Epistemology and methodology remains a legitimate sub­
ject for investigation and one with normative force. I think that both men want to 
claim that epistemology can be prior, in an innocent way, without there being a 
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natural evolution of Homo sapiens and the fallibility of human knowledge 
is reason not to pursue a first or foundational ist philosophy, yet the natural 
evolution of Homo sapiens and the nature of human knowledge is ex-
tremely relevant to the question what the proper epistemic attitude for 
Homo sapiens is. Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is a first philos-
ophy of science. Under the condition that humans have the fallible but 
reliable sensory experiences they have, the proper epistemic attitude 
toward (some of our best) scientific theories is to believe only in the 
empirical adequacy of the theory, whatever the practice of science consists 
in.12 
Yet, as I will show in the next sections, van Fraassen wants to main-
tain, within his first philosophy of science, that scientists can still hold 
rational existential beliefs concerning specified unobservables. Van 
Fraassen does not want to give up the rationality of these scientific beliefs. 
Consider Quine's well-known critique on the two dogmas of empiri-
cism. Quine reaches the following conclusion: 
Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory 
stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scien-
tific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, 
first philosophy. It can be naturalistic without being totally naturalized. Perhaps 
this sense of priority can be unpacked in terms of the traditional conception of 
philosophy as the synoptic vision but without the traditional view that the business 
of philosophy is to establish permanent foundations.' (1980b: 49) Constructive 
empiricism, as a philosophy of science, may thus be interpreted in the following 
way: it is prior to science but definitely not an epistemological project in the 
sense of 'establishing permanent foundations'. 
12
 However, this remark takes us to the conclusion that to believe only in the 
empirical adequacy of a theory is always the proper human epistemic attitude, 
irrespective of 'the kind of creature man has evolved into'. Since, if humans 
would have evolved into beings able to observe, say, electrons (if there are any), 
electrons would surely belong to the empirical substructures of the model repre-
senting the world and the proper epistemic attitude would still be the empiricist 
attitude! So, along every possible evolutionary world-line in which humans evolve 
into sentient beings the proper epistemic attitude for those beings would be the 
one van Fraassen proposes, whether these beings will discover this epistemological 
fact or not (cf. van Fraassen's response to Churchland (1985) (Van Fraassen 1985: 
284-6). 
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pragmatic. (1953: 46) 
It seems that van Fraassen's concept of rationality which we axe about to 
discuss, makes room to conclude rather the following: 
the considerations which guide the scientist in warping his scientific heri-
tage to tit his continuing sensory promptings are, where pragmatic, ratio-
nal. And the considerations which guide the philosopher of science in 
warping his philosophical heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings 
are, where epistemically justified, reached by applying the rule of 
conditionalization. 
Van Fraassen, as Quine, tries to develop an 'Empiricism without the 
Dogmas' (i.e. without arguing the distinction between analytic and syn-
thetic statements and without reductionism)'3. But at the same time his 
empiricism differs fundamentally from Quine's in that he thinks that there 
are philosophical questions about science as such, implying a difference 
between philosophy and science;14 a difference Quine denied, and a dif-
ference that can be traced back in van Fraassen's acceptance of the 
Reichenbachian distinction between scientific discovery and logical justifi-
cation. In the following sections I will argue that van Fraassen's concep-
tion of rationality cannot save the rationality of existential scientific 
beliefs concerning specified unobservables. This leads us to the conclusion 
that, if we are not prepared to give up the rationality of these beliefs, van 
Fraassen's empiricism is not a plausible philosophy of science. 
5.7 The Prussian and English Concepts of Rationality 
The reason why a distinction between scientific discovery and logical 
justification makes sense within van Fraassen's empiricism is that the 
empiricist is not out to equate constructing the context or logic of justifica-
tion of belief with the rational reconstruction of science. Consider this 
11
 Van Fraassen rejects the syntactic approach of logical empiricism and the exist-
ence of sense-data (van Fraassen 1980). 
14
 Cf. van Fraassen's section entitled 'Good-bye to Metaphysics' in his Quantum 
Mechanics. An Empiricist View (1991), pp. 480-82. 
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statement by van Fraassen: 
Is it rational to believe in angels or electrons? I construe the temi rational, 
as applied to opinion here, as a term of permission rather than of obliga-
tion. To say that you are rational in your opinions does not mean that your 
opinions are rationally compelled - that any rational person with the same 
experience as yourself would have to agree. It is not irrational to "go 
beyond the evidence", and belief in angels or electrons or the truth of 
theories in molecular biology does not ipso facto make one irrational. The 
constraints or bounds of rationality leave much underdetermined - rational-
ity is bridled irrationality. (1985: 248) 
So, although the logic of justifying our beliefs is limited by the rule of 
conditionalization (cf. section 1.7), the rationality of science and the 
rationality of beliefs go beyond the evidence of the senses. This is 
achieved by distinguishing between two concepts of rationality analogous 
to the Prussian and English concept of law. In the "Prussian" concept of 
rationality 'everything is forbidden which is not explicitly permitted', in 
the "English" concept of rationality 'everything is permitted that is not 
explicitly forbidden' (1989: 171). Van Fraassen opts for the English con-
cept of rationality: 
what it is rational to believe includes anything that one is not rationally 
compelled to disbelieve. And ... the rational ways to change your opinion 
include any that remain within the bounds of rationality, (ibid.: 172-3) 
What are these bounds of rationality? Are these the canons of (Bayesian) 
logic? Van Fraassen is very explicit and his theory of rationality is of 
major importance to assess his position as opposed to scientific realism. If 
rationality consists in following rules for the revision of opinion there is 
only one rule: conditionalization. But why should rationality consist in 
committing ourselves to the rule of conditionalization, so van Fraassen 
asks. Surely, if we pursue, in daily life as well as in science, two aims, to 
believe truth and to avoid error, that 'draw us in different directions, [the] 
extent to which we pursue these two aims must to some extent be a matter 
of choice' (1989: 172). Van Fraassen approvingly cites William James: 
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He who says "Better go without belief forever than believe a lie!" merely 
shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe, (cited in 
van Fraassen 1989: 172) 
So, van Fraassen introduces his voluntarism13 and his pragmatist view of 
rational free enterprise of the spirit16 and he consequently concludes that: 
rationality does not require conditionalization, nor does it require any 
commitment to follow a rule devised beforehand ... Rational change of 
opinion is not a case of rule-following ... [and] rationality is a matter of 
permission rather than compulsion. (1989: 174, 176, 180) 
To the constructive empiricist, scientists who make all kinds of leaps of 
faith in order to make their theories informative and who are 'willing to 
risk forgoing total empirical adequacy' (1991: 16), are not ipso facto 
irrational. In this manner van Fraassen is able to maintain a rather strict 
distinction between the logic of justifying our beliefs and the rational 
reconstruction of science, avoiding many of the critiques on logical empi­
ricism. Given the permissive concept of rationality, the empiricist can 
account for the rationality of scientific practice. Consequently, the con­
struction of the logic of justification is independent of the practice and 
history of the sciences. Although the scientific image presents us with an 
unprecedented belief in the existence of entities unobservable to Homo 
sapiens that cannot be warranted or justified by the rule of 
conditionalization, the beliefs of the scientist and scientific activity come 
out as rational. 
5.8 Constructive empiricism and the lost rationality of scientific belief 
Empiricists and realists quarrel, not about what exists, but about what 
science is.17 To the scientific realist science is a rational enterprise, but as 
we have seen, so it is to the constructive empiricist. The scientific realist 
claims that it is rational to believe in the existence of unobservables. But 
15
 Van Fraassen (1984). 
16
 Van Fraassen (1989: 172). 
17
 See again van Fraassen (1985: 255, пб). 
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we have now come to the conclusion that the constructive empiricist also 
interprets such belief as rational belief. And so we wonder what the quar-
rel between the empiricist and realist is about. One of the consequences of 
van Fraassen's introduction of voluntarism in epistemology seems to be 
the complete dissolution of the problem of scientific realism. If it is 
rational to believe in the existence of unobservables why not call (con-
structive) empiricism (constructive) empiricist realism, or better perhaps, a 
pragmatic realism? The obvious question therefore arises whether there is 
any problem of scientific realism left. 
The moment we realize that the difference between scientific realism 
and constructive empiricism lies not so much in the postulated aim of 
science but rather in the difference in grounds for belief in the existence 
of unobservables, we also realize that the problem of scientific realism has 
not disappeared.18 To the contrary, we finally see what the problem of 
scientific realism now comes to. Given the analysis so far we may sum-
marize the two main philosophies of science by the following state-
ments:19 
Scientific Realism: (a) There are epistemic reasons to believe in 
the existence of observable yet unobserved 
entities postulated by (some of) our best scien-
tific theories; and (b) there are epistemic rea-
sons to believe in the existence of unobserv-
able entities postulated by (some of) our best 
scientific theories. 
18
 There is an ambiguity in van Fraassen's attempt to identify the scientific real-
ism-antirealism debate in terms of the aim of science. When van Fraassen charac-
terizes constructive empiricism as the claim that the aim of science is empirical 
adequacy and scientific realism as the claim that the aim is truth, one wonders 
what is really meant here. Surely, scientists as such (or scientists qua scientists) 
aim at truth. It is a different thing to say that from an epistemologica! point of 
view empirical adequacy is the only possible aim for science. Van Fraassen is 
wrong in introducing hypotheses concerning the aim of science in separating 
empiricism from realism in philosophy of science. However, he is dead right (that 
is, I wholeheartedly accept his terms here) in formulating the debate in terms of 
'the proper form for cognitive attitudes toward scientific theories'. 
19
 'Observable' here is meant in van Fraassen's sense of the term. 
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Constructive Empiricism: (a') There are epistemic reasons to believe in 
the existence of observable yet unobserved 
entities postulated by (some of) our best scien-
tific theories; but (b') there are only pragmatic 
reasons to believe in the existence of unob-
servable entities postulated by scientific the-
ories. 
Obviously we must concentrate on the difference between (b) and (b'). 
That is, we must investigate what the difference is between having epis-
temic reasons to believe that q and having pragmatic reasons to believe 
that q, where q is some existential statement involving unobservables. 
To van Fraassen acceptance of a scientific theory, which postulates 
unobservables, has clearly pragmatic dimensions. The only belief involved 
in acceptance is the belief that the theory is empirically adequate. There-
fore acceptance involves more than the belief that the theory is empirically 
adequate. But it now seems that van Fraassen can account for the rational-
ity of scientific belief in the existence of specified unobservables with his 
English concept of rationality.20 Now, two categories of belief seem to be 
20
 One of the best diagnoses of the problem for scientific realism can be found in 
Miller's book Fact and Method (1987). Miller formulates the problem in terms of 
rationality and rational belief: 'Because modern anti-realism is best seen as a 
tolerant outlook, the burden of proof on realists is heavy. If they only had to show 
that belief in unobservables is reasonable, it would be enough to point out familiar 
empirical arguments employing physical principles, arguments actually found in 
the best scientific writings. Then the burden of proof would be on anti-realists to 
show that these arguments are not really good enough. In fact, the realists also 
have to show that there is something unreasonable or uninformed about any prac-
tice of scientific inference confined to an alternative framework in which the 
existence of the crucial unobservables is not implied by the data. Because this 
burden is so heavy, even the most powerful realist writings have been implausible 
at just this point.' (1987, 370, cf. 482). However, I do not agree with his conten-
tion that 'topic-specific principles help to settle the issue of scientific realism' in 
favour of realism (482, cf. also the discussion between Fine and McMullin in 
Philosophical Studies 61, 1991). I think van Fraassen can handle the case-studies 
on microbe hunting and molecular theory, which Miller offers as examples of 
'field-specific realism', within the framework of constructive empiricism. Indeed, 
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involved in the qualified acceptance of theory21: beliefs that are backed 
up by epistemic reasons and beliefs that are backed up by pragmatic rea-
sons. To the constructive empiricist a belief can be rational if it is based 
on non-epistemic reasons, to the scientific realist such belief is simply 
impossible. Consider the following passage from The Scientific Image: 
science tries to place us in a position where we have theories which we are 
entitled to believe to be true. The conclusion may be harmless of course if 
'entitled' means here only that one can't be convicted of irrationality on 
the basis of such a belief. That is compatible with the idea that we have 
warrant to believe a theory only because, and in so far as, we have warrant 
to believe that it is empirically adequate. In that case it is left open that 
one is at least as rational in believing merely that the theory is empirically 
adequate. (1980: 99) 
I have deliberately taken this paragraph out of its context. At this point in 
his book van Fraassen is not so much concerned with the question of the 
rationality of beliefs in the existence of unobservables, but rather with an 
analysis of explanation in science. But it does bring out the real dispute 
between realists and empiricists in contemporary philosophy of science. To 
the realist, rationality of belief is determined by epistemic reasons for 
belief, to the empiricist, rationality of belief has pragmatic aspects. To 
both, belief in unobservables can be rational. However, to the empiricist 
there can only be non-epistemic reasons to believe in unobservables, to the 
realist there can only be epistemic reasons for whatever belief we hold. 
For instance, to the realist, consilience of inductions is an epistemic 
reason to tentatively believe in the unobservables postulated by the theory. 
To him acceptance of theory may have pragmatic dimensions, but as 
belief it only involves belief grounded in reasons that are epistemic, that 
is, that are considerations concerning the relation between theory and the 
the reaction by van Fraassen to the coincidence arguments from microscopy and 
to Salmon's exposition of common-causes is a case in point. 
21
 By adding the word 'qualified' I mean to speak of acceptance of a scientific 
theory whenever a scientist becomes reflective. In the practice of life there can of 
course be innumerable reasons to accept a theory without ever even having the 
belief that the theory is empirically adequate. In short, acceptance here is meant as 
an 'epistemic attitude'. 
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world. If consilience of inductions is a reason to believe in the existence 
of unobservables it must be an epistemic reason. To the empiricist consil­
ience of inductions cannot be an epistemic reason to believe (even tentati­
vely) in the existence of postulated unobservables since consilience of 
inductions does not logically imply that the unobservable aspects of the 
world are like the model says they are. Consilience can however be a 
pragmatic reason to believe in the existence of the specified unobserv­
ables. In both the realist and empiricist case it is rational to believe in the 
specified unobservables postulated by the accepted theory. 
We now see that there still is a problem of scientific realism. The real­
ist argues that the reasons to believe in unobservables which the empiricist 
interprets as non-epistemic, ось falsely interpreted as such. The problem of 
scientific realism is to find a plausible defence of this statement. ("Show, 
don't tell"). Until today, no such defence has been found. It is crucial to 
the realist that the reasons to believe in unobservables are epistemic; if 
there are no epistemic reasons to believe in unobservables there are for 
him no reasons at all to believe in unobservables, and the scientists and 
philosophers who nevertheless do hold such beliefs are ipso facto irration­
al, since to believe something for no epistemic reason is an irrational thing 
to do. 
However, in analyzing the problem of scientific realism in this way we 
do have gained some insight. We are now able to formulate what might be 
called the problem of constructive empiricism. To see how opaque the 
position of the constructive empiricist has become (as a result of his 
attempt to save the rationality of science), consider this paragraph from 
Laws and Symmetry: 
Just because rationality is a concept of permission rather than compulsion, 
and it does not place us under the sway of substantive rules, it may be 
tempting to think that 'anything goes'. But this is not so. To take one good 
example: belief in laws of nature does not 'go'. It is true that if some 
philosophers believe in the reality of laws, they are not ipso facto irration­
al. But it does not follow that they are in a position to persuade us or even 
give us good reason to follow suit. (1989: 180) 
So, to the empiricist, there are persons with rational beliefs, that is, beliefs 
for which he or she has good reason to hold them, and at the same time 
this person is not in a position to give reasons good enough to persuade 
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others who do not hold these beliefs? How then could the person have a 
good reason for his belief in the first place?22 This strange feature of 
modern empiricism in philosophy of science signifies a major problem in 
constructive empiricism. Here is the problem of constructive empiricism. 
If we accept the fallibility of human opinion, any belief that is not 
based upon some good reason is an irrational belief. According to van 
Fraassen, one is allowed to believe that ρ if one is not rationally com­
pelled to disbelieve that p. But, if we are not rationally compelled to dis­
believe that p, are we then allowed to rationally believe that p? Yes, pro­
vided we have a reason to believe that p. More specifically, we must have 
a good reason to believe that p. We take for granted that to believe ρ is to 
believe that 'p ' is true. Let us now consider the belief that q, where q is 
an existential statement concerning unobservables, for instance, 'There are 
viruses'. 
To the empiricist, belief in unobservables may be rational when based 
upon pragmatic reasons. Therefore, pragmatic reasons are good reasons to 
believe that q. These reasons make it rational to believe that 'q' is true. 
Now, if van Fraassen claims, as he is forced to do in order to save the 
rationality of scientific activity, that pragmatic reasons are good reasons to 
believe that q, he makes a category mistake: pragmatic reasons are by 
definition non-epistemic considerations and so they can never function as 
good reasons for holding the (scientific) belief that q. Belief is always an 
opinion about the relation between a model and the world. And so we 
conclude to the problem of constructive empiricism: 
show that pragmatic reasons are good reasons to believe in the existence of 
specified unobservables which are postulated by scientific theories. 
To take only two, quite different, examples to illustrate the problem of 
constructive empiricism. Firstly, we will take 'commitment to a program­
me' as a pragmatic reason for belief in unobservables. After that we will 
consider 'consilience of induction' as a pragmatic reason to believe in the 
existence of unobservables. 
32
 If something is really a good reason to someone to believe that ρ under certain 
epistemic circumstances, it is also a good reason to others to believe that ρ under 
those epistemic circumstances. 
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(1) To van Fraassen it is a good reason for anyone to believe that, for 
instance, viruses exist if one is committed to a certain research pro-
gramme.23 But what has commitment to a scientific research programme 
to do with belief in viruses? Surely one does not believe in the existence 
of specified unobservables because of the fact that one is committed to a 
scientific research programme? And consequently, one is obviously not 
rational in believing in the existence of unobservables because one is 
committed to a scientific research programme? Yet, these are the conse-
quences van Fraassen has to draw if it can be rational to believe in the 
existence of unobservables, that is, if one wants to hold that scientific 
activity is rational; 
(2) To van Fraassen it is a good reason for anyone to believe that 
viruses exist on the basis of consilience of inductions. (Remember our 
previous discussion on microscopy). But what has consilience of induc-
tions to do with belief in viruses within empiricism? Surely one cannot 
warrant one's belief in the existence of specified unobservables because of 
the fact of consilience of induction. And consequently, consilience of 
induction can only function as a non-epistemic reason to believe in 
viruses. But if consilience of induction is a pragmatic reason it cannot be a 
good reason to believe that the world is populated with viruses, because 
the reason is not the result of considerations about the world. So, one is 
obviously not rational in believing in the existence of unobservables which 
is inconsistent with van Fraassen's earlier claim that it is rational to 
believe in the existence of unobservables. 
And so we must conclude that although there is a fundamental problem 
of scientific realism that needs to be solved, there is also a fundamental 
problem of constructive empiricism. The choice between any of these 
major philosophies of science depends on the importance one attaches to 
these problems. But, and this is the true result of our journey through the 
land of the empiricist, the problem of scientific realism and the problem of 
constructive empiricism can be cast in nearly the same wording24: 
23
 Van Fraassen (1989: 210, cf. 1980: 88). 
M
 Cf. Ellis (1985: 51). 
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Problem of 
find a plausible defence of the statement that 
only epistemic reasons are good reasons to 
believe in the existence of (specified) unob-
servables (and show that there are such rea-
sons). 
fînd a plausible defence of the statement that 
only pragmatic reasons are good reasons to 
believe in the existence of (specified) unob-
servables. 
The empiricist might succeed in his defence if he is prepared to give up 
the idea that scientists hold rational existential beliefs concerning 
unobservables. He might radicalize his empiricism by claiming that no one 
is allowed to believe in the existence of (specified) unobservables since no 
epistemic reasons can be given for such belief. However, this amended, 
yet consistent, empiricism is so radical in its judgment on the rationality of 
scientific belief, that it becomes implausible.25 
To the realist there is the following problem. Given the underdeter-
mination of theory by data and the corresponding statement that it is more 
probable that a theory is empirically adequate than that it is empirically 
adequate and true, the realist seems to be in trouble. If the realist takes the 
'probabilistic tum' he must design a probabilistic argument for scientific 
realism. It seems that if one will always believe what is probable (say, 
>.6), one will always believe at most that the theory (postulating unob-
servables) is true with regard to the observable aspects of the world. But 
this need not be so. Although the probability of the statement that a theory 
25
 If van Fraassen would not accept the possibility that it may be rational to 
believe in the existence of unobservables, he could save the rationality of science 
by excluding beliefs in unobservables to play any role whatsoever and rather 
concentrate on rational decisions. There are some hints at this in the work of van 
Fraassen, (cf. 1989: 170, where he says he is in search for 'a certain allowance 
for true epistemic decisions'). But if these decisions are truly epistemic (i.e. based 
upon beliefs for which we have good reason to hold them) the same problem with 
the rationality of science arises. 
Scientific Realism: 
Problem of 
Constructive Empiricism: 
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is empirically adequate is at least as great as the probability that the theory 
is empirically adequate and true, there may still be reason enough to 
believe that the theory is empirically adequate and true, if the probability 
of this proposition is high enough. But, if one accepts the assertion that it 
is always better to believe what is most probable, one will always believe 
at most that the theory is true with regard to the observable aspects of the 
world.26 
But the realist can argue that, although there is always the possibility 
that the world of unobservables is ontologically different from the way our 
best scientific theories say it is, the chance of this possibility is negli-
gible.27 For instance, recall our discussion on the argument of the grid. It 
is always possible that the microscopic grid is not the miniature of the 
grid drawn by pencil and ink. The processes we now think to be 'structure 
conservative' might be of a completely different kind. Yet, so the argu-
ment must go, we are here concerned with a negligible chance. Whether 
this strategy of defence is effective remains to be seen. I will return to this 
strategy in chapter 9. 
In the absence of a sound probability argument for scientific realism, 
constructive empiricism seems to be preferable. But if we accept empiri-
cism the rationality of science is in jeopardy. Since to believe is to believe 
on the basis of epistemic reasons, and since epistemic reasons are the only 
reasons that make rational belief, scientists hold irrational beliefs if the 
probability argument for realism cannot be found. For the moment, how-
ever, we may claim the following: on the presupposition that scientific 
activity and scientists are rational, there must be a probabilistic argument 
for scientific realism. However, this argument is obviously circular for if 
we assume that science is rational we assume that the only good reasons 
to believe in unobservables are epistemic reasons. And this is simply the 
assumption of scientific realism. 
The weakness of scientific realism shows itself in the fact that on the 
one hand the distinction between observables and unobservables, the epis-
temologica! consequences carried by this distinction, and the underdeter-
26
 Unless, of course P(T is empirically adequate)=P(T is empirically adequate and 
true). But this will never be the case given underdetermination of theory. 
27
 This suggestion has been made by Derksen. In his (1994c) he develops this 
argument from his answer to global scepticism. 
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m ¡nation of theory, are all plausible philosophical theses; while on the 
other hand the probability argument is still lacking. Although scientific 
realism is the philosophy of science that is in agreement with our intu-
itions about the status of our knowledge of unobservables, it is a philo-
sophic shambles. It is time for a Great Restoration of Realism. Meanwhile 
however, and this must be emphasized, constructive empiricism is not an 
alternative for those who think that scientists qua scientists hold rational 
beliefs. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Richard Miller's Fact and Method (1987) gives an illuminating analysis of 
the kind of argument the realist ought to develop in his defence against 
the constructive empiricist (cf. note 20 and motto). According to him, the 
realist needs to argue that there are instances in which it is irrational not to 
go beyond the observable evidence; that there are instances in which it is 
irrational for a human being not to believe in the existence of unobserv-
ables. Unfortunately the cases presented by Miller in order to illustrate 
such instances (microbe hunting and the molecular theory) are a far cry 
from establishing this realist argument (Miller 1987: 465-82). Indeed, in 
this chapter we have extensively analyzed van Fraassen's reaction to the 
arguments from microscopy (Hacking) and the common-cause arguments 
involved in molecular theory (Salmon). In neither case was the empiricist 
forced to concede that these are cases in which it is irrational not to go 
beyond the observable evidence. 
However, as I have argued, van Fraassen's contention that the rational-
ity of scientific beliefs is saved by his empiricism, is based upon the false 
assumption that pragmatic reasons can be good reasons for believing p. 
Pragmatic reasons can never be the reasons on the basis of which a belief 
is qualified as rational. Rational belief in the existence of (specified) 
unobservables is rational for the reason that it is based upon good reasons, 
that is, epistemic reasons (reasons that involve considerations on the map-
ping relation of the model to the world). If van Fraassen allows scientists 
to rationally believe in unobservables, but does so only if these beliefs are 
based upon non-epistemic reasons, he commits a category mistake. Van 
Fraassen cannot convince us of the rationality of science within empiri-
cism. We concluded that van Fraassen is unable to show the rationality of 
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scientific beliefs that involve the affirmation of the existence of unobserv-
ables. If it is impossible for van Fraassen to argue that it can be rational to 
go beyond the observable evidence, and if we simultaneously acknowledge 
the fact that there are innumerable scientific beliefs involving the postula-
tion of unobservables, empiricism stands a poor chance of becoming a 
serious candidate for a plausible philosophy of science. 
We noted that there are two possible ways out for the empiricist. (1) 
To deny the rationality of scientific beliefs in unobservables. Only few 
will be eager to admit this. Or (2) to emphasize that all scientific beliefs in 
unobservables can be reconstructed as rational decisions. Decisions are 
rational or irrational to the extent that they contribute to attaining a goal. 
If van Fraassen is right in claiming that the aim of science is to formulate 
empirically adequate theories, the scientific activity might be reconstructed 
as a complex body of rational decisions. Although the search for a warrant 
of belief in unobservables must be abandoned, van Fraassen says: 
a certain allowance for true epistemic decisions [can] be retained. (1989: 
170) 
This implies a detailed analysis of the rationality of actions as opposed to 
the rationality of beliefs. The question whether this empiricist analysis is 
plausible will be the topic of another study. 
The painful predicament the realist is in seems to be mitigated. Given 
the fact that van Fraassen cannot show the rationality of scientific belief in 
unobservables, the realist has "only" to argue that such beliefs are indeed 
rational; it suffices for the realist to argue that, although no one can be 
forced to believe in unobservables, it can be rational to hold such beliefs. 
Yet, this mitigation can only be illusory. Since we have argued that the 
rationality of beliefs is only guaranteed if the belief is based upon good, 
i.e. epistemic, reasons, the criticism of van Fraassen that there are no such 
epistemic reasons still stands. It is our philosophical task to break the 
deadlock here. 
5.10 Summary of the argument 
Part I of this study led to the conclusion that scientific realism is in need 
of a sound probability argument for knowledge concerning unobservables 
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from knowledge concerning only observables. It was suggested that the 
eliminative inductive arguments from the sciences themselves could offer 
this argument. If, after rigid eliminative inductive testing, there is but one 
plausible hypothesis in some branch of science that explains some phe­
nomena and which postulates unobservables, it is at least rational to ten­
tatively believe that hypothesis to be true; that is, we are of the opinion 
that we have epistemic reasons to suppose that some of our best scientific 
theories tell us something about the unobservable structures of the world. 
This argument seemed to be defeated by the possibility of massive under-
determination of theory by data. Eliminative induction presupposes the 
notion of a crucial experiment which is impossible because of the possible 
underdetermination (Duhem). The danger of this kind of underdetermina-
tion for scientific realism was, however, rendered harmless. (There is no 
reason to believe that we can always think of alternative hypotheses which 
are empirically equivalent yet ontologically incompatible). Yet the case of 
underdetermination on which van Fraassen's empiricism is based, at least 
to a large extent, is a very simple form of underdetermination: it simply 
says that any ontology of a scientific theory involving unobservables can 
be substituted by an as /ƒ ontology. Combining this philosophical fact with 
the elemental probabilistic claim that the probability of the proposition 'p 
is empirically adequate' is always greater or equal to that of the conjunc­
tion 'p is empirically adequate and ρ is true', it is argued by van Fraassen 
that, on epistemic grounds, one can believe only in the empirical adequacy 
of some hypothesis postulating unobservables. 
In Part II we have criticized this constructive empiricism. This criticism 
was initially external (chapter 4): it was shown that even for aprima facie 
favourable case from paleoanthropology the empirical adequacy of con­
structive empiricism turns out to be problematic. Van Fraassen can escape 
these problems with the empirical adequacy of his constructive empiricism 
by presenting his philosophy of science as a first philosophy of science. In 
the present chapter we undertook an internal criticism of constructive 
empiricism and we have identified what I think to be the major flaw in the 
empiricist epistemology that underlies this empiricist philosophy of 
science: it is the idea that one can have pragmatic reasons to believe 
something to be true. This is a category mistake. Next to the problem of 
scientific realism there is also an almost insurmountable problem of con­
structive empiricism. Although the inductive argument for realism is still 
lacking, constructive empiricism is not a plausible alternative. Consequent-
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ly, in Part III we will consider new defences of scientific realism in order 
to develop or at least investigate the inductive argument for scientific 
realism. The Great Restoration of scientific realism has yet to begin. 
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Chapter б 
Arguing from Natural Evolution: 
the Phylogenetic Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
The conclusion drawn from the critique of constructive empiricism is that 
van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is a first philosophy of science.' If 
we think that scientific existential beliefs concerning specific unobserv-
ables are rational beliefs then constructive empiricism is no live option 
within contemporary philosophy of science. However, although we argued 
that van Fraassen's empiricism is implausible (on the condition formu­
lated), we still lack a probability argument for scientific realism. In the 
next three chapters I will investigate whether fairly recent and relatively 
new attempts to defend scientific realism, offer us this argument. 
The aim of the present chapter is threefold: (i) to introduce a relatively 
new brand of epistemology, viz. evolutionary epistemology, by discussing 
an early attempt by Gerhard Vollmer (1975) at such an epistemology (sec­
tion 6.2), (ii) to assess the plausibility of this epistemology in a confronta­
tion with van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (sections 6.3 and 6.4) 
and (iii) to show that no currently held comprehensive evolutionary epis­
temology offers the inductive argument for scientific realism we are after, 
although they nevertheless contain strong hints at such an argument (sec­
tion 6.5-6.7). 
Vollmer's projective epistemology (a comprehensive epistemology 
which contains evolutionary epistemology as an essential part) seems to be 
a scientific realism, and what is more, a naturalistic scientific realism. 
1
 Hooker (1983) also claims that constructive empiricism maintains a clear and 
sharp distinction between science and philosophy, that it can therefore be charac­
terized as a first philosophy of science, and that this is a reason to doubt the 
coherency of constructive empiricism with the history of science and philosophy. 
In section 6.6 of the present chapter I will discuss Hooker's evolutionary natural­
ist realism (cf. Hooker (1987) and van Fraassen's answer to Hooker's (1985) in 
Churchland & Hooker (1985)). 
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However, Vollmer's realism is designed to be an alternative to instramen-
talism and does not fare well when confronted with van Fraassen's sophis-
ticated empiricist philosophy of science. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter I will therefore investigate 
some of the current comprehensive evolutionary epistemologies presented 
in Hahlweg & Hooker's Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology (1989). I 
will argue that, although one would expect these comprehensive epistemo-
logies to be realistic philosophies of science (since they are motivated by 
the tentative truth of our best scientific theories postulating unobservables), 
the evolutionary aspect of these epistemologies supports rather some form 
of pragmatism in philosophy of science. The conclusion must be that the 
inductive argument for scientific realism will not be found by emphasizing 
the evolutionary aspect of some comprehensive epistemology. There is no 
'phylogenetic argument' for scientific realism. 
6.2 Vollmer's evolutionary epistemology. 
'Why has not man a microscopic eye? 
For this plain reason: man is not a fly' 
Pope, Essay on Man. 
In his evolutionary epistemology Vollmer tries to answer a very specific 
question that has known many famous (and in retrospect perhaps even 
infamous) answers in the history of philosophy. None of these answers 
proved to be satisfactory. In his book Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie 
(1975) the question is formulated as follows: 
[Wie kommt es], dass die subjektiven Strukturen der Wahrnehmung, der 
Erfahrung und (möglicherweise) der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis mit den 
realen Strukturen wenigstens teilweise übereinstimmen bzw. überhaupt auf 
die Welt passen. (102) 
The answer to this question can be identified as the main thesis of evol-
utionary epistemology which originated with Konrad Lorenz (1941). 
Vollmer states: 
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[Hauptthese:] Unser Erkenntnisapparat ist ein Ergebnis der Evoltion. Die 
subjektiven Erkenntnisstrukturen passen auf die Welt, weil sie sich im 
Laufe der Evolution in Anpassung auf die Welt herausgebildet haben. Und 
sie stimmen mit den realen Strukturen (teilweise) überein, weil nur eine 
solche Obereinstimmung das Überleben ermöglichte. (Vollmer 197S: 102) 
The main thesis of evolutionary epistemology is that epistemological ques-
tions are answered by the theory of natural evolution in conjunction with 
psychological theories of perception and cognition (102-3). 
Now, one's first philosophical reaction to evolutionary epistemology is 
that it contains too many questionable presuppositions to make it a candi-
date for the true epistemology. Some of these presuppositions are: (1) that 
it is indeed the case that (some) subjective cognitive structures correspond 
to real structures or fit the world, (2) that there is some coherent criterion 
of reality, of knowledge in terms of correspondence, and (3) of truth as 
correspondence; furthermore, (4) that there exists a structured world which 
is independent of the existence of Homo sapiens, (5) that evolutionary 
theory is approximately true, and (6) that an epistemology based on empi-
rical facts is possible. 
But, according to Vollmer, the evolutionary epistemologist is allowed 
to take any definition of any concept as a starting point in his analysis of 
knowledge, since his statements are essentially tentative and can be 
improved upon at any time given any evidence, be it empirical or more 
philosophical. Vollmer states: 
Die Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie ist untrennbar verbunden mit dem 
hypothetischen Realismus, einer bescheidenen Form des kritischen Realis-
mus. Seine Hauptthesen sind: Alles [faktische] Wissen ist hypothetisch; es 
ist Vermutungswissen, fehlbar, vorläufig. Es gibt eine reale Welt, unabhän-
gig von unserem Bewusstsein; sie ist strukturiert, zusammenhängend, quasi-
kontinuierlich; sie ist wenigstens teilweise erkennbar und über Wahrneh-
mung, Erfahrung und intersubjektive Wissenschaft erklärbar. (1985: 251) 
The tentative definitions within evolutionary epistemology are (Vollmer 
1984: 70): 
Knowledge := an adequate reconstruction of outside structures in the 
subject 
Cognition := the process leading to knowledge, 
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and some of the tentative claims of evolutionary epistemologa which func-
tion as the hypothetical realist's starting point {ibid., 75-82) are: 
(1) There is a far-reaching, though not complete, agreement between 
objective structures (of the real world outside) and the subjective 
structures (of our knowledge about this world); 
(2) Philosophical answers can and may have a scientific answer; 
(3) The adaptation of an organism to its environment is never ideal. 
(4) The adaptation of our cognitive apparatus cannot be too bad. 
(5) Human knowledge is ontogenetically a priori but phylogenetically a 
posteriori. Kant's concept of a priori is destroyed; factual knowl-
edge is innate but it is not necessarily true. 
(6) There is a clear distinction between experiential knowledge (struc-
tured by our forms of intuition and categories) and scientific knowl-
edge. 
It is obvious that these claims will not be accepted by every epistemolo-
gist2 or even by most. Clearly, a critical discussion is needed. This is 
exactly what Vollmer, as a critical realist and Popperian, tries to initiate in 
essays like 'On the Supposed Circularities in an Empirically Oriented 
Epistemology' (1982). Here I will simply assume that the arguments pres-
ented to defend the possibility of an evolutionary epistemology are indeed 
acceptable. Vollmer notices that, as yet, nobody has presented a philo-
sophical way to "certain knowledge", nor has anyone offered convincing 
arguments against an evolutionary based epistemology. Lacking a philos-
ophy in which claims to knowledge can be justified to such an extent that 
we may speak of a foundational bedrock for knowledge, and lacking any 
cogent argument against the possibility of evolutionary epistemology, the 
evolutionary Hauptthese is our best epistemologica! guess at the moment. 
6.2.1 Evolutionary epistemology and our mesocosm 
Evolutionary epistemology introduces the notion of 'cognitive niche'. The 
human cognitive niche is 'that section of the world to which our cognitive 
apparatus was adapted during evolution'. This niche may be called 'meso-
2
 Cf. for instance Putnam (1983a), (1992, ch. 2). 
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cosm'. It is important to see what kind of objects are in this mesocosm. 
For our discussion of the relation between evolutionary epistemology 
and philosophies of science (like scientific realism and constructive 
empiricism), the most important characteristic of the mesocosm is the 
following: 
"Mesocosm" is by definition an anthropocentric concept, since it explicitly 
refers to man and his sensory abilities. Man's mesocosm, therefore, is not 
just what is usually called "macrocosm". There are structures such as the 
magnetic field of Earth which are perfectly macroscopic, but not part of 
our mesocosm because we do not feel such entities, although some birds 
and insects do ... There are, on the other hand, microscopic structures like 
photons or molecules which are "seen" or "felt", hence are mesocosmic. 
(1984: 87-8) 
Evolutionary epistemology claims to explain the existing fît between sub-
jective (cognition-constitutive) structures and objective mesocosmic struc-
tures, applying the theory of evolution and natural selection. It also claims 
to explain why it is that early or naive scientific theories with regard to 
other than the mesocosmic objects, for instance Descartes' theory that 'the 
unseen microscopic world has the same structures as the macrocosm', 
were refuted. Our 'forms of intuition may be completely inadequate' when 
other dimensions than the mesocosmic ones are concerned. On numerous 
occasions science has taught us that this is indeed the case. Hence 
Vollmer's claim that there is a clear distinction between experiental 
knowledge (structured by our forms of intuition and categories) and scien-
tific knowledge. 
Given this distinction one wonders what the relation is between evol-
utionary epistemology and philosophy of science. 
6.2.2 Evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary philosophy of science 
A recurrent and to my mind important theme in Vollmer's writings is the 
incompleteness of evolutionary epistemology (1984: 82, 1985: 312-3, 
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1987: 217ff, 1992: ПО).3 
In his Objective Knowledge Popper seems to develop an evolutionary 
epistemology that does not differ too much from Lorenz' and Vollmer's 
evolutionary epistemology. However, although we might accept the many 
analogies between Lorenz' and Popper's evolutionary epistemology 
(Vollmer 1987, 205-6), it must be clear that within Popper's epistemology 
the emphasis is on the similarity between scientific theories that are sug­
gested, developed or refuted in a process of critical discussion, and organ­
isms that originate, evolve or go extinct in a natural selection process. 
Popper's evolutionary epistemology is rather an evolutionary philosophy of 
science: scientific development is like natural evolution. 
Vollmer stresses the disanalogies between the natural evolution of 
species and the development of theories in science. Furthermore, the evol­
utionary epistemology of Lorenz and Vollmer tries to explain the evol­
ution of cognitive abilities and its epistemologica! consequences whereas 
Popper's evolutionary epistemology tries to explain the evolution of scien­
tific knowledge* It is therefore not only useful but necessary to distin­
guish between (Lorenz') evolutionary epistemology and (Popper's, 
Toulmin's or Campbell's) evolutionary philosophy of science (Vollmer 
1987). In this sense evolutionary epistemology as such has nothing to say 
on the role of scientific theories or the status of scientific knowledge, 
hence it is incomplete as an epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology 
ist keine Wissenschaftstheorie, besitzt aber durchaus wissenschafts-theoreti-
sche Relevanz. (1985: 313) 
Evolutionary epistemology tries to argue that the human (or subjective) 
cognitive apparatus is adequate to compute the signals from the outside 
world in such a way that the human organism survives and reproduces. To 
survive there must be some correspondence between objective and subjec­
tive structures, more specifically, there must be an isomorphism between 
3
 There is another way in which evolutionary epistemology is not complete: 'What 
is missing is a complete system of categories of human experience which would be 
underpinned by biology and psychology' (Vollmer 1984: 119). I will not discuss 
this sort of incompleteness. 
4
 Cf. Bradie's well-known study in which evolutionary epistemology is divided 
into two separate programs (Bradie 1986). 
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these structures in the case of mesocosmic objects; in order to survive 
'mesocosmically' adequate knowledge seems to have been necessary. This 
means that the evolutionary epistemologist explains knowledge only in so 
far the correspondence between mesocosmic objective structures and our 
subjective cognitive structures is concerned. The additional analysis of 
non-mesocosmic knowledge asks for a comprehensive epistemology. Such 
an epistemology is developed by Vollmer under the name of projective 
epistemology. 
6.3 Projective epistemology 
In the following sections of the chapter I will evaluate evolutionary epis-
temology and projective scientific realism taking the constructive empiri-
cist as Vollmer's main opponent. In section 6.3.1 I examine the claim that 
evolutionary accounts of the human cognitive abilities implies some kind 
of scientific realism, to wit projective realism. Subsequently, the argu-
ments Vollmer offers in defence of scientific realism are assessed with 
regard to empiricism rather than instrumental ism (section 6.3.2), and Anal-
ly I turn to offer a critique of projective realism (section 6.3.3). 
In a complete or comprehensive epistemology an analysis of the rela-
tion between reality and knowledge is offered. Vollmer tries to develop 
such an epistemology by way of using the model of projection (1975: 
122ff, 1984: 94ff, 1985: 28-35, 1994): 
If an object is projected optically on to a screen, then the structure of the 
image depends on the kind and structure of the object, the projection, and 
the screen. If we know all of these three components, then we can con-
struct the image. The image will not correspond with the original object in 
every detail. In general, the information content is reduced by projection. 
But there will always be some partial isomorphism between the object and 
the image ... [The] inverse process, the reconstruction of objects, is only 
hypothetical even if the image, the projection mechanism and the screen 
are completely known ... The possibility of interpreting immediate experi-
ences as projections of a "higher" reality has given inspiration to many 
authors. Well-known are Abbott's and Gamow's "flatlanders" and 
Beltrami's "ants" living on a two-dimensional surface (of a sphere for 
example) and trying to find out the metrics and topology of their world 
from local measurements, such as triangulations. The idea that two-dimen-
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sional patterns sensed and perceived are in reality just projections of three-
dimensional objects would be, for them, truly Copernican or, for that mat-
ter, Einsteinian. Is not our general epistemological situation a similar one? 
Are we not continuously trying to reconstruct a "true" world from sensory 
impressions? (1984: 95) 
If we accept this line of argument we can offer an explanation of the fit 
between human cognitive structures and mesocosmic objects in terms of 
the theory of evolution and we may also try to defend the claim that we 
have good, i.e. epistemic, reasons to believe that our best scientific the-
ories tell us something about objects of non-mesocosmic dimensions. That 
is, projective epistemology contains a general philosophy of science: 
[The] term "projection" should not be understood in a purely iconic sense. 
This is true also for the higher levels of knowledge. Experience transcends 
the everyday mechanisms of reconstruction, using in addition memory, ele-
mentary inferences, simple analogies, and ordinary language. Scientific or 
theoretical knowledge in turn transcends ordinary experience, relying on 
systematic observation, measurement, law statements, formal logic, and 
theoretical models. Scientific instruments may be seen as "pitfalls" by 
which we try to project real objects onto our plane of observation ... Only 
this projective-realistic interpretation gives us the justification to objectify 
[signals] and talk of [ordinary-experience transcending objects] as reaV 
(1984, 96-7) 
Apparently we have epistemic reasons to believe that some of the current 
scientific theories tell us something about non-mesocosmic objects. Since 
this is one form of scientific realism we must now consider the relation 
between projective epistemology and scientific (anti)realism. 
6.3.1 Projective epistemology and scientific realism 
The weakest form of scientific realism is the statement that we have epis-
temic reasons to believe that some of our best scientific theories tell us 
something about the unobservable structures of the world. Weak as it is 
this realism is incompatible with van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. 
Since evolutionary epistemology is not meant as a philosophy of 
science, whereas scientific realism and constructive empiricism obviously 
are, evolutionary epistemology itself seems irrelevant to the discussion 
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between the realist and empiricist. But projective epistemology is a differ-
ent story altogether. Although evolutionary epistemology seems to be 
compatible with constructive empiricism, Vollmer's projective epistemolo-
gy is a brand of scientific realism. We need to sort out these relations in 
the next section, but if projective epistemology is a scientific realism, and 
if it is defended by way of relatively new arguments, we might find in 
them new arguments against the strongest form of scientific anti-realism, 
viz. constructive empiricism. 
Luckily, Vollmer has taken a stand in the debate on scientific realism. 
In a contribution to the Studies on Mario Bunge 's Treatise he commits 
himself to a referential and methodological realism, that is, to the claim 
that 
scientific terms are meant to refer to real objects. Scientific theories (try 
to) describe (or reconstruct) patterns of the external world. These patterns 
are not and need not be directly accessible to our senses, and their descrip-
tion may be incomplete, approximate, preliminary, conjectural, fallible, 
sometimes even false. But the aim of science is and should be objective 
knowledge, boldly conjectured, rigorously tested, seriously criticized and, if 
possible, beneficially applied. (1990: 246-7) 
At first glance it is difficult to classify this position as a brand of scientific 
realism. Surely, scientific terms are meant to refer, but do they? Scientific 
theories try to describe patterns which are not directly accessible to our 
senses, but do they? Apparently they do, according to Vollmer. But they 
do so approximately, preliminarily, or conjecturally. However, the aim of 
science is and should be objective knowledge. This is obviously more than 
van Fraassen is willing to admit. Objective knowledge in Vollmer's sense 
means more than empirically adequate knowledge. Objective means refer-
ring to the real world only and true' (Vollmer 1984: 100). In this sense, 
then, Vollmer is a scientific realist. 
Does Vollmer claim anything about what it is to accept a scientific 
theory? Clearly there are many hints by which to conclude that the projec-
tive epistemologist holds that to accept a theory involves more than the 
belief that it is empirically adequate, for instance Vollmer's claim that an 
electron 'is an object with a specific structure described by the equations 
of quantum mechanics' (1984: 105). To (tentatively) accept a theory is 
certainly to believe that it is true. So, 
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projective scientific realism claims (a) that all knowledge is hypothetical, 
(b) that scientific theories are interpretations of projections of real objects 
which transcend ordinary experience onto our plane of observation, (c) that 
science aims to give us theories which are true, and (d) that acceptance of 
a theory involves the belief that it is true.s 
There is one immediate major difficulty within projective realism. This 
has to do with the acceptance of hypothetical realism. Is it possible for us 
to believe that all factual knowledge is hypothetical and simultaneously to 
accept a theory involving the belief that it is true? I think it is. We may 
qualify our belief in the truth of the theory when we accept it. It is a 
belief that is révisable. We may now accept a theory and believe it to be 
s
 It seems to be claim (b), the claim that scientific theories are interpretations of 
projections of real objects which transcend ordinary experience onto our plane of 
observation, which distinguishes projective scientific realism from other natural-
ized realisms (cf. Boyd 1981, Bhaskar 1975b, 1979, 1986, Churchland 1979, 
1989, Giere 1985b, 1988, Hooker 1987, Papineau 1987). It is however not clear at 
all what is meant by theories as interpretations of projections. What is the differ-
ence between theories as interpretations of projections and theories as representa-
tions, syntactic structures, semantic structures, ideals, conceptual schemata, para-
digms, heuristics, or even (parts of) neural nets? The only information we get 
from Vollmer is that we are like 'Flächenwissenschaftler die ihre Welt 
erforschen'. We are in a specific epistemological situation similar to that of 
Abbott's flatlanders. So, projective scientific realism does not say so much as to 
what a scientific theory is; it rather claims something about the human epistemic 
condition. And this latter emphasis on the human epistemic condition is character-
istic of projective scientific realism, whether theories are representations, neural 
nets, models or whatever. It is therefore rather the idiosyncrasy of Vollmer that 
marks his realism. It is not a difference that makes his realism really different 
from other naturalized realisms. It is a difference only of emphasis. However, we 
must conclude that if projective scientific realism is to be a philosophy of science 
it must clarify the notion of 'theory' and of 'interpretations of projections'. There 
are perhaps some clues in Vollmer's work as for instance in his claim that scien-
tific instruments are "pitfalls" 'by which we try to project real objects onto our 
plane of observation'. Does this metaphorically way of speaking hide any clear 
notion of 'theory'? As yet we do not know (cf. Vollmer 1994). The lack of a 
clear notion of theory in Vollmer's projective epistemology need not have impli-
cations for his defence of scientific realism. 
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true, yet acknowledge that our hypothetical realist position tells us we 
cannot prove it to be true, and that in the light of new evidence we might 
be forced to give it up. Consequently we must now determine what the 
arguments Vollmer offers in defence of this projective scientific realism 
are. 
In the aforementioned essay Vollmer takes as his opponent the instru-
mentalist.6 The arguments for projective scientific realism against this sort 
of scientific anti-realism might be summarized as follows (Vollmer 1990): 
(1) If we care for explanations at all then it is rational to prefer realism 
for its greater explanatory power in explaining (251-4): 
(a) the success of theories (retrodiction and prediction of phe-
nomena); 
(b) the failures of theories; 
(c) the convergence of science (fundamental constants can be 
measured by different methods, measured values of quantities 
seem to approach a specific limiting value); 
(d) the discovery of invariants (constants of nature, constants of 
motion, energy, momentum, angular momentum etc.); 
(e) the existence offundamental scientific research. 
(2) Realism offers a stronger motivation for empirical research (255). 
(3) Chance events have no causes. They are therefore neither explained 
nor predicted. The instrumentalist will therefore declare them un-
amendable to science. The realist will not. The realist will 'incor-
porate all components of scientific explanation into science' (255-6). 
(4) 'The instrumentalist is neither modest enough to be a solipsist nor 
ambitious enough to be a firm realist. He accepts some things as 
real, e.g., his body, his past, other human beings, the things he per-
ceives "with his own eyes (or with his five senses)". But his deci-
sion what to accept as real and what not is quite arbitrary' (257). 
Here the 'positive' argument for realism is that on the realist view 
what to accept as real, is not arbitrary. 
6
 Vollmer: 'scientific theories are nothing but economic condensations of past 
observations and, at the same time, instruments for the prediction, mastering and 
possibly prevention of future events.' (1990: 246-7). 
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These, then, are the arguments for projective scientific realism. Within 
contemporary philosophy of science it is, I think, generally accepted that 
they are effective in dismantling the instrumentalist's warship. But are 
they as effective when exposed to this new naval fortress coming out of 
the ocean's mists: constructive empiricism? In sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. I 
will offer a critique of projective scientific realism. 
6.3.2 Evolutionary epistemology and constructive empiricism 
The first thing we notice is the fact that with the acceptance of evolution­
ary epistemology Vollmer (unaware of this fact) implicitly rejects con­
structive empiricism. This can be concluded from his exposition of the 
relation between evolutionary epistemology and the mesocosm. There 
Vollmer states: 
our sense organs, perceptional powers, structures of experience, ordinary 
language, and elementary inferential habits, are well adapted to this 
mesocosm and are adequate for mesocosmic needs. The same is true for 
our forms of intuition. Our powers of visualization are adapted to and fit 
everyday needs. Mesocosmic structures can be visualized. This is explained 
by evolutionary epistemology. (1984: 88) 
If we combine these statements with the claim cited earlier that 'there are 
microscopic structures like photons or molecules which are "seen" or 
"felt", hence are mesocosmic', we see that evolutionary epistemology is 
claiming too much, that is to say, it not only presupposes hypothetical 
realism but scientific realism as well. (Non-mesocosmic objects in 
Vollmer's sense are for instance radio waves). 
Apparently, the evolutionary epistemologist has reasons to believe that 
there really are photons and molecules. But evolutionary epistemology as 
such had nothing to say about the status of scientific theories, in which 
photons and molecules function as postulated entities, apart from the fact 
that it explains why some structures postulated by high level scientific 
theories are not visual izable. Evolutionary epistemology was indeed not 
meant as a philosophy of science, but we now see that, with this specific 
interpretation of the mesocosm, it is - implicitly - a philosophy of science. 
This is far more than was initially hinted at by Vollmer when he said that 
evolutionary epistemology, though incomplete, is relevant to philosophy of 
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science. 
But even if some evolutionary epistemology is a philosophy of science 
in disguise it need not be a scientific realism (as in Vollmer's case): it will 
rather tum out to be a constructive empiricism. Let me elaborate this 
point. 
The constructive empiricist will of course argue that the mesocosm is 
not an anthropocentric concept. It is rather a concept that is derived from 
our best high level ('entanthropomorphisierte', as Vollmer has it) scientific 
theories about the human cognitive apparatus. That the human body is 
sensitive to photons and molecules can only be concluded if we (tentative-
ly) accept as true certain physical and biological theories in which these 
entities are postulated. Given van Fraassen's description of observability, 
the empiricist will point out that Vollmer's class of mesocosmic objects 
actually consists of two sub-classes, to wit, classes of observable and 
unobservable mesocosmic objects respectively. Van Fraassen will argue 
that radio waves (which are not part of the mesocosm), photons and mol-
ecules are all unobservable by the human senses: there are never circum-
stances which are such that, if a photon, a molecule or a radio wave is 
present to us humans under those circumstances, then we (humans) ob-
serve the photon, the molecule or radio wave. The right epistemic attitude 
toward theories that postulate these entities is therefore to accept them as 
empirically adequate. It might even be rational to believe in the existence 
of these entities, but only on pragmatic grounds, never on epistemic 
grounds. 
The empiricist will further argue that the proper epistemic attitude 
toward the (neo)Darwinian theory of evolution and the psychological the-
ories on perception and cognition, that is, toward those theories the evol-
utionary epistemologist tentatively accepts as true, is rather to accept them 
as empirically adequate. So, evolutionary epistemology is not, as Vollmer 
wants us to believe, a (possibly) true theory of mesocosmic knowledge but 
rather a (possibly) empirically adequate theory of observational knowl-
edge. Therefore, evolutionary epistemology can do without the realistic 
interpretation of these theories. All that is needed is the tentative belief in 
the empirical adequacy of these theories. 
Evolutionary epistemology was meant to answer epistemological ques-
tions by scientific theories but obviously the evolutionary epistemologist 
must also commit himself to a specific epistemic attitude toward these 
theories, that is it must presuppose a solution to the scientific realism 
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debate. This remark makes it very clear that Vollmer's realistic evolution-
ary epistemology depends on his projective epistemology. 
6.3.3 Projective epistemology and constructive empiricism 
Vollmer could argue that, although evolutionary epistemology is insepara-
tely connected to the concept of mesocosm (and therefore with the postu-
lation of unobservables), this does not pose a problem to the projective 
epistemologist since his epistemology actually involves a defence of scien-
tific realism. In a logical analysis projective epistemology must precede 
evolutionary epistemology. This is to be expected since projective epis-
temology is a candidate for a complete epistemology. As we have argued, 
evolutionary epistemology may only offer us an explanation of our knowl-
edge of observables. The question therefore is whether Vollmer's argu-
ments against the instrumentalist are as effective when directed against the 
constructive empiricist. Since Vollmer thinks that only scientific realism 
can explain the success of science, let us take a look at the constructive 
empiricist explanation of the success and methodology of science.7 
In his Scientific Image van Fraassen gives an anti-realist account of the 
retrodictive and predictive success of science: 
I would like to point out that science is a biological phenomenon, an activ-
ity by one kind of organism which facilitates its interaction with the envi-
ronment ... I claim that the success of current scientific theories is no mir-
acle. It is not even surprising to the scientific (Darwinist) mind. For any 
scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition, a jungle red in 
tooth and claw. Only the successful theories survive - the one which in fact 
latched on to the actual regularities in nature. (39-40) 
The point is that 'successful theories' here means 'empirically adequate 
theories' and no reference to unobservable entities is needed to explain the 
success of science. Many authors have remarked that this explanation will 
not do. For instance Peter Lipton argues that although van Fraassen's 
answer explains why it is generally the case that current scientific theories 
are empirically adequate it cannot explain the fact that a specific theory is 
empirically adequate. The fact that an empirically adequate theory is an 
7
 See also section 1.6. 
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individual from the class of empirically adequate theories is (to us) not a 
satisfactory explanation of the empirical adequacy of that theory for the 
same reason that we are not satisfied with the (Hempelian) explanation 
that a specific raven is black because all ravens are black (Lipton 1991: 
169-171). 
Van Fraassen accepts this criticism and he offers a new pragmatic the-
ory of explanation that deals with this realist objection.8 The phenomenon 
for which realism is an explanation, is also explained by constructive 
empiricism. As Lipton himself argues, the empiricist explanation removes 
the miraculous success of science. Yet, Lipton offers a further critique: 
Constructive empiricism assumes that scientific canons of induction yield 
theories that will continue to be empirically successful in new applications, 
but it does not explain why this should happen. (1991: 171) 
However, van Fraassen does explain why this should happen: accepted 
theories are believed to be empirically adequate, that is, as adequate with 
regard to all possible observable phenomena. A theory that would be truly 
empirically adequate will always be empirically successful even in new 
applications. 
So the empiricist can indeed explain the success and failures of scien-
tific theories. However, according to van Fraassen, the realist, in his expla-
nation of science, appeals to 'inflationary metaphysics'. Therefore, the 
empiricist explanation is better on economic grounds. 
What about the anti-realist explanation for the convergence of science? 
More specifically, what about the constructive empiricist explanation of 
the fact that constants can be measured by different methods and the fact 
that the value of these constants seem to approach a specific limiting 
' Van Fraassen: 'The ... question for theories would be why, say, Balmer's for-
mula for the line spectrum of hydrogen survives as a successful hypothesis. In that 
case too we explain, on the basis of the physics we accept now, why the spacing 
of those lines satisfies the formula. Both the question and the answer are very 
different from the global question of the success of science, and the global answer 
of realism. The realist may now make the further objection that the anti-realist 
cannot answer the question about ... Balmer's formula, in this fashion, since this 
answer is in part an assertion that the scientific theory, used as the basis of the 
explanation is true. This is a quite different argument' (1980: 219). 
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value? What about van Fraassen's explanation for the discovery of invari­
ants and the existence of fundamental scientific research? Is it possible to 
explain all these facts of science in an anti-realist fashion? 
Van Fraassen has pointed out in his Scientific Image that this can be 
done. In 'Empiricism and Scientific Methodology' he illustrates the ade­
quacy of constructive empiricism as an answer to these questions. I will 
not discuss van Fraassen's arguments here. It was only my aim to point 
out to the projective scientific realist that his major opponent, the con­
structive empiricist, is simply not impressed by the arguments Vollmer 
offers against the instrumentalist. The instrumentalist's unjustified modesty 
has become the empiricist's warranted honesty. And the slippery slope of 
instrumentalism that leads to solipsism (according to Vollmer) is replaced 
by the firm plane of human agnosticism. 
The relevance of the plausibility of constructive empiricism is clear: 
van Fraassen will deny the projective realist claims (b), (c) and (d) (cf. 
section 6.3.1).9 Perhaps scientific theories are interpretations of projec­
tions of real objects which transcend ordinary experience onto our plane 
of observation. We cannot know. Van Fraassen's agnosticism cannot be 
ignored. Yet, in a certain sense the projective realist admits that we do and 
cannot know that scientific theories are projections. They are simply our 
best epistemologica! guesses at the moment. The projective realist is also a 
hypothetical realist. Given the history of Western epistemology, he tentati­
vely denies the existence of a First Philosophy and, more importantly, a 
First Philosophy of Science. Does this philosophical attitude constitute a 
decisive argument in rejecting van Fraassen's empiricism and in accepting 
Vollmer's projective realism? This depends on the question whether one 
can reject a first philosophy in epistemology while maintaining a first 
philosophy of science, as van Fraassen does, according to my interpreta­
tion. 
9
 In part II, chapter 5 I have argued that constructive empiricism must be inter­
preted as a first philosophy of science. This is not incompatible with the 
projective realist claim (a) (cf. section 5.6). 
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6.4 Naturalistic epistemology and naturalistic philosophy of science 
Ever since the failure of Camap's Aufbau-project and Quine's exposition 
of the dogmas of empiricism and naturalization of epistemology great 
doubt has risen on the possibility of a First Philosophy (Carnap 1928, 
Quine 1953, 1969), that is, on the possibility to secure human knowledge 
by a priori means. Nowadays many philosophers of science accept the fact 
that they cannot escape the postulated truth of neo-Darwinism (which says 
(roughly) that man is the result of a process of natural selection and ran-
dom mutations of genes). Many accept the idea that a First Philosophy is 
no longer a live option within philosophy and many hold the belief there-
fore that philosophy of science ought to accept the knowledge embodied 
in modern or mature science. These latter views culminate in a new, 
though not unproblematic, philosophy of science (cf. Hooker 1987). In the 
very same year Quine naturalizes epistemology, Eman McMullin identifies 
naturalistic philosophy of science as follows: 
Many high-level scientific theories such as Newtonian mechanics or neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory, have far-reaching consequences for philos-
ophy. The discussion of these consequences, the modification of older 
philosophical views in the light of these newer scientific results, this too 
can properly be called philosophy of science, though here science plays a 
rather different role. Specific scientific results, not the general procedures 
by which the results are arrived at, are the starting-point of this inquiry. 
(1969: 31) 
Yet there seems to arise an insurmountable problem: Which theory should 
the philosopher of science pick from the pool of competing scientific the-
ories, as the one he endorses and builds upon in his philosophy of 
science? There is no other possibility here, then to accept and apply the 
current standards or criteria for theory evaluation and theory choice. Better 
than this we cannot (at the moment) do, and luckily we do not start from 
scratch. At the same time it is clear that it is very likely that the theory of 
neo-Darwinism will be among the theories the philosopher of science will 
(tentatively) accept as true, since by (almost) any criteria proposed neo-
Darwinism will be the only (plausible) theory on the origin and evolution 
of man. 
191 
Chapter 6 
Man is part of nature. Hooker says clearly: 'The leading motif here is 
the commitment to theorizing humans as natural species' (1987, 260). Our 
latest guess is that we, as vertebrates, evolved from the conodonts, sea-
creatures that are now postulated by scientists as the first vertebrates that 
lived between 520 and 200 My ago (Sanson 1992). Within naturalistic 
philosophy of science, the evolutionary path these conodonts took is of 
great importance for the explanation of properties we as Homo sapiens 
now possess (like the ability to know) and the activities we now employ 
(like trying to get to know the unobservable structures of the world). Of 
course, the philosopher who takes this neo-Darwinism as his starting-point 
in philosophy of science takes a vulnerable stand, since whenever major 
changes in this scientific theory occur, his philosophy of science ought to 
be modified as well. Yet that is the risk a naturalistic philosopher takes 
while seeking a new and better philosophy of science which is consistent 
with neo-Darwinism. 
The question is, however, whether a naturalized epistemology immedi-
ately leads to a naturalized philosophy of science. In a well-known study 
Giere argues that there is at least an analogy between the failure of knowl-
edge-foundationism and methodological foundationism (Giere 1985a). 
Logic can provide neither the foundation of knowledge nor the foundation 
of scientific method. The former has been shown by Quine, the latter by 
Kuhn et alia. (This is an admittedly simplified reconstruction). Giere's 
own conclusion from these recent developments is that science, as a natu-
ral phenomenon, must be studied in the same way as science studies other 
phenomena, and he pleads for an evolutionary tum in philosophy of 
science. He declares: 
The general problem faced by naturalistic philosophy of science, then, is to 
explain how creatures with our natural endowments manage to learn so 
much about the detailed structure of the world - about atoms, stars and 
nebulae, entropy, and genes. This problem calls for a scientific explanation. 
(1985a: 340)10 
10
 Notice that the presupposition in this quotation is that we indeed have knowl-
edge about unobservables like genes. The general problem of naturalistic philos-
ophy of science postulates the existence of a solution to the problem of scientific 
realism! (But see Giere 1985b for recognizing that this is far from obvious). 
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But this conclusion seems to me to be rather quick. If there is an analogy 
between first philosophy in epistemology and first philosophy of science 
this does surely not imply that if one rejects the former one is forced to 
also reject the latter. Indeed, van Fraassen accepts the fact that all human 
knowledge is hypothetical (or: probable to some extent) but he also main-
tains (for instance) that a rather straight distinction between the discovery 
and justification of scientific knowledge can be made." Probabilistic 
logic does determine the boundaries of the epistemic justification of our 
(scientific) knowledge, although Homo sapiens may use all kinds of heu-
ristics of discovery. Science shows us to be creatures able to experience 
the world by specialized senses. These senses are sensitive to input within 
certain domains of the world. Our epistemic attitude toward claims about 
domains of the world to which we do not have access by our senses, is 
different from the epistemic attitude we have toward claims that only 
concern what is observable to humans. We are what we are: finite crea-
tures. And for these creatures there are no epistemic reasons to believe in 
the existence of unobservables. 
Although Vollmer's projective scientific realism is a naturalized episte-
mology and a naturalized philosophy of science, this fact alone does not 
make it preferable to empiricism. We need the further argument which 
shows that van Fraassen cannot both deny a first philosophy in epistemo-
logy and accept a first philosophy of science. But such argument is not 
available. Therefore, van Fraassen is still Vollmer's undefeated opponent. 
But, what is more important, we have not found the inductive argument 
for realism in Vollmer's defence. Let us return to the realist claim that we 
have epistemic reasons to believe that some of our scientific theories tell 
us something about the unobservable structures of the world. The (projec-
tive) naturalistic realist argues that this realism follows naturally from the 
history of epistemology. However, we must also realize that a naturalistic 
philosophy of science does not necessarily follow from the history of 
epistemology, as for instance the work of Rorty shows (Rorty 1980). 
Other philosophically interesting positions seem to be possible, as for 
instance (here we go again) constructive empiricism. Naturalism in epis-
" Cf. also van Fraassen's remark in his (1989): 'an individual scientist may addi-
tionally believe in the reality of entities behind the phenomena. Similarly a chess 
player may wear flowers or hum a madrigal while playing' (193). 
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temology, the main inductive conclusion from the history of Western epis-
temology, may be reconcilable with both scientific non-realism and anti-
realism (cf. also Fine 1986b, Matheson 1989). 
Vollmer's projective scientific realism emphasizes the lesson to be 
learned from the history of epistemology, and this is to be appreciated. 
Yet, we have not found an argument against constructive empiricism nor a 
convincing argument for scientific realism from within his evolutionary 
epistemology. I will therefore further probe some of the available evol-
utionary epistemologies. Although Vollmer's projective epistemology is 
intended as a complete epistemology, in which evolutionary epistemology 
plays a fundamental role, it is nevertheless not a comprehensive evolution-
ary epistemology. In the remaining sections of the chapter I will investi-
gate some of the current comprehensive evolutionary epistemologies, to 
see whether we may find hints at the correct 'Ultimate Argument' for 
scientific realism. 
6.5 Comprehensive evolutionary epistemology 
Perhaps we have started our discussion of evolutionary epistemology with 
the wrong idea in our philosophical minds, viz. the idea that the evolution-
ary explanation of human beliefs concerning inobservables is of an alto-
gether different kind than the evolutionary explanation of human beliefs 
concerning observables. In their impressive study Hahlweg & Hooker 
(1989) state the following: 
There are two common assumptions of current writing on evolutionary 
epistemology which we do not share. The first idea is the idea that there 
should be two distinct theses for evolutionary epistemology, one to the 
effect that the current organs of cognition can be given an evolutionary 
explanation and the other to the effect that the content of knowledge can be 
given an evolutionary explanation and that the two evolutionary accounts 
are independent. We hold this idea to represent a misleading bifurcation. 
There is no contrast between organs and the information they contain that 
can be properly drawn within evolutionary dynamics: the two must be 
understood as developing together in a single process. The second idea is 
to the effect that the aim of evolutionary epistemology is to show a formal 
analogy between causal principles on which evolution works and the for-
mally distinct rational/normative principles by which scientific knowledge 
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develops. (1989: 23, 106, cf. Bradie 1986) 
Let us interpret this statement as Hooker's claim (rather than Hahlweg's) 
that the trae evolutionary epistemology is a comprehensive or complete 
evolutionary epistemology which asserts that 'cognitive evolution is a 
literal extension of biological evolution' (1989: 105, Hooker dubbed this 
epistemology Unified Evolutionary Epistemology (cf. his 1987)). 
Comprehensive evolutionary epistemology combines the insights of the 
pioneers in evolutionary epistemology like Lorenz (1941), Piaget (1972), 
Popper (1973), Toulmin (1972) and Campbell (1974). Hahlweg & 
Hooker's own summary may serve to determine the new kind of evol-
utionary epistemology we are talking about, so I quote at full length: 
From Lorenz we take the fundamental importance of understanding the 
evolutionary history of an organism, capacity, or function for understanding 
its nature and dynamics. We also take the conclusion that an evolutionary 
history of cognition supports a general fallibilism, indeed, a complex 
fallibilism that is "penetrable", one whose structure can be theorized 
(fallibly), investigated and perhaps improved upon. From Piaget we take 
the importance of understanding all living processes in terms of dynamics 
of open-ended regulatory systems, and the basic idea that psychogenesis is 
an extension of embryogenesis in this sense. Popper taught us the import-
ance of reversing the traditional priority between the questions "What is 
knowledge?" and "How does knowledge progress?", and the methodological 
incisiveness of fallibilism. From Toulmin we take the importance for any 
evolutionary theory of science of recognizing its historical and social 
dimensions, and the systematic importance of methods in relations to the-
ories. And from Campbell we take the fundamental role of processes of 
variation and selective retention to evolutionary development, in particular 
the power of nested hierarchies of such processes for regulatory systems 
development, and the importance of recognizing social context in their 
functioning. It has become evident that evolutionary epistemology sheds 
fresh light on many areas of traditional philosophy. (1989: 43-4, my 
italics) 
This latter claim suggests that we may apply this kind of comprehensive 
epistemology (which is obviously different from Vollmer's projective 
epistemology since his is not an evolutionary philosophy of science) to the 
traditional philosophical problem of scientific realism. Perhaps Vollmer's 
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projective epistemology and consequently his defence of scientific realism 
is founded upon a misconception of what a trae evolutionary epistemology 
must consist in. According to Hooker a trae evolutionary epistemology 
claims a literal evolutionary construction of the activity of science. 
6.6 Comprehensive evolutionary epistemology and scientific realism 
Let us now see whether authors who support a comprehensive evolution-
ary epistemology also support some form of scientific realism on the basis 
of such an epistemology. I will here discuss the epistemologies of 
Campbell & Palier, Hahlweg, Ruse, and Hooker, respectively. 
In their contribution to the Hahlweg & Hooker volume on evolutionary 
epistemology Campbell & Palier discuss the question whether evolution-
ary epistemology can be extended to "justify" scientific beliefs (Campbell 
& Palier 1989). They suggest a 'general selection theory' as the overall 
solution to 'puzzles of "design"' and they mention two such puzzles: 
For Darwin, the perceived fit between animal form and environmental 
opportunity was the design puzzle. For the epistemologist of scientific 
belief, the design puzzle is the presumed fit between belief and the invis-
ible world to which such belief refers. (1989: 232-33) 
As I understand their proposal they want to argue that 'since scientific 
beliefs are the property and product of a social system' the evolutionary 
epistemology for science 'must include specification of social processes 
that would plausibly lead to the substitution of more valid belief (233), 
and they concede that this sociological turn12 (243) is compatible with 
the epistemologies of modem empiricists like Lehrer, Goldman, Dretske, 
BonJour and Chisholm. Their proposal is meant to answer the question: 
'How is it possible that the beliefs of physicists (for example) have come 
better and better to fit the physical world (in particular the invisible physi-
12
 They claim: 'Most of what scientists believe is based upon trusting other scien-
tists, but the knowledge-assertions of these other scientists (being normal social 
vertebrates) are motivated fully as much by their desire to influence the decisions 
of listeners as by the desire to describe accurately', (243) and they refer to the 
work of Hull (1988, 1978). 
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cal world) to which they refer' (242), and it involves 'a mechanistic the-
ory of how the nature of invisible physical world could be one of the 
selectors affecting differential belief-survival in the physics community' 
(loc.cit.), which emphasizes an evolutionary account of linguistically trans-
mitted beliefs. 
However, I can find no argument in their analysis for scientific realism. 
They claim that their general selection theory can make sense of the early 
empiricist ideology of science and simultaneously that it 'can offer a 
plausible scenario (theory) for a social system that would allow "the way 
the world is" to be one of the selective forces operating on belief change 
in a physical science' (1989: 24S). But if this is the case, and if they con-
clude to an evolutionary empiricism, as they do, one cannot expect an 
argument for scientific realism which says we have epistemic reasons to 
believe that our best scientific theories 'fit the invisible world' to a large 
extent. It is the sociological tum which makes it impossible to argue, from 
their evolutionary epistemology, that we can have epistemic reasons (that 
is, reasons that concern the mapping relation between theory and the 
world) to tentatively hold some belief concerning unobservables to be true. 
Campbell and Palier argue that 'a selection theory version of a naturalistic 
epistemology for science requires a plausible scenario as to how the 
beliefs of the physicists could come to fit the invisible world those beliefs 
refer to' (2S2, my italics) but their argument seems to concern, at least to 
my mind, only the fit of scientific beliefs and the visible world. Campbell 
and Palier may argue that 'selection theory requires that the nature of the 
world has participated in the winnowing of the proliferation of alternative 
beliefs' (252) but since they so wholeheartedly agree with contemporary 
empiricists and give their theory a modem sociological twist, I cannot see 
how the nature of the invisible world has participated in the winnowing of 
the proliferation of alternative scientific beliefs. The generation, retention, 
selection and variation of scientific beliefs seems therefore rather to be a 
psychological and sociological matter. The conclusion from Campbell & 
Paller's general selection theory must rather be that it is the beliefs about 
the nature of the invisible world which participated in the winnowing of 
the proliferation of alternative scientific beliefs. And this is a far cry from 
the probability argument for scientific realism we were looking for, unless 
one argues that the high degree of coherence of scientific beliefs concern-
ing unobservables is due to the fit between these beliefs and the world 
those beliefs refer to. Campbell & Paller's comprehensive evolutionary 
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epistemology supports an empiricist philosophy of science. Something 
which was to be expected since one author (Campbell) is 'infamous for 
applying the "blind-variation-and-selective-retention" formula ... to all 
increases in fit and order. The other [Palier] comes from the anti-realist 
wing of the empiricist tradition' (Campbell & Palier 1989: 231-2). It 
seems to me to be quite implausible that these two authors will provide us 
with 'a plausible, naturalistic theory as to how beliefs of science might 
come to fît the separate reality they refer to' (241) if they want to include 
beliefs that refer to unobservables. 
Hahlweg defends a comprehensive evolutionary epistemology which he 
develops from Waddington's work on the cybernetic model of evolution-
ary change and the evolution of hierarchically ordered regulatory systems 
(Halhweg & Hooker 1989). Hahlweg is of the opinion that 'it can also be 
shown that science can be characterized as a regulatory control hierarchy 
and the evolution of science as the evolution of hierarchical competence' 
(1989: 51). I will not discuss Hahlweg's comprehensive evolutionary epis-
temology. I will merely look at his statements on the character and status 
of scientific theories within this epistemology. Indeed, Hahlweg formulates 
something like the problem of scientific realism when he states: 
it is appropriate to make a digression and discuss the role scientific theories 
play within the present framework, in particular the question of what the-
ories tell us about the nature of the world. (1989: 67) 
Hahlweg's exposition of the status of scientific theories is however disap-
pointing to the extent that one had expected a fresh evolutionary light to 
be shed on this old traditional philosophical problem. However, Hahlweg 
suggests merely a metaphor to illustrate the function of scientific theories. 
He takes theories to be 'guides to action' analogous to 'geographical 
maps' (68). Since we are interested here in finding an argument for scien-
tific realism and wonder whether some comprehensive evolutionary episte-
mology may offer such argument, it is interesting to note that Hahlweg is 
not proposing an instrumentalist philosophy of science, in spite of his 
'insistence that scientific theories are primarily guides to action': 
Maps, too, are guides to action, and they can fulfil this function only 
because they do depict genuine invariant relationships holding in the world. 
It is, however, as impossible to evaluate theories on the basis of their truth 
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content as it is impossible to evaluate maps on theirs. We select maps on 
the basis of their capacity to guide us to our destination. Likewise we 
choose to employ theories that can serve as guides to action. In doing so 
we indirectly select for theories that depict the genuine invariant relation-
ships holding in the world. (1989: 70-1) 
If this is an argument for scientific realism, it is not an argument that is 
typically evolutionary! It looks rather like a familiar argument for realism 
from the efficacy of our actions based upon scientific theories postulating 
unobservables. If we pick out those theories which are the best guides for 
action, given our goals, we indirectly select for true theories. This is a 
variation on the well-known success argument for realism, since what 
would be the argument for this claim if not some inference to the only 
explanation: only when we suppose we selected theories that depict the 
genuine invariant relationships holding in the world can we explain the 
success of these theories as efficient guides to action. Again, as we argued 
in Part I, this inference to the only explanation argument, to be a sound 
argument for realism, must be analyzed as some kind of probability argu-
ment. Our conclusion must be that Hahlweg's comprehensive evolutionary 
epistemology does not explicate this argument for realism but merely 
assumes that it can be given. 
Michael Ruse also sets out to defend a comprehensive evolutionary 
epistemology (Ruse 1986, 1989). He claims that science 'is governed and 
evaluated by certain commonly accepted rules and criteria'. Ruse writes: 
these rules and criteria used by the scientist are not subjectively decided on 
by the individual scientist, nor even by a group of scientists. Neither are 
they reflections of absolute reality, or some such thing. They are rather the 
principles of reasoning and understanding that we humans use because they 
proved of value to our ancestors in the struggle of existence. In other 
words, what I argue is that the principles of science ( and I include here 
mathematics and logic) are reflections of the innate dispositions, or 
epigenetic rules, which are bumed into the thinking processes of every 
normal human being. (1989: 193) 
To what extent does he argue for or against some form of scientific real-
ism? I think Ruse does not address the problem of scientific realism at all. 
Although he wonders what implications an evolutionary philosophy of 
science has 'for our thinking about ultimate reality' (1989: 218) he is 
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mainly concerned with the discussion between metaphysical realism and 
Hilary Putnam's metaphysical anti-realism or internal realism. I will say 
more about internal realism at the end of the next chapter. Here we must 
conclude that since Ruse argues against Vollmer's hypothetical realism 
(218-9) and is willing, with Clark, 'to reject the notion of a reality beyond 
our experience' (220) (for all human experience is mediated by epigenetic 
rules, which leaves bare noumenals that are simply declared redundant) he 
is defending a metaphysical anti-realism. What Ruse's opinion on scien-
tific realism is I do not know. But if his evolutionary philosophy of 
science directs him in accepting a metaphysical anti-realism he will prob-
ably accept some internal scientific realism à la Putnam. Indeed, after 
rejecting some Kantian noumenal world as the real world he claims that 
nevertheless 
we still have the real world, but it is the world as we interpret it, (1989: 
220) 
and he refers to the work of Putnam. Although he concludes that evol-
utionary epistemology has 'some fairly fundamental and far reaching 
implications about ontology' (220) Ruse is silent on the problem of scien-
tific realism which is of course strange for a philosopher/scientist who 
needs a realistic interpretation of neo-Darwinian theories to argue his case 
in the first place. Anyway, I do not think that we will find some probabil-
ity argument for scientific realism from Ruse's evolutionary epistemology. 
Finally, I will discuss Hooker's evolutionary naturalist realism (1987, 
1989). In his unified evolutionary epistemology the parallelism found in 
some other comprehensive evolutionary epistemologies is eliminated. 
Knowledge is conceived of as a natural product (a regulatory structure13) 
and the 'leading motive is the commitment to theorizing humans as a 
natural species' (1987: 260). Hooker recognizes human knowledge as 'an 
extension of pre-existing regulatory systems processes' and he distin-
guishes between what he calls horizontal and vertical increase in regula-
tory complexity. This distinction is important to the discussion on scien-
11
 That is, 'a primary factor in the coordination of our responses to our environ-
ment (including now both our internal environment and the guiding of our search 
for more knowledge)' (Hooker 1989: 108). 
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tifie realism. The first signifies an increase in the degree of finesse within 
an existing regulatory level, the second a strengthening of cross-level 
interactions or the adding of new regulatory levels (1989: 105). If these 
notions are applied in philosophy of science we get the following picture: 
Theories regulate the development of practices (technologies) and data 
structures (facts), and methods regulate the development of theories. 
Methods, theories, and technologies may all be refined and extended; this 
is the "normal" situation [horizontal evolution of knowledge]. They may 
also change in more radical or revolutionary ways [vertical evolution of 
knowledge], thereby forcing it to retreat to less committed (cf. more 
neotenous) assumptions. The key to understanding scientific development is 
the process of ascending these theoretical and methodological hierarchies 
and the multiple ways in which normal science may pave the way for this. 
(Hooker 1989: 109) 
This reminds us of course of Kuhn's Structure. But, as a realist, Hooker 
does not accept the radical thesis of incommensurability that some philos-
ophers read into Kuhn's account of scientific development. To the con-
trary, Hooker continues: 
As the theory and method hierarchies are ascended, the range of data struc-
tures that can be incorporated increases. At first only the specific empirical 
structures corresponding to specific empirical generalizations can be 
encompassed (explained), for example, how this ball falls, how this pendu-
lum swings. Then classes of generalizations can be derived through alter-
ation of parameter values in a theory, and thereby their classes of empirical 
generalizations encompassed, for example, the law of free fall, the pendu-
lum law. Then classes of structurally different theories can be derived at 
successively higher levels, for example, from Newton's laws to Lagrangian 
and Hamiltonian theory and thence to symplectic structure on differentiable 
manifolds, and so on "up". Each ascent allows regulated response to be 
conditioned one nesting deeper: "if the pattern is of kind K, then if the 
conditions are of kind C, then ..." The widening range of data structures 
encompassed means a widening range of situations to which regulated 
adaptation becomes possible, i.e. an increasing adaptability (loc.cit.). 
This seems to suggest, perhaps, some kind of scientific realism and indeed 
Hooker wants to defend a realist philosophy of science. Does such realism 
follow from his unified evolutionary epistemology? And if so, in what 
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way? 
Hooker's realism is obviously a naturalistic realism in the sense that 
science must be interpreted 'as but the cutting edge of the evolutionary 
process, as an extension of the exfoliation of regulatory systems' (110) 
and he accepts a fundamental fallibilism. Therefore, 'all is fallible theory' 
(135). Hooker claims that in accepting his evolutionary epistemology one 
has to conclude that human knowledge is a natural phenomenon and that it 
must be studied like any other natural phenomenon, so that 'epistemology 
should form a coherent unity with science, a self-consistent conception of 
us and our cosmos' (1989: 134). Since, according to Hooker, the scientific 
image is a realistic image this reasoning immediately supports scientific 
realism (loc.cit.). 
In his (1987) Hooker explores in great detail arguments for and against 
scientific realism (1987: 322-57). However, the crucial point in his 
defence of realism is that the impasse that currently characterizes the 
scientific realism-constructive empiricism debate can be overcome if we 
realize that there is one fundamental difference between constructive empi-
ricism and his evolutionary naturalist realism: 
realism insists on informing the basic content of philosophical theory with 
the scientific image, empiricism maintains the separation of philosophy and 
science (1987: 183, cf. 176). 
Indeed, as we argued in Part II constructive empiricism is a first philos-
ophy of science and Hooker's analysis of the situation is correct. Hooker 
defends a systematic realism which combines comprehensive evolutionary 
epistemology, philosophical naturalism and scientific realism in a way 
such that systematic realism is 'a grand inference to the best explanation' 
that explains 'the human cognitive enterprise in a unified way' (1987: 
322). Hooker, then, denies that constructive empiricism can make better 
sense of science and scientific activity than realism does (cf. Hooker 
1985). 
However, whether this latter claim is true or not, we must not be mis-
led by Hooker's remark that evolutionary epistemology evidently implies 
scientific realism. Within Hooker's systematic realism cognitive develop-
ment is principally open-ended: 'we learn, leam how to learn, learn about 
learning and about learning how to learn ... Every component must be 
open-ended for us since we began in ignorance of them all. Our actual 
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history confirms these dynamics' (1987: 277). But how, then, does Hooker 
argue for the epistemic components of his realism? He wants to maintain 
that (1) empirical adequacy is but one component of the overall epistemic 
value of a theory which determines our rational epistemic attitude to the 
theory and (2) that the most epistemically valuable theories are the most 
acceptable guides to reality (1987: 2S6). However, we know that natural 
evolution does not select for true beliefs, it selects at most for empirically 
adequate beliefs for some cognitive niche; or in terms of Hooker's unified 
evolutionary epistemology: in the case of science, the widening range of 
data structures encompassed means a widening range of situations to 
which regulated adaptation becomes possible, i.e. an increasing adaptabil-
ity, but this widening range of data structures does not mean an increase 
in the probability of scientific theories postulating unobservables. What 
then are our epistemic reasons to believe in the existence of unobserv-
ables? Why do we think the realist attitude toward theories postulating 
unobservables is the rational epistemic attitude to take? 
I think Hooker's answer must ultimately be that if we assume scientific 
realism, in combination with naturalism and a comprehensive evolutionary 
epistemology, we are able to understand best ourselves and the world we 
live in. Systematic realism is presented as a grand inference to the best 
explanation. Yet, we have seen that to argue along these lines is to offer 
some probability argument for realism (Part I). Such probability argument 
for realism is not given by Hooker, although his systematic realism makes 
much sense of scientific activity. 
Moreover, since Hooker believes that science is 'the cutting edge of the 
evolutionary process, an extension of the exfoliation of regulatory sys-
tems', and since we know that the evolutionary process does not select on 
the truth of the ontology of unobservables postulated in science but solely 
on the practical use of science, we cannot expect a probability argument 
for scientific realism from comprehensive evolutionary epistemology. 
Indeed, it seems that if there is a link between comprehensive evolutionary 
epistemology and philosophy of science it is (some sort of) pragmatism 
that is supported rather than (some sort of) scientific realism. 
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6.7 Comprehensive evolutionary epistemology and pragmatism 
Have we, in our discussion of comprehensive evolutionary epistemologies, 
not made the mistake that was clarified by Nicolas Rescher in his Metho-
dological Pragmatism (1977)? Did we concentrate too much on what 
Rescher calls Thesis Darwinism instead of Method Darwinism! Perhaps we 
did. So let us briefly discuss Reseller's exposition of evolutionary 
epistemology. 
One could claim that our critique of the several comprehensive evol-
utionary epistemologies discussed is identical to the more familiar objec-
tion to any comprehensive evolutionary epistemology identified by 
Rescher: 
A wide gap separates the efficient pursuit of man's practical interests from 
the domain of his cognitive endeavours. False beliefs can be practically or 
survivalistically efficacious, true beliefs can be counterproductive in these 
ways. No amount of theoretical argumentation can paper over the lack of 
strict correlation between the truth-status of our opinions and the success or 
failure of actions predicated on them. (1977: 140) 
Reseller's response was to distinguish Thesis Darwinism, 'the survival of a 
thesis in continued espousal is truth-indicative', from (a Peircean) Method 
Darwinism, 'method-survival (in a group of active inquirers who are ratio-
nal and realistic) is a cogent and powerful indication of adequacy (i.e., 
truthfulness)' (1977: 142-3). The formulated objection to comprehensive 
evolutionary epistemology is only valid if we aim at Thesis Darwinism. 
But Rescher is aware of an analogical objection to Method Darwinism 
which runs as follows: 
The possibility of a pragmatically successful exploitation of the instrumen-
talities afforded us by nature is surely compatible with the most profound 
ignorance of the workings of things. Think of an analogy: One can learn to 
drive a car or operate a cyclotron most successfully, and yet maintain a 
profound ignorance as to the workings of these devices. Successful manipu-
lation requires only the most superficial sort of knowledge: what happens 
when we pull which levers, so to speak. Successful action may thus be 
compatible with massive cognitive inadequacy. (1977: 144) 
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And this seems a fundamental objection to Method Darwinism. What is 
Rescher's answer in defence of Method Darwinism? He argues that the 
objection 'is rendered ineffective by the vast range and extent, the tremen-
dous generality of the pragmatic success at issue with an inquiry proce-
dure' (loc.cit.). But this looks like the familiar inference to the only expla-
nation: how could we explain 'the vast range and extent, the tremendous 
generality of the pragmatic success of method' if not by assuming that 
method-survival is indicative of truthfulness? Yet, as we now know there 
is an alternative explanation for this pragmatic success of scientific 
method: constructive empiricism. Perhaps, then, Rescher would like to 
claim that the pragmatic success of science can be best explained by the 
truthfulness of method. For this to be a strong argument it must be a prob-
ability argument: although it may still be the case that the pragmatic suc-
cess is the success of a fundamentally flawed science (where its ontology 
of unobservables is concerned), the chance that this is actually the case is 
extremely small. However, the details of this argument are not given and 
Rescher's own objection undercuts his methodological Darwinism. 
Recently Rescher convincingly argued that one cannot expect an argu-
ment for scientific realism from a comprehensive evolutionary perspective. 
In discussing 'evolution's role in the success of science' he concludes that: 
the success of science can be explained well short of the supposition that it 
manages to get at the real truth of things. It merely means that those ways 
(whatever they may be) in which it fails to be true are immaterial to the 
achievement of good results - that, in the context of the particular applica-
tions at issue, its inadequacies lie beneath the penalty level of actual fail-
ure. This matter of adequacy sufficient "to get by" - this idea of an "error-
tolerant" nature permitting applicative success to attend factual falsity - is 
something that is in large measure explicable in evolutionary terms. (1987: 
109-10) 
The 'mitigated realism', which, according to Rescher, can be defended by 
an argument from natural evolution, is not a scientific realism. It is a real-
ism compatible with van Fraassen's empiricist philosophy of science. Once 
more we are led to the conclusion that scientific realism cannot count on 
the plausibility of some comprehensive evolutionary perspective. To the 
contrary, if realism with regard to observables can be defended on evol-
utionary grounds the empiricist-pragmatist philosophy of science of van 
Fraassen seems the more plausible one. The sole objection from some 
205 
Chapter 6 
comprehensive evolutionary epistemology to van Fraassen's empiricism is 
the objection already made in part II: in so far as these epistemologies are 
naturalistic philosophies of science they are (so it is claimed) the result of 
a recent development in the history of Western epistemology, i.e. the 
denial of first philosophy in philosophy of science. However, as we have 
witnessed the evolutionary character of these philosophies of science does 
not suggest a naturalistic realism, pace Hooker, but rather a naturalistic 
pragmatism, unless we are able to argue from reliable knowledge concern-
ing observables to probable knowledge concerning unobservables. 
Recently Stich (1990) argued that even in the case of knowledge con-
cerning observables evolutionary explanations cannot show that our per-
ceptual beliefs are approximately true. In a detailed discussion of the pro-
cess of natural evolution and selection he points to the fact that there are 
processes which undermine any evolutionary account of the truth of our 
beliefs concerning observables: genetic drift, pleiotropy, heterozygote 
superiority, and meiotic drift (1990: 63ff). Stich concludes that 'it is sim-
ply not the case that evolution inevitably produces close approximations to 
optimally well-designed systems' (67). Furthermore, natural selection does 
not care about truth, not even on the perceptual level, but only about the 
reproductive success of the organism, 'and from the point of view of 
reproductive success, it is often better to be safe (and wrong) than sorry' 
(62). One can well understand that this point of departure leads Stich to 
some form of pragmatism14 (1990: ch. 6). 
However, although Stich's remarks form an argument for a rather rad-
ical scepticism in epistemology, these are not relevant to the scientific 
realism/constructive empiricism debate, since even if Stich is right van 
Fraassen's empiricism would suffer from it as much as scientific realism. I 
have only mentioned Stich's work to emphasize that it is unlikely that 
evolutionary accounts of beliefs can show the approximate truth of those 
beliefs, whether referring to observables or to unobservables. 
It is not to be expected that comprehensive evolutionary epistemologies 
will offer an evolutionary argument for scientific realism. Nevertheless, 
both Vollmer's projective epistemology and Hooker's unified evolutionary 
14
 Indeed, Stich refers to Rescher's Methodological Pragmatism (1977) as 'essen-
tial reading for anyone interested in a pragmatic epistemology' though there are 
many points on which Stich and Rescher disagree (1990: 167). 
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epistemology aim at a defence of scientific realism and we have found 
some hints in their attempts to defend scientific realism. But instead of 
arguing from (neo)Darwinistic theories on natural selection and random 
mutations of genes, these hints seem rather to involve considerations on 
probabilities concerning the existence of unobservables. 
6.8 Conclusion: is there an argument for scientific realism from natural 
evolution? 
We set out to answer the question whether there is an argument for scien-
tific realism from natural evolution. It turns out that the answer must be 
negative: there is no phylogenetic argument from natural evolution for 
scientific realism.™ Arguing from natural evolution only takes us from 
the success of (neo)Darwinistic theories to some form of pragmatic-
empiricist philosophy of science, of which van Fraassen's constructive 
empiricism is but one example. Arguing for scientific realism we need 
some probability argument that takes us from highly probable, human, 
beliefs concerning observables to highly probable, human, beliefs concern-
ing unobservables. Scientific theories on the nature of Homo sapiens may 
well be relevant to the extent that they supply elements to this grand argu-
ment, but in themselves they are insufficient. 
In the previous chapters we explored the true nature of constructive 
empiricism and we concluded that it is a first philosophy of science, i.e. 
that van Fraassen insists on a sharp and clear distinction between philos-
ophy and science. In discussing the different evolutionary epistemologies it 
became clear that the main motive for these epistemologies is the fact that 
a first philosophy in epistemology has turned out to be very unlikely. It is 
important to notice that the denial of a first philosophy in epistemology, in 
the sense that an absolute foundation of knowledge is impossible, is not 
incompatible with van Fraassen's empiricism. Indeed, van Fraassen will 
surely accept the denial of a first philosophy in this sense. However, we 
also noticed in the evolutionary epistemologies the importance of the 
denial of a first philosophy of science, in the sense that philosophy of 
science is independent of the history and the practice of science. Construc-
,s
 Cf. Putnam (1993a). 
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tive empiricism ¡s such a first philosophy of science so that most compre-
hensive evolutionary epistemologies are incompatible with this empiricism. 
But unfortunately, and this is the conclusion drawn from the present chap-
ter, these evolutionary epistemologies do not support scientific realism by 
some new evolutionary argument. 
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Connectionism: The Ontogenetic Approach 
7.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, there is no (phylogenetic) evolutionary inductive argu-
ment for scientific realism. In this chapter I will explore another attempt 
to offer a new defence of scientific realism which we may characterize as 
ontogenetic. In this chapter I will go along with Paul M. Churchland in his 
philosophical connectionism, as depicted in his A Neurological Perspective 
(Churchland 1989). I will take just one more step within this new para-
digm in the philosophy of science and try to reformulate or translate the 
problem of scientific realism in terms of neural networks and vector-to-
vector transformation in order to see whether some new solution to the 
problem of scientific realism is forthcoming. 
To accomplish this we need first of all a reformulation of scientific 
realism in connectionist terms. Furthermore, we need a description in 
Churchland's new vocabulary of one of the most common defences of 
scientific realism, i.e. one that uses an inference to the best explanation, 
(presupposing of course that his vocabulary 'cuts nature at its joints'). 
Finally, we will ask ourselves whether this connectionist reformulation of 
the problem of scientific realism does indeed point towards an unexpected 
new solution to the problem. The conclusion will be that there is no typi-
cally connectionist argument for scientific realism. 
To be able to give a connectionist reformulation of the old problem of 
scientific realism, it should first be clear what the nature of theory is with-
in the connectionist paradigm. The crucial point then is to take scientific 
realism itself as a theory and a theory to be defended by an inference to 
the best explanation. This will make it possible to reformulate the problem 
of scientific realism (to wit, its defence) within Churchland's philosophical 
connectionism. Yet, we will then have to reconsider Churchland's own 
scientific realism (1979, 1985) to see whether his version of scientific 
realism is compatible with his connectionism. 
Of course, it should be noted that there are many possible critiques to 
materialistic connectionism as it is developed in Churchland's work. I will 
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nevertheless ignore the work of, for instance, Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988), 
Philipse (1990) and Fodor & Lepore (1991), several contributions in 
Greenwood (1991), and even classical articles like Davidson (1973) and 
Fodor (1974). The reason for this is that as long as there is an ongoing 
debate between connectionists (Ramsey, Stich & Carón 1991, P.S. 
Churchland & Sejnowski 1992, but also Thagard 1992) and anti-connec-
tionists which will probably continue for quite a while (depending on (the 
absence of) new discoveries in the neurosciences), we are offered the 
opportunity to apply connectionist ideas to old philosophical themes like 
the problem of scientific realism. Bearing in mind that whenever there is a 
decisive argument against connectionism its alleged solution to the prob-
lem of scientific realism will also have to go, we are free to consider any 
fruitful expansion of the new paradigm to new areas. 
7.2 The nature of theory: connectionist philosophy of science 
Paul Churchland is obviously a philosopher of science who is working 
within a neo-Darwin¡stic paradigm, although he does not emphasize this as 
much as he should (but cf. Churchland 1989: 150, Churchland & Church-
land 1983). In the following I will assume that Churchland accepts the fact 
that we are as much the result of a natural process of selection and ran-
dom mutations of genes as are all other living creatures. Furthermore, and 
in this he is much more explicit, Churchland accepts the latest discoveries 
in the neurosciences.1 These neuroscientific results are the building blocks 
of Churchland's connectionist philosophy of science. 
Churchland states that it is due to developments within philosophy of 
science, and more specifically to the changing opinions on the nature of 
theory, that a neurocomputational theory of mind, as a competitor to folk 
psychological theories of mind, is possible at all (1989, xii), and surely 
this cannot be denied. Thus Churchland states: 
The nature of explanation in general and of psychological explanations in 
particular became an issue central to philosophers of mind because the 
1
 Cf. Dowling (1991), Hinton (1992), Fischbach (1992) for a general introduction 
into neuroscience and Clarke & Jacyna (1987) for the history of neuroscience. 
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conceptual framework with which we conceive of ourselves (as creatures 
with beliefs, desires, and other mental states) came to be seen as a com-
mon-sense explanatory theory - "folk psychology" - a theory that enables 
each of us to predict and explain the behavior of the other humans that 
surround us (1989: xi). 
In this section I will give a brief outline of Churchland's connectio-
nism, but I will highlight only those concepts of his connectionism that we 
need in order to establish a new approach towards a solution to the prob-
lem of scientific realism. 
7.2.1 Connectionism 
The notion of a network plays a crucial role in connectionism2 (cf. fig. 1). 
Churchland uses a three-layered net as his example. We thus have an input 
layer, a hidden units layer, and an output layer. The knots of these layers 
are fully connected to every knot of the layer beneath and/or above and 
every connection either inhibits or excites the input-signal, depending on 
the weight of the connection. We can think of the weight of the connec-
tions as represented in a (hyper)space and we can think of the signalling 
through the layers of the network as a vector-to-vector transmission. 
This model is used as a model for neural networks. However, Church-
land will be the first to withhold any radical realistic interpretation of the 
network model as a model of a neural network (1989: 181). Yet the simi-
larities are striking. Here I will not pursue this point but will rather con-
centrate on two questions that are being answered within connectionism in 
a specific way and which are relevant to the discussion of scientific real-
ism: 
(1) How does a human being represent the world? and 
(2) How does it learn to apply concepts? 
2
 Churchland traces the origins of connectionism in Rosenblatt's Perceptron-para-
digm (19S6). After being criticized heavily by Minsky & Paperi (1969) it has 
found new impulses by adding to the original two layer network a third layer of 
hidden units and by the description of the generalized delta rule by Rumelhart, 
Hinton & Williams (1986) by which a neural network can actually be 'trained'. 
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(1) A human being represents the world by realizing a certain configur­
ation of synaptic weights in its neural network, given a certain 
α Ω ΟΌ 
SYNAPTIC CONNFCTIONS 
(VARIOUS MIGHTS) 
AXONAl OUTPUT 
SYNAPTIC CONNECTIONS 
(VARIOUS HEIGHTS) 
AXONAL OUTPUT 
OUTPUT 
UNITS 
HIDDEN 
UNITS Η 
INPUT 
UNITS 
Fig. 1. Λ simple network (from Churchland 1989: 162) 
history of inputs and given certain realizable biological possibilities. Econ­
omically speaking we can say that the individual represents the world in a 
'learned partition on its hidden-unit activation space' (cf. fig. 2). 
(2) A human being learns to apply concepts to categorize the world in 
virtue of the fact that its neural network reacts to (certain) erroneous3 
classifications of (parts of) the world by rearranging (part of) the synaptic 
weights. In other words, learning is describing a gradient descending line 
in weight/error (hyper)space and representing is partitioning the hidden 
unit activation-(hyper)space (cf. fig. 3). 
This extremely brief summary of some of the concepts in connectio-
3
 Erroneous according to some 'external teacher'. 
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nism nevertheless allows us to identify the connectionist meaning of 
'theory'. 
7.2.2 Theory as the configuration of synaptic weights 
Churchland suggests that we should take theory to be a point in the synap-
tic weight-(hyper)space of a neural network (1989: 177). In other words, a 
theory is the configuration of synaptic weights of an individual neural 
network. The theory of Einstein is the configuration of synaptic weights of 
the person we denote with the proper name 'Einstein'. In terms of neural 
networks a theory is not something a person has but rather something a 
person is. The theory of Einstein was lost from the moment Einstein 
passed away. But what should we then mean by the theory of relativity? 
Surely there are many people representing the theory of relativity while 
differing in their configurations of synaptic weights. 
Identifying theory with the configuration of synaptic weights of a neu-
ral network obviously invokes an underdetermination-problem. Several 
different configurations of synaptic weights can prima facie represent the 
same theory. People can be identical to the extent that they represent the 
same theory without being identical with regard to the configuration of 
their synaptic weights. Considering the empirical fact that different neural 
networks seem to communicate with each other on the same theory of 
relativity, Churchland wonders whether a different meaning must be 
attached to the notion of 'theory'. Let us briefly look at this suggestion of 
a second meaning. 
7.2.3 Theory as the set of partitions in activation-vector (hyper)space 
In trying to avoid the connectionist problem of underdetermination we 
could perhaps understand by theory the set of partitions in the hidden unit 
activation-vectorspace of the neural network. Whenever two people have 
the same (relevant) set of partitions represented in the hidden unit activa-
tion-vectorspace, they have the same theory, even if they differ with 
regard to their configurations of synaptic weights. 
Yet Churchland chooses to take theory as the configuration of synaptic 
weights rather than the set of partitions. The reason for this is that if we 
emphasize the dynamics of a neural network (i.e. the learning process, the 
changes in the set of partitions through time) the level of the synaptic 
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weights is the essential in predicting the behaviour of an individual. 
Churchland states: 
REGION OF "PRO'OTYPICM. 
VECTORS REGION OF "PROTOTYPICAL" 
VECTORS 
Fig. 2. Learned partition on hidden unit activation-vector space, 
for only three of many hidden-unit activation levels of a net 
(From Churchland 1989: 169) 
The laws of cognitive evolution ... do not operate primarily at the level of 
partitions ... Rather, they operate at the level of the weights ... We need 
only concede that different global theories can occasionally produce ident-
ical short-term behavior. (1989: 177-78) 
We could perhaps express this in a more direct way by noting that the 
materialistic configuration of synaptic weights is 'really there' whereas the 
set of partitions is 'only represented' by the hidden units. Naturally, the 
configuration of synaptic weights suffices to study the dynamic character 
of 
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Fig. 3. Learning: gradient descent in weigbt/еггог space for 
only two of many hidden-unit activation leveb of a net 
(From Churchland 1989: 166) 
the neural network (the conceptual changes or the learning process). 
Notice however that if Churchland takes theory to mean the configuration 
of synaptic weights, similar behaviour of individuals at a certain moment 
in time is no longer a sufficient ground for the belief that both individuals 
'adhere to the same theory'. 
This leaves us with the choice to understand 'theory' to mean either 
'configuration of synaptic weights' or 'set of partitions represented in the 
hidden unit activation-vectorspace'. Let us follow Churchland and decide 
to the following working hypothesis on the connectionist meaning of the­
ory: a (global) theory is a (or the) configuration of synaptic weights of a 
neural network. 
We accept the fact that there are as many different theories as there are 
different configurations of synaptic weights. Probably all neural networks 
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differ in their configuration of synaptic weights. Due to differences in 
input-history and physiological make-up, different neural networks will 
embody different configurations of synaptic weights. This leads us to the 
connectionist hypothesis that every individual neural network is a different 
(global) theory.4 
7.3 The nature of scientific realism: connectionism at work 
Churchland adheres to and enthusiastically argues for scientific realism. 
My suggestion here is to reformulate scientific realism (and one of its 
common defences) in connectionist terms to see whether this would lead 
to a new, unexpected, solution to the problem of scientific realism. 
7.3.1 Scientific realism in connectionist terms 
Accepting the naturalist thesis to which Churchland adheres, viz. the thesis 
that there is no crucial difference between scientific and philosophical 
theories, we are now free to apply the connectionist notion of theory to 
the theory of scientific realism itself. Connectionist anthropology claims 
that semantic engines, like human beings, are (implemented) neural net-
works. Connectionist philosophy of science claims that theories can be 
identified as individuated neural nets. This implies the following: the the-
ory of scientific realism does not exist; there are as many theories of 
scientific realism as there are scientific realists. For instance, a die-hard 
scientific realist is a not so dynamic configuration of synaptic weights 
which will, irrespective of any acoustic or visual inputs, never 'change his 
opinion'5. In a discussion with its opponent there is a continuous (rel-
evant) vector-to-vector transformation that makes the network (given the 
configuration of synaptic weights) classify scientific realism as the most 
A
 Cf. Churchland (1991) where he demonstrates that connectionist philosophy of 
science makes very much sense of the radical theses of Feyerabend like his thesis 
on incommensurability, 
5
 Here we face a major difficulty in connectionism. What do we mean by 'chang-
ing its opinion'? Must connectionism not presuppose intentionality? Here I will 
simply assume that 'change of opinion' means 'modifying a theory' which, in 
connectionist terms, means 'to redistribute the synaptic weights'. 
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plausible (relevant) theory.6 That is to say, it will give certain answers to 
certain questions, or to put it in slightly different terms, it will behave in a 
certain way given certain stimuli. What the prototype of scientific realism 
is differs from network to network, and what networks a scientific realistic 
network will qualify as its intellectual allies, will also be a function of the 
dynamic configuration of synaptic weights and the input-history of the 
neural net. 
Of course, this cannot be the whole story of scientific realism. The spe­
cific content of the theory of scientific realism is not yet formulated in 
connectionist terms. However, such a formulation can easily be given. A 
scientific realist is a neural network that represents/is the theory that some 
network (or some parts of some networks) (nearly) truly represent the un-
observable structures of the world; that the prototypes (or some of the 
prototypes) in the state-spaces of these networks really inhabit the world. 
I am well aware of the many problems this reformulation might invoke for 
the plausibility of some connectionistic scientific realism. Yet I will first 
focus my attention to the reformulation of one of the most common 
defences of scientific realism, viz. in terms of 'inference to the best expla­
nation'. 
7.3.2 The connectionist reformulation of the IBE-defence of scientific 
realism 
About ІВБ Churchland writes: 
On the Parallel Distributed Processing approach, we can begin to explicate 
the crude notion of "inference to the best explanation" with the more pen­
etrating notion of "activating the most appropriate prototype vector". Acti­
vating the most appropriate available prototype is what a well-trained 
network does as a matter of course, and it does it directly, in response to 
the input, without canvassing a single alternative vector. In the end; the 
process is not one of "inference" at all, nor is its outcome generally a 
sentence. But the process is certainly real. It just needs to be reconceived 
within the more penetrating framework of cognitive neurodynamics. (1989, 
6
 Churchland is not clear by what criteria we might classify scientific realism as 
the most plausible relevant theory. See section 7.5.2 for a discussion of this prob­
lem. 
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218. My italics) 
Given the description of what a scientific realist is, we are now in the 
position to fully reformulate the defence of scientific realism in connectio-
nist terms. 
The theory of scientific realism does not exist, only scientific realists 
exist. A scientific realist is a well-trained neural network. Its dynamic 
configuration of synaptic weights represents the theory that some (parts of) 
networks represent correctly the unobservable structures of the world. 
Given (relevant) input, such a network will respond in a way that is the 
result of activating the most appropriate available prototype vector. This 
reaction is in its turn input for other neural nets. In the case of some net-
works (as in the case of the scientific realist) this input will result in acti-
vating the prototype of scientific realism. Depending on the configuration 
of synaptic weights and the input of the net there will or will not occur a 
change in the most appropriate available prototype vector and as a conse-
quence the network will remain a scientific realist or will 'change its 
opinion'. 
To what extent, then, may we hope to find a new defence of scientific 
realism with connectionism at our disposal? Our first reaction may well be 
that with the notion of a 'well-trained network' the problem of realism has 
simply disappeared! 
7.3.3 Is there a problem of scientific realism within connectionism? 
Indeed, with scientific realism and its defence reformulated in connectio-
nist terms, the problem of scientific realism seems dissolved. After all, at a 
certain moment a certain network will as a matter of course either con-
clude to scientific realism or it won't; what else could it do? The neural 
network represents the theory that some (parts of) neural nets represent 
(nearly) correctly the unobservable structures of the world. That is just the 
way it is. One cannot help being a realist or an anti-realist. 
However, this is not the case and discussions on scientific realism will 
continue. The reason for this is that a neural network is a dynamic con-
figuration of synaptic weights: it can learn and 'change its opinion'. Ulti-
mately, there can be a radical change in the theory the network represents. 
So the problem of scientific realism has not disappeared after all. Given a 
cacophony of sensory stimuli and certain interactions of neural networks 
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there will be a complex process of mutual manipulation which will, given 
the configurations of synaptic weights, result in either consensus or diver-
gence of opinions. 
On the one hand, neural nets are the result of a long process of natural 
selection, on the other hand they are the result of a much shorter process 
of learning (the tuning) and so they have certain properties specific to 
them. Suppose a neural net is given an input for which it has not yet an 
available prototype vector, for instance when a net is presented for the 
first time ever, in whatever form, with the question why some theories are 
so successful in predicting and explaining the phenomena. What is hap-
pening then within a neural net, Churchland describes as follows: 
in familiar cases a suitable prototype is activated directly. And if the nov-
elty of the case foils our waiting categories and thus forces us into search 
mode, then we search only the comparatively tiny space comprising the set 
of our own currently available prototype vectors. Even here the search is 
mostly blind and probably stops at the first success. If one's initial encoun-
ter with the problematic explanandum fails to activate directly a familiar 
and subsequently successful prototype vector, then one repeatedly reenters 
the problematic input in a variety of different cognitive contexts, in hopes 
of finally activating some prototype vector or other, or some vector close 
enough to an existing prototype to give one at least some handle on the 
problem. (219) 
The problem of scientific realism therefore exists by virtue of at least one 
neural net in which a 'suitable prototype' that ought to be activated direct-
ly given certain input is simply not present. This input can be the (written 
or spoken) product of another neural network.7 
The problem of scientific realism in connectionist terms is the neural 
search for an appropriate available prototype vector, given the problematic 
input to a configuration of synaptic weights which can be expressed by the 
question why some (parts of) neural nets are so successful in explaining 
and predicting the observable structures of the world. 
7
 Supposing this input is available in due course and a confrontation of neural nets 
takes place we sometimes speak of the transfer of knowledge, a discussion or 
perhaps even indoctrination. 
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The problem of scientific realism is a problem to someone. In other 
words, it is a problem relative to a specific neural network. Now, the 
meaning of 'appropriate' in 'the most appropriate available prototype 
vector' is clear: this term refers to erasing the problematic character of the 
input. But this raises at once the question of the epistemic relation 
between a neural net and the environment in which it lives. In what sense 
does a neural network represent the world correctly or truthfully if the 
criterion for appropriateness is simply erasing the problematic character of 
some input? This takes us to the connectionist role of the notion of truth. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will therefore (a) consider the notion of 
truth within the connectionist paradigm and (b) see whether scientific 
realism can be given a consistent place within connectionism. 
7.4 The nature of truth 
Within connectionism truth could perhaps be taken as a certain unique 
relation between the network and the world. A network represents certain 
(or probable) knowledge if it categorizes the world in the (approximate) 
right way, i.e. if the prototypes of the net (approximately) correspond with 
the observable and unobservable natural kinds. However, the question is 
how we could determine the verisimilitude of a neural net. A zero-mini­
mum in weight/error (hyper) space can never be sufficient to speak of 
correct representations because of the possible о wdeterm ¡nation of the 
world by the prototypes of the net. The neural net might not be, ontologi-
cally speaking, the most economic one. Furthermore, as Churchland him-
self notices, it is very unlikely that any neural net will ever reach such a 
zero-minimum (1989: 194).8 For these reasons it simply ceases to be 
8
 There Churchland argues: 'nothing guarantees that we humans will avoid getting 
permanently stuck in some very deep but relatively local error minimum. For 
another, nothing guarantees that there exists a possible configuration of weights 
that would reduce the error messages to zero. A unique global error minimum 
relative to the human neural network there may be, but for us and for any other 
finite system interacting with the real world, it may always be nonzero. And for a 
third thing, nothing guarantees that there is only one global minimum. Perhaps 
there will in general be many quite different minima, all of them equally low in 
error, all of them carving up the world in quite different ways. Which one a given 
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interesting to ask for the measure of verisimilitude of a neural net. Either 
we must reformulate truth in other terms than correspondence, or we 
should admit that truth plays but a minor role (or even no role) within 
connectionism. It is this latter conclusion Churchland draws: he is of the 
opinion that within connectionist epistemology we can only speak mean-
ingfully about the (measure of) cognitive success of dynamic configur-
ations of synaptic weights (1989: 150-1, 157, 194, 249, 301) 'which sug-
gests that the proper course to pursue in epistemology lies in the direction 
of a highly naturalistic and pluralistic form of pragmatism.' (1989: 194).9 
A scientific realist is such a configuration of synaptic weights. Some 
networks (like the present author) think there is reason to believe that 
there are networks that represent the unobservable structures of the world, 
other networks think there cannot be such reasons. Asking for the truth 
with regard to this discussion, within connectionism, seems pointless: we 
had better ask for the measure of success of these two categories of net-
works. But success in what? With Churchland we must say that a neural 
net has cognitive success to the extent that it makes problematic input 
from the complex natural and social world (there is no appropriate proto-
type vector that can be activated directly as a matter of course) unprob-
lematic. But why call this a cognitive success if the success referred to is 
actually a pragmatic success? I will therefore bracket Churchland's phrase 
cognitive success in order to remind the reader of the fact that what is 
really meant is pragmatic success. 
Earlier on we concluded that connectionism is a position within 
Darwinism. From this it follows 
(1) that it is not obvious that the structure of the world is such that in a 
process of natural selection those networks will be selected which 
correctly represent the unobservable structures of the world (cf. the 
previous chapter and Churchland (1989: 140) and 
(2) that it is as yet unclear with regard to what aspect of the world a 
neural net is tuned where it is supposed to represent philosophical 
thinker reaches may be a function of the idiosyncratic details of its learning his-
tory.' 
9
 In other words, according to Churchland 'truth' is a folk psychological notion 
that has to go if folk psychology proves inadequate as a theory of the mind. 
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theories (like scientific realism). 
Since truth plays no significant epistemologica! role within connectio-
nism, it seems rather pointless to ask whether scientific realism is true 
since we have no way to 'establish' this truth. However, what we can ask 
ourselves is whether someone is a "cognitive" successful neural net for the 
reason that the net represents the doctrine of scientific realism. These 
considerations lead me to the following three remarks: 
(1) It would be strange if a new connectionist philosophy of science 
would lead to the denial of the truth of (neo)Darwinism and neuroscience 
since it was the acceptance of (neo)Darwinism and neuroscience as true 
that led to this philosophy of science in the first place. Yet, is this not the 
case given the role of the notion of truth in connectionism? According to 
the standards of connectionism any plausible scientific theory is simply 
accepted. However, it is accepted for completely other reasons than we 
were used to think. It is not accepted for the reason that it is (thought to 
be) true (this would imply scientific realism) and not even for the reason 
that it is (thought to be) merely empirically adequate (this would imply 
constructive empiricism). Neo-Darwinistic connectionist philosophers of 
science take themselves to be dynamic configurations of synaptic weights 
which are adapted to several specific problems that were once input to 
these nets. Their scientific theories are nothing but the most appropriate 
available prototype vectors in these nets. Yet there remains the difficulty 
that within connectionism believing a theory to be true is permissable but 
fundamentally epistemically unwarranted. Connectionism seems therefore 
to suffer from the same problem as constructive empiricism: how can 
there be pragmatic reasons for believing some theory to be true? (cf. chap-
ter 5). I will return to this issue below (section 7.5.1). 
(2) Of course, the uneasiness we have with connectionism is that con-
nectionism itself is a theory and that it must therefore be possible to 
reformulate connectionism in its own terms. At the same time it is clear 
that it is as useless to ask for the truth of connectionism as it is in the case 
of any other theory. Yet, Church land writes his book and hopes it will 
function as an input for other neural networks in such a way that it will 
'convince' these nets of the truth of connectionism. But Churchland can 
only be a comforter to the souls of philosophers of science: if we adapt 
our dynamic configuration of synaptic weights in such a way that we 
come to represent connectionism, we will notice a decisive increase in 
222 
Connectionism 
"cognitive" success whenever we face the question of the status of scien-
tific theories. Perhaps then Churchland himself could find comfort in the 
pragmatic theory of truth of CS. Peirce. The true philosophy of science 
will be the one the community of philosophers of science will agree to in 
the long run (Peirce 1878: 273). As Peirce once wrote: 'Let us not pretend 
to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts' (Peirce 1868). 
If all neural networks in philosophy of science activate as a matter of 
course connectionism as the most appropriate available prototype vector, 
connectionism is true. (Notice that in this case we have changed the con-
tent of the notion of truth.) Still, Churchland argues extensively that there 
is no reason to believe that such a convergence of opinions will ever take 
place (cf. for instance 1989, 194)'° and therefore the comforter himself 
finds little comfort. 
(3) Churchland says one can only speak meaningfully of successfully 
and less successfully adapted cognitive dynamic configurations of synaptic 
weights. Within connectionism a scientific realist is a certain dynamic 
configuration of synaptic weights of a neural network. The problem of 
scientific realism is the neural search for an appropriate available proto-
type vector, given the problematic input. A philosophical network which is 
being confronted with problematic input, like the success some nets 
exhibit in predicting and explaining the phenomena, searches for 'an 
explanation' and ultimately activates as a matter of course for instance a 
scientific realistic vector. Emphasizing 'for instance' brings out my third 
remark. How can a connectionist sincerely stay a scientific realist, know-
ing that his scientific realism is but a philosophical position relative to his 
net, determined by his configuration of synaptic weights and input-history? 
This last question forces us again to consider the possibility of connec-
tionist scientific realism. Can Churchland really and sincerely be a scien-
tific realist within his own connectionism the way he wants to be a scien-
tific realist? I think this question can ultimately be answered in the affirm-
ative. 
10
 But cf. Rescher (1979), Almeder (1989), and Misak (1991). 
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7.5 The possibility of connectionist scientific realism 
Our inquiry into the possibility of a connectionist scientific realism should 
concentrate on the last pages of Churchland's book Scientific Realism and 
the Plasticity of Mind (1979) and the last remarks of his article 'The Onto-
logica! Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues' 
(1985). 
In his (198S) Churchland confesses he actually agrees with van 
Fraassen (1980) to a great extent, especially where van Fraassen moves 
away from the sentential theory of cognition, but he claims that 
the criticism to which I am inclined is that van Fraassen has not moved 
quite far enough (45). 
Subsequently Churchland offers the connectionist reasons why the notion 
of truth plays but a minor role within his philosophy of science: natural 
evolution does not select on the truth of beliefs, truth is a folk scientific 
concept which must be replaced by other concepts, and there is no guaran-
tee that there is a Complete and Final True Theory. What then is the con-
tent of Churchland's scientific realism, so one may ask. This is Church-
land's answer: 
[I] The term realism still marks the principal contrast with ... positivistic 
instrumental ism. Whatever the integrity of the notion of truth, theories 
about unobservables have just as much a claim to truth, epistemologically 
and metaphysically, as theories about observables. [2] Second, I remain 
committed to the idea that there exists a world, independent of our cogni-
tion, with which we interact and of which we construct representations: for 
varying purposes, with varying penetration, and with varying success. [3] 
Lastly, our best and most penetrating grasp of the real is still held to reside 
in the representations provided by our best theories. Global excellence of 
theory remains the fundamental measure of rational ontology. And that has 
always been the central claim of scientific realism.' (1985, 46-7, 1989: 
151) 
I will now consider whether Churchland's scientific realism is compatible 
with his connectionism. 
In the light of connectionism there is nothing interesting about a truth-
claim with regard to a theory. In the case of scientific realism as a theory 
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we can only meaningfully ask for the measure of adaptation (or "cogni-
tive" success) of those neural nets which represent theories that postulate 
unobservable entities given certain problematic input. But now there seem 
to be two connectionist roads to scientific realism, provided the arguments 
(which are not yet given) are sound: 
(1) neural nets represent the unobservables of the real world, and 
(2) those nets that represent scientific realism are "cognitively" more 
successful than any other nets. 
The previous sections were preparations to discuss (2). But let us tackle 
the first claim first. Subsequently we will consider whether the second 
connectionist road offers us a new argument for scientific realism. 
7.5.1 Neural nets, prototypes and unobservables 
In his Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind Churchland speaks of 
a little creature that depends for its survival on correct estimations of the 
tidal movements of the sea (145-8). Let us suppose this creature is a neu-
ral net. The creature is able to make the right predictions by way of learn-
ing and applying a process called 'curve-fitting': 
The combined output of [...] three internal oscillations will mimic/antici-
pate to perfection the sundry ups and downs of its watery environment 
(1979: 147-8) 
In this way the creature (which is supposed to be an epistemic engine) will 
be extremely "cognitive" successful. But then Churchland goes on and 
concludes that the three parameters correspond with three factors causing 
the complex tidal movement, to wit a primary and two moons. 'We might 
even say that our creature has learned some astronomy' (1979, 148). The 
creature represents structures which are unobservable to the creature! The 
prototypes of the creature (more or less) correspond to real unobservables. 
Yet Churchland overlooks two issues here if we try to apply this 
example to the defence of scientific realism. First of all there is a survival 
problem in the case of the creature (1979: 145), which makes the tidal 
movements of the water an inevitably problematic input to this creature. If 
there was no lethal danger the creature was not forced to apply its evol-
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utionary acquired ability to modify its configuration of synaptic weights. If 
no such lethal danger is involved there is no reason to apply any curve-
fitting procedure. Since in the case of Homo sapiens believe in the exist-
ence of unobservables is no matter of life and death, our curve-fitting 
procedures does not epistemically warrant the postulation of unobserv-
ables. Therefore, the story of the tidal creature is compatible with con-
structive empiricism and does not automatically lead to scientific realism. 
(The argument is obviously an analogy which is only convincing if we, 
humans, could infer to unobservables by a way independent of the prag-
matic success of a certain configuration of synaptic weights, which is 
impossible). 
Furthermore, Church land simply postulates the theory that the tidal 
movements are caused by three objects in space but this is Churchland's 
(not the creature's) best explanation for the tidal movements. Other expla-
nations of the pragmatic success of his neural net could well be generated 
by the tidal creature (if it could take a philosophical attitude) since the 
primitive creature itself knows nothing about the unobservable world or 
about the astronomy of the galaxy it lives in, independently from its suc-
cess. In terms of neural nets we must say this little animal is an unsuper-
vised (but perhaps monitored) network (cf. P.S. Churchland & Sejnowski 
1992: 96-102). Churchland's view here functions as a God's eye point of 
view. Of course, no one would doubt that the knowledge concerning un-
observables represented in human neural nets would be warranted if we, 
humans, already knew what the unobservable world really looks like... 
The conclusion from the story of the tidal creature is that there is no 
guarantee whatsoever that neural networks discover hidden variables that 
represent unobservable natural entities. There is only the hypothesis that 
neural nets which postulate unobservable entities by way of curve-fitting 
are better adapted to complex input. There could be various reasons for 
the plausibility of this hypothesis. A net will perhaps inefficiently use its 
energy if it only postulates observable entities. Or perhaps it wants to stop 
the experience of stress and so it postulates a cause for observed empirical 
regularities. It could be driven by the desire for simplicity which it can 
only achieve by postulating unobservable natural kinds. Or, lastly, it could 
represent the world in such a way that it gains some evolutionary advan-
tage. But these reasons are all pragmatic reasons, and to the extent that 
these reasons lead one to postulate the existence of unobservables, they are 
clearly not epistemic reasons to believe in the existence of unobservables. 
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So if Churchland thinks we do believe some theory, postulating {inobserv-
ables, to be true, we do so for the wrong reasons. As we have seen in our 
discussion of the problem of constructive empiricism, this leads to the 
conclusion that we are irrational in believing in the existence of unobserv-
ables. If scientific realism claims that it is rational to believe in the exist-
ence of unobservables, connectionism seems not to lead to scientific real-
ism. 
However, one could of course argue for connectionist scientific realism 
along a different line. Of course there is no guarantee that a neural net 
will represent the real unobservables but we could claim that the prag-
matic success of neural nets to cope with the problems, posed upon them 
by the complex real world, can only be explained by assuming that the 
postulated unobservables (or the created prototypes) correspond to the real 
unobservables. But this argument is simply a variation upon a familiar 
theme: it is an inference to the only explanation. However, we have seen 
in previous chapters that the pragmatic success of naturally evolved and 
learning creatures can also be explained by (constructive) empiricism. This 
means the connectionist must retreat to some probability argument: The 
chance that some of the prototypes of a successful neural nets do not cor-
respond to unobservables is real but extremely small. This is not a new, 
typically connectionist, argument for scientific realism. 
7.5.2 The success of scientific realist neural nets 
Elaborating on the connectionist reformulation of the problem of scientific 
realism in the light of Churchland's recent work, I would like to suggest 
the following. 
A scientific realist is a neural network representing the theory that 
some networks represent the unobservable structures of the world. The 
realist represents this theory as the result of a natural learning ability and a 
problematic input, problematic relative to the net. This result can be 
achieved analogous to the representation of the little creature of the tidal 
movements of the water. The result is relative to the net but this does not 
mean that the result is arbitrary or, in more general terms, that philosophi-
cal positions are arbitrary. It does mean that a philosophical position is 
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relative to the net that represents it, given certain input." The net would 
like to argue against other nets that if they experience its problematic 
input as problematic, scientific realism is the best solution to it. However, 
these nets have a different configuration of weights and input-history and 
therefore (a) the problematic input could well be experienced as unproble-
matic or (b) if it is experienced as problematic a different solution may be 
applied. 
So, the only thing we can do to convince a scientific anti-realist (as for 
instance van Fraassen) of the problem-solving capacities of scientific real-
ism is to present van Fraassen with the complex input that led us to acti-
vate scientific realism as the most appropriate available prototype vector 
(as a matter of course). Yet, given the fact that philosophical discussions 
have no relevance for the survival of the neural nets, van Fraassen can 
always and without deadly danger either ignore the problematic input (the 
input simply doesn't initiate a modification of the synaptic weights) or 
accept the input as problematic and activate constructive empiricism as the 
most appropriate available prototype vector as a matter of course. Connec-
tionism therefore does not offer a new argument for scientific realism. 
Connectionist scientific realism seems to be defensible, but only by some 
probability argument, which has, as yet, not been spelled out. 
" Philipse (1990) criticizes connectionism in this respect and states: 'Churchland's 
naturalism or scientific realism collapses into a 'neo-Kantian' transcendental ideal-
ism, which says that reality as we perceive it is a product of the conceptual struc-
tures we adopt. But this variety of transcendental idealism is not a stable philo-
sophical position either' (1990, 169). Now I take the first statement to be true. 
Neo-Kantianism is an old-fashioned way to state that man is something like a 
neural network. However, a neural net can represent the theory that it itself is a 
neural net and that others are as well. A connectionist network in philosophy of 
science can represent the theory that some neural nets represent the unobservable 
structures in the world. Within the relativism caused by the fact that our knowl-
edge is network-laden there is enough room to discuss the effect, the problem-
solving capacities, of scientific realism. So I do not see why connectionism cannot 
be a stable philosophical position. Philipse is of the opinion that right from the 
moment we accept Churchland's connectionism this naturalism becomes 'but one 
arbitrary choice among many others' (169). The mistake in this, however, is 
substituting the term 'arbitrary' for 'relative to a network'. 
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7.5.3 Is connectionism a realist philosophy of science? 
Let us return to the description of scientific realism given by Churchland. 
The first thesis of his realism ('theories about unobservables have just as 
much a claim to truth, epistemologically and metaphysically, as theories 
about observables') may be reformulated as the claim that the pragmatic 
success of neural nets achieved by postulating unobservables (that is, cre-
ating prototypes allegedly corresponding to unobservables of the real 
world) can be defended by proposing scientific realism as the most prob-
able explanation of this success. The argument is not a new typically 
connectionist argument and we are familiar with its problems. 
The second realist thesis ('there exists a world, independent of our 
cognition, with which we interact and of which we construct representa-
tions') can easily be reformulated in connectionist terms: there are nat-
urally evolved neural nets (inhabitants of a world that exists independently 
of these), and there is a causal interaction between environment and 
(adapted) neural nets. It is not clear whether this metaphysical claim must 
be part and parcel of scientific realism. In sections 7.6 and 7.7 I will dis-
cuss metaphysical anti-realism or internal realism in this respect and brief-
ly turn to the question whether one can also be an internal scientific real-
ist. Churchland's connectionism may actually lead to such a metaphysical 
anti-realist scientific realism and in that case he is forced to drop this 
realist thesis on the independent existence of the world. 
Churchland's statement that 'global excellence of theory' is the 'funda-
mental measure of rational ontology' need not be a typically realist thesis. 
What is meant by 'global excellence of a theory'? Within connectionism 
this refers to the measure of pragmatic success of a neural net. Now why 
is the pragmatic success of a neural net (the extent in which it can "cope 
with" reality) the fundamental measure of rational ontology? The answer is 
clear: we do not have an alternative measure! But the pragmatic success of 
neural nets may be explainable in terms of empirical adequacy. If a neural 
net is empirically adequate it will be, by its very nature, globally excellent 
to the max. Yet this is compatible with constructive empiricism. What the 
connectionist should argue therefore is (again) that the pragmatic success 
is a sign for cognitive success and that the postulation of unobservables is 
epistemically warranted. The argument for this connectionist claim we 
have not found. 
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Coming to a close, we must conclude that the connectionist translation 
of the old problem of scientific realism does not bring out new arguments 
for scientific realism. The connectionist reformulation of the problem of 
scientific realism only made us conclude that the defence of scientific 
realism depends upon the dynamic configurations of neural networks 
which inhabit the world and that this defence succeeds to the extent that 
network-relative problematic input can be made unproblematic.12 This is 
indeed the process we witness in the current debate between realists and 
anti-realists. Connectionism does not, however, lead to a new argument for 
scientific realism. 
7.5.4 Churchland versus van Fraassen 
The attentive reader who is at home in the current debate on scientific 
realism will perhaps object that I did not consider Churchland's frontal 
attack on constructive empiricism (already formulated in his 1982). Let me 
here summarize this criticism. 
Churchland argues that van Fraassen cannot maintain his distinction 
between things observable by humans, but not in fact observed, and things 
not observable at all (1989: 144). His argument runs as follows: 
12
 There is a possibly crucial critique of connectionism which I have not dis-
cussed. How can Churchland know that the reasons to be a scientific realist are 
actually causes. To the question whether the connectionist can sincerely be a 
scientific realist, even knowing his scientific realism is relative to the neural net-
work he is, he has got to answer that the question is not a sincere question. After 
all, the questioner is asking for reasons, but if connectionism is right there are 
only causes. I think the situation is analogous to the situation of the vitalist (or in 
our case the folk-philosopher) and the anti-vitalist (the connectionist). The analogy 
(a modification of an analogy often used by the Churchlands) is as follows: 'The 
connectionist says there are no such things as reasons. But the claim is self-refut-
ing. The speaker can expect to be taken seriously only if his claim cannot. For if 
the claim is true, then the speaker does not have a reason for holding his position. 
But if he has no reason for sticking to his claims, then his statement is a meaning-
less string of noises, devoid of reason and truth.' Answering the question of the 
sincerity of connectionist scientific realism does however force Churchland into a 
true and radical eliminitative materialism, even if it means eliminating the notion 
of reason as denoting a natural kind. 
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Admittedly, for any distant entity one can in principle always change the 
relative spatial position of one's sensory apparatus so that the entity is 
observed: one can go to it. But equally, for any microscopic entity one can 
in principle always change the relative spatial size or configuration of one's 
sensory apparatus so that the entity is observed. Physical law imposes 
certain limitations on such plasticity, but also does physical law limit how 
far one can travel in a lifetime. (1989: 144). 
This argument however misses the point in that van Fraassen only men-
tions the importance of physical laws to the extent that these determine 
what is and what isn't observable to exemplars of Homo sapiens, given 
their physiology. Van Fraassen could easily admit that scientific devices 
are meant and used to detect unobservables, but his claim that the epis-
temic attitude toward theories which postulate the existence of what we 
think we have detected (unobservables) is fundamentally determined by 
the physiology of Homo sapiens remains unaffected. This may sound 
unsatisfactory to Churchland but he needs a further argument to show that 
van Fraassen cannot maintain the distinction between unobserved observ-
ables and unobservables. Such argument is not given. 
Next Churchland tries to argue against van Fraassen that a theory's 
superempirical virtues are epistemic virtues. Consider his main argument 
for this assertion which hinges on the radical theory-ladenness of observa-
tion: 
Since there is no way of conceiving or representing "the empirical facts" 
that is completely independent of speculative assumptions, and since we 
shall occasionally confront theoretical alternatives on a scale so comprehen-
sive that we must also choose between competing modes of conceiving 
what the empirical facts before us are, it is clear that the epistemic choice 
between two global alternatives cannot be made by comparing the extent to 
which they are adequate to some common touchstone, "the empirical facts". 
In such a case, the choice must be made on the comparative global virtues 
of the two global alternatives, T^-plus-the-observational-evidence-therein-
construed, versus 72-plus-me-observationd-evidence-therein-(differently)-
construed. That is, it must be made on superempirical grounds such as 
relative coherence, simplicity, and explanatory unity. (1989: 146) 
This argument is however without strength when used against the empiri-
cist. The choice, that must be made, will be classified by van Fraassen as 
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a pragmatic choice as opposed to an epistemic choice, and this is indeed 
recognized by Church land who in the next paragraph of his exposition 
draws a parallel between Carnap's 'external questions' and van Fraassen's 
pragmatics. 
The real motive behind Churchland's critique on van Fraassen seems to 
be of a much more metaphysical kind. Ever since he argued for a funda-
mental plasticity of mind (1979) Churchland classifies all our concepts, 
whether observational or unobservational, as being on a par. He claims 
this parity 'should not be surprising' since our history shows us 'mistaken 
ontological commitments in both domains', that is the domains of the ob-
servable and the unobservable (1989: 140-1). Examples of such mistakes 
in the observable realm are witches and the geocentric starry sphere. 
Churchland concludes, and his connectionistic work only enforces this 
conclusion, that 
the ontology presupposed by our observational judgments remains essential-
ly speculative and wholly révisable, however entrenched and familiar it 
may have become. (1989: 141) 
Churchland implies that if we are sceptical about the existence of unob-
servables we have as much reason to be sceptical about the existence of 
observables so that the distinction between observables and unobservables 
cannot sustain the difference in epistemic attitude towards scientific the-
ories. With regard to the status of superempirical virtues of theories 
Churchland offers a similar argument. He asserts that 'it is difficult to see 
how van Fraassen can justify a selectively realist attitude towards "observ-
ables", since, as we have seen, pragmatic considerations must attend their 
selection also' (1989: 146). 
But if this is true it is easy to see that the correspondence of prototypes 
in a neural network, whether they allegedly refer to observables or unob-
servables, with real observables or unobservables can only be epistemical-
ly warranted by offering some probability argument that takes us from 
pragmatic success of a neural net to cognitive success of a neural net. 
Since this observation does not constitute a new and unexpected solution 
to the realism debate I cannot see any new typically connectionist argu-
ments for scientific realism. Furthermore, Churchland's remarks on van 
Fraassen's constructive empiricism seem to lead him towards some form 
of pragmatism, a tendency we already noted in discussing the notion of 
232 
Conneclionism 
truth within con neet ¡on ism. This leads me to the conclusion that if 
Churchland really wants to defend some connection ist scientific realism he 
must either offer some probability argument or he must retreat to an inter-
nal (or pragmatic) scientific realism. It is this latter option I now want to 
discuss.13 
7.6 Connectionism and internal realism 
So far I explored the consequences of Paul Churchland's philosophical 
connectionism for scientific realism in general and more specifically the 
consequences for Churchland's own scientific realism. The resulting 
connectionist realism may sound familiar to many. Connectionist realism 
seems very similar to Putnam's internal realism. But if so, is connectionist 
scientific realism then an aw//-realistic position? 
13
 I have not discussed Churchland's two thought experiments (1989: 147-149) for 
I think van Fraassen's answer (van Fraassen 1985: 284-6) is satisfactory. The first 
thought experiment involves a human being deprived of all of his senses, 'a man 
to whom absolutely nothing is observable'. He has however at his disposal a 
micro-computer with several environmentally-sensitive transducers. Churchland 
claims that its ontology must consist entirely of unobservable entities, so on van 
Fraassen's account this human being is never epistemically allowed to believe 
anything. Churchland simply concludes: 'Surely, reason does not require [him] to 
be so abstemious' (1989: 147). Since van Fraassen would claim that relative to a 
community of such human beings there will exist a lot of observables, Churchland 
asks him to consider in a similar vein our transducing measuring instruments. But 
Churchland's experiment presupposes that we know what the world would be like 
for the senseless human being, but we do not, so that any analogy between his 
environmentally-sensitive transducers and our scientific apparatus is ill-conceived. 
Again, in his next thought experiment, Churchland suggests to imagine 'some folk 
who observe the microworld of virus particles, DNA-strands, and large protein 
molecules' by using a electron microscope instead of eyes. Churchland then sug-
gests that, on van Fraassen's account, though 'the causal connections to the world 
and the continuing experience of it' are identical to humanoids and humans they 
should nevertheless 'embrace different epistemic attitudes towards the 
microworld'. But the main presupposition is that these creatures actually observe 
viruses, DNA-strands and proteins, a claim for which Churchland, according to 
van Fraassen, has no epistemic reasons. 
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Putnam says in his (1981): 
Intemalism is not a facile relativism that says, 'Anything goes'. Denying 
that it makes sense to ask whether our concepts 'match' something totally 
uncontaminated by conceptualization is one thing; but to hold that every 
conceptual system is therefore just as good as every other would be some-
thing else. If anyone really believed that, and if they were foolish enough 
to pick a conceptual system that told them they could fly and to act upon it 
by jumping out of the window, they would, if they were lucky enough to 
survive, see the weakness of the latter view at once. Intemalism does not 
deny that there are experiential inputs to knowledge; knowledge is not a 
story with no constraints except internal coherence; but it does deny that 
there are inputs which are not themselves to some extent shaped by our 
concepts, by the vocabulary we use to report and describe them, or any 
inputs which admit of only one description, independent of all conceptual 
choices. Even our description of our own sensations, so dear as a starting 
point for knowledge to generations of epistemologists, is heavily affected 
(as are the sensations themselves, for that matter) by a host of conceptual 
choices. The very inputs upon which our knowledge is based are concept-
ually contaminated; but contaminated inputs are better than none. If con-
taminated inputs are all we have, still all we have has proved to be quit a 
bit. (54) 
Suppose we take this statement by Putnam as the description of internal 
realism. That is, let us suppose that here internal realism is itself not yet 
"contaminated" by any denial of the (Realist) correspondence theory of 
truth or Putnamian notion of truth as the idealization of rational accepta-
bility. That is to say, suppose that given this quotation, it is still open to 
us how we might come to conclude to intemalism. 
Now, if we accept Churchland's naturalistic connectionism we can see 
at once why an internal realism must follow. Our sensory inputs are con-
taminated by our concepts in a quite literal way. Let me quote in full the 
crucial passage from Churchland (1989): 
If our cognitive activities arise from a weave of networks [and] if we 
construe [a theory as a configuration] of synaptic weights, [then] it is clear 
that no cognitive activity whatever takes place in the absence of vectors 
being processed by some specific configuration of weights. That is, no 
cognitive activity whatever takes place in the absence of some theory or 
other. [In so far] as there is cognitive activity at all, it exploits whatever 
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theory the creature embodies, however useless or incoherent it might be. 
The only place in the network where the weights need play no role is at 
the absolute sensory periphery of the system, where the external stimulus is 
transduced into a coded input vector for subsequent delivery to the trans-
forming layers of weights. However, at the first occasion on which these 
pre-conceptual states have any effect at all on the downstream cognitive 
system, it is trough a changeable configuration of synaptic weights, a con-
figuration that produces one set of partitions on the activation-vector space 
of the relevant layer of neurons, one set out of millions of alternative 
possible sets. In other words, the very first thing that happens to the input 
signal is that it gets conceptualized in one of many different possible ways. 
At subsequent layers of processing, the same process is repeated, and the 
message that finally arrives at the linguistic centers, for example, has been 
shaped at least as much by the partitional constraints of the embedded con-
ceptual system(s) through which it has passed as the distant sensory input 
that started things off. From the perspective of computational neuroscience, 
therefore, cognition is constitutionally theory laden. (188-9) 
Churchland seems to deny that there is any cognitive activity which is not 
itself to some extent shaped by our concepts and this makes him a sort of 
internal realist. Since he is also prepared to defend some form of scientific 
realism, connectionist scientific realism shows how it may be possible to 
be an internal realist and a scientific realist at the same time (cf. Hacking 
1983, ch. 7). That this is possible is also concluded, though along a some-
what different line, by Ellis (1988). Ellis cautiously concludes that the 
main argument for scientific realism is not an argument for what absolute-
ly exists 'but for what exists from our epistemic perspective' (433). Con-
nectionist scientific realism can remove these reservations. After all, this 
realism is a detailed materialistic filling-in of Ellis' assertion. 
Yet, although connectionist scientific realism seems to deny that there 
is any cognitive activity 'which is not itself to some extent shaped by our 
concepts', it must be clear that Putnam's elaborated internal realism will 
not coincide with connectionism. Churchland maintains, as we saw in sec-
tion 7.5, a metaphysical realism. He remains 'committed to the idea that 
there exists a world, independent of our cognition, with which we interact 
and of which we construct representations'. This becomes clear by his 
statement that there are inputs (rather than input-signals) at the absolute 
sensory periphery of the system which are not yet contaminated by any 
concepts. These inputs are part and parcel of the mind-independent world 
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postulated by Churchland's realism. Since Putnam's internal realism is 
meant as a metaphysical ал//-real ism in which it is denied that we can 
intelligibly speak of such a mind-independent world, one notices a certain 
tension in Churchland's 'internal scientific realism'. 
In a fairly recent article Church land confesses that 
[after reading Putnam's 1988] perhaps the most unexpected was the realiz­
ation that 1 am no longer able to distinguish clearly between Putnam's 
newly-explained and newly-named pragmatic realism (hitherto: internal 
realism) on the one hand, and the expressly anti-utopian version of scien­
tific realism that I have been defending since 1981 on the other. (1992: 
419) 
There are two points to be made with regard to this suggestion. Firstly, I 
have tried to show that Churchland's connectionist philosophy indeed 
leads to some kind of internal realism but certainly not for the reason 
Churchland presents here. We are strengthened in this opinion by the fact 
that in his answer to Churchland's commentary Putnam does not accept 
this confession of conversion (Putnam 1992).14 The anti-utopian character 
of Putnam's internal realism is simply not typical for his internal realism. 
Many naturalistic philosophies of science, to give an example, are anti-
utopian. Therefore, if connectionism is an internal realism for this reason, 
it is not reason enough. Secondly, internal realism claims to be a metaphy­
sical anti-realism which is clearly incompatible with Churchland's meta­
physical realism. If Churchland suggests that he 'can and must embrace' 
Putnam's internal realism (1992: 423), his position becomes incoherent." 
14
 The discussion between Churchland and Putnam obviously concentrates not on 
the question whether connectionism is some form of internal realism but rather on 
the question whether connectionism offers a viable philosophy of mind. Putnam 
states: 'as I read over [Churchland's] papers, I see no interest at all in the problem 
I ... described as that of providing standards of evaluation applicable to the public­
ly inspectable linguistic products of socially conducted inquiry' (1992: 441-2, and 
1988). 
15
 Our presupposition that Putnam's internal realism can be formulated by the 
reasonably straightforward quotation taken from his Reason, Truth and History 
(1981) is of course rather naive, and only served to demonstrate some kinship of 
connectionism to internal realism. Putnam's anti-realism involves much more than 
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7.7 Internal scientific realism 
Now, the question is why a scientific realist (like for instance Churchland) 
should be attracted to this kind of internal realism at all. Some authors 
like Hacking, Ellis and Putnam himself, think that internal scientific real-
ism is a real possibility. With regard to the question of reference, Putnam 
says: 
it is trivial to say what any word refers to within the language the word 
belongs to, by using the word itself. What does 'rabbit' refer to? Why, to 
rabbits, of course! What does 'extraterrestrial' refer to? To extraterrestrials 
(if there are any). (1981, 52)'* 
And this offers Putnam the opportunity to defend an internal scientific 
realism. Our best scientific theories form the conceptual scheme of scien-
tists and within this scheme 'electron' refers to electron. In a more encom-
passing philosophical conceptual scheme we are perhaps even allowed to 
epistemically believe in the existence of electrons. The discussion on 
Scientific jtealism becomes the discussion on scientific realism (cf. 1990: 
26-9). The discussion remains but we are reminded of the human epistem-
ic condition. Putnam says clearly: 
our conceptions of coherence and acceptability are [deeply] interwoven 
with our psychology. They depend upon our biology and our culture; they 
just the 'radical contamination of our inputs by our concepts'. It is supposed to be 
a more plausible theory than the theory of external (or metaphysical) realism, 
which includes not only the idea that there is a mind independent world, but also 
the idea that we could all be Brains in a Vat, and the idea of truth as correspon-
dence, and the idea that there is exactly one true and complete description of the 
way the world is etc. (Putnam 1981: 49-74). 
16
 Cf. Cream (1990): 'In relativizing metaphysical and epistemologica! truth to a 
language and by turning philosophical disputations into arguments over the prag-
matic utility of language systems, Carnap strikes a very deep philosophical nerve 
... [There is the objection] that Camap's proposals amount to a form of relativism 
... [But] once meanings are fixed [in a language system], the charge of relativism 
is completely unfounded. Before they are fixed, there is no question of truth to 
relativize.' (11) The same argument might be characteristic of internal realism. 
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are by no means 'value free'. But they are our conceptions, and they are 
conceptions of something real. They define a kind of objectivity, objectivity 
for us, even if it is not the metaphysical objectivity of the God's Eye view. 
Objectivity and rationality humanly speaking are what we have; they are 
better than nothing. (1981, 55) 
It seems to be possible to defend an internal scientific realism. Analogous 
to a (metaphysical) realism with a human face, it must be possible to for-
mulate within this realism a scientific realism; a scientific realism for its, 
humans. If we claim that there are really electrons we use a criterion of 
reality which is always, in some way or another, relative to some human 
conceptual scheme. So, 'really' always means something relative to some 
conceptual scheme. If we think 'really' can mean 'really independent of a 
scheme' we are really thinking something impossible. 
Internal scientific realism is a scientific realism that makes scientific 
results relative to Homo sapiens. But this is a truism, given the Darwin-
istic hypothesis! It seems to be nothing more than the claim that we might 
never know how the world really-independent-of-any-conceptual-scheme 
looks like. Our best scientific theories might tell us the world is so and so 
and, of course, our belief in the correctness of the picture can never be 
epistemically warranted as true knowledge; it can at most be warranted as 
probable knowledge. But this is something, I think, all post-Kantian phil-
osophers now accept. 
Furthermore, if internal realism is presented as a Relativism that is 
claimed to be True it is of course self-refuting.17 But one can anticipate 
17
 Putnam sees the plausibility of internal realism illustrated by the impossibility 
to generalize about truth with regard to all languages and by the proposed and 
accepted solution to give up 'a single unitary notion of truth applicable to any 
language whatsoever' (1990: 17). We are then confronted with the logical puzzle 
of self-reference, the opacity of the logic of the expression 'For all languages (...)' 
and the solutions proposed by such men as Russell, Godei and Tarski. And here 
too is my confusion with Putnam's internal realism: from the dissatisfaction of 
these solutions follows Putnam's statement that 'Realism is an impossible attempt 
to view the world from Nowhere', but how could he possibly mean this state-
ment? Putnam says at the end of his first Kant Lecture: 'What I am saying is that 
elements of what we call "language" or "mind" penetrate so deeply into what we 
call "reality" that the very project of representing ourselves as being "mappers" of 
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Putnam's remark that he only claims relativism to be true (and indeed 
Putnam rejects Relativism). But still, Putnam's internal realism seems to 
consist of nothing more than emphasizing the epistemic human condition. 
Is internal realism acceptable to scientific realists? Well if we realize 
that a non-metaphysical, empirical or naturalistic version of some kind of 
internal realism is also possible, it might be acceptable. This means one 
can be some sort of internal realist in the sense of the original formulation 
of the theory by Putnam on the basis of the plausibility of certain scien-
tific theories.18 Reformulating internal realism as an empirical hypothesis 
something "language-dependent" is fatally compromised from the very start'. 
(1990: 28) Since this is itself put in a language how could we exclude the possi-
bility that Putnam's view of the matter is contaminated by the concepts used? 
Obviously, we cannot. So why accept internal realism? In his second Kant Lecture 
Putnam says: 'All I ask is that what is supposed to be "true" be warrantable on 
the basis of experience and intelligence for creatures with "a rational and a sen-
sible nature'". (1990: 41) We may now ask Putnam whether Realism is false, that 
is, whether the denial of Realism itself is warranted on the basis of experience and 
intelligence for creatures with a rational and sensible nature. Surely the conclusion 
must be that no rational and sensible man can warrantly assert the denial of Real-
ism (but neither can he assert its affirmation). The reason for this is that we 
know, ever since Kant, that we are trespassing the domain of the unknowable. 
Realism and anti-realism are metaphysical theories. The fact that we know this is 
by way of a transcendental argument for science. The possibility of science 
explained in a Kantian way leads to the death of metaphysics. Realism and Rela-
tivism are metaphysical theories and warranted assertability of these statements is 
not within reach for rational and sensible human beings. The question now is 
whether Putnamian Internal Realism is a metaphysical theory. I think it is. There-
fore internal realism cannot be warrantly asserted. Why then should we even like 
to be internal realists? 
18
 Indeed, in his recent work Realism With a Human Face (1990), in which we 
find the two Kant Lectures, Putnam narrates an analogy from quantum mechanics 
which is supposed to be an empirical argument for internal realism. In quantum 
mechanics, according to Putnam, we witness our best scientific theory saying that 
the God's Eye point of view or metaphysical realism is impossible. (It is, as it 
were, an empirical companion piece to his 'Brain in a Vat' argument). But surely 
Putnam must say that even if quantum mechanics must be interpreted as the scien-
tific way of saying that there can be no God's-Eye point of view (quantum mech-
anics says that there cannot be a quantum mechanical theory of the whole uni-
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rather than as a metaphysical theory seems to me to be a naturalistic 
approach to, or solution or understanding of, a perennial problem in phil-
osophy. My suggestion is that the naturalistic approach of Churchland 
(1989), and others, could bring us closer to an understanding of why inter-
nal realism, as an empirical statement about the way we are, is plausible 
from an evolutionary perspective. It would clear the air around the philo-
sophically obscure position of Putnam." 
We conclude that connectionist scientific realism is best defended, not 
by characterizing it as a Putnamian internal scientific realism (this would 
make it incoherent), but rather by offering some probability argument. 
Such an argument must show that it is reasonable to believe that neural 
nets represent unobservables or, in a more sophisticated way, that scien-
tific realist neural nets are cognitively more successful than, say, construc-
tive empiricist neural nets. Such an argument we have not found in the 
writings of Churchland. There is therefore no specific connectionist argu-
ment for scientific realism.20 
verse), the tentative truth of quantum mechanics will never give us a decisive 
reason to conclude to a Putnamian internal realism. And if this is true, neither can 
quantum mechanics show the impossibility of metaphysical realism and the God's 
Eye point of view. 
19
 See for instance Sosa (1993) for a penetrating critique in which scientific real-
ism plays a role in what Sosa calls Putnam's Master Argument for internal real-
ism. 
20
 Michael Ruse also argues for internal realism as an empirical hypothesis. In his 
book Taking Darwin Seriously Ruse pays great attention to the notion of epigenet-
ic rules as it is introduced by Lumsden & Wilson (1981). An epigenetic rule can 
be described as follows: '[An epigenetic rule is] a constraint which obtains on 
some facet of human development, having its origin in evolutionary needs, and 
channelling the way in which the growing or grown human thinks and acts'. 
(Ruse 1986: 143) Epigenetic rules can be divided into primary and secondary 
rules. Primary epigenetic rules concern physiological characteristics of humans. 
Ruse discusses the example of colour perception which is 'rooted in the actual 
physiology of the eye' (144). We can only process the visual information we 
receive through certain channelling constraints. The human incest barrier is an 
example of a secondary epigenetic rule. Here the 'action of the genes' is indirect 
and mediated by education and made possible by the fact that people have the 
ability to learn. Nevertheless, as in the case of primary epigenetic rules, it is the 
adaptive significance of these rules that brought them into being (144-7). 
240 
Connectionism 
Instead of elaborating on Ruse's Darwinian approach to science, we would do 
better in the light of our discussion of internal realism to see in what way the 
notion of these epigenetic rules can be turned directly into an empirical argument 
for internal realism. With regard to the primary epigenetic rules Ruse states: 'I 
take it that [the existence of primary epigenetic rules] fits in with much that com-
mentators on science (including working scientists) have concluded about the way 
in which one rarely (if ever) simply acquires and uses raw sensations - uninter-
preted chunks of experience ... Everything that human beings take in is filtered 
and transformed in some way. To argue that our evolutionary heritage also takes a 
hand is a natural extension of this thesis about the theory-ladenness of 
experience'. (155) 
I take it that this argument has its origins not in any kind of logical thesis but 
in science itself. That is to say, given the plausibility of (neo-)Darwinism there is 
a way in which the theory-ladeness of observation becomes firmly grounded in 
our best scientific theories of the day. Putnam's description of intemalism can 
now be grounded in science itself and can be done so independently of a possibly 
suspicious interpretation of quantum mechanics. Does anyone seriously doubt the 
theory that we have been evolved from more primitive forms of life? From this 
theory (humans are the product of evolution through natural selection) follows the 
fact that all our experiential inputs are fundamentally contaminated by our "con-
cepts" that we use. Internal realism follows from taking neo-Darwinism seriously, 
and it does so as an empirical hypothesis. 
The same point can be made with regard to the secondary epigenetic rules that 
operate in science, like certain deductive and inductive rules (160-174). The me-
thodological rules of science are encoded in the epigenetic rules as they are pro-
duced by natural selection. I will not discuss this point any further. However, we 
should focus on one consequence that springs immediately into mind. Ruse right-
fully points out that natural selection 'only cares about keeping us alive and our 
passing on of genes' (172). And he continues: 'if we benefit biologically by being 
deluded about the true nature of formal thought, then so be it. A tendency to ob-
jectify is the price of reproductive success'. (172) Of course, this argument does 
not only concern formal thought. The naturalistic and Darwinistic philosopher is 
faced with the possibility that all our believes are false, including Darwinism (cf. 
Stich 1990). After all, evolution by natural selection is no guarantee for true 
beliefs. How does Ruse cope with this objection? 
His reply to this objection is disappointing, to say the least. Ruse retreats to a 
coherence theory of truth. According to Ruse the Darwinian rejects a correspon-
dence theory of truth. As the result of three and a half billion years of natural 
selection, the best I, as a living creature on this earth, can hope for is that my 
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beliefs are coherent. Ultimately, my beliefs will not correspond to true reality, to 
things-in-themselves that is (202). In this Ruse counts himself in good company 
considering his references to Putnam's Reason, Truth and History (1981) and 
Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980). 
However, I see no reason why a Darwinian could not accept a correspondence 
theory of truth. Even Putnam in the passage quoted in full length above does not 
adhere to a coherence theory of truth. To repeat, Putnam stated: 'If anyone really 
believed that, and if they were foolish enough to pick, a conceptual system that 
told them they could fly and to act upon it by jumping out of the window, they 
would, if they were lucky enough to survive, see the weakness of the latter view 
at once'. (1981: 54) This remark is only intelligible if there is a world indepen-
dent of our conceptual scheme which tells us we, as human beings, cannot fly! 
The example is even more striking since Putnam uses an evolutionary crucial si-
tuation. If we all had the conceptual scheme that told us that the shortest way to 
get from a certain height to sea level is by way of flying (flapping your arms that 
is), our species would die out if we all took this deadly way before reaching the 
stage of reproducing. It is interesting to argue, as David Papineau does in his 
book Reality and Representation (1987) that the empirical fact of error-making 
provides us with the opportunity to argue that there is a real difference between 
thinking you are right and being right. This fact leaves enough room for a corre-
spondence theory of truth, although determining that a (complex) belief corre-
sponds to true reality is not easy. Yet, truth still is correspondence between repre-
sentation and the world independent of these representations. The point I would 
like to stress is that if we are concerned with the latter question of determining a 
correspondence relation we have entered a quite different epistemologica! dis-
cussion. Actually, we have switched from the ontological external-internal realism 
debate to the epistemologica! scientific realism/anti-realism debate. The conclusion 
must be that one can adhere to an empirical internal realism and nevertheless 
maintain a correspondence theory of truth. It is possible to hold the belief that it 
is inconsistent on empirical grounds for a human being to state that there is a 
concept-independent or perspective-independent world, and simultaneously hold 
the belief that truth consists in correspondence of human representations and the 
world. 
We know that Putnam declares the rejection of a correspondence theory of 
truth as the hallmark of internal realism. However, it could well be that the inter-
nal realism à la Putnam (elaborating on his original description of it in 1981) is 
the result of his hesitation to naturalize reason. Indeed, Michael Devitt's naturalis-
tic argument against a late Putnam ¡an internal realism seems very appropriate to 
me(1991:231-3).2 
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Entity Realism And the Rationality of Scientific Practice 
8.1 introduction 
In the previous chapters 6 and 7 I have argued that two recent evolution-
ary defences of scientific realism do not offer us any new argument for 
realism. The argument in defence of scientific realism is still a probability 
argument that takes us from probable knowledge concerning observables 
to probable knowledge concerning unobservables. In chapters 1 to 3 I 
have argued that what are usually called abductive arguments for realism 
in fact refer to eliminative inductive arguments concerning scientific the-
ories that postulate unobservables. They provide epistemic reasons to 
believe in the existence of these unobservables. In order to defend scien-
tific realism we need therefore inductive arguments from (the history and 
practice of) science. Within entity realism, and more specifically within 
Harré's policy realism one frequently refers to this inductive argument 
from the history and practice of science. However, this inductive argument 
is seldom worked out in detail and usually reformulated in the vague 
terms of inference to the best or only explanation. In this chapter I will 
evaluate these forms of scientific realism. 
Nowadays the philosopher of science depends for the plausibility of his 
theories on his knowledge of the nature of the latest and most successful 
scientific theories in many special sciences. Jerrold Aronson rightly states 
at the very end of his book A Realist Philosophy of Science: 
It will probably take much more than a lifetime before philosophers com-
prehend the nature of things in light of the new quantum field theories. 
Until we gain ontological insight into these recent theories, unless we visit 
the subatomic zoo, their true meaning will escape us. This is fine, for it 
means that exciting developments in the philosophy of science lie ahead of 
us, I believe for generations to come (1984: 273-74) 
This remark could of course be made with regard to all kinds of other new 
successful scientific theories like neurophysiological theories, sociobiologi-
cal or game-theoretic economical theories. "You ain't seen nothing yet" 
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reads the sign painted on philosophy of science's banner and in this chap-
ter I would like to focus on one such new and exciting development in the 
philosophy of science, which is Rom Harré's policy realism (Harre 1986). 
Harré's policy realism (already anticipated in his Theories and Things 
(1961) and his The Principles of Scientific Thinking (1970)) fits in well 
with a more global new trend in philosophy of science, a kind of Zeitgeist, 
in which the importance of the scientific experiment is both reevaluated 
and upgraded (Franklin 1986, Galison 1987) and, more importantly, in 
which we notice a turn away from epistemológica! questions toward ontol-
ogical ones. 
I take policy realism to be a position which (in a way) follows nat-
urally from the difficulties in entity realism as it is held by Nancy 
Cartwright and Ian Hacking. I will therefore ask the reader to follow me 
in a kind of 'rational reconstruction' of yet another kind of defence of 
scientific realism as it appeared upon the philosophical scene after Bas van 
Fraassen's Scientific Image (1980).1 Firstly, I will elaborate on the transi-
tion from theoretical (scientific) realism to entity realism (sections 8.2-
8.4). Secondly, I will try to construct the argument that leads one from 
(naive) entity realism to policy realism (section 8.5). And finally, I will try 
to assess the plausibility of policy realism (section 8.6). However promis-
ing, it will regrettably become clear that the argument for policy realism is 
nothing but the well-known and much discussed Miracle Argument. In 
section 7 I will briefly go into Derksen's candidate realism to illustrate 
that even this weak kind of scientific realism is incompatible with con-
structive empiricism. 
8.2 The transition from inference to the best explanation to inference to 
the most likely cause 
Nancy Cartwright, Ian Hacking and Rom Harre are scientific realists in the 
sense that they believe that science provides us with knowledge about the 
underlying structures of reality, that is, of structures that are not percep-
tible to the human senses (Cartwright 1983: 92-3, Hacking 1983: 21, 
Harre 1986: 70). In pointing out the difference between her position and 
constructive empiricism, Cartwright discusses the phenomenon of a track 
1
 For an historical account of Harré's policy realism see Derksen (1994b). 
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in a cloud chamber: 
In explaining the track by the particle, 1 am saying that the particle causes 
the track, and that explanation [...] has no sense unless one is asserting that 
the particle in motion brings about, causes, makes, produces, that very 
track [...] If there are no electrons in the cloud chamber, I do not know 
why the tracks are there. (1983: 92, 99) 
Surely this is what a scientific realist would argue. In the same vein Ian 
Hacking conveys in the opening paragraphs of his Representing and Inter-
vening (1983) his belief in the existence of electrons. To Hacking 'pro-
tons, photons, fields of force, and black holes' are 'as real as toe-nails, 
turbines, eddies in a stream, and volcanoes. The weak interactions of small 
particle physics are as real as falling in love'. This is enough to count Ian 
Hacking in as a scientific realist. Finally, Rom Harre, although his philo-
sophic position is more sophisticated than Hacking's, is a scientific realist 
in the sense just mentioned. In his Varieties of Realism he states: 
I hope to show just what level of realism can be sustained [...] It will rum 
out to be a modest but substantial doctrine sufficient to justify the confi-
dence commonsense has in the ability of the scientific community to 'pen-
etrate the secrets of nature' but without an absurd optimism in inevitable 
and indefinite progress. (1986: 70) 
What can be meant by 'the scientific community penetrating the secrets of 
nature' other than that a scientist can tell us something about the underly-
ing structures of the world we live in? 
These observations suffice to classify Cartwright, Hacking and Harré as 
scientific realists, but how do they defend their position? In this section I 
will concentrate on Cartwright's realism. In section 8.3 I will discuss 
Hacking's position and ultimately I will turn to Harré's policy realism. 
Cartwright rejects scientific realism if it is described as the facticity view 
of fundamental laws. After she has made the crucial distinction (linking up 
with actual scientific practice) between fundamental and phenomenological 
laws, she paraphrases this facticity view as follows: 
[The facticity view of fundamental laws] supposes that the fundamental 
laws of nature tell how objects of various kinds behave [...] What is critical 
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is that they talk of objects - real concrete things that exist here in our 
material world, things like quarks, or mice, or genes; and they tell us what 
these objects do'. (1983: 55) 
This is in itself not incompatible with scientific realism. Yet Cartwright 
thinks these fundamental laws (as opposed to phenomenological laws) lie 
about the real concrete things Mike quarks, or mice, or genes', while scien-
tific realists are supposed to believe them to be true about these objects. 
Interpreted as this facticity view, scientific realism is indeed implausible. 
However, as Dilworth in his article 'Empiricism versus Realism' keenly 
observes this description of scientific realism does not appeal to any exist-
ing realist (1990: 457-8). Furthermore, if Cartwright claims that she does 
not object to the existential claims concerning theoretical entities, then the 
question becomes to what extent her anti-realism really differs from the 
stronger scientific realism of, for instance, Giere who would certainly need 
not subscribe to the facticity view of fundamental laws.2 
Cartwright's simulacrum account of explanation plays an important role 
in the argumentation for her entity realism. In this theory of explanation 
the way from theory to reality is through the model and phenomenological 
laws3. Explaining a phenomenon consists in constructing a model so that 
the theory fits the phenomenon. The fundamental laws are taken to be cor-
rect or incorrect with regard to the objects in the model. However, these 
model-objects merely give a "deceptive" image of the things in reality, 
that is, an object in the model is but a simulacrum, it has only 'the form 
2
 In Callebaut (1993) Giere tells us: 'I think universal generalizations play almost 
no role in science when you see how it actually works. This is obvious in biology. 
But I think it is also true in physics. What you have is general schemata for con-
structing specific models - that is what Newton's laws and the Schrödinger equa-
tion really are. Some of the detailed models scientists construct fit the world 
better than others. But universal generalizations? Who needs them? So, do the 
laws of physics lie? My answer is no. But not because they tell the truth, but 
because there are no laws in this sense. There are no laws to ІіеГ (174-5). 
3
 The semantic approach to theories is shared by many philosophers. Both Harre 
and van Fraassen reject the syntactic view (or as Putnam called it the Received 
View) of theories (cf. Suppe 1989, eh. 1). However, as van Fraassen aptly 
remarks, the semantic view of theories does not force one to adhere to either 
realism or anti-realism. 
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or appearance of things, not their substance or proper qualities'. The 
phenomenological laws are true or false with regard to the phenomena in 
reality. According to Cartwright, the basic idea of this theory of explana-
tion can be found in the practice of science itself. 
This actual scientific practice illustrates another distinction Cartwright 
makes, viz. between a theoretical explanation and a causal explanation. A 
theoretical explanation moves from mathematical framework to model to 
phenomenological laws to reality. No existential claims are involved here. 
A theoretical explanation can be argued for (inconclusively, of course) by 
way of an inference to the best explanation (1983: 82). However, parallel 
to such a theoretical explanation runs a causal explanation. In the case of a 
causal explanation we face a different situation altogether. For a causal 
explanation the following holds: 
(1) In providing the cause of an effect, the reality of the cause is simul-
taneously stated; and 
(2) One can argue for a causal explanation by way of an inference to 
the most likely cause. Such an argumentation will finally consist in 
reasoning from experimenting to accepting a certain causal explana-
tion (1983: 6, 98). 
The example by which Cartwright illustrates her simulacrum account of 
explanation is the phenomenon of 'quantum damping' (1983: 78-81). 
Cartwright argues that in the case of the theoretical or mathematical expla-
nation (a Schrödinger equation) pragmatic considerations play an import-
ant role in the choice for a certain model (one of the six Cartwright men-
tions), whereas in the case of the causal explanation (emission and absorp-
tion of real photons) such a pragmatic attitude with regard to different 
causal explanations for different situations is typically absent: 
We do not use first one causal story in explanation, then another, depend-
ing on ease of calculation, or whatever'. (1983: 81) 
The nature of these two kind of explanations, theoretical on the one hand, 
causal on the other, becomes clear in the different attitudes we have with 
respect to these explanations. As for causal explanations we cannot escape 
the existential claims: 'causal explanations have truth build into them' 
(91). Causal explanations are incomplete without the existential claim that 
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the cause really exists. To posit the existence of the cause is an internal 
characteristic of the causal explanation. Although one should be an anti-
realist with regard to our (fundamental) laws (for all we can say of them 
is how they lie), we can be realists with regard to the theoretical entities 
posited by (successful) scientific theories. 
Let us now turn to the main problem in this defence of entity realism. 
It is clear that the argument for entity realism depends on the justification 
of inference to the most likely cause, that is, on the fact that it is reason-
able to accept the most likely cause as actually existing. It is here that the 
main problem for entity realism emerges. To argue for the existence of a 
cause we have to designate or denotate that cause by means of the causal 
explanation. But how do we decide or determine whether we have reason-
able grounds to accept the causal explanation which designates that cause 
as a theoretical entity? Here Ian Hacking's account of intervening nat-
urally suggests itself (as Cartwright herself admits (1983: 98)) in order to 
solve this problem of entity realism. 
8.3 The transition from representation to experimentation 
Ian Hacking provides the entity realist with a way to determine whether 
one can reasonably posit the existence of a cause. I take this to be one of 
the main points of his Representing and Intervening (1983). 
Theories are complex representations of facts (Hacking 1983: 134). 
However, Hertz already pointed out that there can be different representa-
tions of the same body of facts, and so we conclude (with John Dewey) 
that knowledge and reality can no longer be explicated in terms of thought 
and representation (ibid., 63). In a crucial paragraph of his book, Hacking 
states: 
Realism and anti-realism scurry about, trying to latch on to something in 
the nature of representation that will vanquish the other. There is nothing 
there. That is why I tum from representing to intervening. (145) 
Obviously, Hacking has no intention to follow Richard Rorty in his relati-
vistic pragmatism (Rorty 1980). Inspired by the hermenéutica! philosophy 
of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960), Rorty wants to replace the epistemo-
logica! and technical point of view in Western philosophy by a construc-
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tive and edifying philosophical attitude to, as he says, 'find new, better, 
more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking' (Rorty 1980, 360). How-
ever, it is not clear in which this being 'better, more fruitful and more 
interesting' of a vocabulary consists other than in an achieved state of 
consensus, and a self-defeating relativism threatens to arise. If Hacking 
would follow Rorty the world would indeed be lost. To guard his philos-
ophy of science from such a devastating relativism Hacking needs a cri-
terion by which one can conclude to the reality of a cause as a theoretical 
entity. Hacking has such a criterion and it is well formulated in his slogan: 
'if you can spray them (i.e. electrons or positrons over a charged niobium 
ball) then they are real': 
We are completely convinced of [for instance] the reality of electrons when 
we regularly set out to build - and often enough succeed in building - new 
kinds of device that use various well-understood causal properties of elec-
trons to interfere with other more hypothetical parts of nature. (265) 
Let us label this the criterion for reality. It is this criterion of reality 
Cartwright probably hinted at in order to argue for the plausibility or the 
reasonableness of inference to the most likely cause. Now, at last, the enti-
ty realist has a criterion to determine whether or not it is reasonable to 
accept a causal account (with its postulated causes and its existential 
claims that naturally go with it). 
However, to my mind this criterion of reality carries along two separate 
and quite different philosophical hypotheses, to wit an ontological hypoth-
esis and an epistemological hypothesis. Let me formulate them: 
(1) The ontological hypothesis: Whenever we use the causal properties 
of entities to interfere with other hypothetical parts of nature, these 
entities exist; 
(2) The epistemological hypothesis: It is rational to accept a causal ex-
planation as true whenever we have good, i.e. epistemic, reasons to 
suppose that we use the causal properties of the hypothetical enti-
ties, postulated by a causal explanation, to interfere with other hypo-
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thetical parts of nature.4 
The plausibility of the epistemological thesis is sufficient to defend 
Cartwright's and Hacking's entity realism. Suppose that it is rational to 
accept a causal explanation as true whenever we have good reasons to 
assume that we use the causal properties of hypothetical causes to interfere 
with other hypothetical parts of nature. Further, suppose that we actually 
do have good reasons to assume that we use the causal properties of hypo-
thetical entities, to interfere with other hypothetical parts of nature. Then 
we are certainly allowed to believe in the existence of those entities (even 
though the theories may be false). Entity realism may then (tentatively) be 
accepted as true. But notice that the question whether we actually have 
good reasons to assume that we use the causal properties of hypothetical 
entities to interfere with other hypothetical parts of nature, is still not 
settled. To argue for this, more is needed. More specifically and not sur-
prisingly, we need an epistemological analysis of the notion of 'good 
reason' to defend entity realism. 
The ontologica! hypothesis is of course a tautology5 and can therefore 
be of no use to the realist in his defence of scientific realism (cf. also 
Giere 1988: 124-7). Still, if the plausibility of the epistemological hypoth-
esis is accepted entity realism is convincingly defended (even if we might 
never know whether we really use the causal properties of hypothetical 
entities to interfere with other hypothetical parts of nature). 
We have arrived at the conclusion that the plausibility of entity realism 
depends on the plausibility of the thesis on what it is for someone to ratio-
nally accept a causal explanation as true. It is therefore quite natural to 
formulate entity realism as the doctrine that it is rational to believe in the 
existence of theoretical entities postulated in plausible causal accounts of 
* Of course, the epistemological analysis of 'good reasons' precisely is the nub of 
the scientific realist - anti-realist issue. Van Fraassen thinks the rationality of the 
belief in unobservable entities can be accounted for by an appeal to pragmatic 
reasons, while the realist thinks the rationality of such belief requires epistemic 
reasons. Cf. chapter 5 for a discussion on this issue. 
5
 Discussing Hacking's 'spraying slogan' Peter Lipton rightfully remarks that a 
non-trivial formulation of the ontological hypothesis like "Whenever we use prop-
erties we take to be properties of the entity, then the entity exists", 'doesn't sound 
either very plausible or very ontological' (personal correspondence). 
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certain phenomenological events in the world. The main argument for en-
tity realism then is the justification or reasonableness of inference to the 
most likely cause in conjunction with the fact that we often do have epis-
temic reasons to believe that we use causal properties of theoretical 
entities to interfere with other parts of the world. As Morrison points out 
Hacking 'takes himself to be addressing only the metaphysical questions 
[not the epistemological questions]' (1990: 1). Given the analysis of entity 
realism so far, this is something Hacking cannot possibly maintain. 
In the next section I will criticize this reformulation of Hacking's entity 
realism and argue that Harré's policy realism can be seen as a philosophi-
cal position that naturally follows from the difficulty which arises in the 
case of this realism. The difficulty stems from the fact that, according to 
the anti-realist, the entity realist can only presuppose that scientists are in 
fact manipulating unobservables to explore the hypothetical parts of 
nature. To the sophisticated anti-realist there cannot be any epistemic rea-
son for the latter claim. 
8.4 Entity realism criticized 
Perhaps I should first strengthen my interpretation of Hacking's criterion 
of reality as an epistemological criterion since not everyone will be con-
vinced, least of all Hacking himself. In his Representing and Intervening 
Hacking tells us: 
There are surely innumerable entities and processes that humans will never 
know about [...] The best kinds of evidence for the reality of a postulated 
or inferred entity is that we can begin to measure it or otherwise under-
stand its causal powers. The best evidence, in turn, that we have this kind 
of understanding is that we can set out, from scratch, to build machines 
that will work fairly reliably, taking advantage of this or that causal nexus. 
(274) 
Here Hacking formulates an epistemological criterion for justified beliefs 
rather than a sufficient ontologica! criterion for the existence of theoretical 
entities (cf. Morrison 1990: 4). We can indeed postulate that the machines 
we build are fairly reliable because the workings of these machines are 
based upon this or that causal nexus, but the evidence we have for this 
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hypothesis is on closer inspection an inference to the best explanation: the 
theory that this or that causal nexus is involved explains best the reliability 
of the machines.6 
As I have already pointed out, the fact that Hacking's criterion of real-
ity must be interpreted as an epistemologica! criterion does not undermine 
his defence of entity realism. (The debate on scientific realism is a debate 
on epistemologica! questions). Still, there is a fundamental difficulty with 
Hacking's defence of realism. The criterion of reality gives no definite 
answer to the question whether we in fact manipulate some theoretical 
entity (to interfere with other hypothetical parts of nature). Hacking's 
statement that if you can spray electrons then they are real, has as a pre-
supposition that we in fact do spray the niobium ball with electrons. But, 
as both Dilworth and Morrison aptly point out in their studies, the argu-
ment that electrons are tools, does not lead one to the conclusion that they 
are real (Dilworth 1990, Morrison 1990). The anti-realist, notably Bas van 
Fraassen, would argue that scientists, while performing experiments, are 
'totally immersed in the scientific world-picture' and that 'nothing is more 
natural' than this (1980: 80-1); they believe they are manipulating elec-
trons to interfere with other hypothetical parts of the world. However, the 
constructive empiricist will point out to us that scientists and philosophers 
of science alike cannot on epistemic grounds claim that electrons really 
exist (van Fraassen 1980: 83). For all we know something completely 
6
 It should be noted that Hacking is very consistent in applying his criterion of 
reality to astronomy. In his article 'Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitation-
al Lensing' (1989) he argues for an astrophysical anti-realism and a corresponding 
anti-realistic attitude with regard to gravitational lenses, precisely because of the 
fact that we cannot manipulate a gravitational lens system. In astrophysics we 
cannot use gravitational lenses as tools and so we are not entitled to regard them 
as real. Hacking states: 'Astrophysics is almost the only human domain where we 
have profound, intricate knowledge, and in which we can be no more than what 
van Fraassen calls constructive empiricists' (578). But surely the question whether 
we are entitled to regard theoretical entities as real or not, is a question of 
whether it is rational or not to believe in the existence of theoretical entities. So, 
there can be no doubt that Hacking's criterion of reality is in fact an 
epistemologica! criterion. (I will only very briefly return to this point in my con-
cluding remark on the priority of epistemology over ontology, cf. section 8.8). 
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different could be manipulated. 
At this point the difference between a constructive empiricist and an 
entity realist threatens to become insignificant since, on my interpretation, 
the entity realist claims rationality for the belief in unobservables. But so 
does van Fraassen. Suppose we are of the opinion that we have good rea-
sons for the belief in the existence of electrons. To recall, Bas van 
Fraassen would not object to this kind of entity realism (1985: 248, cf. 
chapter S, section 8). But the entity realist, of course, wants to argue that 
we can rationally believe in the existence of electrons on epistemic 
grounds whereas van Fraassen thinks there are only pragmatic grounds for 
such belief.7 So despite first appearances a great gap remains between 
constructive empiricism and entity realism even after interpreting 
Hacking's criterion of reality in an epistemologica! way. However, the 
entity realist now faces the difficulty in arguing for the plausibility of 
entity realism. What are the epistemic grounds on which to argue that we 
are really spraying electrons over the niobium ball? 
To stress the special character of causal explanations in which the out-
come of an experiment is described, that is, to point to the truth that is 
build into them, is not enough since reference to a theoretical entity as a 
cause is established by using a causal theory which is accepted on epis-
temic or at least reasonable grounds. So the question posed by Cartwright 
is still in need of an answer: 'when do we have reasonable (i.e. epistemic) 
grounds for counting a causal account acceptable?' (Van Fraassen's 
answer simply is: 'whenever the cause is an observable'). 
A causal account for the phenomena of quantum damping (for its asso-
ciated line broadening) in terms of the emission and absorption of photons 
postulates the existence of photons. If photons are the most likely cause 
for quantum damping we use an inference to the most likely cause to infer 
the existence of photons. But why should this causal account be acceptable 
in the first place? I have tried to make clear that Hacking's criterion of 
reality offers little help here. Van Fraassen's point still stands: electrons 
are unobservable entities and so there can only be pragmatic grounds for 
believing in the existence of electrons. The fact that we are supposedly 
7
 However, as we have shown in chapter 5, van Fraassen's new epistemology 
forces him to classify many of the scientific beliefs (beliefs held by scientists) as 
irrational beliefs. 
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spraying them over a niobium ball makes no difference. The entity realist 
however, in distinguishing himself from the constructive empiricist, wants 
to claim that there are epistemic grounds for believing that electrons exist. 
I conclude that the scientific realist is still in need for an argument for 
the plausibility of his realism. Hacking's 'spraying slogan' is not sufficient 
to defy the constructive empiricist. What the spraying slogan actually says 
is that if you can spray electrons or positrons over a niobium ball then you 
have epistemic grounds to believe electrons and positrons are real. Yet, 
how do we argue for the claim that we are spraying electrons in the first 
place? The only argument available to the entity realist seems to be some 
version of the miracle argument: entity realism is the only philosophy that 
doesn't make the reliability of instrumentation a miracle. Surely van 
Fraassen offers an alternative account of the reliability of instruments. 
Therefore, the argument for entity realism must be modified to an infer-
ence to the best (instead of the only) explanation and we are right back 
where we started. This inference to the best explanation must be spelled 
out as an inductive argument. Is there a way to do this, and if so, how? 
In the second half of this chapter I will discuss Harré's policy realism. 
I will show that this position follows in an almost logical way from the 
difficulty for entity realism I just spelled out. I will discuss the arguments 
for policy realism and assess the plausibility of this scientific realism with 
its unrivalled nuances and perhaps well-chosen strategy of defence. 
5.5 The transition from entity realism to policy realism 
Rom Harre sees great difficulties for theoretical or truth realism.8 Truth 
realism is the label Harre attaches to the view that a theory is true or false 
by virtue of the way the world is. These difficulties arise with regard to 
those theories that speak of entities having such a nature that direct 
empirical determination of their occurrent properties is not possible (1988: 
388-9). According to Harre, truth realism operates with a theory of refer-
ence in which reference is taken as denotation of entities by terms satisfy-
8
 These difficulties ultimately stem from the fact that the truth of universal state-
ments is problematic. Entity realism is only concerned, or so it seems with the 
(relatively) unproblematic truth of existential statements. Cf. Derksen (1994b). 
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ing certain clusters of prepositional functions. According to the doctrine of 
truth realism the predicates of these functions refer to occurrent properties. 
This latter claim puts the truth realist into an awkward position when he 
considers the theoretical terms of scientific theories which by their very 
nature refer to unobservable entities. The empirical determination of the 
occurrent properties of these entities is in principle (or by definition) 
impossible. Therefore, prepositional functions cannot be satisfied by terms 
which refer to such entities. Reference to theoretical entities seems there-
fore to be impossible within a truth realist attitude towards scientific the-
ories. Harre takes this to be evidence against the plausibility of truth real-
ism and develops a completely different notion of reference. No longer 
should we take reference to be the satisfaction of a certain set of predi-
cates by a term referring to an entity, but rather the realization of a physi-
cal relation between ourselves and the entity at issue by means of the 
apparatus (1988: 391, 394). 
The affinity between Hairé's realism and Cartwright's and Hacking's 
entity realism must be clear. After all, Cartwright and (to a much higher 
degree) Hacking already suggested the importance of such a physical rela-
tion between us and theoretical entities by means of the apparatus we use 
in experimenting. According to Hacking, spraying the niobium ball with 
electrons or positrons by means of a certain kind of machinery certainly 
realizes such a physical relation. However, Rom Harre develops a much 
more general philosophy which backs up this idea of reference. Policy 
realism should therefore be taken as a much more sophisticated philo-
sophical position within philosophy of science than either Cartwright's or 
Hacking's entity realism. 
Let us for the time being concentrate on Harré's realism as a referen-
tial realism. Harre thinks that science becomes intelligible if we combine 
his referential realism with the Gibsonian notion of qffordance. In 'Real-
ism and Ontology' Harre states: 
an affordance is a dispositional property of a material system which is 
manifested in response to a particular human intervention. (1988: 389) 
The general structure of such a dispositional property, of such an affor-
dance, can be described in the following way: 
If С then D in virtue of N 
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Take for example a nowadays perhaps old fashioned apparatus like a 
cloud chamber. In a McGraw-Hill International textbook for science stu-
dents we read: 
In its simplest form a cloud chamber consists of a cylinder with a glass 
plate at one end and a piston on the other that contains air saturated with 
water vapour. When the piston is moved down rapidly, the vapour expands 
and cools to a supersaturated state. If a charged particle passes through the 
chamber at precisely this time, the ions formed along its path serve as the 
nuclei of water droplets that condense from the vapour. This trail can be 
observed or photographed by illuminating the chamber from the side. The 
identity and initial energy of a particle that stops in a chamber can be 
established from the length of the track and from its thickness. Because the 
density of the air-vapour mixture is low, a high-energy particle usually 
passes right through, but if the chamber is placed in a magnetic field the 
track curvature will reveal the momentum of such a particle as well as the 
sign of its charge. (A. Beiser 1984: 471-2) 
Subsequently, we can now describe one of the dispositional properties of 
an electron in the following way: if a cloud chamber is brought into a cer-
tain state, a vapour trail of a certain length, curvature and width appears in 
virtue of an electron. This dispositional property of an electron to cause a 
specific vapour trail in a cloud chamber can be called an affordance. 
Reference can now literally be conceived of as something physical: 
given the dispositional character of nature referring means realizing a 
physical relation between experimenter and entity by means of an appar-
atus. 
Here I come to the main difference between entity realism and Harré's 
realism. The difference, so is my suggestion, can be reconstrued as an 
answer to the problem which entity realism stared right into the face. 
Referring successfully seems to be impossible if we do not know what 
entity we are looking for. In other words scientific theories must provide 
us with the descriptions of an example of a natural kind. Harre stresses to 
a great extent the necessity of maintaining a theoretical context next to a 
practical context. Hacking wants 'a notion of reference that is not tied by 
any specific, binding theory about what is referred to' (1983: 93) and 
finds in Putnam's theory of meaning an acceptable candidate, not realizing 
that Kripke and Putnam take the theoretical context to be 'absolute' (as 
Harre puts it) which renders this theory of meaning useless to an entity 
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realist like Hacking who reduces the theoretical context all together. Marre 
sees things very differently. In his Varieties of Realism (1986) he states 
that although Kripke and Putnam are 'mistaken in taking the theoretical 
context to be absolute': 
they are right to emphasize that in real natural science it is ultimately the 
theoretical context that exerts greater influence on the way we use kind 
terms. Practical distinctions need, in the end, to be certified by theoretical 
arguments which guarantee or undermine such distinctions by reference to 
chemical constitutions or physical natures, such as atomic architecture. 
Only in this way can those behavioral differences which are induced extrin-
sically by differences in context be differentiated from those which are the 
effect of different intrinsic properties. ( I l l ) 
To know what we are looking at and to know what we are looking for, 
the intension of kind terms must be determined. Harre concludes: 
in general the theoretical context has priority in determining the intension 
of kind terms' 
although he hastens to add, in the very same sentence, the insight of those 
who call themselves entity realists: 
but [...] these terms are located in two contexts [viz. a practical one and a 
theoretical one], and [...] the way they are used at any moment is the result 
of an interplay between them. (113) 
Nevertheless, in emphasizing the indispensability of the theoretical context 
his realism, later to be called policy realism, must be distinguished from 
the entity realism of Cartwright and Hacking. Only by maintaining a theo-
retical context next to a practical one do we believe that the vapour trail in 
the cloud chamber is caused by an electron and not by something else; 
only by maintaining a theoretical context next to a practical context do we 
believe that we are spraying electrons over the niobium ball and not some-
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thing else.9 So here then is the transition from entity realism to another 
kind of scientific realism. Let me now formulate Harré's policy realism. 
Harre distinguishes three domains of beings. First, the domain of actual 
and possible objects of experience. Secondly, the domain of beings which, 
if real, can become phenomena for the aided human senses. And finally, 
there are beings that transcend every possible human experience. Three 
different kinds of scientific theories correspond to these three domains 
(1986: 70-3), and: 
the defence of scientific realism will take different forms for each type of 
theory, and be accomplished to a different degree' (Harre 1986: 69, 72, cf. 
ibid., 235). 
However, I will not discuss the distinction between the different types of 
scientific theories as such. I take it for granted that there are pragmatic, 
iconic and mathematical theories in science corresponding with respective-
ly domain 1, 2 and 3. 
Policy realism can be described by the following cluster of statements 
(Harre 1986: 59-61, 225; 1988: 390, 391, 394): 
(1) Reference should be taken as realizing a physical relation between 
experimenter and entities by means of the apparatus; 
(2) The properties physics ascribes to nature are dispositional. Contrary 
to Cartwright, Harre characterizes scientific theories as tendency 
theories (1986: 282,291); 
(3) Scientific theories tell us (under certain conditions) which research 
is rational to perform. Scientific theories are the sources of well-
articulated material practices or material hunts in which we search 
for the deeper structures of the world and its entities. In his recent 
essay 'Exploring the Human Umwelt' Harre says: 
* In his (1994) Harre poses the question: 'How do we know how to manipulate 
unobserved entities?' (15). This comes close to the main question of entity real-
ism: 'How do we know that we (probably) manipulate unobservable entities?', but 
the difference is essential. 1 take it that, according to Harre, it is the plausibility of 
the theoretical context which must help us here. 
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it is reasonable to read a [plausible] theory [...] as if its terms denoted real 
things, and to use the sense of those terms as guides to setting up practical 
procedures for attempts to manipulate or perhaps actually to disclose their 
putative referents. (Harré 1990: 309)10 
The plausibility, or rather the relative plausibility, of a theory is a techni-
cal term Harré spells out in terms of the properties of a theory-family (the 
underlying ideal cognitive object of theories) like balance of behavioral 
and material analogies, comparative strength of these analogies, preserva-
tion of natural-kind rules, coordination of analytical and source analogy or 
model, and the moment of equilibrium in a continuous history of adjust-
ments within a theory-family. It is impossible for me to elaborate on these 
most interesting and important notions within the scope of this chapter. 
So, rather than scrutinizing the many aspects of Harré's policy realism 
individually, I will focus on the reasonableness or plausibility of policy 
realism in general." 
What exactly are the arguments for policy realism? For each realm of 
beings Harré defends a policy realist philosophy of science but he admits 
that the strength of these defences depends on the realm of beings the 
realism is being argued for. Harré's argument for policy realism with 
regard to the domain of beings which are actual and possible objects of 
experience and the domain of beings which can become phenomena for 
the aided human senses is, to my mind, the following: 
(1) Shifting Boundary Argument: (a) The history of science shows that 
many searches for theoretical entities, which were based on plausible scien-
tific theories, were successful, and (b) technical advances in the apparatus 
10
 In his Varieties of Realism this is formulated as Lenin's Rule: 'the plausibility 
of a theory makes it reasonable to pursue the policy of setting up a search for the 
putative referent' (1986: 225). 
" In his (1994) Harré defines the defence on scientific realism as follows: 'We 
must establish that the policy of reading theories according to the realist interpre-
tation is more rational than the policy of reading them according to positivist (or 
conventionalist) interpretative principles'. Here we already notice a shift from the 
topic of the rationality of scientific beliefs to the topic of the rationality of scien-
tific practices. It is, ultimately, this shift which renders the policy realist attack on 
constructive empiricism vacuous. 
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used in scientific practice show that we were right in taking beings of 
domain 2 to be actually existing natural kinds of the same type as they 
appear in domain 1. (1986: 59-60, 238; 1988: 389-391) 
Next I distinguish two arguments for a policy realist stance toward the 
domain of beings that transcend every possible human experience. These 
are: 
(2a) Indispensability Argument: Causal explanations of phenomena which 
are restricted to reference to beings in domains 1 and 2 are essentially 
incomplete. That is to say, science takes beings of domain 3 to be indis-
pensable for a causal account of certain phenomena. Science needs causal 
accounts which postulate the existence of beings in domain 3. If the 
affordances of such a being from domain 3 are sufficiently linked by 
strings of intermediate dispositions to beings of domain 1 we are entitled to 
speak of a natural kind in domain 3. These natural kinds are of a quasi-
type 1 natural kind. (1986: 308-9, 313-16) 
(2b) Argument from Success of Research: In his article 'Realism and 
Ontology' Harre closes with the following remark which I take to be a 
distinctive argument for policy realism with regard to domain 3: 
[quantum field theory] is a spectacular exemplar in that the parallel 
between electro-magnetic interactions and neutral-current interactions is as 
perfect an example as one could wish of the way in which, through a 
development in theory coupled with the influence of apparatus upon the 
affordances in terms of which the real entities are defined, [a theory] leads 
us to a highly successful research programme. (1988: 397) 
The general argument for policy realism with regard to all domains of 
beings seems to be the history of science which provides us with many 
illustrations of scientific theories operating as the sources on which a suc-
cessful research programme is set up, a research programme aimed at the 
exploration of the material world we live in (1988: 389-91, 1994); Let us 
call this argument the inductive argument from the history of science. Is 
this then the probability argument for realism we have been searching for 
throughout this study? 
Unfortunately, although the general argument for policy realism seems 
to be an inductive argument, formulating the subarguments for policy real-
ism the way I did one gets the impression that they are very similar to the 
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old and well-known Success- or (No-)Miracle Argument for scientific real-
ism as it is formulated by Smart, Putnam, Boyd and McMullin. I would 
like to argue that it is not the way of formulating these arguments that 
makes them look like the more familiar but vague Miracle Argument for 
scientific realism and that the general argument for policy realism is 
indeed inductive but insufficiently spelled out. 
8.6 On the status of policy realism 
According to the policy realist we are entitled to take plausible scientific 
theories as tickets to set up a search for entities of all three domains. To 
set up a material practice or material hunt on the basis of the plausibility 
of scientific theories is a rational thing to do. 
I reformulated Hacking's entity realism as the doctrine that it is rational 
to believe in the existence of theoretical entities postulated in plausible 
causal accounts of certain phenomenological events in the world, and the 
main argument for entity realism is the justification or reasonableness of 
inference to the most likely cause in conjunction with the fact that we 
often do have good (or epistemic) reasons to believe that we use causal 
properties of theoretical entities to interfere with other parts of the world. 
Surely, policy realism is no entity realism in this respect. We are not to 
believe in the existence of theoretical entities of plausible scientific the-
ories because of the plausibility as such. Plausibility means something 
completely different in the case of policy realism. As Harre formulates it 
in his 'Exploring the Human Umwelt': 
Plausibility is not a sign of the verisimilitude of the theory but of the 
rationality of testing it for referential adequacy (1990: 309-10). 
Moreover, policy realism is epistemologica!ly modest: 
Under certain conditions it is reasonable to read the terms of a theory as 
denoting as yet unobserved phenomena (1990: 308). 
And surely we must believe in the existence of the entities the terms of a 
theory dénotâtes if we are setting up a material hunt. 
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The similarities between policy realism and Jarrett Leplin's methodo-
logical realism are obvious. There is even a striking resemblance concern-
ing research in quantum mechanics and domain 3 beings which are unob-
servable in principle. Leplin says: 
What I maintain is that the development and continuation of the quantum 
theory as a program of research owe their rational reconstructability to 
realist assumptions, whether or not the developed theory sustains those 
assumptions. (1986: 37) 
Of course, Harré did note this similarity (1986: 113-4). However, defend-
ing methodological realism is definitely different from defending entity 
realism. So, although Harré sees his referential realism or policy realism 
as an entity realism (1986: 65) (in the sense Brian Ellis describes it in one 
of the footnotes to his Rational Belief Systems (1979: 45)), we must not 
let ourselves be misled. When it comes to the crunch, I think policy real-
ism cannot defend the truth of any specific existential claim with regard to 
the ontology of any scientific theory. After all, policy realism pleads for 
the rationality of scientific research rather than the epistemic belief in the 
truth of existential statements about unobservable entities (cf. Harré 1994 
in which he admits this confusion). 
Although it seems apt to interpret Hacking's criterion of reality as an 
epistemologica! criterion and therefore to take entity realism as a statement 
on what it is for a philosopher to rationally believe in, entity realism was 
originally not meant as a theory of scientific rationality.12 In the case of 
policy realism, however, it is the rationality of (specific) scientific research 
that is defended in the first place. 
The difference between a constructive empiricist like van Fraassen and 
a policy realist like Harré is minimalized by re-shifting from ontological 
questions (like the existence of theoretical entities denoted by theoretical 
terms) to epistemologica! ones (like what it is rational to believe in). 
According to the policy realist the relative plausibility of scientific theories 
entitles us, that is, makes it rational for us, to pursue a material hunt. It is 
12
 Hacking, in his (1983), says: 'ratiocination and belief are traditionally called 
logic and epistemology. They are not what this book is about' (1). Cf. his remark 
on rationality in the panel discussion 'The Rational Explanation of Historical 
Discoveries* in Nickles (1980b: 24). 
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not clear how even a weak realism with regard to theoretical entities can 
be defended on these grounds. We must remind ourselves once more of 
the fact that in his philosophy of science van Fraassen makes a sophisti-
cated distinction between rational and irrational belief: to a constructive 
empiricist setting up a material hunt can be as rational as it is to a policy 
realist setting up the same material hunt. Yet in the case of unobservables 
it might be rational on pragmatic grounds to do so. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how a policy realist can defend the claim 
that (for instance) electrons exist without using an 'inference to the 
best/only explanation' argument. The instrumental success of scientific 
research may be explained by positing unobservables, but if epistemic 
belief in the existence of unobservables is involved the constructive empi-
ricist will point out that this is simply not the proper epistemic attitude 
towards theories that postulate unobservables. So, although Harré's policy 
realism is a sophisticated defence of realism it does not address the ques-
tions posed by van Fraassen.*3 
Once again the question for the scientific realist is whether we may 
rationally, that is, on epistemic grounds believe that electrons exist for the 
reason that the scientific theories, which postulate the existence of the 
electron, provide us with successful scientific research. Smart's answer is 
clear: 'it is just too much to believe the universe is just as if there were 
electrons' (1985: 272). Van Fraassen's answer is equally clear: we may 
rationally believe in electrons but we cannot ground this belief in epis-
11
 In his (1990) Harre admits that policy realism cannot defeat constructive 
empiricism (316). He states that constructive empiricism 'is fraught with internal 
difficulties'. Interestingly Harre remarks that the implementation of a material 
hunt is 'only rational if we are willing to believe in the existence of the 
[(inobservable] beings apparently denoted' (318), but then again, van Fraassen 
claims that scientists are fully immersed in the scientific world-picture and will 
easily accept the existence of unobservables. Material hunts may be completely 
determined by pragmatic reasons to act. It says as such nothing about the rational-
ity of scientific beliefs. This means that arguing from the rationality of material 
hunts (or more generally, from the rationality of the practice of science) does not 
lead one to an argument against constructive empiricism. If Harre means to say 
that there can be no pragmatic reasons for the belief that some unobservable exist, 
and that it is this what van Fraassen's constructive empiricism presupposes, I am 
almost in full agreement with him (cf. chapter 5). 
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temic reasons. Can a policy realist give a clear answer to the question 
whether we may believe in electrons and on what grounds? 
The arguments for the reasonableness of policy realism are ultimately 
based upon the successes in the history of science, i.e. upon those events 
in the history of science when we discovered entities that were first 
thought of as unobservable entities. Scientists discovered (or detected) 
these entities, like terra austral is, the bisection of flow in the renal portal 
vein, shepherd moons and bacteria, by setting up material practices which 
were initiated by plausible scientific theories. This provides inductive 
evidence for policy realism. However, the policy realist's arguments are 
based on certain presuppositions. 
With regard to the existence of beings in realm 1 Harre says: 
Gibsonian theory does establish the essential contours of the Kantian cat-
egories as the [realistic] metaphysics of perception without the Kantian 
commitment to the transcendental necessity of the categories a priori' 
(1986: 160) 
and with regard to the existence of beings in realm 2, Harre takes it for 
granted that we indeed lifted the veil of perception from 'theoretical' 
entities by means of technical advances in the apparatus of the experi-
menter. The shifting boundary between domains 1 and 2 is taken for 
granted: 
Sometimes advances in instrumentation do occur and make available for 
inspection that which previously had been available only for manipulation. 
(Harre 1994: 10) 
The history of successful material hunts is taken for granted but this is 
something van Fraassen will simply not accept. Let us discuss the shifting 
boundary argument, presupposing Gibsonian theory. 
Harré's argument for the plausibility of the shifting boundary with 
regard to beings from realm 2 is obviously a (No-)Miracle argument. To 
the question how we are to explain the experimental or instrumental suc-
cess of science one cannot answer that it was rational to set up a material 
hunt on the basis of theories; this answer is irrelevant. One could answer 
that the theories which initiated the material hunt were plausible. But why 
should the plausibility of theories explain the instrumental success of 
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scientific practice? The reason for this is of course that we simply suppose 
we have no alternative explanation for this experimental success. If not 
explained in this manner the instrumental success in scientific research 
would be miraculous. This argument must be part and parcel of policy 
realism. 
But ever since van Fraassen's constructive empiricism we do seem to 
have an alternative explanation for this experimental success, so the next 
best thing we can do is to argue that policy realism is the best explanation 
of the instrumental success of scientific practice and use an inference to 
the best explanation to defend this philosophy of science. This inference 
refers to an inductive argument: the chance that science exposes major 
(instrumental) successes through history despite the fact that the unobserv-
ables postulated do not really exist is real but small enough to be negli-
gible. We have not found arguments in policy realism which back up this 
claim. 
In the case of policy realism there is perhaps a difference in the kind of 
scientific success that is normally being explained: the success of science 
should be spelled out in terms of how successful we are in trying to find 
what we are looking for in our material practices, that is, first we postu-
late an ontology and subsequently we try to find an exemplar from this 
ontology. Ontology seems to be prior to epistemology. Indeed, this is 
taken to be a characteristic feature of policy realism. However, Boyd 
states that scientific realism is justified because it is the best explanation 
'for various facts about the ways in which scientific methods are epistemi-
cally successful' (1985: 3), and I see no difference between this scientific 
realism and policy realism if we realize that these successful scientific 
methodological rules are preeminently to be found at work in the material 
hunts. But if this is correct we must conclude, firstly, that there is no 
priority of ontology over epistemology (although this does not imply the 
reverse) and, secondly, that policy realism must accept the unsubstantiated 
reasonableness of inference to the best explanation which is exactly the 
problem entity realism tried to evade (that is, it is not spelled out as an 
argument from probable knowledge concerning observables to probable 
knowledge concerning unobservables). 
Characterizing the ultimate argument for policy realism with regard to 
domain 2 as an inference to the best explanation, we are back where we 
started. The question at issue is an epistemologica! one and the argument 
for Harré's realism must be unmistakably qualitatively inductive: we pos-
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tulate entities of a certain type to explain an empirical regularity that 
involves entities of a different type. Harre would of course argue that if the 
implicated difference in type is not an ontological difference in kind (so to 
speak) then the difference is epistemologically irrelevant. The history of 
science contains many instances of such cases. Let me briefly go into this 
line of argument. 
Aronson, Harre and Way (1993) speak of induction over types as 
opposed to induction over particulars. It is clear that an induction over 
types is only possible if we have at our disposal certain criteria of similar-
ity. If we postulate a certain unobservable type of entity to account for an 
empirical regularity amongst the tokens of an observable type of entity, 
then there are two possible interpretations: (1) we could stress the similar-
ities between the two types (say a 'football' and the chemist's buckmin-
sterfullerene or 'buckyball', a carbon compound 200 million times smaller 
than an ordinary football), and take the stance that the types are two 
tokens (one happens to be unobservable, the buckyball, and one happens 
to be observable, the football) of a supertype (spherical or ball-like 
objects); in this way we could ontologically speak of an induction over 
types14; or (2) we could stress the main difference between the two types 
and say that they belong to two different classes of types of entities alto-
gether, namely a class of humanly unobservable types of entities and a 
class of humanly observable types of entities respectively. 
The first interpretation allows Harre to defend his realism by an induc-
tive argument from the history of science. With regard to domain 1 the 
history of science shows that material hunts initiated by plausible theories, 
that is, by theories that are empirically adequate and postulate types more 
or less similar to the types of the known world, were successful. The same 
argument holds with regard to domain 2. If we assume that the future will 
be like the past we inductively conclude that plausible theories will initiate 
successful material hunts because the entities postulated by such theories 
(probably) exist (Aronson, Harre & Way 1993). 
However, with regard to domain 2 of beings which are not yet observ-
able to the unaided senses, the constructive empiricist will object to the 
strategy of defence. To the empiricist the moons of Jupiter are observable 
and electrons are not, and this has nothing to do with seeing the moons of 
14
 Cf. Harre (1994, section 4). 
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Jupiter through a telescope; it has to do with there being circumstances 
which are such that if an entity is present to us under those circumstances, 
then we could observe it (van Fraassen 1980: 16). There are never circum-
stances such that electrons are observed by us. So here the constructive 
empiricist will disagree with Harré's exposition of the history of science as 
a history of successful material hunts for beings of domain 2 (not to men-
tion beings of domain 3). 
Here, then, lies the reason why the inductive argument from the history 
of science for policy realism will not succeed. The specific difference 
between observable and unobservable types is epistemologically relevant, 
so that the inference from regularities amongst observables to the existence 
of unobservables that explain, is not an induction from observed cases to 
similar cases: the unobserved cases are of a different kind altogether 
because of their unobservability. The main specific difference between 
buckyballs and footballs, between DNA and spaghetti etc., is their size, 
i.e. the fact that they are unobservable in the one case but observable in 
the other. This brings us back to the original epistemological discussion 
between the realist and the constructive empiricist. 
Another reason for disregarding the inductive argument from the his-
tory of science with regard to domain 2 is that the similarities between 
observable and unobservable types are given by the very same theories 
that initiate the material hunt. The belief that a detected type of being is 
more or less of the same type as beings from domain 1 is not indepen-
dently supported. We do not know the world of unobservables like the 
'chemist's buckyball' (rather than the moons of Jupiter) in the same way 
we know the world of observables like footballs. We can only suppose 
that the detected entities are of the same type; we can never observe that 
they are of the same type in the way that we can observe the moons of 
Jupiter of being of the same type of footballs if we went to Jupiter. The 
only reasons we have for supposing the chemical buckyball is a type of 
being more or less similar to types of beings of domain 1 (footballs) is the 
instrumental success of our chemical theories. This argument from suc-
cess, however, is problematic from the start. 
The "rational" reconstruction of entity realism was meant to shed light 
on a new defence of scientific realism. A defence that would contain the 
fleshing out of the Miracle argument for scientific realism in terms of 
inductive arguments that may take us from probable knowledge concern-
ing humanly observable entities to probable knowledge concerning human-
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ly unobservable entities. With regard to beings of domain 2 policy realism 
has certainly not offered such a defence. The result is that policy realism 
cannot account for the rationality of beliefs in unobservables, but merely 
for the rationality of setting up material hunts. Yet although the rationality 
of scientific beliefs is also out of reach for the constructive empiricist (cf. 
chapter 5), the material practices can be classified as rational by van 
Fraassen, since practices and decisions (in opposition to beliefs) concern-
ing unobservables may be wholly determined by pragmatic reasons. So, 
once again we must emphasize that the defence of scientific realism must 
be motivated by the fact that only epistemic grounds can save the rational-
ity of beliefs. 
Finally, let us concentrate on Harré's argument for a very modest 
scientific realism with regard to beings of domain 3. We labelled this 
argument the indispensability argument: science provides only incomplete 
causal accounts of certain phenomena if it restricts itself to postulating 
beings of domains 1 and 2. This argument seems to be a reformulation, in 
a different context, of Wilfrid Sellars' argument for scientific realism. 
Sellers claims: 
only in theoretical frameworks can we hope to find the proper nomologi-
cals [...] in terms of which to provide satisfactory explanations of particular 
matters of fact (313). 
Only when we take scientific theories seriously, that is, realistically, can 
we satisfactorily explain the success of empirical generalizations. Only 
then is it clear to us why observables and their behaviour can be described 
in empirical generalizations in the first place. Only then do we really 
explain. This is the essence of the 1976 PSA discussion between Sellars 
and van Fraassen. Van Fraassen's answer to this argument for a modest 
scientific realism for beings of domain 3 can be anticipated. He will argue 
that this argument is a typical realist (No-)Miracle argument and will point 
out the many difficulties this argument suffers from. 
The second argument for policy realism for beings of domain 3 offered 
by Harré at the end of his 'Realism and Ontology', is that quantum field 
theory leads us to a highly successful research programme (the argument 
from success of research). What is meant by successful here? In his 
'Exploring the Human Umwelt' Harré takes it to be manipulative success 
and appeals to Hacking's criterion of reality. The boundary between 
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domain 2 and 3 ¡s contingent. Harré writes: 'manipulative success with 
realm 3 beings is a good ground for a (révisable) ontological claim on 
their behalf (1990: 312). Yet, the real argument for the statement that we 
are manipulating realm 3 beings is a (No-)Miracle argument: if we are not 
manipulating electrons how are we to explain these phenomena that appear 
in our material practices? Since I have already gone into this argument I 
will not discuss it further. 
Coming to the end of the chapter, I must regrettably conclude that the 
defence even of a modest scientific realism like policy realism, is still 
quite problematic. I think its defence is liable to the same objections phil-
osophers raise against the inference to the best explanation argumentation 
of (for instance) Richard Boyd's scientific realism. Furthermore, the argu-
ments van Fraassen offers against scientific realism are not addressed and 
therefore not answered. No new argument for scientific realism is found 
and the desired probability argument for realism, although hinted at, is not 
given. 
8.7 The real inductive argument from the history and practice of science 
Derksen (1994b) argues convincingly that the correct conclusion to be 
drawn from Harré's philosophy of science is that a weak form of scientific 
realism, to wit candidate realism, may be defended. Harré concentrates 
too much on the practice of science and neglects the rationality of scien-
tific belief. Although he is able to defend the rationality of scientific prac-
tice, so is van Fraassen. Yet, as we have seen in chapter S, the rationality 
of scientific beliefs concerning unobservables is forever beyond the empi-
ricist's reach. Candidate realism, however, maintains that we can have 
(epistemic) reasons to believe in unobservables. It claims that 
we can have reasons for believing that a theoretical entity X [i.e. an unob-
servable] is an - acceptable - candidate for reality, worthy to be taken 
seriously (Derksen 1994b: 54). 
Now, the most simple inductive argument from the history of science for 
scientific realism is the empirical claim that the history and practice of 
science is full of successful material hunts (or X-searches, as Derksen calls 
them) for postulated unobservables. But this is something van Fraassen 
will equally simply deny. Is there an inductive argument that does not pre-
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suppose the intuitively correct distinction made by van Fraassen between 
observables and unobservables? 
The real inductive argument from the history and practice of science, at 
least according to my interpretation of Derksen (1994b), can be depicted 
as follows: 
(1) Underdetermination of a scientific theory by the empirical data 'is 
not as bad as the anti-realist claims it is'; 
(2) The history of science is full of successful material hunts (or X-
searches) for postulated unobservables that were initiated by (plaus-
ible) theories; 
(3) Epistemically, this is reason enough to believe that some unobserv-
ables are acceptable candidates for reality while others are not. 
In other words, the inductive argument from the history and practice of 
science is interpreted as the claim that, (although there may always be 
alternatives to some realistic hypothesis,13 namely at least the agnostic as 
if hypotheses), the success of material hunts for postulated unobservables 
initiated by (plausible) theories is reason enough to believe that the 
guessed chance that the as if ontology (that is, some other ontology) is so 
small that it is negligible. Let us summarize this in the following way: 
The realist inductive argument from the history and practice of science: the 
chance that the successful material hunts for unobservables are initiated by 
false theories is real but small enough to be negligible. 
But if this inductive argument for scientific realism is not painstakingly 
worked out in detailed terms of probabilities, it seems to boil down to the 
general claim that the scientific world-picture, although it may be false, is 
not likely to be false. And this, in its tum, seems to be nothing more than 
the general claim that although human scientific knowledge is fallible 
knowledge, it is not very likely that we are wrong about the unobservable 
structure of the world. Still, the claim is certainly not acceptable to the 
constructive empiricist. 
15
 Ontologically speaking and given that the hypothesis postulating unobservables 
is the result of many eliminative inductions. 
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The reason for this is that the success of material hunts for unobserv-
ables is neither confirmed nor denied by van Fraassen: he remains agnos-
tic about the successful ness of material hunts for unobservables (for logi-
cal reasons). Furthermore, he would argue for a pragmatic explanation of 
the "successful material hunts for unobservables" in terms of the immer-
sion of scientists in the scientific world-picture. Next, he will (or rather, 
must) point out that if these hunts involve scientific beliefs they must be 
reconstructed, for epistemologica! reasons, as cases of successful material 
hunts for observables. Finally, van Fraassen would argue that the correct 
inductive argument from the history and practice of science is the claim 
that the chance that the successful material hunts for observables are initi-
ated by empirically inadequate theories is so small that it is negligible. 
The nub of this empiricist response is hidden in the phrase 'for epis-
temologica! reasons'. Since van Fraassen claims that the probability of a 
theory being empirically adequate is at least as probable as the conjunction 
that the theory is empirically adequate and true, the proper epistemic atti-
tude towards theories that initiate "successful" material hunts for unobserv-
ables is not to believe them to be true but merely to believe them to be 
empirically adequate. That is, (epistemically) we only have reason enough 
to believe in the empirical adequacy of the theory, and (epistemically) we 
do not have reason enough to believe in the truth of the theory. Under-
determination plays a role in this argument to the extent that any ontology 
of unobservables may as well be interpreted as an as if ontology. How-
ever, the constructive empiricist pays a high price for his agnosticism: he 
can no longer maintain that scientific beliefs concerning unobservables are 
rational beliefs (cf. chapter 5). Nevertheless, for the inductive argument 
from the history and practice of science, hinted at by Harre and spelled 
out by Derksen, to be a powerful argument for realism it must go from 
probable knowledge concerning observables to probable knowledge con-
cerning unobservables. Such an argument, in candidate realist terms, must 
start from successful material hunts for observables initiated by (plausible) 
theories in the historical and practical record of science. If this is estab-
lished one could argue that the same theories also initiated allegedly suc-
cessful material hunts for unobservables. Subsequently one is free to argue 
that, although one might reinterpret these cases as further successful 
material hunts for observables (van Fraassen), it is unlikely that this is the 
case and, consequently, that one is permitted for inductive reasons to 
believe some of the unobservables to be serious candidates for reality. But 
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this argument looks like the more familiar argument by Smart et alia that 
'it is just too much to think that the universe is as //"there are electrons', 
and, as we have seen, it will not do against van Fraassen's penetrating 
critique. 
Is the debate on realism lost by the realist? It certainly looks that way. 
However, I think that if we pull together the different yet incomplete 
strands of argumentations for scientific realism from part III, and combine 
them with the critique of constructive empiricism I formulated in part II, 
though we might not be able to formulate the 'Ultimate Argument for 
Scientific Realism', we might be able to point out the direction in which 
we must seek this argument. This will be the content of the concluding 
chapter. 
8.8 Conclusion 
To defend the priority of ontology over epistemology, which is being sug-
gested in all brands of entity realism, and therefore to dismiss the epis-
temologica! turn, seems to me to be wrongheaded. Aronson says in his A 
Realist Philosophy of Science: 
I find the relationship between epistemology and ontology to be far more 
complex than many philosophers have previously envisaged. (1984: 262) 
To state that the relation is complex does not by itself lead one to the con-
clusion that ontology is prior to epistemology. It would, to my mind, be 
wrong to argue for an ontological turn. If we take ontology to be the study 
for what there is and epistemology to be the study for what we can know, 
then we must conclude that every statement on what there is depends, for 
its plausibility, on the reasons we have for holding a statement (tentative-
ly) to be true. Of course, the inverse also holds: every statement on what 
reasons we have to believe something, presupposes something that or 
someone who believes. The relation between ontology and epistemology is 
indeed complex and policy realism, as the most sophisticated entity real-
ism yet, has, at least to my mind, fallen victim of this complexity by stat-
ing the priority of ontology. But it has not done so in vain: we are now, 
more than ever, aware of this complex relation between ontology and epis-
temology. Given this complex relation it seems premature to defend scien-
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tifie realism by taking the ontological tum. Indeed, as I have tried to 
show, it is the rationality of beliefs concerning unobservables that is at 
stake in the scientific realism debate; this is clearly an epistemologica! 
question. 
In this chapter I evaluated referential or entity realism from an epis-
temologica! point of view to see whether this kind of scientific realism 
offers the defence we have been looking for. I argued that Cartwright's 
entity realism presupposes Hacking's criterium for the reality of causes 
and that Harré's policy realism is an inevitable alteration of Hacking's 
realism if one recognizes the necessity of maintaining a theoretical context 
next to a practical one. 
However, although presented as a brand of entity realism, Harré's real-
ism seems more to be a theory of scientific rationality, but only to the 
extent that it argues for the rationality of scientific practice not of scien-
tific beließ. 
Fortunately, the ultimate argument for scientific realism, hinted at by 
Harre, is indeed an inductive argument from the history of science. It is 
applied by Derksen in a defence of candidate realism which concentrates 
on the rationality of beliefs. However, although presented as a probability 
argument it seems still to be liable to the empiricist epistemologica! cri-
tique of van Fraassen, since it equates detectability with observability. 
Finally, we must now judge and assess the case for scientific realism. 
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The Case for Scientific Realism 
9.1 Introduction: Scientific realism and the current state of affairs 
In this final chapter I will bring together the several conclusions from 
previous chapters in order to give an outline or sketch of the 'Ultimate 
Argument for Scientific Realism'. 
Prior to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, scientific realism was 
not unproblematic: the problem of underdeterm¡nation was already recog-
nized as the main threat to realism and section 9.1.1 summarizes our con-
clusions with regard to the danger of underdetermination. Yet it goes with-
out saying that scientific realism is again and more than ever under heavy 
attack since van Fraassen published his major work The Scientific Image 
in 1980. Section 9.1.2 recapitulates this attack. 
However, van Fraassen's empiricism is not unproblematic either. I will 
summarize my critique of empiricism (section 9.2), which is a negative 
argument in defence of scientific realism, and subsequently I will try to 
spell out provisionally the (positive) correct inductive argument for scien-
tific realism (section 9.3). In section 9.4 I offer an epilogue in which I 
will look for the gain in this defence of scientific realism when compared 
to McMullin's inspiring 'A Case for Scientific Realism' (1984). 
9.1.1 Scientific realism undermined (I) 
The most common defence of scientific realism is undoubtedly in terms of 
some 'inference to the best explanation' argument. That such a defence is 
usually called 'abductive', with reference to the work of Charles S. Peirce, 
is misleading (chapter 2). Yet it may be innocent enough as long as it 
does not put us on the wrong track in defending realism. 
In the present study I have analyzed the most sophisticated 'inference 
to the best explanation'-defence along these lines offered by Richard 
Boyd, Alan Musgrave and, more specifically and importantly, Paul 
Thagard in his Computational Philosophy of Science (1988, 1992), and I 
have come to the unfortunate conclusion that it leads at most to the claim 
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that we are allowed to accept scientific theories as if they refer to unob-
servable entities (chapter 1). Evidently, this is not enough to defend scien-
tific realism, that is, the claim that we do have epistemic reasons to 
believe in the existence of inobservables. 
An 'inference to the only explanation' argument for scientific realism is 
a much stronger argument. Indeed, many scientific realists unwittingly 
defend realism by this argument. But how do we argue that some scientif-
ic explanation is the only (plausible) explanation? Realists point to the 
eliminative inductive arguments used by scientists to defend the claim that 
we are epistemically warranted to believe in unobservables which are pos-
tulated by those explanations that survive many eliminative inductions. 
Unfortunately underdetermination of theory by data drastically reduces the 
epistemic strength of these eliminative inductive arguments. 
The threat of underdetermination for scientific realism is a serious, and 
perhaps even fatal one. In chapter 3 I distinguished two dimensions to 
underdetermination, viz. an historical and a logical one. The historical 
dimension of underdetermination is not a real threat to realism. Although 
our attempt to turn allegedly resolved cases of underdetermination into an 
argument for realism failed, we were nevertheless able to defy the attack 
from underdetermination by pointing out that scientific realism can deal 
with resolved cases of underdetermination, whether one is concerned with 
either empirically or evidentially equivalent theories. This leaves the logi-
cal threat of underdetermination. 
The logical argument against scientific realism from Putnam's 'Models 
and Reality' paper is very complex. We have not immersed ourselves in 
the many logical details of this argument. I have offered three reasons to 
think that the logical argument from underdetermination is less powerful 
than it seems: first, the presupposition of the argument that scientific the-
ories are first-order theories is implausible, secondly the argument does 
not show that (the generated) logically incompatible theories are ontologi-
ca! ly incompatible, and thirdly, since Putnam thinks that an internal scien-
tific realism is possible the argument is evidently not meant as an argu-
ment against scientific realism but rather against metaphysical realism and 
for Quinean indeterminacy of reference. If the threat of underdetermina-
tion is lessened, the strength of eliminative inductive arguments for the 
existence of unobservables is proportionally increased. Scientific realism 
can be defended by the kind of probability arguments we find in science 
itself. However, with van Fraassen's empiricist critique scientific realism 
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is again under fire. 
9.1.2 Scientific realism undermined (II) 
Van Fraassen argues that there is an intuitively correct distinction between 
entities that are observable to exemplars of Homo sapiens and entities that 
are unobservable to such creatures. Observability is described in terms of 
what would be observable to humans given their physiology. 
Given this relatively clear cut distinction between two classes of enti-
ties there is an easy way to show how underdetermination, despite the 
many difficulties with Putnam's application of the Löwenheim-Skolem 
theorem, still is the main threat to scientific realism. Any theory postulat-
ing unobservables has as its at least equally probable rival, the theory that 
postulates the unobservable ontology asanas (/Ontology (implying, with-
out specifying, that the correct ontology of unobservables may be com-
pletely different from the one actually proposed). Since the claim that a 
theory (postulating unobservables) is empirically adequate is at least as 
probable as the claim that the theory is empirically adequate and true (that 
is, the unobservables postulated are real), the epistemic reasons, within the 
probabilistic paradigm, can only warrant the belief that any theory (postu-
lating unobservables) is empirically adequate. This latter claim is obvious-
ly incompatible with scientific realism which says we have epistemic rea-
sons to believe in unobservables. 
Thus, van Fraassen claims that Ρ(Γ is empirically adequate & гтие)^Р(Г 
is empirically adequate), which is evidently true. But perhaps one wants to 
object that if ?(T is empirically adequate & true) is high enough, we have 
nevertheless epistemic reason enough also to believe Τ is empirically ade­
quate and true. 
Now, the difference in these probabilities is a function of the degree of 
underdetermination. Suppose we have three theories (postulating unobserv­
ables) and suppose that for each of these theories Ρ(Γ is empirically ade­
quate) is very high. If these theories are ontologically incompatible and if 
the three ontologies are the only possible ontologies, then Р(Г is empiri­
cally adequate & true^Pir is trae)=.333 (for if Τ is true it is empirically 
adequate), which is not enough reason for belief.' Evidently, only if we 
1
 Following some plausible probabilistic rule of acceptance. 
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have but one correct ontology of unobservables it follows that Ρ(Γ is 
trae)=P(7' is empirically adequate) and only in that case, if it is rational to 
believe that Τ is empirically adequate then it is as rational to believe that Τ 
is true. Unfortunately, according to van Fraassen, we always have at least 
two ontologies: the postulated one and the as if one (that is, some other 
ontology). If we have only two alternatives the probability that these the­
ories are true will never exceed .5, so that it will never be rational to 
believe that some theory postulating unobservables is empirically adequate 
and true. We will never have reason enough to believe that some theory 
postulating unobservables is empirically adequate and true. Worse to 
come, it is not that there are only two alternatives. The as if ontology is 
only shorthand for infinitely many alternatives so that the probability for 
any ontology of unobservables will decrease to zero. 
In essence this is the empiricist's attack on realism.2 Notice that the 
empiricist does not claim that the unobservables postulated by some scien­
tific theory are dispensable.3 He may accept that scientists feel the urge to 
postulate unobservables in order to be able to explain empirical generaliz­
ations. He may therefore accept that for pragmatic reasons the scientist 
(although he may think otherwise) is often seduced to postulate unobserv­
ables. (Remember the empiricist claim that not all reasons to accept a 
theory are epistemic reasons). And perhaps these entities indeed exist but, 
according to van Fraassen, we will never be epistemically warranted to 
believe this to be true. Agnosticism with regard to the existence of unob­
servables is therefore the proper epistemic attitude towards scientific the­
ories. 
2
 Notice that van Fraassen's assertion on the aim of science plays no role at all in 
undermining scientific realism. 
3
 Cf. van Fraassen's remark on twentieth-century philosophy of science: 'Perhaps 
the worst consequences of the syntactic approach was the way it focused 
attenetion on philosophically irrelevant technical questions. It is hard not to con­
clude that those discussions of axiomatizability in restricted vocabularies, 'theor­
etical terms', Craig's theorem, 'reduction sentences', 'empirical languages', 
Ramsey and Carnap sentences, were one and all off the mark - solutions to purely 
self-generated problems, and philosophically irrelevant. The main lesson of the 
twentieth-century philosophy of science may well be this: no concept which is 
essentially language-dependent has any philosophical importance at all.' (1980: 
56). Cf. also McMullin (1984: 9). 
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Let us now look for a realist rebuttal. 
9.2 Scientific realism defended: a negative argument 
In chapter 4 I investigated Giere's claim that the degree of empirical ade­
quacy of constructive empiricism as a descriptive philosophy of science 
might actually be quite low. I tested empiricism on aprima facie unprob-
lematic case for empiricism, viz. a case from the paleoanthropology 
which seems to be concerned only with observables in van Fraassen's 
sense. It became clear, however, that even in this case the degree of empi­
rical adequacy of empiricism was, though not altogether nil, at least ques­
tionably low. The palaeoanthropological case study, although inconclusive 
as an adjudicator in the scientific realism debate, took us nevertheless to 
the right track in criticizing constructive empiricism. 
Van Fraassen must either accept a very low degree of empirical ade­
quacy for empiricism (it must reinterpret the phenomenology of science) 
or develop a new empiricist epistemology which would justify this low 
degree of empirical adequacy. In his Laws and Symmetry (1989) van 
Fraassen develops such an epistemology. I defended the assertion that, 
when applied in philosophy of science, this epistemology makes construc­
tive empiricism я first philosophy of science: the plausibility of construc­
tive empiricism is independent from the history and practice of science. 
This fact counts against empiricism, once we accept the important 
insights of Kuhn, McMullin, Laudan, Giere and others, who argued that 
no philosophy of science can discard the history of science, but in itself it 
is not an argument against empiricism. Criticizing constructive empiricism 
must consist in a careful analysis of van Fraassen's new epistemology. 
In chapter S I showed that in this new epistemology, in which it is 
possible to rationally believe in the existence of unobservables for prag­
matic reasons (1980: 99, 1985: 148, 1989: 172-3), van Fraassen makes a 
category mistake. Having a rational belief is intimately connected to hav­
ing epistemic reasons for holding the belief. In suggesting that one can 
have pragmatic reasons to believe something to be true van Fraassen is 
faced with, what I called, the problem of constructive empiricism. 
This is more than a problem; it is an incoherency in contemporary 
empiricism. For there simply can never be pragmatic reasons for rationally 
believing something to be true. Not giving epistemic reasons for holding a 
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belief is believing the world is as one believes it is without having an 
argument for it, that is, without offering considerations that bear on the 
degree of correct representation of the world by the theory. Unless one is 
prepared to postulate some human, intuitive or privileged access to the 
true nature of the world, one must give up the idea that one may rationally 
hold the belief that ρ without having epistemic reasons for holding the 
belief. Since van Fraassen evidently accepts the rejection of a first philos­
ophy in epistemology and accepts the fallibility of human knowledge, he 
must also accept the fact that, for the belief that ρ to be rational, epistemic 
reasons to hold that belief are required. 
Van Fraassen is consequently forced to give up the rationality of scien­
tific beliefs (i.e. beliefs held by scientists) concerning the existence of 
unobservable entities. Now, are we prepared to do the same? Are we pre­
pared to give up the rationality of many of the scientific beliefs? If not, 
we have a negative argument for scientific realism: 
Negative argument for scientific realism: 
(i) The constructive empiricist, as the strongest adversary to the scien­
tific realist, cannot maintain the rationality of any of the existential 
scientific beliefs concerning specified unobservables; 
(ii) We are not prepared to give up the rationality of (all of) these 
beliefs4; 
(iii) Constructive empiricism is therefore implausible; 
(iv) Therefore, scientific realism gains some plausibility. 
The argument is weak for two reasons. First of all, it depends on the stub­
bornness of the realist to give up the rationality of some of the scientific 
beliefs. If this is simply a psychological fact the argument is indeed very 
weak. Can the realist offer some plausible reasons for being unwilling to 
give up the rationality of existential scientific beliefs concerning specified 
unobservables? Only if there are epistemic reasons for believing in unob­
servables. Again we are faced with the problem of scientific realism: we 
must find an argument that takes us from probable knowledge concerning 
A
 That is to say, we are not prepared to reinterpret (all of) these beliefs as mere 
opinions. 
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observables to probable knowledge concerning unobservables (cf. section 
9.3). 
Secondly, the argument has the character of an el im ¡native argument 
but have we considered all other alternatives? There may be several other 
anti-realist (or non-realist) philosophies of science that are even more 
sophisticated than constructive empiricism.1 These philosophies of science 
may perhaps equally claim that we do not have epistemic reasons to 
believe in the existence of (specified) unobservables and yet simultaneous-
ly see a way to save the rationality of these scientific beliefs. Although I 
am not aware of these philosophies of science, we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that someday someone will develop such a philosophy of science. 
This weakens the argument 
5
 Fine's 'natural ontological attitude' (NOA) may be such a theory of science. I 
think NOA may be interpreted as a minimal philosophy of science (Fine 1986). It 
is the minimal philosophical advise to 'accept the scientific results "in the same 
way" as we accept the evidence of our senses' (Fine 1984a: 96). It is minimal for 
'all that NOA insists on is that one's ontological attitude ... be governed by the 
same standards of evidence and inference that are employed by science itself 
(1984b: ISO). It is the advise to believe whatever scientists say it is right to 
believe. But it does not tells us why we should believe what scientists believe. 
Jennings correctly argues that 'NOA would be fine in a world where no one asked 
philosophical questions about scientific claims. But philosophers typically do ask 
such questions' (1989: 237). I will not discuss Fine's notions of 'core position' 
and the '"no-theory" theory of troth' (cf. De Regt 1989). However, it seems to me 
that Fine's natural ontological attitude is actually an epistemologica! attitude: for 
some reason or another our best knowledge resides in our best scientific theories 
of the moment. I would like to know why Fine thinks this is the case, that is, 
what this reason is and what the status of this knowledge is. Cf. McMullin (1984: 
39): '[Fine] proposes, as the consequence of a "natural ontological attitude" that 
"there really are molecules and atoms" and rejects the instrumentalist assertion 
that they are just fictions. But some argument is needed for this, beyond calling 
this attitude "natural"'. (Fine's criticism of constructive empiricism is, I think, 
correct to the extent that he sees a priori elements in the empiricist epistemology 
which is incompatible with rejecting a first philosophy in epistemology (1984b: 
144)). 
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9.3 Scientific realism defended: the strong argument 
The scientific realist is in need of an argument that takes him from prob-
able knowledge concerning observables to probable knowledge concerning 
unobservables. Van Fraassen claims there is no such argument. Is he right 
in this? 
Evolutionary realists argue from evolution and natural selection. Some 
argue that, phylogenetically, Homo sapiens would have become extinct if 
this species would be completely wrong in its representations of the 
(risky) world (chapter 6). Others argue that, ontogenetically, an exemplar 
of Homo sapiens leams how to cope with the (risky) world which is only 
possible if its representations of this world are approximately correct 
(chapter 7). However, I have argued that neither approach offers us the 
inductive argument that takes us from reliable instrumental knowledge to 
probable theoretical knowledge. The basic reason is that nature does not 
add a bonus-probability to the probability of survival to creatures with true 
representations of the unobservables world.6 Yet the argument these evol-
utionary realists really aim at is the inductive argument for realism: they 
implicitly argue that the chance that our representations of the world are 
incorrect with regard to unobservables is real, but so small that it is negli-
gible. Unfortunately this argument has not been worked out. 
The same holds for the entity realists (chapter 8). The argument from 
the manipulation of unobservables (Hacking's criterion of reality) delivers 
no defence of scientific realism. The argument simply assumes that we are 
in fact manipulating these unobservable entities. Again, the correct way 
out for the entity realist is to recognize that the true argument for realism 
is a probability argument from reliable instrumental knowledge. To with-
draw to some methodological realism or policy realism (Harre) saves the 
rationality of scientific practice on a realistic reading but is utterly silent 
on the rationality of existential scientific beliefs concerning unobservables. 
Again, many hint at the correct inductive argument, some inference to the 
only explanation, but fail to explicate it. 
6
 If Stich (1990) is right even the stronger claim would hold that this is neither 
the case where representations of the observable world are concerned (cf. section 
6.7). 
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Derksen comes close to explicating an inductive argument for scientific 
realism or candidate realism. The chance that the successful material hunts 
(or X-searches) for unobservables are initiated by false theories is real but 
negligible (section 8.7). However, the presupposition of this argument is 
that there are successful material hunts for {inobservables. This is some-
thing van Fraassen denies. But if van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is 
implausible, since it must give up the rationality of existential scientific 
beliefs concerning unobservables, why must we cling to the empiricist dis-
tinction between observables and unobservables? If we were allowed to 
reject the observable-unobservable distinction and replace it with the more 
scientific distinction between detectable and undetectable entities, the his-
tory and the practice of the sciences offer us many illustrations of detected 
and therefore now observed entities that were once thought to be undetec-
table. We rely on the calibrating processes of science that takes us from 
highly probable knowledge concerning observables to the probable knowl-
edge that what we see through a high-powered microscope is veridical (for 
instance through the calibrating chain naked eye-glasses-light microscope-
electron microscope). The inductive argument for realism could then be 
reformulated thus: 
The chance that the successful material hunts (or X-searches) which aim 
for detecting and observing entities that were once thought to be undetec-
table, are initiated by false theories, is real but negligible. 
However, I find van Fraassen's distinction, relative to Homo sapiens, 
between observable and unobservable entities quite plausible. It is not that 
the existence of entities is relative to the human physiology. But evidently 
the human epistemic attitude toward certain claims about the structure of 
reality depends on the human physiology. An electron is unobservable, 
whereas the moons of Jupiter are observable in principle, by humans. I 
find it plausible that this distinction carries epistemologica! consequences. 
It seems to me a truism that it is the human condition that we must be 
more cautious with regard to claims concerning unobservables than to 
claims concerning observables. 
However, I think, the following and strong argument for scientific 
realism is compatible with these (empiricist) insights. 
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Strong argument for scientific realism: 
i. There is a plausible distinction between observables and unobserv-
ables relative to Homo sapiens. 
ii. This distinction is epistemologica!ly relevant: we must be more 
careful with regard to claims about the existence of unobservables. 
iii. First philosophy in epistemology is implausible. (Probabilism is the 
'new' paradigm). 
¡v. Our current scientific theories are instrumentally reliable; they incor-
porate highly probable knowledge concerning observables. 
v. These theories are the result of eliminative inductions. 
vi. Many of these theories postulate the existence of unobservables. 
vii. There is the danger of underdeterm¡nation, but as to yet it is not 
clear whether it is possible, at any given time, to generate infinitely 
many ontologically interesting incompatible yet empirically (or even 
evidentially) equivalent alternatives. 
viii. The chance that the postulated unobservables of science do not exist 
is therefore real but negligible. 
ix. Therefore, inductive arguments in science lead to probable knowl-
edge concerning unobservables; one is epistemologically warranted 
to tentatively believe in the existence of the specified unobservables; 
scientific realism is more plausible than constructive empiricism. 
This is the sketch of the inductive argument for scientific realism. Prem-
ises (vii) and (viii) are the crucial steps in this 'Ultimate Argument for 
Scientific Realism'. They need to be worked out in detail. The future will 
tell whether this is a Herculean task. I will postpone this fleshing out of 
the argument to a further study, but here are some preliminary remarks. 
Van Fraassen offers his argument from underdeterm ¡nation (section 
9.1.2) against premise (vii). But considering some unspecified as //ontol-
ogy as an interesting alternative boils down not to the general claim that 
we can never be sure of the fact that, say, electrons really exist, but rather 
to the claim that the probability of this existential statement is zero. In the 
example of Rutherford's atomic theory ('there are electrons') and 
Vaihingens assertion ('there may be electrons'), one tends to forget that 
the as //"ontology is the assertion not only that the ontology of the unob-
servable electrons may be the incorrect, one, but the further and much 
stronger assertion that the probability of the electron theory being true 
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approaches zero. So, van Fraassen will never have enough reason to, even 
tentatively, believe in the existence of any unobservable. And neither will 
anyone else. 
This underdetermination argument is rejected for the reasons already 
given. Merely suggesting an as if ontology is scientifically uninteresting. 
To be a serious alternative this as if ontology needs to be spelled out in 
detail. But if this is accepted van Fraassen's argument from underdeter-
mination is not different from the argument from underdetermination we 
discussed in chapter 3. It remains to be seen whether interesting alternative 
ontologies can be generated, and if so, how many. There is no historical 
argument from underdetermination against realism and neither is there a 
logical one. 
If van Fraassen rejects the demand for spelling out the as //"ontology 
by which scientific realism loses its plausibility we may dismiss the as if 
ontology as an interesting ontology. If we accept the further claim that 
unobservables must be postulated, there is as much reason to tentatively 
believe the electron theory to be true as there is reason to believe it 
empirically adequate, for the ontology of electrons is the only and indis-
pensable ontology (we apply an inference to the only explanation). 
Of course, van Fraassen will claim that epistemologically speaking 
there is no need for ontologies of unobservables. There are only pragmatic 
reasons for scientists to postulate unobservables. However, scientists them-
selves do not experience their ontologies of unobservables as (mere) prag-
matic devices! They sincerely, though tentatively, believe. Again, if my 
analysis of his epistemology is correct, van Fraassen is compelled to qual-
ify scientists as irrational in this respect. 
Furthermore, from our discussion of candidate realism it follows that it 
is very implausible to state that scientists search for unobservable entities 
only for pragmatic reasons. Surely, one must have epistemic reasons to 
believe that an unobservable entity exists in order to rationally initiate a 
material hunt. Of course, van Fraassen could argue that what scientists 
think the reasons are for what they are doing are not the real reasons. 
They may be searching for unobservable entities for merely pragmatic rea-
sons after all. But if this is true, van Fraassen must qualify these hunts as 
irrational. Let us briefly consider Millikan's material hunt for elementary 
electrical charges, since van Fraassen offers the case of Robert Millikan's 
experiments to illustrate his constructive empiricism. 
Van Fraassen says: 
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I shall describe the experiment by which Millikan measured the elementary 
electrical charge ... Theory enters in two ways. The first is that the form 
his answer takes is that of a theoretical statement: he is filling in the blanks 
in a developing theory. The second is the role of already accepted theory in 
the design of his apparatus ... it is the role that makes theory of value to 
the working scientist ... The question was: 'What is the elementary electri-
cal charge?' The reason the scientist turns to a theory to rely on is that he 
must first obtain an answer to the preceding question: 'How can we experi-
mentally determine the elementary electrical charge?. (1980: 73-4) 
But the question preceding the question 'How can we experimentally 
determine the elementary electrical charge?' is the existential question 
'Are there elementary electrical charges?'. Van Fraassen acknowledges 
this and he continues: 
There are cases where a theory says that there must be some entity or 
value, satisfying some conditions, and experimental scientists discover what 
that is. When in physics we have a [discovery] - the electron, the neutron, 
the magnitude of the charge of the electron - we obtain [new] information 
that was not implied by the theory beforehand. This is, in part, information 
about what the unobservables are like - but surely, unless they exist, there 
can be no information about them to be had? (1980: 75) 
Did Millikan believe in the existence of elementary electrical charges? 
Van Fraassen cannot affirm these answers. On my analysis of van 
Fraassen's new epistemology, he would like to say: 'Yes, Millikan prob-
ably believed in elementary electrical charges for pragmatic reasons', but 
this is committing a categorical mistake (cf. chapter 5). So, if Millikan 
believed in these charges his belief was an irrational belief. But if Millikan 
did not believe in the existence of elementary electrical charges, why 
should he then try to determine the quantity of the charge? Van Fraassen 
is very unclear in interpreting Millikan's experiment. He admits: 
While the success of his experiments in singling out a unique value for this 
charge is simultaneously a test of the theory that there exists this elemen-
tary electrical charge, it was not surprising at this time that such tests 
should bear out that theory, (loc.cit.) 
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The reason for the second half of the latter claim is that van Fraassen 
thinks that 'experimentation guides theory construction while the part of 
the theory that has already been constructed guides the design of the 
experiments that will guide the continuation [of theory construction]' 
(loc.cit.). But this leaves untouched the first half of the claim that, unless 
we are naive Popperians, Millikan's experiment somehow backed up the 
claim that there are elementary electrical charges. Otherwise, how could 
one measure them? Moreover, van Fraassen is silent on Millikan's scien-
tific beliefs. Millikan did indeed fill in 'a value for a quantity which, in 
the construction of the theory, was so far left open' (77) but why did he 
undertake this material hunt? And, indeed, 'he was writing theory by 
means of his experimental apparatus' (77), but did he believe in the exist-
ence of elementary electrical charges for pragmatic reasons? Van 
Fraassen's position is becoming rather implausible. The only way to save 
his skin is to admit that on his account scientific existential beliefs con-
cerning specified unobservables must be qualified as irrational. If he does 
admit this then, if Millikan did believe in these charges for pragmatic 
reasons, this was an irrational belief. But surely, Millikan thought he had 
epistemic reasons to believe in the existence of elementary electrical 
charges for why should he try to determine the quantity of this charge? 
Now, again, van Fraassen may be induced to claim that Millikan's 
experiments need only the belief that the world is as if there are elemen-
tary electrical charges. If the world is as if there are elementary electrical 
charges we can rationally set out to measure them. But if we succeed in 
measuring them with great accuracy and perhaps in very different ways, 
do we still believe the world is as //"there are elementary electrical charges 
of a precise quantity? I think J.J.C. Smart expresses everybody's but van 
Fraassen's feeling when he exclaims that this is just too much to believe 
(Smart 1985). 
But, this much must be acknowledged, van Fraassen's sophisticated 
position is not refuted. (If van Fraassen gives up the rationality of existen-
tial scientific beliefs concerning specified unobservables, his position is, 
though perhaps implausible, a coherent one). Furthermore, we have not yet 
succeeded in showing that disbelief in the existence of specified unobserv-
ables is irrational per se. Miller's contention that a defence of scientific 
realism must show that such disbelief is indeed irrational (Miller 1987: 
482) implies nothing less than working out the strong inductive argument 
in full detail. 
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Premise (viii) of the argument involves the notion of negligible 
chances: the chance that the postulated unobservables of science do not 
exist is real but, according to the realist, negligible. I will not discuss the 
problems involved in this notion of negligible chances (cf. Derksen 
1994c). I will here merely assume that since we all deal with negligible 
(artificial) chances in more mundane and less controversial situations there 
is no reason to believe it cannot be spelled out in detail. 
9.4 Epilogue: ten years after McMullin 's case for scientific realism 
Rereading McMullin's 'A Case for Scientific Realism' (1984) can only 
lead to a further appreciation of McMullin's philosophical work. McMullin 
has defended, scientific realism from his first published paper in 1955 
onwards, by arguing from actual theory construction and development by 
scientists. But McMullin acknowledges that 'much has changed in philos-
ophy of science since that time [and] a different sort of defence is [now] 
called for' (1984: 36). Since that time Thomas Kuhn wrote his Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1962, 1970), Bas van Fraassen his Scientific 
Image (1980), and Larry Laudan wrote his 'Confutation of Convergent 
Realism' (1981b). 
Since McMullin's 1984 article, again, much has changed in philosophy 
of science, though this time not too many have noticed the change. Van 
Fraassen wrote his 'Empiricism in Philosophy of Science' (1985) and his 
Laws and Symmetry in 1989. Today, though perhaps not a different argu-
ment for scientific realism is called for, we do need to spell out the real, 
inductive, and strong argument for realism. 
In the introduction I have presented McMullin's defence of scientific 
realism in a nutshell. Finally, I shall more precisely identify this argument 
as a sufficient but elliptical argument against van Fraassen's position. 
McMullin describes scientific realism as the claim that 'the long-term 
success of a scientific theory gives reason to believe that something like 
the entities and structure postulated by the theory actually exists' (26). 
Consequently, against Kuhn McMullin argues for a high degree of conti-
nuity in the history of the sciences (29). Against Laudan he argues that 
Laudan's examples of successful theories that are false and false theories 
that are successful are simply not the examples the realist builds his case 
upon. To the contrary, 
288 
The Case for Scientific Realism 
The sort of theory on which the realist grounds his argument is one in 
which an increasingly finer specification of internal structure has been 
obtained over a long period, in which the theoretical entities function 
essentially in the argument and are not simply intuitive postulations of an 
"underlying reality" [as in the cases of Laudan's list] and in which the 
original metaphor has proved continuously fertile and capable of increas-
ingly further extension. (17) 
Now, although I sympathize with these rebuttals of the attacks on realism 
by Kuhn and Laudan, McMullin's answer to van Fraassen is not so clear. 
McMullin argues that 'theories that are in van Fraassen's sense empirically 
adequate can also be shown under certain circumstances to have likely 
ontological implications' (21). Furthermore, he rejects the empiricist dis-
tinction between observables and unobservables as having no epistemolo-
gica! consequences (33-4). However, if we carefully read van Fraassen's 
work on the observable-unobservable distinction we must accept this dis-
tinction. This distinction has no implications for the 'ontological status' of 
entities (as McMullin seems to interpret this distinction) but it does have 
epistemological consequences. Let us therefore see how McMullin defends 
his first contention on the likely ontological implications of empirically 
adequate theories. The argument can essentially be described as follows: 
(i) (Fairly recently) scientists use structural explanations or models, that 
is, 'scientists construct theories which explain the observed features 
of the physical world by postulating models of the hidden structure 
of the entities being studied' (26);7 
(ii) These models tum out to be highly fertile, that is, a good model 
generates novel predictions by extending its original metaphor to 
ever more specification in the face of anomalies and these novel 
predictions turn out to be correct; 
(iii) The high degree of fertility of structural models is a 'contingent 
feature of the history of science' (33); 
(iv) 'What best explains [iii] is the supposition that the model approxi-
mates sufficiently well the structures of the world that are causally 
responsible for the phenomena to be explained to make it profitable 
7
 Cf. Laudan's Science and Hypothesis (1981b) and McMullin's The Inference 
That Makes Science (1992). 
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for the scientist to take the model's metaphoric extensions seriously' 
(33). 
It must now be clear, in the light of the present study, what the construc-
tive empiricist objections to this Success Argument will be. I will not 
repeat them here. 
From the point of view of the present study we can make the following 
simple, yet certainly not simplistic, comment to McMullin's argument: it 
is elliptical. We have gained insight into the structure of the real, but well 
hidden, inductive argument for scientific realism that is hinted at by many 
and first of all by McMullin. In the light of the sophisticated criticism by 
van Fraassen it has become clear what the Great Restoration of scientific 
realism must consist in. We must spell out the formulated strong inductive 
argument. Meanwhile, constructive empiricism can only be a small com-
fort to philosophers of science: though a coherent position it must give up 
the rationality of existential scientific beliefs concerning specified unob-
servables. 
The case of scientific realism is not closed. Some may think it is. 
Either because they think the present defence of realism is strong enough 
to sustain it, or because they think realism is indeed implausible and ready 
to be rejected in favour of constructive empiricism. However, with regard 
to the latter, I have shown that the price to be paid for constructive 
empiricism is to withhold scientists their rationality, and is therefore 
uncomfortably high; and with regard to the former, I have shown that the 
present defence of scientific realism is not strong enough, yet that it can 
be made stronger. If the case for scientific realism is spelled out in detail, 
along the lines indicated in this study, 1 feel confident that the case of 
realism will be won by its defenders. This confidence implies action. 
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Summary in Dutch 
Anima est quodammodo omnia. Dit is de Middeleeuwse vertaling van één 
van de kernachtigste uitspraken van Aristoteles. In zekere zin is de ziel 
alles. Deze uitspraak kan geïnterpreteerd worden als een oude oplossing 
voor een zeer oud probleem: het probleem van de kentheoretische status 
van representaties. In een moderne context, en binnen de hedendaagse 
wetenschapsfilosofie, laat dit probleem zich vertalen naar de vraag of 
Homo sapiens er in slaagt de voor hem onobserveerbare structuren van de 
wereld waarheidsgetrouw te representeren in wetenschappelijke theorieën. 
Dit is het probleem van het realisme binnen de wetenschapsfilosofie. 
Een meer toegespitste formulering van dit probleem luidt als volgt: 
mogen we, om epistemische redenen, geloven in het bestaan van de onob-
serveerbare entiteiten die gepostuleerd worden in onze beste wetenschap-
pelijke theorieën? Zijn wetenschappelijke representaties slechts handige 
hulpmiddelen voor de mens om zich te redden in deze riskante wereld, of 
mogen we aannemen dat het instrumentele succes van deze representaties 
(voorspellingen komen immers steeds weer uit) de sterke claim rechtvaar-
digt dat de gepostuleerde onobserveerbare zaken, van quarks tot mentale 
structuren, daadwerkelijk bestaan? De wetenschappelijk realist is van me-
ning dat er inderdaad epistemische redenen zijn om te geloven dat de 
onobserveerbare entiteiten, gepostuleerd in onze beste wetenschappelijke 
theorieën, daadwerkelijk bestaan. De filosofische taak bestaat hierin: zoek 
een steekhoudend argument voor deze stelling. 
De meest gangbare verdediging van het wetenschappelijk realisme is 
een 'inference to the only explanation': alleen het wetenschappelijk realis-
me verklaart het instrumentele succes van de wetenschap en dus is het 
rationeel om te geloven dat de onobserveerbare entiteiten, die gepostuleerd 
worden in die wetenschap, daadwerkelijk bestaan. 
Echter, Bas C. van Fraassen heeft laten zien dat zijn constructief empi-
risme (een wetenschappelijk ontí-realisme) eveneens het instrumentele 
succes van de wetenschap kan verklaren. De realist modificeert het oor-
spronkelijke 'inference to the only explanation'-argument tot een (vaak als 
abductief geduid) 'inference to the best explanation'-argument: het weten-
schappelijk realisme is de beste verklaring voor het succes van de weten-
schap. 
Summary in Dutch 
In hoofdstuk I wordt het recente werk van Richard Boyd, Alan Mus-
grave en Paul Thagard besproken. Zij proberen het wetenschappelijk rea-
lisme te verdedigen via een 'inference to the best explanation' (1BE). 
Echter, door een onderscheid te maken tussen 'inference to the best expla-
nation' en 'inference from the best explanation', zoals McMullin ooit 
voorstelde, kan aangetoond worden dat deze verdedigingen van het weten-
schappelijk realisme uiteindelijk niet voldoen. 
Hoofdstuk 2 is een intermezzo dat laat zien dat de Peirceaanse notie 
van abductie niets te maken heeft met het IBE-argument voor het weten-
schappelijk realisme, ook al suggereerde J.J.C. Smart (in 1963) het tegen-
overgestelde. Door deze suggestie is de discussie over de juiste verdedi-
ging van het wetenschappelijk realisme wellicht op het verkeerde been 
gezet. Men zocht naar een abductief argument, terwijl zelfs in het werk 
van C S . Peirce al duidelijk wordt dat het wetenschappelijk realisme alleen 
verdedigd kan worden door een overtuigend inductief argument, dat is 
gebaseerd op de eliminatieve inducties uit de wetenschap zelf. Helaas 
wordt de kracht van deze eliminatieve inducties teniet gedaan door het 
hardnekkige Duhemiaans probleem van onderdeterminatie van theorie door 
de data. 
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt daarom dit probleem van onderdeterminatie. Er 
wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen het historische aspect en het logi-
sche aspect aan dit probleem. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat alleen het 
logische probleem van onderdeterminatie het wetenschappelijk realisme 
ondermijnt. Een korte excursie Iaat echter zien dat de meningen over hoe 
dit logische onderdeterminatie-argument moet worden opgevat, nogal uit-
eenlopen. Echter, het is opnieuw Bas C. van Fraassen die een heel simpel 
anti-realistisch onderdeterminatie-argument oppert: een theorie die bepaal-
de onobserveerbare entiteiten postuleert ondervindt altijd, als meer waar-
schijnlijke concurrent, de theorie die zegt dat de wereld is alsof er die 
onobserveerbare entiteiten zijn. Hiermee wordt Deel 1 afgesloten. Deel II 
probeert van Fraassen's positie op zijn waarde te schatten. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt beargumenteerd dat van Fraassen's empirisme 
problematisch is, zelfs wanneer het wordt geconfronteerd met een voor dit 
empirisme, op het eerste gezicht, favoriete geval uit de paleoanthropologie. 
Deze tak van wetenschap betreft, zo lijkt het, slechts observeerbare entitei-
ten. Echter, in de analyse van van Fraassen's wetenschapsleer met betrek-
king tot deze tak van wetenschap blijkt dat van Fraassen zijn theorie moet 
presenteren als een Eerste Wetenschapsfilosofie, dat wil zeggen, als een 
312 
Summary in Dutch 
wetenschapsfilosofie die onafhankelijk is van de wetenschapsgeschiedenis 
en -praktijk. Dit lijkt, binnen de hedendaagse wetenschapsfilosofie, geen 
levensvatbare optie. 
Nadat additioneel bewijs is aangevoerd voor de stelling dat van Fraas-
sen's wetenschapstheorie inderdaad als een first philosophy of science 
moet worden geïnterpreteerd, wordt in hoofdstuk 5 de vraag naar de ratio-
naliteit van existentiële wetenschappelijke opvattingen betreffende onob-
serveerbare entiteiten gesteld. Van Fraassen's empirisme bevat, mijns 
inziens, een categorie-fout. Van Fraassen is van mening dat men op grond 
van louter pragmatische redenen iets kan geloven als zijnde waar. Dat is 
voor hem de reden dat existentiële wetenschappeljke opvattingen aangaan-
de onobserveerbare entiteiten (bv. 'Er zijn elektronen') toch rationeel zijn. 
Echter, deze stellingname leidt tot het probleem van het constructief empi-
risme: van Fraassen moet laten zien dat pragmatische redenen goede rede-
nen zijn om te geloven in het bestaan van onobserveerbare entiteiten. 
Mijns inziens is dit onmogelijk. De rationaliteit van belangrijke weten-
schappelijke opvattingen is daarom, voor de empirist, verloren. Als we 
hechten aan de rationaliteit van die wetenschappelijke opvattingen, dan 
kunnen we beter realist zijn. Dit brengt ons terug tot de speurtocht naar 
een steekhoudend inductief argument voor het wetenschappelijk realisme. 
Deel III bevat een bespreking en kritiek van een drietal belangrijke pogin-
gen tot het formuleren van dit inductief argument. 
Er zijn in de hedendaagse wetenschapsfilosofie pogingen gedaan om 
een wetenschappelijk realisme te verdedigen via een evolutionair argu-
ment. Hoofdstuk б bespreekt wat we zouden kunnen noemen het phyloge­
netisch argument: de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de soort Homo sapiens 
maakt het waarschijnlijk dat de door ons nu gepostuleerde onobserveerbare 
entiteiten werkelijk bestaan. Het is met name Gerhard Vollmer die op deze 
manier het realisme tracht te beargumenteren. In dit hoofdstuk wordt ech­
ter betoogd dat een evolutionair argument eerder leidt tot een empirisme à 
la van Fraassen dan een wetenschappelijk realisme. Het gezochte inductie-
ve argument voor het wetenschappelijk realisme wordt hier dus niet ge-
vonden. 
Vervolgens wordt een andere, individualistisch-evolutionaire, benade-
ring bekeken: het ontogenetisch connectionisme van Paul M. Churchland. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt dit connectionisme aan een nauwkeurige analyse 
onderworpen. Levert het connectionisme een inductief argument voor het 
wetenschappelijk realisme? Ja, maar dit argument is niets meer en niets 
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minder dan een onuitgewerkte vorm van het IBE-argument voor het realis-
me, zodat het connectionisme wat dat betreft de wetenschappelijk realist 
niet verder helpt. 
Hoofdstuk 8 bespreekt Rom Harré's beleidrealisme. Harre is zich be-
wust van het feit dat het wetenschappelijk realisme inderdaad alleen kan 
worden verdedigd door een inductief argument. Hoewel Harre zich con-
centreert op de rationaliteit van de wetenschapspraktijk in plaats van de 
rationaliteit van wetenschappelijke opvattingen, waarin het bestaan van 
onobserveerbare entiteiten wordt gepostuleerd, vinden we in zijn werk, en 
de reactie van Ton Derksen op dit werk, duidelijke aanwijzingen hoe het 
inductieve argument voor het wetenschappelijk realisme uiteindelijk moet 
lopen. 
In het concluderende hoofdstuk 9 worden de verschillende hints die 
gevonden zijn in de besprekingen van het werk van de wetenschapsfiloso-
fen uit Deel III, nog eens beschouwd. Tezamen met de kritiek op het 
constructief empirisme van van Fraassen uit Deel II, is het vervolgens 
mogelijk om in ieder geval een schets te geven van het overtuigende in-
ductieve argument voor het wetenschappelijk realisme. Het werk sluit af 
met een epiloog waarin McMullin's argument uit 1984, uiteengezet in zijn 
artikel 'A case for scientific realism', wordt vergeleken met deze schets uit 
1994. Er wordt geconcludeerd dat, ook al is het inductieve argument voor 
het wetenschappelijk realisme nog niet tot in alle details uitgewerkt, er nu 
althans zicht is op de stappen die binnen deze argumentatie nog moeten 
worden gezet voordat we kunnen spreken over 'The case for scientific 
realism'. 
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STELLINGEN. 
Behorende bij het proefschrift Representing the World by Scientific 
Theories. The case for scientific realism. 
door Herman C.D.G. de Regt 
1. Bas С. van Fraassen maakt in zijn constructief empirisme de fout 
te denken dat pragmatische redenen goede redenen zijn om iets te 
geloven (to believe that ρ). Hierdoor is de rationaliteit van de 
wetenschap voor deze moderne empirist verloren. Als wij geloven 
in de rationaliteit van de wetenschappelijke existentiële opvattin-
gen aangaande onobserveerbare entiteiten (zoals de opvatting 'Er 
zijn elektronen'), dan is het constructief empirisme geen plausibe-
le wetenschapsfilosofie. 
(zie hfd. 5) 
2. Filosofie is het ontmaskeren van schijnbare vanzelfsprekendheden. 
Dat de filosoof Frits Bolkestein de, vanzelfsprekend geachte, hoge 
status van de academische opleiding als schijn ontmaskert, is 
logischerwijs het gevolg van zijn genoten academische filosofische 
opleiding. Bolkestein bepleit met zijn inzicht aldus het bestaan van 
(in ieder geval) de academische filosofische opleidingen. 
(Interview Ischa Meijer met Frits Bolkestein 
I.S.C.H.A., RTL 5, 18 december 1994) 
3. Benadrukken dat de mens een natuurlijke soort is (Homo sapiens), 
brengt ons niet dichter bij een goede verdediging van het weten-
schappelijk realisme. Er is geen typisch evolutionair argument 
voor de stelling dat (bijvoorbeeld) elektronen bestaan. 
(Zie hfd. 6 & 7) 

4. Het grote voordeel van het fenomeen Yomanda is dat het begin 
van de crisis van de rede in de Lage Landen thans eenvoudig te 
localiseren is: Tiel. 
5. Vanwege het verschil tussen 'logisch mogelijk' en 'ontologisch 
interessant' kan de ernst van het probleem van de onderdeter-
minatie van (de) theorie(ën) door de feiten, voor het probleem 
van het wetenschappelijk realisme althans, afgezwakt worden. 
(Zie hfd. 2, 3 & 9) 
6. Na afzwakking van het probleem van onderdeterminatie is het 
vraagstuk van het wetenschappelijk realisme identiek aan het 
vraagstuk of een kans ooit klein genoeg is om deze epi s temisch te 
kunnen verwaarlozen. 
(Zie hfd. 9, sectie 3). 
7. Zoals de wereld is, is ze noodzakelijk zo, hoewel ze anders had 
kunnen zijn. 
8. 'De Colleges van Cartografen maakten een Kaart van het Rijk die 
de Omvang van dat Rijk had en er zorgvuldig mee samenviel. De 
Volgende Generaties, de Studie van de Cartografie minder toege-
daan, begrepen dat die uitgebreide Kaart nutteloos was en lever-
den hem niet zonder Meedogenloosheid over aan de Onbarmhar-
tigheden van de Zon en van de Regen'. 
'Del rigor en la ciencia' 
(Over nauwkeurigheid in de wetenschap), 
in: J.A. Suárez Miranda, Viales de Varones Prudentes, 
(Reizen van Eerbiedwaardige Mannen) 
libro cuarto, cap. XIV, Lérida (16S8) 
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